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Abstract 
 
This study explores the moral ethos of contemporary psychotherapy as represented in 
the psychoanalytic and systemic therapeutic traditions. It examines current moral/ethical 
debate in the field and presents a detailed critique of the individualistic normative 
orientation of this debate; its peripheral status within the discourse of psychotherapy; its 
restrictive focus on professional micro ethics; and the eschewing of engagement with 
wider macro level moral themes and concerns. The disjuncture between this 
individualistic moral ethos and the vigorously relational thrust of wider developments in 
psychotherapeutic theory and technique is highlighted. An argument is made for the 
reformulation of moral/ethical debate in terms that take account of these relational 
developments, which might in turn serve as a catalyst for the realization of what is 
arguably their progressive and democratizing potential. The failure of hermeneutical, 
post-structuralist and postmodernist influences in recent decades to move this debate 
forward and the entrenched modernist/postmodernist divide within psychotherapeutic 
discourse are also explored. 
 
Underlying the limitations of current moral/ethical debate is the restricted paradigm of 
individual consciousness within which this debate unfolds and which it appears unable 
to transcend. In this study the critical social theory of Jűrgen Habermas serves as a 
touchstone for exploring potential for movement from the paradigm of consciousness to 
that of communication as a framework for moral/ethical deliberation. It is argued that 
key trends within psychotherapy are already straining towards a communicative ethical 
orientation which is implicit in current practice and that the theoretical vacuum around 
this subject is impeding recognition of its full potential. Alongside Habermasian theory, 
Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and Anthony Giddens’s social theoretical 
perspective on psychotherapy offer key points of reference for the dialogue between 
critical social theory and psychotherapy which this study seeks to promote. 
 
Drawing on the work of Habermas and Honneth, it is argued that the underlying moral 
“grammar” of the psychotherapeutic encounter may be framed in terms of the struggle 
for understanding and agreement and the struggle for recognition. The theme of 
reflexivity emerges as an important organizing framework for this discussion and as a 
bridge for dialogue between psychotherapy and social theory. It is proposed that we can 
helpfully think of significant discursive moments in the therapeutic encounter as islands 
of heightened reflexivity in which the full communicative power of language is 
potentially unleashed. The study concludes with a view of psychotherapy as a reflexive 
resource and potential carrier of communicative reason helping people to develop and 
enhance cognitive and emotional capacities that may in turn help them participate in 
spheres of discursive communication and move towards genuinely communicative use 
of language. 
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Introduction 
 
 
What good is served by psychotherapy? As an empirical question this is one that greatly 
preoccupies contemporary psychotherapeutic discourse, yet as a moral/ethical question 
it has a distinctly more peripheral status in current debates. Traditionally, questions 
relating to the normative orientation of psychotherapy have remained within the 
framework of the various institutional divides in the field and have tended to become 
fused with issues of therapeutic approach and technique and with issues of difference 
between the therapeutic traditions. One example is the historical polarization between 
behavioural and intra-psychic functioning as the preferred locus for change, a difference 
institutionally represented in the traditional distinction between behavioural therapy 
(Hersen, 2005; Woolfolk and Richardson, 1984) versus psychoanalytically oriented 
therapy.1 Historically a strong separation has also been maintained between 
family/systemic psychotherapy and psychoanalysis with a corresponding polarization of 
emphasis on family interaction processes versus intrapsychic functioning as the locus 
for change.2     
 
From an outsider perspective the psychotherapeutic field will most likely appear 
fragmented and confusing with a variety of competing schools and traditions all 
asserting the uniqueness of their approach and methodology. But in a climate where 
                                                 
1  “Psychotherapy” is used throughout this study as a generic term covering all “talking therapies” and 
counselling approaches that address psychological difficulty (Gabbard et al., 2007). A technical 
distinction between psychotherapy and counselling is sometimes made in relation to differences in 
intensity and duration of treatment but in a general sense these terms are interchangeable. 
“Psychotherapy” includes psychoanalysis and family/systemic psychotherapy, which are the focus of this 
study, but it also includes a range of other therapies, for example, humanistic integrative therapy 
(Schneider et al., 2001) and cognitive behavioural therapy (Chapter 7, p.171-2) which will not be 
explored here.  
          
2  Within the UK psychoanalytic tradition, “psychoanalysis” is often used in a technical sense to describe 
long term treatments involving four or five analytic sessions weekly, whereas “psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy”, “psychodynamic counselling” or “psychodynamic psychotherapy” describe treatments 
entailing less frequent weekly contact. These terms can be a focus for immense rivalry and nuanced 
distinctions in the therapy world. In this study “psychoanalysis” is used in a more general and 
encompassing sense to describe therapeutic approaches that are grounded in the tradition established by 
Sigmund Freud and which emphasise working with unconscious processes.  
   In the UK, “family” and “systemic” therapy are interchangeable terms. The term “systemic” was 
originally associated with an influential school of family therapy known as the Milan Group (Campbell 
and Draper, 1985) but has evolved into a generic description of family therapy. Whilst family/systemic 
therapy has its roots in practice with the family system, this approach is increasingly used in interventions 
with individuals, couples and organisations and the description of this work as “systemic” is 
understandably favoured when the unit of intervention is other than the family.  
2 
empirical research is heavily promoted, traditional oppositional certainties are 
challenged by lack of substantial empirical evidence for omnipotent claims. Existing 
research also underlines the efficacy of generic therapeutic factors notably the quality of 
the therapeutic relationship or alliance, in helpful therapeutic outcomes across the 
different therapies (Asay and Lambert, 1999; Miller et al., 1995). Research findings 
further suggest that in clinical practice the interventions offered by experienced 
clinicians across the various therapeutic divides may not be as dissimilar as each 
competing tradition might imply in their theoretical stance (Bateman, 2000). In this 
climate more modest claims and ideas not surprisingly come to the fore around the key 
question “what works for whom” (Fonagy et al., 2002; Roth and Fonagy, 2005). 
Attention gets focussed on shared ground between the therapies; on shared conceptions 
of good outcomes; and significantly, on more integrative ways of working across the 
traditional divides. A focus on behavioural change need not exclude an interest in 
underlying intrapsychic change and one may promote the other in a circular fashion. A 
focus on changing family interaction processes need not exclude an interest in the 
individual psyche.  
 
Whilst it is important not to overstate integrative developments or to trivialize 
difference between specialist therapeutic orientations, it is also vital for the future 
development of psychotherapy that we harness the creativity and possibilities for 
enhanced practice inherent in tentative moves towards integrative ways of thinking and 
working. It is important to do so in order to increase the effectiveness of psychotherapy 
generally and in particular to extend its reach to client groups who are less easily helped 
within current therapeutic paradigms.3 One striking example of this more integrative 
ethos is the re-evaluation of the historical opposition between family/systemic and 
psychoanalytic approaches initiated by family therapy theorists in recent times (Flaskas, 
1996, 1997; Flaskas and Pocock, 2009; Larner, 2000).4 What follows is a contribution 
to this particular debate and one that seeks to take it further by offering a philosophical 
                                                 
3  The psychoanalytic model of mentalization developed by Fonagy and Target (1996, 1998, 2003) which 
is explored in this study, is associated with this integrative ethos and with efforts to extend the reach of 
psychoanalytically oriented therapy to client groups who are considered especially challenging to treat, 
including those with a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004). See 
Bateman (2000) for discussion of the integrative dimension of treatment programmes for personality 
disorder that combine elements of cognitive behavioural and psychoanalytic therapy.                 
4  The author of this study has also contributed a number of articles to this debate (Donovan, 2002, 2003b, 
2005, 2007, 2009).    
3 
analysis that addresses the moral/ethical orientation of contemporary practice in both 
therapies. It is informed by the critical theoretical perspective of Jűrgen Habermas and 
that of an allied theorist within the tradition of critical social theory, Axel Honneth.5 It is 
also informed by key debates in which Habermas engaged with other leading 
philosophers of the twentieth century, Michel Foucault and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
whose perspectives, unlike that of Habermas, have permeated psychotherapeutic 
discourse to some degree. Their influence is evident in postmodernist and hermeneutical 
strands of thinking within psychotherapy which have emerged in recent decades and 
which will be explored in this study. 
 
What good is served by psychotherapy? In contemporary psychotherapeutic discourse 
this question quickly leads in the direction of evidence-based clinical practice and 
empirical outcome research. But here the underlying moral/ethical dimensions of the 
question also present themselves immediately even if they are routinely ignored. 
Therapeutic goals, irrespective of who is defining them or how vaguely they are 
defined, are infused with normative assumptions about what constitutes mental health, 
optimal psychic functioning, and optimal family functioning. In their extensive review 
of therapeutic outcomes in the child mental health field, Fonagy et al. (2002) consider it 
necessary to emphasize at the outset that empirical evidence is not absolute and needs to 
be considered within a relativist frame. They note that “psychotherapy researchers are 
particularly conscious of the danger of imposing ethnically rooted cultural biases on 
definitions of “needing treatment” or a “good outcome” (p. 4). They use the example of 
the achievement of selfhood through the separation-individuation process which is 
central to psychoanalytic thinking and to Western culture generally but not to other 
cultural contexts. Varma (1988) notes that in Indian culture there is a greater degree of 
mutual interdependence and considers it questionable to what extent Western 
psychotherapy with its high emphasis on autonomy and individual responsibility can be 
seen as appropriate for members of such a society. Evaluating what constitutes a good 
outcome in psychotherapy is intricately linked with wider evaluations of what 
constitutes good and right living and what constitutes a good society. Answers to the 
question “what good is served by psychotherapy?” are inextricably connected with 
wider conceptions of “goodness”, the territory of moral/ethical and political debate, 
                                                 
5  References for Habermas, Honneth, Foucault and Gadamer are cited in Part 11 of this study.  
4 
even if this is obscured by a focus on method and technique and the lingering influence 
of a positivist outlook which has looked on the model of the natural sciences as the most 
appropriate for all scientific enquiry and engagement including that of psychotherapy. 
 
This study explores the moral/ethical ethos of contemporary psychotherapy, both 
explicit and implicit, as it is represented in the systemic and psychoanalytic traditions. It 
examines contemporary debate on this subject and criticizes its restriction. One of the 
key arguments of the study is that the current debate remains locked into the paradigm 
of individual consciousness in its consideration of moral/ethical themes and locked into 
ways of thinking that reinforce the individualist frame. It is argued that engaging with 
wider developments in social and philosophical theory can help transcend the 
limitations of this individualist orientation. Within twentieth century philosophy, the 
realization that we are always already embedded in language, gave rise to the 
paradigmatic shift from a philosophy centred on individual consciousness as in the 
writings of Descartes, to one that privileges intersubjectivity and language. This 
linguistic turn as it is represented in the work of Habermas is a key focus. Specifically I 
will consider how he encapsulates the linguistic transformation in a theory of 
communicative action and communicative ethics. My aim will be to demonstrate that 
his theory sheds helpful light on key concerns within the therapy field particularly 
relating to morality and ethics and that it potentially offers a philosophical framework in 
which we might begin to conceptualize the moral/ethical orientation of contemporary 
therapeutic engagement.  
 
Within psychotherapeutic discourse it is also the case that the latter decades of the 
twentieth century have witnessed a major shift in focus from individual to relational 
themes and concerns. Nowhere is this more apparent than in psychoanalysis, where the 
deeply relational object relations tradition now prevails having transcended Freud’s 
earlier instinct based formulations.6 Family therapy is similarly driven by a relational 
ethos and has its origins in a strongly held opposition to the individualistic ethos of 
classical psychoanalysis in which most of the founding family therapists had already 
trained. In essence I will argue that this paradigm shift, which vigorously embraces 
relational themes also moves psychotherapy unequivocally beyond the parameters of 
                                                 
6  Object relations theory is explored in Chapter 1 with specific reference to the work of two 
psychoanalysts, Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott.   
5 
current moral/ethical debate in the field, which implicitly remains locked into an earlier 
paradigm of individual consciousness and an associated restrictive focus on professional 
micro ethical concerns such as client confidentiality. The resulting disjuncture or time 
lag between ethical formulations and other developments in the field serves only to 
reinforce the peripheral status of ethics in psychotherapeutic discourse generally. One of 
the key motivating factors for this study is the view that the current problematic status 
of ethics matters enormously in terms of its implications for the future development of 
psychotherapy. The disjuncture between ethical considerations and wider theoretical 
debate means that both domains are mutually impoverished and deprived of potentially 
creative input. 
 
As a preliminary step to initiating dialogue between critical social theory and 
psychotherapy it is necessary to consider the very different meanings of the terms 
“morality” and “ethics” as used in each discourse. Within psychotherapy two different 
levels of meaning are evident. At one level, what we might call the official level, these 
terms are applied interchangeably with reference to considerations of good and right 
living and questions of value and here there is no standard distinction between the terms 
that can be identified (Tjeltveit, 1999). However as I shall discuss in Chapter 2, at the 
level of personal preference, it becomes apparent that “morality” is much less favoured 
than “ethics” and much less likely to be used in the psychotherapeutic literature. This 
situation most probably arises because of the negative connotation that attaches itself to 
“morality”, in particular an association with “moralistic” and with the idea of a narrow 
and rigid imposition of ethical standards (ibid.). There is little doubt that this situation 
also reflects the positivist ethos that persists in psychotherapy, in the context of which 
“ethics” is seen as more circumscribed and “scientific”, as reflected for example in 
Palmer Barnes and Murdin’s (2001) observation that “morals are usually seen as the 
system adopted by the individual whereas ethics is the science of morality and duty” 
(pp.1-2). It needs to be acknowledged that the latter definition of ethics is also 
consistent with wider usage and with the Oxford dictionary definition which 
encompasses the idea of ethics as representing a field of moral science.7 Within the 
discourse of critical social theory, Habermas (1990, [1996]2002) offers a very different 
perspective on the distinction between morality and ethics, which has its roots in the 
                                                 
7  Sykes (1982) Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English.  
6 
Kantian philosophical tradition. Here, to borrow Honneth’s words, morality is 
understood as the “universalist attitude in which one respects all subjects equally as 
ends in themselves” whereas “ethical life refers to the settled ethos of a particular life 
world” ([1992]1995, p. 172). Habermas offers a “discourse theory of morality” 
grounded in the paradigm of communication in which questions of justice or rightness 
in the Kantian sense are at the forefront. In its emphasis on a universalist stance on 
questions of morality this perspective is the complete opposite of that which pertains 
within psychotherapy where questions of morality are reduced to personal “morals” and 
debate on the subject is reduced to a restrictive engagement with issues relating to 
professional micro ethics.  
 
All of this does not make for an easy alignment of terminology in any attempt to 
promote dialogue between psychotherapy and critical social theory but it also focuses 
attention succinctly on the issues involved. Taking account of this situation I have made 
the pragmatic decision to adopt the psychotherapeutic stance of using the terms “moral” 
and “ethical” interchangeably including the admittedly cumbersome “moral/ethical” on 
occasions by way of challenging the persistent avoidance of the term “moral” in the 
psychotherapy literature. At the same time one of the fundamental aims of the study is 
to challenge the reduction of morality to private morals and the eschewing of a wider 
and more expansive engagement with moral/ethical themes that relate to good and right 
living at the personal, familial and societal levels. On occasions I refer to this as the 
macro level of moral/ethical debate to underline difference from the current 
psychotherapeutic preoccupation with micro ethical concerns. Here it should also be 
underlined that in using the term “moral ethos” in the title of this study and “ moral 
question” in the title of Chapter 2, I am implicitly challenging the negative connotation 
associated with this term and underlining the need to put the “moral” back into 
moral/ethical debate in psychotherapy, that is morality in its universalist sense as 
pertaining to macro level questions of justice and fairness that apply at personal, 
familial, societal levels and beyond.                    
 
Lack of creative engagement with moral/ethical themes leaves psychotherapy seriously 
ill equipped to respond to the substantial and often conflicting demands and 
expectations to which it is subjected in our times. On the one-hand demand for 
psychotherapy has never been greater. On the other hand it is pilloried for its lack of 
7 
scientific credentials and in particular its lack of a comprehensive empirical evidence 
base for claims to clinical effectiveness. In public sector psychotherapy clinics, waiting 
lists for treatment are often impossibly long and the pressure to see ever more clients 
with limited resources is enormous. The emphasis is on delivering short- term 
interventions with a strong focus on alleviating symptoms of distress and on measuring 
outcomes accordingly. It is a way of working that fits very comfortably with the 
medical model or metaphor of diagnosis, treatment and “cure” but fits very 
uncomfortably with many psychotherapists’ own experience of having trained to deliver 
longer term interventions with a more exploratory, analytical or depth psychological 
ethos where symptomatic relief sits within a much wider orientation towards 
developmental change (Sanders and Tudor, 2000; Tudor and Hargaden, 2002).  
 
Expectations of psychotherapy, notably from professional colleagues in allied 
disciplines are high, often unrealistically so. In child and adolescent mental health 
services, for example, psychotherapy is frequently requested by other professionals for 
families living in conditions of acute material and social deprivation which these 
professionals, who are already involved, can do little to ameliorate. Yet whilst these 
conditions remain unchanged they may impact significantly on peoples’ well being but 
also on their capacity to avail of whatever psychotherapy might potentially have to 
offer. Here the problematic issue is not the methodological challenge of adapting 
therapeutic technique to the needs of those who are severely disadvantaged materially 
and which is notably elaborated in the family therapy practice of Salvador Minuchin 
(1967, 1974). The key issue here is that psychotherapy is not an alternative to 
addressing material need and in situations where the latter is to the fore, it is not 
uncommon for psychotherapists to find themselves resorting to an advocacy role in 
order to try and mobilize other essential services whilst waiting lists for their own 
service grow ever longer. Some argue that historically one of the reasons psychotherapy 
has been accepted into the mainstream is precisely because it has tended to neglect 
social contexts in favour of intrapsychic and individualistic factors.8 Viewed from this 
perspective psychotherapy appears as a conservative force promoting adjustment and 
accommodation to the social and political status quo. Some ask whether psychotherapy 
is becoming the religion of our times and given the fervour with which the different 
                                                 
8  For an overview of the critique of psychological reductionism in psychotherapy see Chapter 7 pp. 164-
70. 
8 
schools have traditionally held their beliefs and disapproval of competing approaches it 
is not difficult to see why the religious metaphor might arise (Najeeb, 2002, 2007). In 
the case of psychoanalysis in particular the past decades have witnessed the emergence 
of a powerful and vociferous critique along these lines typified in the writings of 
Frederick Crews (1993, 1998), a former Freudian literary critic who charges Freud with 
the creation of a pseudo- science resting on epistemological quicksand.     
 
Against this background of conflicting demands, pressures and attacks, some within the 
psychotherapy field plead for greater engagement with social and political themes and 
greater recognition of the social origins of psychological distress (Frosh, 1999; Samuels, 
1993, 2001) But it is generally unclear what form this recognition might take and in 
particular what impact it might have on the shape of psychotherapy. Furthermore such 
appeals tend to be underpinned by normative/political assumptions whose own validity 
is taken as self evident. Whilst appeals of this nature are acknowledged as worthy of 
attention, they are rarely taken up in any active clinical sense by the majority of 
psychotherapists who cling to the security of their professional status and professional 
discourse. Here moral/ethical debate shrinks into a preoccupation with codes of ethics in 
which micro ethical clinical themes loom large. Arguably one of the reasons why this 
happens is that it is unclear what the alternatives are in any practical sense. 
Psychotherapists are neither revolutionaries nor political activists and it is unlikely they 
ever will be. By and large they are people with a deep interest in the intimate dramas of 
personal and family life who, against the odds, preserve a space for thinking in 
circumstances that often make this extremely difficult. They are unlikely to be 
sympathetic to critiques suggesting that they need to move outside this space to engage 
with more overtly political concerns and organization. Underlying this study is the 
belief that any satisfactory engagement with moral/ethical themes in psychotherapy 
needs to focus on this personal and intimate space as our starting point. It is within this 
space that we need to begin the task of reformulating and broadening the parameters of 
moral/ethical debate in psychotherapy. We need to begin with what psychotherapists 
actually do and not with what we might wish them to do instead. Arguably in so doing 
one is more likely to elicit a sympathetic response from practicing psychotherapists. We 
need to begin with what is creative and progressive in moral/ethical terms within 
psychotherapy as it is currently practiced and use this as a foundation for further 
development and change.  
9 
 
This study is written from the perspective of a practicing psychotherapist in the field of 
child and adolescent mental health, with dual training in psychodynamic and systemic 
therapeutic orientations and with extensive personal experience of the challenges and 
demands facing psychotherapists in public and voluntary sector practice, having worked 
for many years at the Anna Freud Centre,9 which is located in the voluntary sector, and 
having also worked in the child and adolescent mental health service of the UK National 
Health Service. The nature of demands on these services and the related fire-fighting, 
crisis-oriented quality of much of the work, are such that they impact enormously on 
morale and within this context there is a real danger of losing touch with wider 
questions concerning the meaning and value of psychotherapy and its place in society. 
Paradoxically in this environment the need to address such questions has never been 
greater if psychotherapy is to avoid losing its way in a morass of conflicting demands 
and pressures. This study is also motivated by the belief that the current emphasis on 
seeking answers to questions concerning the value of psychotherapy through the 
medium of empirical outcome research needs to be counterbalanced by and securely 
anchored in a philosophical debate regarding the moral/ethical orientation of 
psychotherapy. Without this explicit debate psychotherapy is dangerously exposed to 
implicit factional interests from within and outside the field whose primary motivating 
concerns may be incongruent with the future creative development of psychotherapy.       
 
Whilst Habermas’ philosophical contribution serves as an anchor for much of the 
thinking informing this study, his writings are formulated at a level of abstraction, 
which makes direct linkage with the immediacy of psychotherapeutic concerns 
problematic. As well as using the ideas of an allied critical theorist Axel Honneth 
([1992]1995, [2000]2007), I also refer to the work of Anthony Giddens (1991, 1992) 
and Martha Nussbaum (2000). Both theorists offer further insights on themes that are 
central to Habermas’ work and at the same time offer a bridge for thinking about links 
with psychotherapy. I am drawing on these related social theoretical perspectives in 
order to flesh out my argument regarding the relevance of a communicative ethics for 
psychotherapy, in a way that might render it relevant to the practice based concerns of 
                                                 
9  The Anna Freud Centre was established by Sigmund Freud’s daughter Anna in 1947 in Hampstead, 
London, some years after their arrival from Austria prior to the outbreak of war. Anna Freud was one of 
the founders of child psychoanalysis and the objectives of the centre which she established were to help 
children in emotional distress and provide training and research in this area of mental health practice.      
10 
the psychotherapist. In this way I am also hoping to underline the richness of thinking 
within philosophy and social theory from which psychotherapy mostly cuts itself off 
either through lack of engagement or through simplistic and uncritical applications of 
philosophical and sociological thinking in a way that isolates such thinking from the 
rich and complex debates to which it belongs. Throughout this study I am proposing a 
complementarity between the orientation of Habermasian thinking and his 
reformulation of ethics in terms of a discourse ethics on the one hand and developments 
in the world of psychotherapy on the otherhand. In essence the latter revolve around the 
idea of construing personal problems in relational/communicative terms together with 
the constant push towards opening up communication and reflecting processes within 
the therapeutic encounter. Such ideas arguably fit well with Habermas’ ideas about 
systematic distortions in communication and his idea of discourse as reflecting an 
ethical ideal of relatively unconstrained communication. Whilst Habermas ([1968]1978) 
engaged initially with classical Freudian psychoanalysis as a possible paradigm for 
critical theory in his early work he subsequently lost interest in the psychoanalytic 
paradigm and therefore Axel Honneth’s later engagement with psychoanalytic object 
relations thinking as part of his ethical theory will be an important anchor for 
discussion.  
 
Whilst Habermas has engaged in a vigorous debate with post-structuralist, 
postmodernist and hermeneutical thinking, important aspects of which well be explored 
in Part 11 of this study, it is also the case that Habermas is not simply opposed to these 
traditions and has taken much from them in reformulating his own theory along the 
way, not least the recognition that his initial conception of reason as self reflection was 
too closely tied to an idea of solipsistic subjectivity and that reflection needed to be 
relocated in contexts of intersubjectivity. What separates him from postmodernist and 
hermeneutical perspectives is his salvaging of a moment of universalist ethical certainty 
in his theory of communicative ethics. The fact that he does so in a highly formal and 
abstract fashion raises questions about the significance of his theory in a practical sense 
(White, 1988) but it is also the case that Habermas’ work can be supplemented without 
contradiction by analyses that are more closely tied to practical and historical concerns 
including those of Honneth and Giddens which I consider in this study. Notwithstanding 
its limitation, the great contribution of Habermasian thinking is his reworking of the 
Kantian moral principle of universalisation in terms of the conditions of 
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communication. He argues that we start from a situation of intersubjectivity, and that it 
is only within this intersubjectivity that moral phenomena and moral problems arise. 
This situation of intersubjectivity implies certain unavoidable presuppositions of 
communication, namely that in order to communicate we share an ideal of agreement 
between equal partners towards which we strive in discourse. It is no longer the 
universalization of isolated subjects seeking to prescribe to all as in the Kantian 
categorical imperative. It is a discursive test amongst partners in communication of 
what could be agreed by all to be a universal norm.  
 
In this way Habermas moves towards a formulation of ethics that is consistent with the 
shift in contemporary thinking from consciousness to language. What he achieves, 
which is crucial from the perspective of this study, is to create possibilities for a 
different kind of engagement with ethical themes that takes account of other 
fundamental changes in how we think about ourselves and our world particularly 
relating to our immersion in language and in processes of communication. It should be 
emphazised here that I do not wish to raise any expectation of a formulaic application of 
Habermasian thinking to psychotherapeutic practice. This is an unhelpful and 
inappropriate expectation of theory that sometimes permeates psychotherapeutic 
discourse. Throughout this study my aim is rather to engage in a critical dialogue with 
Habermasian and related social theory from the standpoint of psychotherapy and to 
connect with existing strands of dialogue between social theory and psychotherapy as 
part of that process.    
 
In essence my argument is that key trends and developments in psychotherapy already 
point towards a communicative ethical orientation implicit in current practice. I am 
arguing that these developments are straining towards a formulation of ethics as more 
clearly rooted in communicative processes and that the theoretical vacuum around this 
subject may be impeding recognition of their full potential. In Part 1, the focus is on the 
object relations tradition within British psychoanalysis, and the related theory of 
mentalization or reflective functioning (Fonagy and Target, 1996, 1998, 2003) that both 
point in this direction. I will also consider key elements in contemporary, postmodernist 
influenced, systemic psychotherapy notably the reflecting team approach, which reveals 
a similar communicative ethical ethos. In Part 11 the focus shifts to social theory and its 
potential contribution to debate around morality and ethics in psychotherapy. I begin by 
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outlining Habermas’ theory of communicative ethics before elaborating two key debates 
in which he engaged with Gadamer and with Foucault. Here my main concern is not 
only to distinguish Habermas’ position from each of these perspectives. I am also 
arguing that his critique of Gadamerian and Foucauldian thinking respectively sheds 
helpful light on why their application, in what is very loosely defined as the 
postmodernist paradigm within psychotherapy, is extremely problematic and why this 
paradigm has noticeably failed to move the debate about morality and ethics forward. In 
this context I will also consider the “ethical turn” in postmodernist thinking in recent 
decades with specific reference to the work of Zygmunt Bauman (1993, 1997) whose 
thinking has infiltrated psychotherapeutic discourse to some extent. Part 11 concludes 
with a return to critical social theory to consider the work of Axel Honneth where the 
struggle for understanding and agreement in Habermas’ communicative ethics is 
supplemented by a theoretical perspective on the struggle for recognition within 
Honneth’s work. This paves the way for Part 111 in which the central argument is that 
the “moral grammar” of the psychotherapeutic encounter may be framed in terms of the 
struggle for understanding and agreement and the struggle for recognition and that both 
can helpfully be anchored in Habermasian thinking around a communicative ethics.  
 
Notwithstanding its limitations and incompletion, the value of Habermas’ contribution 
is in offering an overarching philosophical framework for scientific enquiry and 
engagement in which morality and ethics are firmly anchored. In Part 111, I explore the 
implications for how we might conceptualize psychotherapeutic practice and our ethical 
engagement therein. The theme of reflexivity will serve as an organizing framework for 
this discussion, that is, reflexivity as it is formulated in social theory and as understood 
in contemporary psychotherapy. It will be suggested that a common denominator in 
formulations of reflexivity across both discourses is the idea of flexible thinking and 
talking processes that can easily move between different levels of meaning and 
communication. The idea of psychotherapy as a reflexive resource in our society and the 
task of the psychotherapist as one of helping to increase reflexive capacities will serve 
as a bridge for dialogue between social theory and psychotherapy. I will argue for an 
idea of psychotherapy as a potential carrier of communicative reason helping people 
develop and enhance cognitive and emotional capacities that will in turn help them enter 
into and participate in spheres of discursive or reflexive communication. Using 
conceptual frameworks from social theory mentioned above, I will underline the 
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communicative ethical orientation of developments in psychotherapy. These relate to 
what, in Anthony Giddens’s (1992) language, we might describe as the democratisation 
of personal life or the democratisation of intimacy. Thinking about our work in these 
terms may bring us closer to an understanding of the implicit moral/ethical orientation 
of current practice in ways that may also help us maximise and build on its potential 
including its potential to help people towards genuinely communicative use of 
language.  
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Part I  
 
 
Current trends in psychoanalytic and systemic psychotherapy: the 
moral question 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1895 Freud first published Studies on Hysteria with his colleague Josef Breuer in 
which he sets out his initial thoughts on a method of treating neurosis that would soon 
be named psychoanalysis. Breurer’s celebrated patient “Anna O” whose case history is 
described in Studies on Hysteria had already named the method used by Breuer, her 
“talking cure”.  Over a hundred years later psychoanalysis has matured into a discipline 
whose intellectual and cultural influence is both wide ranging and profound. It has also 
spawned an approach to the therapeutic treatment of psychological disorder which is the 
dominant tradition in most countries in the Western world and the debt owed to 
psychoanalysis by all subsequent developments in “talking therapies” is immense even 
if, as Kramer (1997) points out, this is not always readily acknowledged. In the years 
since psychoanalysis first took shape much has also changed within the psychoanalytic 
tradition. Freud’s “talking cure” has evolved into what could, more accurately be 
described as the communication cure in which the relationship between analyst and 
patient is central and in which minute details of conscious and unconscious 
communication in the transference/countertransference relationship between analyst and 
patient are at the heart of the work. Object-relations theory which now exerts enormous 
influence in the psychoanalytic field has moved psychoanalysis beyond Freud’s model 
of instinctual economy with its emphasis on biological instincts and drives towards a 
model that emphasizes relations between subjects. Steuerman (2000) notes that this 
paradigm shift means that “for some purists, psychoanalysis has lost its bearings, as it 
deals less with sexuality and more with what would normally be termed moral concerns, 
namely envy and gratitude, guilt and reparation, autonomy and responsibility” (p.18). It 
is precisely this shift towards moral concerns in psychoanalysis that is of interest here, 
together with complementary and parallel developments in family/systemic 
psychotherapy.  
  
15 
In Part I, my primary objective is that of mapping the therapeutic territory which will 
serve as a reference point throughout the study and given the key position of the object 
relations tradition in contemporary British psychoanalysis, any attempt to map the field 
must of necessity address this tradition.1 Chapter 1 considers the origins of 
psychoanalysis and looks at object relations thinking as represented in the work of 
Melanie Klein 2 and Donald Winnicott (1953, [1958]1992, 1964, 1965, 1971, 1988, 
1992). It also considers the related psychoanalytic theory of mentalisation or reflective 
functioning which is of more recent origin but with close affiliations to object relations 
thinking (Fonagy and Target, 1996, 1998, 2003). My reason for including this model is 
that it concentrates attention on psychological difficulties at the severe end of the 
spectrum, that is, difficulties that would most likely have been excluded from 
psychoanalytic treatment in earlier times. It therefore represents a progressive 
development and one that contains useful pointers for the future development and 
democratization of access to psychotherapy. It also encompasses an integrative dialogue 
with other disciplines notably developmental psychology and given this integrative 
ethos it acts as a useful bridge for thinking about potential areas of commonality 
between psychoanalysis and other therapeutic approaches including family/systemic 
psychotherapy.  
 
The areas of psychoanalytic and systemic thinking that I address in Part 1 reflect my 
prioritization of clinical practice based concerns. My interest is in theoretical 
perspectives that currently influence those engaged in clinical practice in the UK to a 
significant degree. Theorists writing from a different starting point, geographical or 
otherwise, including those connecting with psychoanalytic ideas from the standpoint of 
social theory will have other priorities and may elect to draw on other sources of 
inspiration including those which have greater influence within the academic discourse  
around psychoanalysis as distinct from the clinical version.3 Thus, for example, the 
writings of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan ([1953]1977) 4 and those of post- 
                                                 
1  Fonagy and Target (2003) observe that the only geographical exceptions to the dominance of object 
relations thinking are a number of French speaking countries notably France and French Canada. Here 
especially but also in some parts of Latin America, Lacanian thinking has had a significant influence (see 
footnote 4 below). 
2  Klein, M (1975b) The writings of Melanie Klein, 4 Vols. Vol. 1: Love guilt and reparation and other 
works, 1921-1945; Vol. 11:  The psychoanalysis of children; Vol.111: Envy and Gratitude and other 
works 1946-1963; Vol. 1V: Narrative of a child analysis, London, Hogarth Press. 
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Lacanian theorists such as Cixous (1980), Irigaray (1985) and Kristeva (1986) 
undoubtedly wield substantial influence in the academy but their impact on 
psychoanalytic clinical theory and practice in the UK is much less evident compared to 
the object relations theory. In focusing specifically on influential areas of thinking that 
connect with clinical practice my primary objective is to begin excavating their implicit 
ethical orientation and in so doing to broaden the terms of moral/ethical debate which 
remains steadfastly focused on micro ethical themes closely tied up with professional 
codes of ethics. Chapter 1 underlines the strong relational ethos of contemporary 
psychoanalysis and the implicit concern with moral/ethical themes. Chapter 2 brings 
these themes explicitly into focus, considering the difficulties and restrictions in the way 
the subject of morality and ethics is articulated both historically and in the 
contemporary discourse. Chapter 3 focuses on the postmodernist influenced paradigm 
shift in psychotherapy with particular reference to family/systemic psychotherapy and 
considers the ongoing difficulty in articulating moral/ethical themes which persists in 
this framework.    
                                                                                                                                               
3  Samuels (1993) observes that the gulf between academic discourse in relation to depth psychology on 
the one hand and its clinical version on the other hand is especially pronounced in the UK and North 
America.  
4  Jacques Lacan was a French psychoanalyst who urged what he called “a return to Freud” whilst 
rejecting the biological aspects of Freudian theory. Instead he offers a metaphoric reformulation of the 
latter in which the unconscious is seen as structured like a language. In effect he sees language as 
constitutive of unconscious processes. In considering the constitution of subjectivity he does not view it 
as a process of individuation but rather sees the “subject” as constituted by language and culture which he 
refers to as the symbolic order. Lacanian thinking is a complex and intricate system of thought that is 
most commonly associated with post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives in psychotherapy and 
will be considered briefly in that context in Chapter 2 (pp. 54-63). However because of its lack of 
substantial influence within psychoanalytic clinical discourse in the UK, it will not be considered in depth 
in this study. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Psychoanalytic thinking and practice: the object relations perspective 
 
 
The origins of psychoanalysis   
 
There is little doubt that the overall cultural and intellectual impact of Freudian theory1 
during the past century has been extensive and profound, notwithstanding trenchant 
attacks in recent decades which, amongst other things, question its scientific status and 
therapeutic benefits (Grűnbaum,1984; Crews, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998). Fonagy and 
Target (2003) reflect that obituaries of Freudian theory have by no means been confined 
to recent decades, citing the emphatic prediction of the demise of psychoanalysis by an 
early advocate of behaviourism, John Watson, in 1930.2  What followed was in fact a 
golden age for psychoanalytic ideas. On Elliott’s (1999) account, one reason for the 
enduring appeal of Freudian theory is, quite simply, that Freud “was a great thinker. His 
work embodies and points beyond the contradictions of his time…..Freud holds a 
pivotal place in the fabrication of the modernist epoch” (p. xiii). Addressing the 
contemporary context, Fonagy and Target (2003) also point out that the situation 
regarding empirical evidence in support of Freudian theory is not quite as 
overwhelming bleak as some critics, notably Frederick Crews, might imply but they 
accept that recent criticisms hold some validity and that much of Freudian theory is now 
out of date, can appear mechanistic, untenable from an evolutionary perspective, overly 
preoccupied with sexuality and also politically incorrect. Yet they go on to reflect that, 
 
puzzlingly, despite its obvious flaws, Freud’s theory has remained amongst the 
most influential theories of personality in clinical practice. The key is perhaps to 
be found in the intuitive appeal of psychoanalytic ideas: they provide many 
clinicians with a framework within which to view aspects of their clients’ 
behavior which would otherwise appear incomprehensible. Until another theory 
emerges that addresses the same range of experiences it is likely that a large 
number of clinicians will continue to treat Freud’s ideas seriously despite the 
lack of scientific evidence. (pp. 49-50) 
 
                                                 
1  Freud, S. (1953- 1974) The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud,  
   London, Hogarth. 
2  Fonagy and Target (2003, p. 7) cite Watson, J.B. (1930) Behaviorism (rev. edn) New York, Norton.   
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Early in his career, having decided to investigate nervous diseases in the context of his 
medical practice, Freud famously undertook a period of study with the neurologist 
Charcot at the Salpȇtrière hospital in Paris. This experience proved formative in 
changing his focus from that of research on the brain, to an exploration of the human 
mind (Fonagy and Target, 2003; Schwartz, 2003). Under the intellectual leadership of 
Charcot, the phenomenon of hysteria, which was studied within the domain of 
neuropathology, had become a key focus for research. Following his return to Vienna, 
Freud’s first significant psychoanalytic proposals also focused on hysteria, a condition 
where the patient experiences apparently severe physical symptoms of pain, paralysis 
and so on in the absence of any obvious organic cause. He was impressed by the 
approach of a Viennese colleague Joseph Breuer, in talking to his patients about their 
symptoms and in the use of hypnosis to explore the emotions connected with the initial 
appearance of these symptoms. Charcot had also practiced hypnosis and Freud now 
began to use this technique in his clinical work. However he soon grew disenchanted 
with the results and with the problem of inducing hypnotic states in many patients who 
were resistant to this approach.3  
 
Freud began to experiment with new methods of addressing his patients’ difficulties, 
which would later include free association and dream interpretation and which enabled 
his patients to talk more freely about their problems. Whilst his relationship with Breuer 
became strained as this work evolved, the latter’s case of “Anna O” described in Studies 
on Hysteria (1895) heralded the beginning of the therapeutic approach that would 
become known as the “analytic hour” and “talking cure”. Together with Breuer, Freud 
began to transform the informal talking and listening undertaken by physicians of that 
era into a therapeutic treatment based on a more formal model of talking and listening to 
patients’ concerns on a long term basis. They were, in Schwartz’s (2003) words, “the 
first to permit the human subject to speak for him/herself….for the first time a space 
had been created where the meanings of subjective experience could be purposefully 
sought until they could be found” (p. 54). They demonstrated that the symptoms of 
hysteria had psychological meaning and could not be explained simply in terms of 
difficulties or degeneration of the nervous system. Not surprisingly their humane 
methods gained popularity amongst those who could afford the treatment given the 
                                                 
3  See Chapter 4 (p. 92) for discussion of Habermas’ engagement with this aspect of Freud’s work.    
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cruel and desperate treatment strategies for hysteria and other conditions sometimes 
adopted at that time, ranging from teeth extraction to female castration (ibid., pp. 56-7). 
 
Initially Freud’s (1895) model of neurosis was based on the assumption that hysterics 
had previously experienced some major emotional trauma which had become repressed 
due to being unacceptable to the conscious mind. The emotions relating to the repressed 
trauma continued to press for discharge into consciousness and in Freud’s view 
symptoms were the result of a breakthrough of this repressed affect into consciousness. 
The meaning of the symptoms could be uncovered by linking them to the forgotten 
trauma and Freud also believed that the latter could generally be traced back to 
childhood experiences including those of sexual seduction. His therapy which initially 
included hypnosis, focused on helping his patients to release pent-up emotional energy 
by bringing the forgotten trauma back into consciousness. For Freud the existence of 
repressed trauma pointed to the existence of parts of the mind that could be described as 
the unconscious and which were not immediately open to exploration either by the 
subject him/herself or by another person. Much of his later work would focus on 
understanding differences between the mode of functioning of unconscious processes 
and those of conscious regions of the mind. Here it is important to acknowledge that 
Freud’s key advance was not so much the discovery of the unconscious, the idea of 
which was already part of the culture of that time, but in devising methods for its 
systematic study and in showing it to be part of the psychic make up of all human 
beings (Schwartz, 2000).     
 
As Freud’s theory evolved he formed the view that memories of childhood sexual 
trauma were not necessarily accurate recollections of actual events but were suggestive 
of fantasies relating to unconscious wishes (Freud, 1905b).4 His attention switched from 
external explanations of psychological disorder to inborn drives and biological tension 
states which triggered ideas that in turn pressed for discharge against the resistance of 
the conscious mind. Disguised wish fulfilments could be represented in dreams and 
could also be expressed for example in so called slips of the tongue. At the centre of 
Freud’s evolving theory was a view of human life as determined by biological urges or 
                                                 
4  Masson (1984) famously attacked Freud for what he perceives as the latter’s abandonment of this 
“seduction theory of neurosis”. However as Fonagy and Target (2003) observe, Freud did not “suppress” 
this theory so much as amend it to correspond with his evolving understanding of infantile sexuality.  
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instincts which the individual needed to master in order to comply with the demands of 
society. He termed these biological urges “sexual” although here the term is being used 
in a broad sense to indicate physical pleasure. He also identified different stages of 
development of these biological urges that were distinguished on the basis of the 
different zones of the body in and through which the sexual instinct manifested itself 
and which included the oral, anal and phallic stages. At the phallic stage which is the 
setting for the most crucial sexual conflict in Freud’s theory of human development, the 
three to four year old child becomes more interested in the genital region and conflict 
arises in the shape of the Oedipus complex as the child develops an unconscious wish to 
possess the parent of the opposite sex and to eliminate the same sexed parent. In very 
general terms the shift in Freudian theory from a perspective that emphasized childhood 
trauma towards a model anchored in drive theory meant that the focus of therapy also 
shifted from uncovering forgotten trauma to a focus on integrating into consciousness 
various unconscious wishes whose repression was seen as the source of suffering and 
neurosis. In a further stage of development Freud (1923) reworked his overarching 
conceptual framework substantially and settled on a model that hypothesized three 
structures within the human mind; the id which was entirely unconscious and the 
reservoir of sexual and aggressive drives; the superego as the psychic representation of 
parental authority figures which holds the ideals taken from parents and from society 
and which is the source of guilt; and finally the ego which was seen as mediating 
between the competing demands of the id, the superego and external reality. 
 
Amongst those developments that coalesced to shape the “talking cure”, Freud’s 
recognition of transference phenomena was a key development that has remained at the 
heart of psychoanalytic treatment ever since. In essence the concept of transference 
refers to the tendency which people have to repeat in their relationship with the analyst -
or with other important people in their lives - the patterns of relationship, fantasy and 
conflict that they experienced with key figures in their childhood, notably their parents. 
In Freud’s words, transferences are “ new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and 
fantasies that are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but 
they have this peculiarity….that they replace some earlier person by the person of the 
physician” (1905a, p.116 quoted in Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 457). Freud’s own 
awareness of this phenomenon and it’s implications for the analytic situation came 
gradually and once again Breuer’s case of “Anna O” proved instructive. In his work 
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with this patient Breuer had come to recognize that her symptoms were associated with 
forgotten memories many of which related to her intense relationship with her father 
whom she had nursed through a terminal illness. In the later stages of her treatment with 
Breuer, she developed passionate feelings for him which appear to have caused him 
great alarm and concern regarding the impact on his marriage and his position as a 
respected physician within Viennese society. It would appear that the treatment of 
“Anna O” was terminated abruptly and as Schwartz (2003) observes, the fact that this 
treatment was only partially successful seems closely connected to lack of recognition 
“that the therapist/patient relationship is an integral part of the treatment which needs to 
be resolved for the treatment to succeed” (p. 51).  
 
Against the background of the “Anna O” case, Malan (1979) regards it as indicative of 
Freud’s courage that he persisted in making sense of the phenomenon of transference 
which he initially perceived exclusively as an obstacle to treatment. Only later did he 
recognize the immense scope which it offered for analyzing the patient by offering a 
context in which past conflicts were revived in the immediacy of the therapeutic 
relationship. Since Freud’s time, as psychoanalytic treatment has come to be formulated 
more and more in terms of the therapeutic relationship, the question of how the 
transference is managed and addressed remains at the heart of psychoanalytic debates as 
does the related issue of the countertransference which encompasses thinking about the 
therapist’s unconscious reactions to the patient’s transference. Within the object 
relations psychoanalytic tradition which will shortly be discussed, some analysts 
influenced by the Kleinian orientation, work predominantly with the patient’s feelings 
and fantasies about the analyst with much less attention to life outside the consulting 
room and may adopt a vigorously interpretative technical style. Others, including those 
influenced by the Winnicottian object relations orientation or the more recently 
formulated model of mentalization, both of which will also be discussed below, are 
likely to adopt a more cautious approach to interpreting unconscious material relating to 
the transference particularly in the early stages of the work because of their belief that 
this kind of intervention is developmentally unhelpful or premature for some client 
groups including those with limited reflective capacity. The latter constitutes a major 
clinical challenge particularly as more people with more severe levels of psychological 
difficulty come within the orbit of psychotherapy and it is an important thread of 
discussion throughout this study.                 
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Given the rich and expansive nature of Freudian theory it is not surprising that it has 
offered a huge reservoir of sometimes conflicting perspectives for later generations of 
psychoanalytic thinkers to explore and upon which to elaborate. However throughout 
the various revisions of his own work undertaken by Freud, a constant thread is the 
emphasis on the centrality of the instinctual drives to human development and on the 
psyche as having a fundamentally biological nature. Furthermore as Fonagy and Target 
(2003) point out, in the classical Freudian perspective there is a “silent assumption” (p. 
21) that the stages of drive development are of greater importance than actual events 
within the environment in which a child is developing. One of the most profound 
changes within post Freudian elaborations of the psychoanalytic perspective is the 
reappraisal of this assumption and a corresponding increase in emphasis on the social 
and relational context of human development. This includes much greater attention to 
the significance of early childhood experience; the significance of the actual behaviour 
of the parents towards the child; and the role of attachment and dependency in early 
infancy which concentrates attention on the mother /infant relationship. Nowhere are 
these developments more apparent than in the emergence of object relations thinking 
which has gained a position of prominence in contemporary psychoanalytic discourse 
and which in the UK context has largely superseded the classical Freudian perspective 
at the level of clinical practice.                                                  
 
 
The object relations psychoanalytic perspective 
 
Object relations theory is a dense and complex theoretical and clinical perspective and 
one that is central to an understanding of contemporary psychoanalysis. It can be seen 
as representing a departure from, but also a development of themes in classical Freudian 
theory. It continues to manifest tensions that were inherent in classical psychoanalysis 
concerning its scientific status in that it proposes a complex theory of early development 
that lacks comprehensive empirical validation. It retains the Freudian idea of analytic 
objectivity or neutrality and emphasizes the important developmental aspects of the 
provision of an objective/external perspective in the analytic work. As in classical 
analysis the relationship between analyst and patient is also highly asymmetrical and the 
analytic style may be vigorously interpretative. In the object relations orientation 
interpretations are closely linked to the flow of communication in the 
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transference/countertransference relationship. In effect a complex dialectical interplay 
therefore exists between the “objectivity” of the analyst and his/her subjective 
experience of the analysand. Any attempt to explore the ethics of analytic engagement 
must therefore take account of this complex dialectical interplay of subjectivity and 
objectivity in the analytic encounter. In effect this is what Habermas ([1968]1978) 
began to do in his early work where he used classical psychoanalysis as an 
epistemological paradigm for critical science. However with his move to formulate a 
communicative ethics he lost interest in the psychoanalytic paradigm and recognition of 
potential commonality between subsequent developments in psychoanalysis and in 
Habermas’ ongoing work was lost.  
 
Given the dominance of object relations thinking in contemporary psychoanalysis in the 
UK most psychoanalytic theorists have tended to aspire to this category and it therefore 
represents a broad church which can make definition difficult. For purposes of this 
study I am following Fonagy and Target (2003) in adopting the pragmatic definition 
offered by the American psychoanalyst, Kernberg (1976) which defines the tradition as 
referring to the Kleinian School and the British School of Independent Psychoanalysts 
as well as other theorists who integrate the ideas of these two schools into their 
perspectives. The term “object-relations” brings to centre stage the relational dimension 
of intrapsychic life by concentrating on the object of the instinct, namely the breast, 
penis, mother, father and so on. Arguably it might be more appropriately termed 
“subject-relations theory” but this in turn would mislead if it were to imply the idea of 
whole subjects relating to each other.5 Rather, what are being addressed are the different 
and sometimes conflicting conscious and unconscious aspects of subjects and the 
relationships that are established between them.  
 
Object-relations theory is rooted in the thinking of Melanie Klein (1975b) and her 
reworking of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Klein began her work in the 1920s and 
retained much of Freud’s emphasis on the instinctual basis of development. However 
she challenged his theory of the structure of the personality when she noted that infants 
relate to their objects much earlier than Freud considered the case (Scharff and Scharff, 
1987). The Freudian view of the new born baby as a narcissistic entity, governed by 
                                                 
5  See brief discussion of relational psychoanalysis, Chapter 2 (pp. 59-63) for alternative perspective on 
the use of the term “object” in psychoanalysis.        
24 
instinctual impulses, is challenged by Kleinian and later objects relations perspectives, 
which view the baby as an active partner from birth, capable of relating to his/her carer. 
Whilst this thinking emerged in the absence of any formal empirical research paradigm, 
Scharff and Scharff also underline that in recent times it has been validated by infant 
observation research which confirms the psychological competence of the baby as an 
initiator and partner in human relationships (ibid., p. 56). It is this recognition that lies at 
the heart of the object relations perspective and which, during the past quarter of a 
century in particular, has resulted in a marked shift of interest towards relational themes 
including those concerning the therapeutic relationship.  
 
Klein began her work with young children and assumed that it was possible to analyze 
them in line with the same rigorous principles of Freudian psychoanalysis as used with 
adults. She did so by approaching the child’s play as a language and interpreted it as a 
way of expressing their psychic conflicts (Segal, 1988). What she discovered in the 
course of her clinical work led her to radicalize Freud’s theory. Her observations 
confirmed his theory of infantile sexuality but she also observed phenomena that were 
less expected. In classical theory the Oedipus complex was thought to start at three or 
four years of age in the genital phase of development. However Klein observed oedipal 
phantasies and anxieties in much younger children and furthermore that pre-genital as 
well as genital trends seemed to be involved in these phantasies.6 She also observed that 
these pre-genital trends seemed to play an important part in oedipal anxieties. She 
concluded that a more primitive pre-oedipal situation could be identified and that the 
older child’s object relationships extended well into the past, as far back as relationships 
to part-objects such as the breast or penis. These part-object relationships preceded the 
relationship to the parents as whole people.  
 
In her work, Klein also noted that the child’s internal image of the object tended to be 
more ferocious and punitive than the actual parents appeared to be and she concluded 
that internal objects are by no means a replica of the external world but rather are 
characterized by unconscious phantasy. When the baby first turns to the breast for 
feeding, Kleinian theory proposes that a rich unconscious world also begins to unfold. 
In her clinical work and her theoretical formulations, Klein followed the complex 
                                                 
6  In Kleinian theory phantasy is spelled with a “ph” to emphasize that she is talking about unconscious 
psychological processes and to underscore difference from conscious fantasy.  
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interplay between the child’s phantasies and his/her actual experience and the gradual 
process by which the child develops a more realistic relation to external objects. For 
Klein the infant is exposed from the start to anxiety stirred up by what she regards as the 
innate polarity of the instincts, that is, the conflict between the life instinct and the death 
instinct.7 The infant is also exposed to the impact of external reality, which is both 
anxiety provoking but also life-enhancing and is from the outset struggling with feelings 
of aggression arising from dependence and frailty. Kleinian theory proposes that the 
immature ego of the infant faced with the anxiety of the death instinct responds partly 
by converting it into aggression and partly by projecting that aspect of itself which 
contains the death instinct into the external object, the breast. This is then felt to be bad 
and threatening to the ego and gives rise to feelings of persecution. Fear of the death 
instinct is thus transformed into fear of a persecutor. At the same time a relationship is 
established with an ideal object as the life instinct is activated and libido is projected 
outwards. Thus from very early in life the immature ego has a relationship to two 
objects, having split the primary object, the breast into an ideal object and a persecutory 
object. Dominated by omnipotent narcissism, the baby wants to have the breast for itself 
at all times and this triggers great rage and great frustration, which has the potential to 
spoil the good experience of the breast when it becomes available. The first hunger and 
the instinctual striving to satisfy it are accompanied by the phantasy of an object that is 
capable of satisfying it but the hungry screaming baby may also phantasize that he/she 
is attacking the breast. The baby then becomes scared of possible retaliation from this 
bad object which may damage the good breast and good experience and this requires 
further splitting of the object, a defence which typifies the paranoid- schizoid psychic 
position as proposed by Klein ([1946]1986).  
 
What Klein endeavours to describe is the primitive world of mental representations of 
the instincts as they arise in the context of the earliest relationships. These 
representations are very tied up with the infant’s bodily ways of relating to the world. 
                                                 
7  One of the more controversial aspects of Kleinian theory is her uncritical acceptance of Freud’s idea of 
the death instinct which is “held to represent the fundamental tendency of every living being to return to 
the inorganic state” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 97). Klein saw the death instinct as representing a 
deeply significant psychological phenomenon present from birth and she saw destructiveness as the result 
of the death instinct. In Rustin’s (1991) words, Kleinian theory “offers a distinctively uncompromising 
view of human destructiveness and the continuing and unavoidable problem in human lives of coping 
with this. The omnipresence of envy is perhaps the distinguishing doctrine of Kleinian work as well as 
one of the main sources of others’ reservations towards it” (p. 21).  
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The baby sucks in a pleasurable way but also bites. It takes in but also expels food. In 
this stage of development the psyche is relating to part rather than whole objects. In the 
Kleinian framework young children are constantly trying to split their objects and their 
feelings. They are constantly trying to retain good feelings and introject good objects 
whilst expelling bad objects and projecting bad feelings. Their aim is to acquire and 
keep inside the ideal object seen as life giving and to expel and keep out the persecutory 
object and those parts of the self, containing the death instinct.  In the paranoid-schizoid 
position the main anxiety is that the persecutory object will get inside, overwhelm and 
annihilate the ideal object and the self. Through her observation of these intricate 
processes in her clinical work she began to formulate her theory of how the very young 
child constructs a rich and complex inner world.  
 
If conditions for development are favourable, Kleinian theory suggests that the infant 
will increasingly feel that the ideal object and libidinal impulses are stronger than the 
persecutory object and the aggressive impulses. The infant will be less driven to project 
the latter outwards and the power attributed to the bad, persecutory object will decrease. 
Tolerance of the death instinct increases and paranoid fears lessen. As integrative 
processes become more stable a new phase of development comes into play, the 
depressive position (Klein, [1935]1975a). The infant now recognizes the whole object 
and relates to this object as such. Recognizing the parents as whole people has wide 
implications. It means recognizing that good and bad experiences do not proceed from 
separate objects but from the same person who is the source of both good and bad 
feelings. It also means recognizing the parents as individuals with their own lives and 
relationships. Whereas in the paranoid- schizoid position the main anxiety is of being 
destroyed by the bad object, now the main anxiety is that the infant’s own destructive 
impulses will destroy the object that is also loved and upon whom he/she feels totally 
dependent. In the depressive position capacity for concern for the other now begins to 
emerge as the other is seen as a whole person with thoughts and feelings and not as a 
part-object devoid of human feelings. The infant now realizes his/her capacity to both 
love and hate the parent and this opens up the experience of guilt about hostility towards 
the loved object and anguish about separateness, exclusion and difference. The pain of 
the depressive position is thus enormous and can lead to defences that include 
omnipotence, denial and denigration of the other. Against this, the capacity for concern 
for the other is what defines the depressive position and reaching this position is for 
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Klein the central achievement of the child’s development. It might also be said that 
Klein’s formulation of the depressive position is the central achievement of her 
relationally oriented developmental theory.   
 
Undoubtedly the complexity of what Klein was attempting to formulate means that her 
vocabulary sometimes falls short of her objective. In trying to develop a language that 
would give meaning to the internal world of the infant, her descriptions can sometimes 
sound far-fetched. Furthermore her speculations can appear “adultmorphic” in the sense 
of attributing to infants what might be regarded as adult levels of knowledge, feelings 
and so on. At the time when she was writing there was little research to back up her 
formulations but after thirty years of infant research some of what might appear to be 
extravagant claims about infancy are now more imaginable (Fonagy and Target, 2003, 
p. 132) It is also important to acknowledge that she was developing psychoanalytic 
insights in areas that were previously untouched by Freudian theory. In Steuerman’s 
(2000) words: “Freud shocked his generation by claiming that children had sexual 
desires that shaped the meaning of their communication. Klein shocked the world by 
claiming that the infant had sexual and aggressive tendencies that expressed themselves 
in a meaningful way” (p. 65, her emphasis). 
 
The impact of Kleinian thinking on contemporary clinical practice is difficult to 
exaggerate. For Klein, “the essence of the talking cure is in the quality of human 
relationship between the patient and others, not in the childhood reconstruction of how 
the person came to be the way he or she is” (Kapur and Campbell, 2004, p. 16). 
Kleinian thinking focused attention much more powerfully on the here and now of the 
relationship between analyst and patient and on the complex communications both 
conscious and unconscious that flow between them in the context of the transference/ 
countertransference relationship. Whilst Freudian theory drew attention to the 
transference, there was now much greater recognition of the importance of 
countertransference feelings evoked in the analyst by the patient. This recognition was 
intricately linked with Klein’s formulations regarding the earliest stages of 
development. In her framework the infant’s feeding experience for example gains a new 
significance in that what is being fed is not just the physical need but also the capacity 
of the infant to form a communicative relationship and to integrate love and hate. The 
good enough carer provides not just physical nourishment but also a space where 
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feelings of hate and aggression can overtime be absorbed and symbolized in a 
communicative relationship. It is this understanding of very early communicative 
processes between carer and infant that forms the theoretical backdrop for clinical 
engagement with communicative processes between analyst and patient, both conscious 
and unconscious, as they unfold and become the focus for psychoanalytic interpretation. 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1988) suggest that the task of the analyst is:   
 
to allow oneself to be guided, in the actual interpretation, by one’s own counter-
transference reactions, which in this perspective are often not distinguished from 
emotions felt. The approach is based on the tenet that resonance ‘from 
unconscious to unconscious’ constitutes the only authentically psycho-analytic 
form of communication. (p. 93, their emphasis)  
Here they articulate the deeply relational psychoanalytic process of opening up 
communication and reflecting processes that typifies Kleinian infused contemporary 
practice.              
 
Beyond the consulting room Kleinian theory also resonates powerfully for theorists 
interested in the intricate links between psychic and social phenomena. What seems 
most relevant here is firstly the Kleinian view of human nature as deeply social from the 
start and secondly the delineation by Klein of positions that denote specific 
constellations of object-relations, feelings, and impulses. In the Kleinian framework 
individuality is the emergent result of a prolonged experience of dependency and 
concern for the other arises from the earliest lack of differentiation between self and 
other. Central to the Kleinian view of this process are the aforementioned positions, the 
paranoid-schizoid and the depressive respectively. Alford (1989) suggests that these can 
be linked to two different conceptions of morality. In the more primitive “talion” 
morality, every act of aggression - phantasized or not - is returned in kind, a way of 
thinking and interacting that is characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position. In the 
depressive position, the person is more able to identify with the pain of the other, 
leading to what Alford calls a “reparative” morality.  
 
Kleinian thinking has been used in a variety of ways by theorists who wish to enhance 
their understanding of social processes. Rustin (1991), for example, explores the links 
between racist states of mind and the primitive splitting and projection that characterizes 
paranoid-schizoid functioning. Kapur and Campbell (2004) draw heavily on Kleinian 
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theory in making sense of “the troubled mind of Northern Ireland” and the 
dehumanization of societal processes both during and in the aftermath of the “Troubles” 
there. Closer to the immediate focus of this study, Steuerman (2000) uses Klein’s theory 
and in particular the Kleinian emphasis on the pervasiveness of destructive impulses, to 
critique the work of both Habermas and Lyotard (1984, 1988) and to expose the 
limitations of their respective rationalist and irrationalist positions. But this is by no 
means a one-way process of influence. A key argument of this study is that social 
theory also has a great deal to offer psychoanalytic understanding of the links between 
psychic and social phenomena. I return to these themes in Part 111, where my concern 
is more explicitly that of a dialogue between psychotherapy and social theory. Here the 
focus remains on psychoanalytic discourse and, in particular, some key developments 
following Klein’s initial formulation of the object relations perspective.  
 
 
The Independent School of British psychoanalysis 
 
Whilst Klein radicalized Freud’s theory, she maintained his emphasis on the instinctual 
basis of development. This contrasts with Fairbairn (1954, 1963) a Scottish 
psychoanalyst and one of the early object relations theorists who, unlike Klein, did not 
see the infant as the sole determinant of how the mother is perceived (Scharff and 
Scharff, 1987, p. 48). He saw the quality of mothering as a significant determinant of 
how this process unfolds. He did not see aggression as the result of the death instinct but 
as a result of frustration in being cared for. In Fairbairn’s view, the fundamental human 
drive was not the gratification of instinctual impulses but the need to be in relationship 
and to be loved and validated therein. Recognition of this need and its conceptualization 
has had a profound influence on all subsequent developments within psychoanalytic 
discourse and in the wider psychotherapeutic field. At birth the infant seeks attachment 
to his/her carer and is then acutely vulnerable to the latter’s responses. Aggression is 
understood as a reaction to frustration in reality and anxiety is related to issues of 
separation from the maternal object. These and related themes, all of which take careful 
account of the actual quality of the early relational environment contributing to the 
infant’s experience, are explored and developed in what has come to be known as the 
Independent tradition within British psychoanalysis.  
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The Independent School of object relations thinking is separate from the British 
Psychoanalytical Society’s Kleinian School.8 It represents the work of a number of 
individual analysts and, unlike the other psychoanalytic schools, does not have an easily 
identifiable founding member. Consequently it lacks some of the theoretical coherence 
of the Kleinian stance. Alongside Fairbairn, other well known early writers within this 
tradition included Balint (1959, 1968), and Winnicott (1953, 1965, 1971). In recent 
decades, analysts writing within this tradition include Bollas (1987, 1989) and 
Casement (1985, 1990). In the present context what is most significant is the overall 
contribution of the Independent group to the relational thrust of contemporary 
psychoanalytic discourse whilst individual differences of emphasis within the tradition 
are of less significance. Overall it may be said that the Independent group has made a 
very substantial contribution to the consideration of earliest child development and in 
particular to the effects of the early relational environment in facilitating or disrupting 
the child’s move from dependence to mature independence. The work of Donald 
Winnicott has had an especially profound impact in this regard both within and beyond 
psychoanalysis. In this study an additional source of interest in the work of Winnicott is 
its adoption by Axel Honneth (1995) in his social theory of recognition. In considering 
Winnicott’s work as an example of object relations thinking in the Independent 
tradition, I am doing so as part of my wider overview of the relational ethos that 
underpins psychoanalytic discourse, whilst simultaneously paving the way for later 
discussion of Honneth’s critical social theory and the influence of Winnicottian object 
relations thinking therein.9 
 
Winnicott was a paediatrician as well as a psychoanalyst and most of his influential 
psychoanalytic concepts, including the “holding environment” and “transitional object”, 
stem from his experience in the child mental health field. He began his psychoanalytic 
training in 1923 and in the course of his early work it became apparent to him that 
classical Freudian theory and practice had significant limitations. He was unhappy with 
the notion prevalent at that time that psychoanalytic treatment was most suited to 
relatively sophisticated individuals suffering from neurotic anxieties that were traced 
                                                 
8  Following the arrival of Sigmund Freud and his daughter Anna in London from Austria in 1938, 
conflict developed between the ideas of Klein and those of the continental analysts who had migrated to 
London. Following extensive debates the British Psychoanalytical Society split into three separate 
divisions: Kleinian, Freudian and Independent. These divisions continue to remain in place.            
9  See Chapter 6  pp. 150-2.    
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back to instinctual life at the four to five year stage in the child’s relationship to both 
parents. For Winnicott (1965), the case histories which he encountered in his work 
showed him that many older children who became disturbed already showed difficulties 
in their emotional development in early infancy. For a time Winnicott became a pupil of 
Klein but unlike her, he was unable to accept Freud’s concept of the death instinct as an 
explanation for destructiveness. He could not believe that we are born with the seeds of 
our own destruction within us. For Winnicott the focus was on the instincts and the 
impulses to which they give rise, as sources of spontaneity and creativity. His 
theoretical position emerged from his attempts to understand the conditions of good 
enough fit between the interactions of mother and baby that could contribute to the 
latter’s healthy development and conversely, the difficulties in mother - baby 
interactions that might contribute to later psychological difficulties. The unequivocally 
relational thrust of his theory is evident in his famous comment that “there is no such 
thing as a baby” by which he meant that if you set out to describe a baby, you will find 
you are describing a baby and someone else, since a baby cannot exist alone but is part 
of a relationship (Winnicott, 1964, p. 88). Every human life begins with a phase of 
absolute dependence and merger and much of Winnicottian theory is concerned with 
understanding the interactional processes whereby mother and child emerge from this 
state of undifferentiated intersubjectivity and learn to love, recognize and relate to each 
other as separate, independent people.  
 
For Winnicott the mother’s role in the initial stage of dependence and symbiosis, is 
understood in terms of the concept of “holding”. In Winnicottian terms the “holding 
environment” is both a psychological and physical space in which the baby is 
emotionally and physically held and protected without knowing this. Through the 
mother’s “good enough” holding response the baby develops an initial sense of self and 
a basic feeling of security and trust. The good enough mother begins with an almost 
complete adaptation to her baby’s needs and thus allows the baby the opportunity for 
the illusion that the breast is part of the baby: “Omnipotence is nearly a fact of 
experience…..the mother places the actual breast just there where the infant is ready to 
create, and at the right moment” (1971, p. 11). The baby takes milk from a breast that is 
part of the baby. Crucially, through this experience of omnipotence, the baby begins life 
by existing as opposed to reacting, by being creative as opposed to being compliant. 
The mother whose “holding” is not good enough cannot sense her infant’s needs 
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sufficiently and cannot allow for the infant’s omnipotent expression. She fails to meet 
the infant’s “spontaneous gesture” which Winnicott (1965) regards as the source of the 
potential “true self”. Instead the mother substitutes her own gestures which require the 
baby’s compliance and out of this emerges the earliest stages of what he terms “false 
self” development and relating.  
 
In Winnicottian thinking the true self refers to the instinctive core of the personality and 
the capacity to recognize and enact spontaneous needs for self-expression. It is thus 
associated with aliveness and spontaneity and is at the heart of authenticity. In false self 
relating on the other hand, the infant and later the adult seeks constantly to anticipate the 
demands of the other in order to maintain the relationship. The true self can only evolve 
in the presence of an unobtrusive other and for Winnicott this means that healthy 
relatedness evolves from the developmentally important experience of being alone in 
the presence of a reliable other. Here Fonagy and Target (2003, p. 142)) note the 
congruence between Winnicott’s view and Hegel’s ([1807]1977) assertion that the self 
in formation loses itself in the other but also supersedes the other since in the other it 
sees its own self. Honneth (1995), whose work is infused with Hegelian philosophy, 
also finds in Winnicottian psychoanalytic thinking a rich source of understanding of the 
intersubjectively constituted nature of the relation- to- self, which Honneth calls “basic 
self- confidence”.  
 
Winnicott (1953) observes that as development proceeds, the good enough mother 
adapts less and less to the infant’s omnipotence, which begins to recede as the infant’s 
spontaneous self connects more with the outside world. This very early space of relating 
and separating is understood as a “transitional” space and it is here that the meaning of 
transitional phenomena including the first “not me” possession, can be located. This 
first possession, which might be a favourite blanket with which the young child 
develops an affectively charged relationship, represents a transitional space between a 
state of being merged with mother and one of relating to her as a separate being. The 
physical object represents both the infant and the mother. It is transitional in terms of 
facilitating the move from omnipotent relating towards a way of relating to the object as 
part of external reality. For Winnicott transitional space is where symbolization begins 
to occur and where meaningful relating and love can develop and grow. Winnicott also 
observes that the child relates to the transitional object not only with symbiotic 
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tenderness but also with rage and aggressive attacks. He postulates that in surviving 
these destructive attacks, objects are placed outside the area of omnipotent control of the 
infant. The object comes to be seen as autonomous with a life of its own. This also 
applies to the child’s relationship with the mother who, by surviving the child’s attacks 
without retaliation, places herself outside the child’s omnipotent control and helps the 
child recognize his/her dependence on the loving care, which she provides. For 
Winnicott the good enough holding environment thus allows for the integration of love 
and aggression leading to the tolerance of ambivalent feelings and ultimately to the 
emergence of concern for the other.  
 
Both Klein and Winnicott formulated their theories in the context of close observation 
of clinical phenomena but neither worked within a formal empirical research paradigm. 
However, subsequent research findings have broadly supported some aspects of their 
work. This applies notably to Winnicott’s key formulations concerning the importance 
of sensitive maternal care in the early stages of life; the inherent limitation on this 
sensitivity, consistent with his concept of “good enough” mothering; and his views 
regarding the traumatic effects of early maternal failure (Fonagy and Target, 2003, pp. 
154-5). But research findings have not supported his exclusive concern with the 
relationship between the infant and mother as the basis for serious mental disorder. A 
related criticism of Winnicott’s theory is its perceived romanticization of the role of 
motherhood (Frosh, 1999, p. 117). Noting the existence of anthropological data 
indicating that relationship patterns in early infancy are socially constructed, Frosh 
writes: “approaches that “naturalise’ mothering as much as object relations theory does 
neglect these data and fuel attempts to bolster traditional patterns of family life” (ibid.). 
Implicit in this is a critique of the apolitical, humanistic slant of object relations thinking 
and its associated preoccupation with personal change. Viewed from this perspective, 
the object relations approach does not offer a sufficiently radical advance beyond the 
classical tradition. It extends the focus beyond the individual to the relationship with the 
mother but then treats this dyad as if it were an individual, rather than a socially 
constructed entity. Whilst object relations thinking, such as the Winnicottian idea of a 
“true self” recognizes environmental obstacles to personal fulfilment and growth, it also 
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reinforces the idea of a human essence that is pre-given and separate from society.10 In 
Frosh words: 
 
               ……at its most extreme, it proposes that social and personal distress could be 
overcome if we could only return to that fundamental state of human nature 
expressed in the new-born child’s loving relationship with the mother; all would 
be harmonious if the world were only less frustrating. This idea leads to the 
proposal that complete integration and happiness is achievable through 
alterations to the kind of relationships that parents form with their children, 
without a restructuring of society- a view opposed by many political and 
feminist theorists. (Ibid., pp. 117-8)                                          
Thus far I have drawn on Kleinian and Winnicottian contributions to the object relations 
orientation, the significance of which is difficult to exaggerate in terms of the wider 
development of psychoanalysis. The dominance of this tradition currently, underscores 
the relational ethos of contemporary theory and practice and the implicit shift towards 
moral/ethical concerns. This is reflected in the theme of concern for the other as a key 
organizing concept in the different approaches outlined.  
 
In twentieth century philosophy the realization that we are always already embedded in 
language gave rise to a radical paradigm shift from a philosophy centred on individual 
consciousness to one that privileges intersubjectivity and language. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that a similar paradigm shift has been witnessed in the psychoanalytic 
discipline based on recognition that we are always already embedded in contexts of 
intersubjectivity and communication from the start of life. This paradigm shift is at 
heart of later discussion concerning the limitations of current moral/ethical debate in 
psychotherapy. In essence my argument is that these limitations reflect a failure to 
embrace the full potential of the paradigm shift from an individual to a relational and 
communicative perspective that now infuses the psychotherapeutic field. From the 
perspective of the study, this shared ground and shared paradigm shift between the 
therapeutic approaches outlined is of much greater interest than differences between 
them, which can be a source of such heated controversy within the psychotherapeutic 
world. I began by supporting the research and clinical stance that takes seriously the 
question, “what works for whom?” and throughout the study my assumption is that this 
is the most helpful context in which to think about differences in clinical approach 
                                                 
10   See Chapter 7 pp. 165-70.  
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within and between psychotherapeutic orientations. My concern is to offer a general 
mapping of the field as a prelude to engaging more explicitly with moral/ethical themes. 
With this in mind I now turn to a further example of the relational ethos that pervades 
current psychoanalytic thinking. This model connects with earlier object relations 
thinking as outlined above but with a very specific focus on expanding therapeutic 
methodology for a wider patient population. It also connects very helpfully with themes 
and concerns in the wider psychotherapeutic community including those within family 
therapy discourse.   
 
 
The theory of mentalisation or reflective functioning  
 
In recent years the theory of mentalisation, also known as reflective functioning, 
developed by Fonagy and Target (1996, 1998, 2003) has emerged in the psychoanalytic 
field as an influential developmental framework for conceptualizing the difficulties of 
patients with limited reflective capacity.11 Previously these people might have been 
deemed unsuitable for psychoanalytic intervention. They have difficulty taking in 
analytic interpretations and are not readily amenable to a classical psychoanalytic 
insight oriented approach. However these are people who may also be in considerable 
personal difficulty and distress, sometimes with a diagnosis of borderline or narcissistic 
personality disorder (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004). They constitute a substantial 
grouping within the population seeking help and increasingly represent a clinical 
challenge with which contemporary psychoanalysis seeks to engage. The theory of 
reflective function should be understood in this context. It is an attempt to formulate and 
understand this category of difficulty, drawing on a developmental psychological 
perspective. Reflective function, in psychoanalytic terms, refers to the capacity to 
conceptualize mental processes in self and other people, that is the ability to interpret 
one’s own and others’ actions in terms of mental states including thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs, desires, intentions and so on. An important distinction is made between this 
concept and self- reflection or introspection which, crucially leaves out the inherently 
intersubjective nature of reflective functioning as conceptualized psychoanalytically. 
Another important distinction is that reflective function is seen as rooted in procedural 
                                                 
11  Whilst the terms “mentalization” and “reflective function” are used interchangeably, Fonagy and 
Target (2003, p. 270) clarify that the capacity to understand interpersonal behaviour in terms of mental 
states is referred to as “mentalization” and this concept is operationalized for research purposes as 
“reflective function”.           
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knowledge and is understood as an automatic process unconsciously invoked in 
interpreting human action unlike self reflection.  
 
Within this approach it is suggested that in early childhood, prior to the age of three, the 
infant exists primarily in a psychic equivalence mode, that is, ideas or perceptions are 
experienced not as representations but rather as accurate replicas of the way reality is. 
This oscillates with the pretend mode that is characteristic of the child’s play in which 
his/her ideas are experienced as representational but are not thought to have a 
relationship to the outside world as such. In the optimal developmental situation these 
two modes are eventually integrated and mental states begin to be experienced as 
representations. Inner and outer reality can then be seen as linked and the capacity for 
mentalisation or reflective function is laid down. At the heart of this theory is the view 
that the acquisition of reflective capacity is rooted in the intersubjective process that 
unfolds between an infant and his/her parents. In this context the child internalises the 
thinking self from the emotionally containing object with whom he/she interacts. In 
situations of good enough parenting this eventually leads to the consolidation of the 
child’s own reflective functioning capacity.  
 
There is accumulating evidence to suggest that maltreatment impairs the child’s 
reflective capacity (Fonagy and Target, 1998) and an important focus for therapeutic 
intervention with such patients is the offer of space where thinking about ideas and 
feelings can be experienced as safe perhaps for the first time.12 Here the relationship 
between analyst and patient is pivotal but, as in the Winnicottian orientation, it entails a 
way of working that is less focused on explicit interpretation of unconscious content at 
least in the early stages of the work, given the limited capacity of the patient for this 
level of reflective endeavour. Nonetheless there is emphasis on the provision of an 
external perspective by the analyst rather than simply locating and empathizing with the 
patient’s own subjective experience. The focus is on helping the patient to gradually 
learn that mental experience involves representations that can be thought about, talked 
about, played with and changed. Whilst heavily infused with Winnicottian themes, this 
contemporary psychoanalytic theory is also similar to the Kleinian stance in important 
respects. These perspectives all reflect the implicit shift towards moral/ethical concerns 
                                                 
12  Fonagy and Target (1998) cite evidence from Beeghly and Cicchetti (1994); Cicchetti and Beeghly 
(1987); Schneider-Rosen and Cicchetti (1984, 1991).      
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that typifies current psychoanalytic discourse. They try to conceptualize the 
developmental trajectory of our human capacity to recognize mental states in others and 
to engage for example with states of hurt and suffering in the other. In these approaches 
there is emphasis on the provision of an objective/external perspective by the analyst 
and indirectly therefore they raise the issue of how to understand and formulate analytic 
objectivity. They underline the privileging of intersubjectivity and communication in 
current therapeutic practice and the focus on helping those for whom communication is 
profoundly limited and distorted by psychological difficulties. The transference 
relationship between analyst and patient becomes the arena in which these difficulties 
are played out, understood and addressed. 
 
The theory of reflective function also represents an important contribution in its own 
right not least because it opens up a very specific and important technical discussion 
about how best to work with those whose reflective capacity is seriously impaired. Here 
it brings psychoanalytic discourse closer to shared technical concerns with other 
therapies including family/systemic therapy which will be explored in Chapter 3. 
Systemic therapy has long focused on finding ways of working therapeutically with 
people who are not primarily motivated by an interest in intrapsychic insight and 
therefore not readily amenable to a classical analytic approach. In this respect reflective 
functioning could be thought of as something of a bridging concept between the two 
therapies (Donovan, 2009). The pivotal status of the theory of reflective functioning 
also rests on the fact that it offers a developmental psychological perspective on why 
some people have greater reflective functioning capacity which, as we shall see, in the 
case of systemic therapy is couched in terms of the concept of reflexivity. This common 
ground between psychoanalytic and systemic discourse, anchored in the concept of 
reflective functioning/reflexivity is important within the overall argument of this study 
and is particularly important for the endeavour in Part 111 to connect the therapeutic 
concept of reflexivity with its social theoretical formulation. This in turn will serve as 
the basis for thinking about an adequate conceptualization of the moral/ethical ethos of 
psychotherapeutic engagement in both therapies. My argument will be that 
psychotherapy can serve as a reflexive resource in personal and social contexts, helping 
to increase reflexive capacities which facilitate participation in spheres of discursive or 
reflexive communication as characterized in Habermas’ theory of communicative 
ethics. As a prelude to all of this, Chapter 2 now considers current formulations of 
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moral/ethical themes in psychoanalytic discourse. In essence my argument is that whilst 
recent contributions indicate recognition of the need for a more satisfactory engagement 
with the moral/ethical landscape in which psychotherapists operate, they fail to engage 
convincingly with the shift described in Chapter 1, from individual to relational themes, 
and thus fail to engage with the radical potential that it represents.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Psychoanalytic thinking and practice: the moral question  
 
 
An historical perspective on the moral question in psychoanalysis 
 
We have seen that the shift from classical psychoanalysis to the object relations 
tradition implicitly brings moral/ethical themes and concerns into the foreground and I 
will now consider to what extent psychoanalytic discourse conceptualizes these 
concerns explicitly. I begin by considering the deep seated historical ambivalence 
towards moral/ethical themes in the psychoanalytic tradition and the context for this 
ambivalence before moving on to explore the parameters of contemporary ethical 
debate including the postmodernist influences that permeate current thinking. My 
argument is that whilst recent contributions indicate recognition of the need for a more 
satisfactory engagement with the moral/ethical landscape in which psychotherapists 
operate, they fail to engage convincingly with the shift described in Chapter 1, from 
individual to relational themes, and thus fail to engage with the radical potential that it 
represents. 
 
In essence the dominant view within psychoanalysis has been to regard the field of 
morality as outside its concern (Chazan, 2001, p. 182). It is not surprising therefore that 
“psychoanalytic theory and the forms of therapy that have grown from it, or in reaction 
to it have not had a great deal to say explicitly about ethics and values” (Palmer Barnes 
and Murdin, 2001, p. 2). The historical precursor to this gap in theorizing can be found 
in Freud’s own critical and sometimes cynical perspective on morality and ethics:  
“Ethics are remote from me….I do not break my head very much about good and evil, 
but I have found little that is “good” about human beings on the whole.” 1 He made little 
distinction between ethics and morality and had no inclination to explore in depth the 
question of the validity of moral judgments (Hartmann, 1960). At best he might have us 
follow the principle: “Be as moral as you can honestly be and do not strive for ethical 
                                                 
1  Letter from Sigmund Freud in Meng, H. & Freud, E. L. (Eds.) (1963) Psychoanalysis and faith: the 
letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister, New York, Basic Books. ( pp. 61-2), quoted in Meissner, 
2003, p. 5. 
40 
perfection.” 2 As Chazan (2001) reflects, much of this was due to his preoccupation 
with the role played by an excessively harsh superego in the aetiology of his patients’ 
disorders. Strands of Freud’s theory raised serious challenges to the moral thinking of 
his time and were at odds with the Kantian view that moral actions are performed out of 
a sense of duty towards the moral law.3 His clinical experience led him to believe that it 
was impossible psychologically to act as Kant suggested, that is out of respect for duty 
which presents itself as obedience to a moral law that is universally binding. In the first 
instance the pleasure principle’s governance of the psychic apparatus appeared to entail 
an egoistic hedonism that shed doubt on the notion of concern for the other for its own 
sake. Whilst Freud considered the ability to love as a criterion for mental health, he 
considered it impossible to love one’s neighbour as oneself (ibid.). Secondly his 
explanation of morality in terms of the superego suggested an ethical relativism that did 
not easily sit alongside attempts to adjudicate between rival moral standards. These 
were seen to vary systematically in line with factors such as child development and 
sociocultural context.  
 
Wallwork (1991) reflects that the body blow to traditional ethics wrought by these and 
other psychoanalytic doctrines are sometimes seen as being at least partly responsible 
for the culture of narcissism evident in modern western societies.4 Some of Freud’s 
interpreters drew the conclusion that his theory made ethical reflection pointless, as 
genuine moral conduct was impossible given his account of drives as causal 
components of human action and his related account of the superego (ibid.). Allied to 
this, the first generation of psychoanalysts tended to distance themselves from ethical 
reflection because of their positivist conviction that psychoanalysis should aim to be a 
value neutral science, free from the distortion of moral values. (Hartmann,1960). In 
clinical terms this was represented in the analytic stance of anonymity and abstinence 
that could be seen to mirror the natural scientist’s detachment from his or her subject 
matter. Within psychoanalytic culture all of this contributed to a pejorative attitude 
towards ethics that had become deeply entrenched by the 1950s despite the contribution 
of a minority of writers such as Rieff ([1959]1979) and Hartmann (1960) who 
endeavoured to articulate ethical themes in psychoanalysis. Others, notably Fromm 
                                                 
2  Letter from Sigmund Freud in Hale, N. G. (Ed.) (1971) James Jackson Putnam and psychoanalysis, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. ( p. 122), quoted in Wallwork, 1991 p. 243. 
3  See Chapter 4  pp.  95-6. 
4  See Lasch (1978) for example, and Chapter 8 (pp. 203-7) below for Giddens’ (1991) critique of Lasch.     
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([1941]2004, [1947] 1999)5 and Adler (1961), broke ranks with the classical 
psychoanalytic tradition in order to develop a theory that allowed space for ethical 
reflection but their work has had little impact within mainstream clinical psychoanalysis 
in the UK.             
 
Notwithstanding Freud’s marked reticence as a moral theorist he recognized that 
psychoanalytic practice itself depended on a moral pact between analyst and analysand 
with reciprocal obligations and duties on both sides. Psychoanalysis was in effect 
underpinned by an “ethic of honesty” (Reiff, [1959]1979). Analysands were expected to 
speak as truthfully as possible even about very shameful matters and to keep their 
promise in a minimal sense by, for example, coming to sessions regularly, paying for 
them and so on. Freud also recognized that the analysand must begin to take “moral 
responsibility” for disavowed fantasies, motives and action. In turn the analyst was 
guided by ethical standards such as confidentiality, respect for the patient and 
truthfulness. These ethical standards made psychoanalytic treatment possible. “The 
great ethical element in psycho-analytic work is truth and again truth and should suffice 
for most people. Courage and truth are of what they are mostly deficient”.6 As Meissner 
(2003) points out, what Freud has in mind here is not simply honesty and truth between 
analyst and patient but that of the patient to and about him/herself.  
 
The gap in analytic thinking between the anti moral ethos of classical psychoanalytic 
theory and the fundamentally moral aspects of analytic practice is striking (Wallwork, 
1991). Furthermore, Freud’s anti moralist stance with respect to duty based Kantian 
ethics is by no means the whole story of his engagement with ethics. In his detailed 
philosophical examination of ethical themes in Freud’s work, Wallwork observes a 
more complex picture and notes that Freud is in fact very respectful towards key 
emphases in Kantian moral philosophy notably the centrality of respect for individual 
autonomy (ibid., p. x). Similarly Fonagy (2005) reflects that the classical psychoanalytic 
                                                 
5  Erich Fromm, was also associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theory. However having become 
increasingly estranged from the thinking of the first generation critical theorists, he left the Institute of 
Social Research at Frankfurt University in 1939. The Freudian revisionist and humanistic stance 
associated with Fromm is critiqued by Marcuse (1955b) for what he perceived to be its removal of libido 
theory and other radical concepts from Freudian theory. See Held (1980) pp. 110-5 for overview of the 
Fromm/Frankfurt School debate.          
6  Letter from Sigmund Freud in Hale, N. G. (Ed.) (1971) James Jackson Putnam and psychoanalysis, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. (p. 171) quoted in Meissner, 2003, p. 10.  
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view which is “rooted in a Kantian philosophical tradition holds that striving towards 
autonomy and the reign of reason is the key to being human” (p. 135). Arguably, the 
lack of overt theorizing about ethics means that this more complex engagement with 
moral/ ethical themes gets overlooked. Continuity with traditional Kantian based moral 
thinking also gets overlooked, even as the abstract individualistic bias of this 
philosophical outlook infuses the psychotherapeutic field, notably in the emphasis 
placed on individual autonomy as the core value in psychotherapy (Holmes and 
Lindley, 1989). The emergence of the object relations orientation with its increased 
focus on relational themes, that distinguishes it from the classical tradition, undoubtedly 
signalled an implicit engagement with what would normally be termed moral/ethical 
concerns as we have seen. However this was not in fact accompanied by any historically 
significant shift towards explicit theorizing of moral/ethical themes and the positivist 
ethos of the classical tradition with its sharp divide between ethics and what was seen as 
value neutral scientific enquiry persisted. 
 
It is true that Kleinian psychoanalytic theory has resonated for theorists interested in 
making links between psychic and social phenomena. But here, Wallwork’s (1991) 
observation regarding the Freudian tradition also applies, namely that most of this 
literature comes from psychoanalysts and sociologists whose primary concern has been 
to draw normative implications from psychoanalysis for evaluating social phenomena 
and ”not with understanding how psychoanalytic findings relate to the deepest questions 
of philosophical ethics” (p. 2). The observation by Samuels’ (1993) regarding the gulf 
between depth psychology in the academy and depth psychology in the clinic, which as 
he notes is especially pronounced in the UK and North America, also merits attention 
here. He reflects that it is academic depth psychology and not the clinical version that 
“seems more at home with an insertion into the political field” (p. 5).7 He is also very 
critical of attempts to employ object relations thinking derived from clinical work with 
individuals or small groups to engage with social, cultural and political themes. What he 
describes as the object relations “consensus” straddling the work of Klein and Winnicott 
comes under particular scrutiny. Whilst Samuels accepts that this object relations 
psychoanalytic stance may help us to make sense of how a person relates to their social 
world for example in terms of paranoid schizoid or depressive functioning, he does not 
                                                 
7  Samuels’ definition of what constitutes academic depth psychology is very broadly based to include 
contributions from other theoretical discourses, for example, Habermas’ writings on psychoanalysis.      
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think that it helps us makes sense of society itself and is deeply critical of the 
psychological reductionism evident when attempts are made to use object relations 
theory in this way:  
 
The assumption that a good- enough environment is all that innate potential of 
an individual requires to flower, and that this is determined within the nuclear 
family and in the first months of life, is hopelessly passive in the face of 
problematic social and political structures……..well being may not be 
achievable in a society characterized by alienation. The time-honoured values of 
humanistic ethics are not free of political bias and complicity in the construction 
of an oppressive and conformist society. (1993, p. 271) 
This issue of psychological reductionism is among the most persistent criticisms 
levelled at psychoanalysis and I shall return to it in Part 111 when I locate 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in a dialogue with critical social theory.8 Here, my 
focus remains on the problematic status of ethics within clinically oriented 
psychoanalytic discourse and the historical failure to articulate an ethical stance in both 
the classical and object relations traditions under the guise of a value neutral natural 
science.  
 
 
Contemporary contributions to moral/ethical debate in psychoanalysis  
 
In recent times the historical and deep seated ambivalence towards ethics within 
psychoanalytic discourse has been overtaken by a growing literature in the wider 
psychotherapeutic field that includes contributions by some writers with a 
psychoanalytic background (Hill and Jones, 2003; McFarland Solomon and Twyman, 
2003; Palmer Barnes and Murdin, 2001). This literature is predominantly focused on 
ethical issues relating to the professional regulation of psychotherapy and much of its 
momentum comes from changes in social attitudes since the 1980s onwards:  
 
In the 1980s, attitudes were changed and the emphasis moved from the 
practitioner who was offering the service to the rights of citizens receiving 
it….Professionals who had assumed that they knew what was best for the patient 
began to have to explain what they were doing and why, both to their colleagues 
and to the public. (Palmer Barnes and Murdin, 2001, p.1) 
 
                                                 
8  See Chapter 7 pp. 164-70.  
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One of the more interesting features of this emerging literature is that, implicitly it 
encourages acknowledgement of common ground across traditional, rigidly held 
divides, notably between psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology.9 This is not 
surprising for once ethical themes in psychotherapy are disentangled from their 
traditional fusion with method and technique, then common ground across traditional 
ideological divides in the therapy world also becomes more apparent, as this study will 
demonstrate in the case of psychoanalytic and systemic therapeutic orientations. The 
tentative integrative ethos evident in this newly emerging ethical debate is therefore of 
interest even if one needs to be cautious about exaggerating its significance and 
cognizant of the fact it may also herald newly developing alliances and schisms in the 
complex political discourse of professional organizations.  
 
Leading contributors to this debate bring with them extensive experience of the 
workings of professional codes of ethics and practice, ethics committees, complaints 
procedures and a range of other matters relating to professional regulation. This 
experience and concern with professional ethics firmly establishes the overall tone for 
debate as does the perceived need for psychotherapy to comply with contemporary 
expectations around professional responsibility and consumer rights. In the words of 
two contributors to this debate, the need which they address, relates to “society’s 
interest in the provision of right conduct in analytic clinical practice” and “growing 
public concern about such issues as professional misconduct, breaches of 
confidentiality, and duties of care including child protection” (McFarland Soloman and 
Twyman, 2003, p. ix). There is no doubt that this emerging debate speaks to an 
appreciative audience of clinicians, who may find themselves facing stressful ethical 
dilemmas relating for example to the breaking of confidentiality in situations where 
their client, or perhaps the client’s child, appears to be at risk of harm, or where they 
may have concerns about the working practices of a professional colleague. These are 
                                                 
9  The founder of analytical psychology was Carl Jung, a Swiss psychiatrist who collaborated with Freud 
for a number of years up to 1913 when personal and conceptual differences resulted in their estrangement. 
Amongst other things, Jung disagreed with Freud over the nature of libido and with what he perceived as 
Freud’s exclusively sexual interpretation of human motivation. He also saw Freud’s approach to the 
psyche as overly mechanistic and causal. The divide between psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical 
psychology has persisted to this day but it is also the case that the latter has borrowed heavily from 
psychoanalysis particularly in the area of analytic clinical technique and in understanding developmental 
processes in infancy and childhood (Samuels et al., 1986). The term “depth psychology” which refers to 
psychology that addresses the deeper layers of the psyche namely the unconscious, encompasses both 
psychoanalysis and analytical psychology. For a brief account of the Freud/ Jung dispute see Samuels et 
al.(1986) pp. 118-22. For more general commentary see Fordham (1995); Glover (1950); Samuels (1985). 
45 
situations that induce high levels of personal stress and anxiety and it is important not to 
minimize the significance of contributions to the literature which speak to these very 
real dilemmas faced by clinicians. Nonetheless there are serious problems and 
limitations with the current parameters of ethical debate, including its exclusive and 
restrictive preoccupation with professional ethics, which need to be addressed.  
 
What is most striking about this debate as it is currently formulated is its marginal status 
in wider psychotherapeutic discourse; the marked absence of a broader engagement 
with moral/ethical and political themes beyond the sphere of professional micro ethics 
and the sparseness of dialogue with social and philosophical perspectives that might 
broaden the debate and ground it at a deeper level. The impoverished quality of 
theoretical discussion that emerges from this restrictive context is striking even in the 
recent contributions to the literature, mentioned above, which show some awareness of 
these difficulties. Strawbridge (2003) notes that the marginal status of ethics is also 
evident in the way this subject is approached on psychotherapeutic training courses. 
Codes of ethics are presented to trainees but are rarely debated or critiqued in any depth. 
It is as if psychotherapy lacks the conceptual scaffolding for this to be possible. 
Discussion concerning ethical dilemmas is conducted against the backdrop of 
overarching legal or quasi legal ethical codes or frameworks whose own legitimacy is 
generally taken for granted. Issues relating to ethical standards are presented in a 
manner that reinforces their status as external to the actual process of therapy and thus 
implicitly reinforces their marginal status in the overall process of therapy. The 
pervasive influence of the positivist stance in psychotherapy favours emphasis on 
technical competence and a reliance on therapeutic method and technique. In 
Strawbridge’s words; “adopting a natural science model of psychology, with its 
technical expertise model of practice, encourages avoidance of ethical and political 
debate…. It militates against viewing therapy as a fundamentally ethical activity” 
(2003, p. 5, her emphasis). In this climate the subject of ethics is addressed in a way that 
can all too easily reinforce the uncritical reification of certain codes and frameworks in 
the absence of clarity or even interest concerning the underlying conception of morality 
from which such codes derive. Yet without this deeper level of debate it is difficult to 
see how the subject of ethics can escape its marginal status, move beyond the preserve 
of those with specialist knowledge or interest in professional regulation and evolve into 
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a more vibrant and meaningful discourse that is seen as integral to the therapeutic 
endeavour.  
  
In the past decade a significant feature of two collections of papers on the subject of 
ethics in psychotherapy, is that they both straddle the historical divide between 
psychoanalytic and Jungian analytic perspectives, (McFarland Solomon and Twyman, 
2003; Palmer Barnes and Murdin, 2001) and both also show signs of wishing to move 
beyond the historically restrictive engagement with ethics within psychotherapeutic 
discourse, not least by adopting a stance of recognizing ethics as integral to the 
therapeutic process. Both collections also take as their starting point the recognition that 
adhering to ethical codes is not synonymous with ethical practice and that one can stay 
within an ethical code whilst behaving unethically. However despite their more 
expansive approach to the subject it is striking that both collections fail to develop 
significantly new thinking beyond a series of short and fragmented contributions that 
convey each author’s personal perspective but without any overarching or unifying 
argument that might push the debate forward. Neither collection succeeds in 
transcending the restrictive discourse of professional ethics. In both the paucity of 
engagement with philosophical perspectives is striking as is the difficulty in establishing 
a creative dialogue with philosophical perspectives, including some postmodernist 
contributions, that are fleetingly considered. Yet both collections undoubtedly offer a 
revealing snapshot of the current state of ethical debate in psychotherapy and, as such, 
warrant attention. I begin by exploring how ethics and morality are defined in this 
literature and how the assumptions evident at this level permeate the entire debate.  
 
In the introduction to this study, it was noted that the terms ethics and morality are used 
interchangeably in psychotherapeutic discourse and I have essentially used them in a 
similar fashion. In Palmer Barnes and Murdin’s collection they include a paper by 
Richard Rowson, a philosopher with expertise in professional ethics who writes that no 
significant distinctions can be made between the two terms: “they are used 
interchangeably to refer to general ideas of right and wrong behaviour, good and bad 
states of affairs” (2001, p. 6). Whilst quoting Rowson, the editors nonetheless qualify 
his position, adding that in common usage the difference between these terms is that 
“morals are usually seen as the system adopted by an individual whereas ethics is the 
science of morality and duty” (pp. 1-2). Contributors to their book show a strong 
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preference for the term ethics which appears in the title of several essays. In McFarland 
Solomon and Twyman’s collection there is further engagement with this question of 
definition. Twyman, a psychoanalyst, writes that the term ethics is used in two ways, 
firstly as a set of rules or ways of thinking that guide, or claim authority to guide actions 
of a particular group, as in a professional code of ethics. In the second sense, ethics is 
used to denote the “systematic study of thinking about how we ought to act” (p. 15). 
Again a strong preference for the term ethics is implicit in her account. Acknowledging 
the interconnection of the two terms she adds: “morality can, however, in common 
usage be seen to carry a loading of a stern set of duties that require us to subordinate our 
natural wishes in obedience to a moral law, and is often seen to carry a religious 
connotation and to be associated with behaviour regulated by a sense of guilt” (p. 16). 
We may conclude that morality is a term not much favoured by psychoanalysts either 
historically or in the contemporary era. In his analysis of ethics and values within the 
wider psychotherapeutic field, Tjeltveit (1999) echoes this theme. Whilst also 
acknowledging that ethics and morality are used interchangeably and that no standard 
distinction exists, he declares a preference for the term ethics over morality on the basis 
that the latter,  
 
often carries negative connotations, perhaps because of its association with the 
negatively-tinged “moralizing”….  and “moralistic”. Moralistic is often used to 
refer to a narrow, conventional, simplistic, judgmental, or rigid imposition of 
ethical principles on others. (p. 31)  
 
In contrast to “morality”, “values” are very much in favour in psychotherapeutic ethical 
discourse (Holmes and Lindley, 1989; Palmer Barnes and Murdin, 2001, Tjeltveit, 
1999). Palmer Barnes and Murdin reflect that like morals, this term is often used 
interchangeably with ethics. It is used by them to highlight the assumptions we make 
about value or worth and which may scarcely be conscious for the therapist or for the 
patient: “Most of the models in use today would place a high value on such concepts as 
awareness and choice, and perhaps increasingly on responsibility and an attitude of 
concern for others” (p. 2). The emphasis on awareness and choice is noteworthy as is 
the implication in their account that responsibility and concern for the other has lacked 
the same emphasis in the past. Holmes and Lindley (1989) writing some years earlier, 
are unequivocal in emphasizing personal autonomy as the core value or principle in 
psychotherapy. They acknowledge the connection with a Kantian conception of 
morality but add that a philosophical justification of this principle is beyond the scope 
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of their discussion. Similarly, Tjeltveit (1999) observes that autonomy is the primary 
good that therapists seek for their clients and that whilst all the therapies affirm this 
value, psychoanalytic approaches are amongst those that stress it. In general, core 
values like codes of ethics in psychotherapy are presented without philosophical 
discussion or justification and without reference to the underlying conception of 
morality from which they derive. However a reading of the contemporary literature 
points to the enduring influence of the Kantian moral framework.10 This pertains in 
particular to the paradigm of solipsistic subjectivity that still pervades ethical debate 
with its emphasis on individual autonomy, even as attempts are also made to transcend 
this paradigm and engage more directly with relational themes. One of the arguments of 
this study is that we are greatly assisted in this process by understanding the moral 
philosophical thinking that underpins the individualistic orientation and by engaging 
with philosophical debates in which it is challenged.         
 
Within psychotherapeutic discourse there appears to be an underlying concern that the 
emerging debate about moral/ethical themes, reflected in the above mentioned 
contributions to the literature, potentially leads into the arena of subjectivity and 
personal belief that needs to be kept in check. This is crystallized in unease with the 
term morality which is perceived to carry such associations. Conversely the assumption 
appears to be that thinking in terms of ethics and values as distinct from morality lends 
some measure of objectivity or restraint to the debate. Arguably this restrictive 
engagement with moral/ethical themes highlights the enduring influence of positivist 
thinking in psychotherapy. Positivism argues for the application of the methods of the 
natural sciences to the social sciences and upholds a sharp split between ethics and 
science; between what is viewed as the disinterested, value neutral pursuit of knowledge 
on the one hand and the ethical framework surrounding its application in practice on the 
other hand. As Delanty (2005, p. 10) observes, positivist thinking has been under 
sustained attack for much of the 20th century from a variety of perspectives and has 
fallen out of favour not least because of developments within the natural sciences 
themselves and in the philosophy of science which challenged the positivist model of 
natural scientific enquiry. It has also been challenged by the hermeneutical tradition and 
by critical social theorists, including Habermas ([1963]1974) who from his earliest 
                                                 
10  Chapter 4  pp.  95-6. 
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writings railed against the excesses of scientific- technological rationality. As he 
observes, the sharp split between science and ethics becomes the basis for the latter to 
be subordinated to the former and for power to become increasingly invested in those 
who take up expert positions, together with the interests they serve:  
 
….no attempt at all is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens 
concerning the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt 
to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of 
society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical. (Ibid., p. 255)  
Whilst issues relating to the political dimension of the psychotherapist’s position as an 
expert in our society and the power invested in this position will be considered in 
Chapter 7, my concern here is to underline the persistent influence of positivist thinking 
in psychotherapeutic engagement with ethics. Amongst other things it is reflected in the 
split between ethics and morality with the latter carrying the weight of ambivalence 
towards the subject under discussion.               
 
The split between ethics and morality and the avoidance of engagement with the latter 
term also highlights the overall lack of systematic philosophical debate. It is noteworthy 
that in the discourse of critical social theory, theorists such as Habermas and Honneth 
have a rather different perspective on the distinction between morality and ethics, which 
has roots in the Kantian philosophical tradition. Here morality is, in Honneth’s (1995) 
words, understood as:  
 
            the universalist attitude in which one respects all subjects equally as ‘ends in 
themselves’ or as autonomous persons; ‘ethical life’, on the other hand, refers to 
the settled ethos of a particular lifeworld, and normative judgements are to be 
made about this ethos only to the extent to which it is more or less able to 
approach the demands of universal moral principles. (p. 172) 
Honneth further notes that in our times, critics of the Kantian tradition advocate 
reversing the relation of morality to ethical life by making the validity of moral 
principles dependent on historically contingent conceptions of ethical life. In Chapter 4, 
I explore Habermas’ engagement with universal moral principles in the shape of his 
discourse ethics where he addresses criticism of Kantian solipsistic individualism whilst 
retaining the Kantian universalist perspective. In Chapter 6, I will also consider 
Honneth’s development of a moral theory of recognition. In essence my argument is 
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that these theoretical positions open up rich and fruitful vistas for psychotherapy to 
explore, beyond the cul-de-sac of professional ethics. In particular they open up 
possibilities for engagement with moral/ethical themes which retain a universalist moral 
perspective and a way forward beyond the contingency of morality construed 
exclusively in terms of personal belief.  
 
 
Philosophical influences in contemporary moral/ethical debate 
 
In both collections of essays on ethics in psychotherapy discussed above, the names of 
Levinas ([1961]1969,1985, 1989) and Bauman (1993, 1997) recur, and it is clear that 
psychotherapists with an interest in ethical themes are finding in their work, some 
potential for expanding thinking about ethics. Unfortunately their engagement with 
these writers is so fleeting that it is difficult to draw conclusions from their tentative 
dialogue. Perhaps there is concern that delving too deeply into such considerations will 
take psychotherapists away from the practice based focus of their endeavour. Yet 
notwithstanding this reticence there is a sense that even minimal engagement with 
philosophical perspectives outside psychotherapy potentially enriches the restrictive 
debate about professional ethics. Lowenthal and Snell (2001) contribute an essay to 
Palmer Barnes and Murdin’s collection in which they are concerned to make links with 
Levinas’ existential thinking. They begin by referring to his idea of ethics as putting the 
other first and suggest that if this is what all relationships should strive for, then:   
 
ethics as practice is not in anyway separate from psychotherapy....To separate 
ethics from practice is fundamentally unethical. This has profound implications 
for the teaching as well as the practice of psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis is 
crucially an examination of the ethics of relationships and the primary place for 
this examination is the patient – therapist relationship. An essential question for 
the training of psychotherapists is therefore: What does it mean for the 
psychotherapist to put the patient first?  (p. 23, their emphasis)  
In their short essay, attempts by the authors to answer this question lead them to 
consider Levinas’ ideas about truth:  
 
….genuine experience in the Levinasian sense is a reaching towards a beyond, 
beyond what familiarly surrounds us. Can it therefore only be in a relationship 
where the other is put first, in dwelling with the absolutely other, that truth is to 
be found? We shall not arrive at truth if we see the beyond as something to be 
colonized and incorporated. (p. 25)  
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They regard psychotherapeutic attempts at scientific certitude, including those of Freud, 
as instances of this colonizing tendency. In contrast they tentatively suggest that one 
might characterize their own Levinasian influenced ethical position as “postmodern 
humanism” (p. 29). 
 
What implications can be drawn from this perspective for psychotherapeutic practice? 
One implication is their dismissal of ethical codes on the basis that such codes and 
associated appeals, complaints procedures and so on involve a type of knowing which is 
not about accepting the other: “The truth of the other is missed and we do not learn in a 
way that enables us to make the right decision” (p. 30). But the authors do not say much 
about what might help us make “the right decision”, ending their deliberations with the 
vague plea that we “see the other as someone we can serve and learn from” (ibid.). They 
say little about the actual process of therapeutic engagement that might encompass this 
ethical perspective. The abstraction of their thinking is unlikely to enhance the status of 
ethics in psychotherapy since it does not connect substantially with the dominant 
discourses of method and technique beyond the implication that ethics entails a certain 
attitude or disposition in one’s work, characterized as serving the other or putting the 
other first. Whilst Lowenthal and Snell are keen to distance themselves from the 
traditional emphasis on individual autonomy in psychotherapeutic discourse, their 
success in moving to a more convincingly relational frame is questionable. 
Notwithstanding the reference to “postmodern humanism” with its implication of 
something new, their stance appears on the same continuum as the traditional Kantian 
based conception of ethics that has prevailed in psychotherapy and allied “helping 
professions” notably the discipline of social work which in the past has been more 
inclined than psychotherapy to articulate its ethical stance or value base (Butrym, 1976; 
Plant, 1970; Younghusband, 1967).These formulations have tended to favour abstract 
principles such as respect for persons, as core principles of clinical practice and despite 
Lowenthal and Snell’s relational emphasis, the abstract quality of their plea that we see 
the other as “somebody we can serve” is strongly reminiscent of such Kantian 
influenced exhortations to respect others as ends in themselves.  
 
Arguably one way to move ethical debate in psychotherapy forward and to secure its 
relational stance would be to ground this debate more explicitly in the paradigm of 
communication. Throughout the psychotherapeutic literature on ethics under 
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consideration there is also evidence of theorists straining towards a different 
engagement with ethical themes, which is less focused on the individual and where the 
communicative processes that underpin psychotherapy come to the fore. This tension is 
evident in the essay by Lowenthal and Snell (2001), where for example, the authors 
reflect that one of the main problems currently with codes of ethics and complaints 
procedures is the way that truth becomes dependent on the school of psychotherapy to 
which we belong and the extent to which ethical procedures “shore up” the 
organizations that legitimize us. They note that ethics committees looking at complaints 
rarely include members outside the particular training of the person complained about, 
let alone from outside the world of psychotherapy. Yet their deliberations lead them 
towards a dismissal of codes of ethics rather than an engagement with how distorted 
processes of communication underlying professional ethical procedures might be 
challenged. Their thinking veers off into more abstract philosophical territory in which 
the link with practice is weakened. They dismiss notions of scientific certitude in 
psychotherapy but do not engage directly with the discourse of method and technique in 
which modernist notions of scientific certitude prevail. And yet, as in their reflections 
on the unrepresentative nature of complaints procedures, a recurring but poorly 
formulated theme in the literature is that of communication processes in psychotherapy 
being opened up to greater scrutiny and the need for more transparency. It is this issue 
that underpins what Bennett (2005) describes as the obsession with confidentiality in 
psychotherapy. It is reflected in the acute concern in the literature with consent 
processes, for example when a psychotherapist wishes to use confidential case material 
in published material. This is an area of communication between therapist and client 
that has come under much greater scrutiny in recent professional ethical debates with 
significant implications in practice. Yet it is as if psychotherapy lacks the conceptual 
scaffolding to engage with the full import of these ethical deliberations that relate to 
power structures in the therapeutic relationship even as it seeks to develop processes of 
communication between therapist and client in which power differentials are potentially 
addressed. 
 
Perhaps the gap in theorizing about, what we might describe as the ethics of 
communication in psychotherapy, also reflects the fact that much of the current pressure 
for change comes from outside psychotherapy in the shape of societal concern with 
consumer rights and professional accountability. Psychotherapeutic formulations of its 
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ethical stance not only struggle to connect with wider developments in psychotherapy, 
notably the relational thrust of current theory and practice. There is a sense in which it 
also struggles to keep pace with wider societal trends and developments. I am arguing 
that in order to propel ethical debate forward, we need to move from the paradigm of 
the individual to the paradigm of communication as the touchstone for ethical 
deliberation. Here, ideas about ethics become ideas about the kinds of conversations we 
might have, whether in ethics committees or in direct encounters with our clients, in 
which matters of ethical import are considered. Here, a concern with communication 
processes is no longer an aside to the main debate about abstract individually oriented 
principles. It becomes the central focus of debate. I am also arguing that in turning to 
philosophical and sociological perspectives to flesh out our thinking we need to move 
beyond the current, albeit limited engagement with postmodernist and related theories. 
We need to engage with other theoretical perspectives within social and philosophical 
theory, in which the dialectical relationship between modernist and postmodernist 
themes is elaborated in a way that speaks more clearly to the concerns and challenges of 
clinical practice. 
 
I have noted that the names of Levinas and Bauman recur in current ethical debate in 
psychotherapy and there is a sense that their writings are seen as a potential source of 
inspiration. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the essay by Lowenthal and Snell, this 
engagement is cursory, lacking a critical edge and it is difficult to draw conclusions 
about its potential. Nonetheless it is interesting to speculate that some of the problems 
which I identified in Lowenthal and Snell’s application of Levinasian thinking, notably 
its abstract quality, might be traced back to Levinas’ own work. Alford (2002) writing 
from the perspective of political theory comments on what he describes as “the great 
lack in Levinas. For all his brilliant evocation of what we owe the other, there is little 
room for conversation. There is, in other words something lonely about Levinas’ world: 
his philosophical world that is” (p. vii). Whilst Levinas’ existential perspective is not a 
direct focus in this study, I am nonetheless mentioning Alford’s critique because it 
reminds us of what is in danger of being lost or overlooked in the absence of a more 
substantive and critical dialogue with theoretical sources of inspiration.  
 
Moving beyond Levinas to Bauman, whose sociological thinking is closely linked to the 
postmodernist perspective and whose work will be addressed in Chapter 6, we find a 
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similar pattern of fleeting engagement. McFarland Solomon (2003) writes that Bauman 
speaks of the self’s ethical capacity as deriving not from shared ontological reality but 
from value and meaning which are “different, higher and unconditional”. She continues:  
 
This is a philosophical position similar in kind to Kant’s notion of the 
categorical imperative. It is the unique and non-reversible nature of my 
responsibility to another regardless of whether the other sees their duties in the 
same way towards me, that makes me an ethical being. (p. 24)  
Differences between the Kantian modernist perspective and postmodernist thinking 
about ethics are not addressed in this contribution. Twyman (2003) also makes passing 
reference to both Levinas and Bauman and considers their thinking about responsibility 
especially pertinent to the work of the psychoanalyst: “In exploring the nature of the 
concept of responsibility there is a widening of the frame which provides a freedom to 
think beyond the usual confines of ethical codes and guidelines. We are invited to 
consider more than keeping to the rules and not doing the wrong thing” (p. 20). Whilst 
this contribution is invaluable in challenging the traditional restriction of ethical debate 
in psychotherapy, it may also be said that key contributors to this debate appear to 
struggle in taking this insight forward, in developing new ways of thinking about ethics 
and finding accessible points of dialogue with postmodernist thinking. Paradoxically, 
away from the confines of explicit ethical debate which has been the focus of this 
discussion there is a richer engagement with postmodernist themes, which unfortunately 
does not translate into or appear to challenge current ethical thinking.                                                                                                          
 
 
The Postmodern perspective in psychoanalysis 
 
The 1990s heralded the arrival of a burgeoning literature within psychoanalytic 
discourse notably in North America, which focused on hermeneutical and postmodernist 
themes (Aron, 1996; Gill, 1994; Hoffman, 1991; Renik, 1993). Gabbard (1997), an 
influential psychoanalytic commentator, summarizes the unifying factor of this 
postmodern theoretical movement in psychoanalysis as one of scepticism towards 
fundamental or unquestionable truths: “In an era where constructed truths and multiple 
perspectives are the currency of psychoanalytic discourse, uncertainty is far more 
fashionable than a search for truth” (p. 22). He makes these remarks in the context of 
arguing against, what he sees as the excesses of a postmodern relativist perspective in 
psychoanalysis, which privileges the patient’s subjectivity and in the words of Goldberg 
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(1994), bids “farewell to the objective analyst”.  Predictably the postmodernist 
perspective within psychoanalytic discourse has not been without controversy but it has 
also done much to challenge the lingering positivist influence which locates 
psychoanalytic objectivity and certainty in the context of the natural science paradigm.  
 
In their lucid analysis of psychoanalytic attempts to navigate “the postmodern turn”, 
Elliott and Spezzano (1996) steer a middle course between the oppositional and divisive 
polarities of modernism and postmodernism, reminding us at the outset that modernism 
and postmodernism are “not homogeneous or unambiguous facts but only partially 
successful attempts to locate and define intellectual centers of gravity” (p.56). They 
begin their analysis with a brief overview of the three different faces of the 
modernity/postmodernity debate in general terms. Firstly, the aesthetic debate in which 
modernist attempts to uncover an inner truth are abandoned in favour of a playful 
celebration of style and surface. Secondly, attention is focused on philosophical and 
cultural concepts of modernity and postmodernity. Here postmodern theories of 
knowledge have resulted in a profound questioning of modernity’s preoccupation with 
foundations, universals and absolutes. Postmodernism signals a disengagement from the 
grand narratives of modernist philosophy and science and recognition that reason can 
come in many forms (Lyotard, 1984). The emphasis is on particularity, ambiguity and 
difference. The third area of debate differentiated in Elliott and Spezzano’s analysis is 
that concerning the personal, social and cultural aspects of postmodern society. Here the 
focus is on the way postmodernity affects the world of the self and of interpersonal 
relationships. Here the authors also draw on Bauman’s (1991) social theory in which he 
identifies postmodernity as marked by a view of the human world as irreducibly 
pluralistic with no horizontal or vertical order: 
 
Postmodernity is a self-constituting and self-propelling culture, a culture which 
is increasingly self-referential in direction. From cable TV to the information 
superhighway: postmodern culture is a culture turned back upon itself, generated 
in and through reflexive systems of technological knowledge. (Elliott and 
Spezzano, 1996, p. 60) 
Following Bauman, Elliott and Spezzano underline that modernity and postmodernity 
need not be seen as dichotomous and that in western societies modern and postmodern 
cultural forms are deployed at the same time. They also helpfully underline continuity 
between contemporary postmodernist influenced thinking in psychoanalysis and earlier 
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perspectives including that of Klein and Winnicott. In the object relations stance of 
these psychoanalytic writers, as we have seen, a relational perspective signals the 
beginnings of a shift away from the classical stance. In the latter, the secrets of the 
unconscious are uncovered in a context where knowledge is still understood primarily 
in terms of rationality and control. For Winnicott (1971) on the otherhand, knowledge 
of the self and others emerges in a “transitional space” between infant and carer. In 
Kleinian thinking there is also an understanding of the intersubjectively constituted 
nature of the self and knowledge of the self and the focus of therapeutic intervention is 
the exploration of phantasy and desire in the framework of the transference/ 
countertransference relationship. For Elliott and Spezzano these and other developments 
in post- Freudian psychoanalysis, at least signal a very tentative shift away from 
positivist scientific certitude and an engagement with “more open- ended forms of 
knowledge and of experience” (p. 75). They are not suggesting that theorists such as 
Winnicott and Klein can be read as “postmodern” but rather that the development of 
psychoanalytic theory is inevitably intertwined with the emergence of the postmodern 
world-view and culture. In response to the question whether psychoanalysis has become 
postmodern or whether a “postmodern psychoanalysis” exists, Elliott and Spezzano 
conclude that this is not the most helpful framing of the issue. Instead their suggestion is 
that self reflexivity of the kind which psychoanalysis has promoted since its emergence 
is radicalized and transformed in postmodern culture and that in recognizing this we can 
begin to appreciate the interconnection between psychoanalysis and postmodernity. In 
elaborating their argument the authors reflect that in Habermas’ ([1968]1978) reading of 
Freud it is precisely this self reflexivity which is seen as the central discovery of Freud’s 
original work.  
 
Elliott and Spezzano’s contribution carefully avoids any false polarization of 
modernism and postmodernism and reveals a nuanced recognition of continuity 
between the two perspectives within the psychotherapeutic context, which this study 
also wishes to promote. Unfortunately their balanced position is by no means 
representative of the overall tone of this debate. On the contrary it is precisely to 
challenge what they regard as reductive, divisive and dismissive positions that the 
authors make their contribution. Their attention is particularly focused on criticism of 
the postmodernist perspective in psychoanalysis which accuses it of holding to a notion 
of the self as inescapably fragmented and of leaving little hope for establishing the truth 
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about anything (Glass, 1993; Leary, 1994). For Elliott and Spezzano, postmodern 
thinking leads us to an idea of the self as decentred as distinct from fragmented. It also 
leads us to see all contributions as perspectival. Unlike critics of postmodernist thinking 
in psychoanalysis whose work they address, they do not believe this necessarily implies 
a relativist position that any psychoanalytic interpretation is as good as any other. 
However they acknowledge in passing that they share some of the concerns of Glass 
(1993) regarding aspects of Lacanian influence and similar approaches within 
postmodernist theorizing in psychoanalysis:  
 
If the identity of the self, as some post modernists assert, following the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, is imaginary- a kind of papering over of the 
indeterminacy of desire itself- then the human subject is fully desubjectivized. 
That brand of postmodernism isolates the self and argues that there is nothing 
hidden or split off in psychological experience, nothing inaccessible to 
ideological explanation. We share that concern about Lacanian and similar 
brands of postmodernism, but since Glass assumes that postmodernism is 
homogeneous he believes that all postmodernists carry this subject- destroying 
virus. (Elliott and Spezzano, 1996, pp. 61-2) 
As noted earlier Lacan ([1953]1977) was a French psychoanalyst who urged what he 
called “a return to Freud” whilst rejecting the biological aspects of Freudian theory and 
offering instead a structuralist rewriting of the latter.11 This focused on language as the 
basic structure of mental life and included the idea that the unconscious is structured 
like a language. Lacan did not regard the constitution of subjectivity in terms of a 
process of individuation nor did he see it in terms of any pre-existing subjectivity that is 
then expressed in words. Instead he regards the “subject” as constituted by language and 
culture which he refers to as the “symbolic order”. In his view “it is the world of words 
that creates the world of things” (ibid., p. 65 quoted in Frosh, 1999, p. 140). Lacan’s 
formulation of the “mirror stage” which introduces the subject to what he calls the 
“imaginary order” is another key component of his theory. This describes the formation 
of the ego through a process of identification with one’s own image. Although the infant 
lacks bodily coordination he/she recognizes him/herself in the gaze and mirroring 
responses of other people, but this image which is one of unity or wholeness contrasts 
sharply with the infant’s own experience of lack of bodily coordination. On Lacan’s 
account, the infant identifies with this “false” image of bodily unity and this in turn 
becomes associated with an imaginary sense of mastery. For Lacan the mirror stage 
                                                 
11 See Part 1, Introduction p.16.   
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shows that the ego is the result of a misunderstanding, a process of mistaken perception 
whereby the subject first becomes alienated from him/herself. Whereas the object 
relations perspective focuses on the object within a framework of need satisfaction that 
assumes the possibility of a satisfying relationship between subject and object, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis emphasises the symbolic dimension of desire. For Lacan the object can 
only be perceived when it has become separated from the infant. It represents a loss that 
can never be made good and it is this that Lacan refers to as desire. As in Freudian 
theory, the Oedipus complex is also central to Lacanian psychoanalysis and in that 
sense it represents a criticism of the shift in emphasis associated with object relations 
thinking onto the early mother/child relationship.  
 
Whilst Alford (1987) observes a certain similarity between Lacan and Habermas with 
respect to the idea of the unconscious as structured like a language, this similarity is of a 
superficial nature in the context of their sharply diverging approaches:12  
 
For Habermas, the goal of analysis - and its society-wide correlate, discourse - is 
the re-establishment of the autonomous individual on a new basis, grounded in 
the mutual recognition of self and other. The goal is to reconstruct (as Habermas 
uses the term in Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus to signify 
the transformation of a still valid perspective, in order to give it new life) 
rational individuality on a new basis. For Lacan, the goal is to show that the idea 
of rational individuality is a veil, concealing repression on the one hand, and the 
will to control on the other. To put it simply, Habermas seeks to recentre the 
subject, Lacan to decentre him or her. (Alford, 1987, p. 5)             
Earlier it was noted that in their largely sympathetic account of postmodernist 
perspectives in psychoanalysis, Elliott and Spezzano also express concern about some 
aspects of Lacanian influenced psychoanalytic thinking that relate in particular to the 
desubjectivized human subject. Whilst they do not elaborate on this theme it echoes a 
wider criticism that is succinctly summarized by Frosh (1999):   
 
If humanism is a fraud and there is no fundamental human entity that is to be 
valued in each person, one is left no way of defending the ‘basic rights’ of the 
individual, for the individual is apparently nothing more than her or his 
construction. The concept of the Real, which Lacanians propose as a third order, 
bubbling away ‘under’ the registers of the Imaginary and the Symbolic and 
fuelling them through its constant subversive threat goes some way to alleviate 
this problem. Nonetheless it must be admitted that Lacan’s position threatens 
                                                 
12  Habermas ([1985]1987b) makes a number of passing references to Lacan, in the context of his critique 
of Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist theory. 
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always to slip either into the essentialism it abhors….or into such a relentless 
structuralism that no content at all is allowed the human subject. (p. 150)        
Notwithstanding these tensions and difficulties, Lacanian psychoanalysis has 
undoubtedly exercised significant influence within academic psychoanalytic discourse, 
notably in the area of feminist psychoanalytic theory (Cixous, 1980; Irigaray, 1985; 
Kristeva, 1986), even if its influence within the UK psychoanalytic clinical context is 
less evident. Furthermore as Elliott and Spezzano’s analysis reveals, there is little doubt 
that in general terms the thinking that has emerged from psychoanalytic navigation of 
the “postmodern turn” represents a rich source of ideas. Whilst these debates are located 
at the margins of clinical discourse it might reasonably be expected that they would 
have had some impact on ethical discourse within the psychotherapeutic field. Yet as we 
seen, the influence of postmodernist forms of thought in mainstream ethical debate in 
the UK is extremely tenuous. There are a number of factors that might account for this, 
including the split alluded to earlier between academic depth psychology and the 
clinical version, and which is especially pronounced in the UK and North America. 
Thus whilst the influence of postmodernist thinking may be well established in the 
academic context, for example in the Lacanian or Neo- Lacanian thinking of writers 
such as Irigaray (1985) and Kristeva (1986), these contributions barely register in the 
clinical context where the influence of traditional object relations thinking associated 
with Klein, Winnicott and others remains dominant. Ethical debate in psychotherapy is 
firmly rooted in the clinical context and this may in part account for its lack of 
connection with debates that unfold primarily in the academy. But it is also arguable 
that lack of substantial engagement with postmodernist thinking in mainstream ethical 
debate reflects more fundamental difficulties and polarization of views.    
 
Beyond the academic/clinical split there is a wider polarization of traditional and 
postmodernist perspectives which in the clinical context is represented in the emergence 
of relational psychoanalysis in North America as a distinctive clinical tradition in recent 
decades (Benjamin, [1990]1999; Mitchell, 1988; Spezzano, 1993; Renik, 1993). Whilst 
this psychoanalytic orientation is heavily influenced by object relations thinking, it also 
sets itself apart as a separate tradition (Mitchell and Aron, 1999). Allowing for 
differences between its contributors, the hallmark of this approach is, to borrow Fonagy 
and Target’s (2003) words, “the assumption that the psychoanalytic encounter is co-
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constructed between two active participants with the subjectivities of both patient and 
analyst generating the shape and the substance of the dialogue” (p. 204). Within 
psychoanalytic discourse this orientation most clearly encapsulates postmodernist forms 
of thinking but its emergence as a distinctive therapeutic tradition also underscores 
divisions in the field and the limitations of existing mediating discourse. It is not my 
intention to explore the “relational psychoanalytic tradition” in detail since its clinical 
impact is much less pronounced in the UK context. Postmodernist and hermeneutical 
influences within systemic psychotherapy on the other hand have been at the forefront 
of mainstream developments in recent decades and will therefore be explored in Chapter 
3, as representative of postmodernist influence in the UK clinical context. However, one 
contribution that is closely associated with the relational psychoanalytic stance, which 
holds particular significance in this study, is that of Jessica Benjamin (1988, 1998, 
1999). Her writings encompass a dialogue between critical social theory, 
psychoanalysis and feminist thinking and have been influential in the development of 
Axel Honneth’s moral theory of recognition.  
 
Benjamin is noted for her contribution to thinking about the concept of intersubjectivity 
in psychoanalytic discourse and the related concept of mutual recognition which she 
sees as the core of intersubjectivity.13 For Benjamin what the various relational 
perspectives on the self within psychoanalysis share is:  
 
the belief that the human mind is interactive rather than monadic, that the 
psychoanalytic process should be understood as occurring between subjects 
rather than within the individual (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984; Mitchell, 1988). 
Mental life is seen from an intersubjective perspective. Although this 
perspective has transformed our theory and our practice in important ways, such 
transformations create problems. A theory in which the individual subject no 
longer reigns absolute must confront the difficulty that each subject has in 
recognizing the other as an equivalent center of experience. (1999, p. 184) 
She focuses on the habitual use of the term “object” within psychoanalytic discourse, 
including, for example, the object relations perspective on the internalization of 
interactions between self and objects. She sees this term “object” as symptomatic of the 
problem which a relational theory needs to address; “an inquiry into the intersubjective 
dimension of the analytic encounter would aim to change our theory and practice so that 
                                                 
13  Benjamin (1999, p. 185) links the term intersubjectivity, which has been brought into psychoanalytic 
discourse, with Habermas’ work ([1968]1978, 1970).    
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“where objects were, subjects must be” (ibid., p. 184). This is not to suggest that the 
relationship to the other as “object” is negated. On the contrary both are seen as central 
to psychic experience and to psychoanalytic thinking with one drawing attention to 
intrapsychic dimensions of experience and the other to intersubjective dimensions. 
What relational and intersubjective perspectives seek is to address “the collapse of 
subjects into objects”. Drawing on feminist perspectives she uses the early mother-
infant relationship to highlight the issues raised. In particular, she addresses the 
traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the child’s developmental achievements of 
separation and individuation which she regards as incomplete and as representing a 
denial of the mother’s subjectivity:  
 
In the ego- object perspective the child is the individual, seen as moving in a 
progression towards autonomy and separateness. The telos of this process is the 
creation of psychic structure through internalization of the object in the service 
of greater independence.….it leaves the aspects of engagement, connection and 
active assertion that occur with the mother as other in the unexamined 
background. This perspective is infantocentric. (Ibid., p.186) 
For Benjamin, intersubjectivity is a developmental achievement entailing a struggle 
between self assertion and recognition of the other, where resolution is marked by 
mutual recognition. As will become clear in my later engagement with Honneth’s moral 
theory of recognition in Chapter 6, Benjamin’s psychoanalytic perspective on 
recognition is a key building block in his elaboration of the psychological dimension of 
his moral theory.14 As such it holds a significant place in contemporary dialogue 
between critical social theory and psychoanalysis. Furthermore whilst Benjamin’s 
theory encompasses a critique of object relations thinking it can also be seen as 
maintaining continuity with this perspective and nowhere is this more evident than in 
her (1998) creative use of Winnicottion theory, in particular his thinking about the role 
of aggression in the developmental process of engaging with the object. This creative 
dialogue with traditional object relations theory is also elaborated in Honneth’s theory 
and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.  
 
Notwithstanding her close affiliation with critical theory, the relational psychoanalytic 
tradition in which Benjamin’s work is positioned, is much more commonly associated 
                                                 
14  Like Honneth (1995), Benjamin connects this concept of recognition back to Hegelian (1807) 
philosophy.   
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with postmodernist influence. Her work also maintains important continuity with 
modernist psychoanalytic perspectives as reflected in her engagement with Winnicottian 
thinking. In that sense her approach could be read as challenging any simplistic 
polarization of modernist and postmodernist contributions and any polarization of 
critical theory and postmodernist thinking. She quotes with approval Fraser’s (1991) 
comment that one does not have to choose between critical theory and postmodernism 
but rather that each can help clarify the problems of the other (Benjamin, 1998, p. 85). 
Her integrative outlook could be read as consistent with Elliott and Spezzano’s 
argument that the postmodernist perspective in psychoanalysis represents a broad 
church and should not be addressed by its critics as if it were a homogeneous entity. 
However even they acknowledge more extremist tendencies that are also evident within 
this orientation and as we have seen, they single out Lacanian influence in this respect. 
 
Gabbard (1997), a prominent psychoanalytic commentator mentioned at the start of this 
discussion, addresses in greater detail some of the more problematic aspects of the 
postmodernist perspective in psychoanalysis in a notably measured contribution that 
resists any divisive polarization of modernist and postmodernist themes and which also 
acknowledges the persuasiveness of Elliott and Spezzano’s analysis. His starting point 
is a concern that one of the excesses of the postmodernist perspective is the privileging 
of the patient’s subjectivity (Lindon,1991a, 1991b; Schwaber,1983, 1990) and he 
reiterates the argument of another commentator, Hanly (1995) that psychoanalysis 
needs to explore the possibility of an epistemology in which objectivity and subjectivity 
are integrated. For Gabbard,   
 
the origin of objectivity in the term object is often overlooked. The analyst’s 
position as an object, external to the thinking mind or subjectivity of the patient, 
offers a vantage point from which the analyst can share observations that are 
different from the patient’s by virtue of being external to the patient…. Even 
though the analyst cannot transcend the intersubjectivity of the analytic couple, 
part of that intersubjectivity involves a perspective outside that of the patient. 
(1997, p. 15) 
Gabbard singles out Benjamin’s work on intersubjectivity and recognition and Fonagy 
and Target’s model of mentalization or reflective functioning as examples of that 
psychoanalytic stance which allows for the idea of the analyst as an object external to 
the mind of the patient. Both imply “a theory of therapeutic action that emphasises the 
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analyst as a new, real object and the analysand’s appreciation of the analyst’s 
subjectivity” (ibid., p. 18). Interestingly neither of these examples of psychoanalytic 
thinking that allows for an integration of objectivity and subjectivity in Gabbard’s view, 
can be located unequivocally within the postmodernist fold. We have seen that Fonagy 
and Target’s approach stands outside the postmodernist orientation in psychoanalysis 
and is heavily influenced by earlier object relations thinking notably that of Winnicott, 
whilst Benjamin’s work is located within the postmodernist fold although her primary 
philosophical allegiance would appear to lie with critical theory and she is of course 
also indebted to Winnicottian theory.  
 
As noted above one of the major difficulties with contemporary moral/ethical discourse 
in psychotherapy generally is that very little of the complexity and richness of the 
debate arising from psychoanalytic navigation of the “postmodern turn” makes its way 
into the consideration of moral and ethical themes. Some of the key questions which 
this study wishes to raise are whether this disjuncture can be traced back to the 
limitations of the post-structuralist, postmodernist and related hermeneutical 
perspectives themselves regarding moral/ethical considerations; and whether the 
noticeable failure of postmodernist thinking to impact on mainstream ethical debate in 
psychotherapy is rooted not simply in the gulf between academic and clinical discourses 
but in a polarization of modernist and postmodernist theoretical and clinical 
perspectives and the lack of a satisfactory mediating discourse. Chapter 3 will continue 
this discussion with further exploration of clinical themes, this time focussing on the 
systemic psychotherapeutic tradition. I will draw on the example of systemic 
psychotherapy to explore issues and difficulties relating to moral/ethical concerns 
within postmodernist influenced versions of psychotherapy. I am privileging the 
systemic tradition’s engagement with postmodernist themes because, unlike 
psychoanalysis in the UK, postmodernist thinking has for sometime held a dominant 
position within systemic psychotherapeutic discourse.      
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Family/ Systemic Psychotherapy: The Postmodern Perspective 
 
 
We have seen that contributors to ethical debate in psychotherapy register their interest 
in postmodernist thinking. Wiener (2003) notes the postmodernist celebration of 
uncertainty and considers that this fits well with her own analytical approach: “The 
postmodern human condition espouses the individual state of mind and moral choices 
have to be made without the reassurance of philosophical foundations, relying rather on 
self- monitoring, and self- evaluation” (p. 132, her emphasis). But beyond a passing 
engagement we have also seen that ethical theorists in psychotherapy struggle to locate 
accessible points of dialogue with postmodernist thinking. The current situation is well 
summarized by Hill and Jones (2003):  
 
Postmodernism may well be exerting subtle influences as a result of the 
adoption of ideas such as multiple realities, co-construction of stories, and 
concerns about the question of (whose) ethics, but in terms of day- to- day 
practice, ethical thinking generally appears to remain firmly rooted in modernist 
ideas: principles and values. (p. 157, their emphasis)  
Modernist and postmodernist forms of thought become overtly polarized in the context 
of theoretical debate but more commonly they operate on separate tracks without any 
satisfactory mediating discourse. In the case of ethics the resulting difficulties are 
especially acute given the poor articulation of moral/ ethical themes in modernist 
versions of psychotherapy and which, as we shall see, is replicated in postmodernist 
influenced formulations of psychotherapy. Arguably it is only by developing a 
satisfactory mediating discourse in which ethical themes are addressed, that 
psychotherapy can find a way out of its restrictive cul de sac of professional ethics. 
Whilst hermeneutical and postmodernist influences in therapeutic discourse 
undoubtedly challenge the pseudo-objectivity of traditional psychotherapy, their failure 
to engage convincingly with the ethics of therapeutic practice weakens and undermines 
their critique. In what follows I will explore these issues as they arise in family/systemic 
psychotherapy’s navigation of the “postmodern turn”.1 
 
                                                 
1  The terms “family” and “systemic” are used interchangeably in the UK psychotherapeutic context. See 
Introduction, footnote 2, p. 1.     
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The origins and development of systemic psychotherapy 
 
Whilst Freud recognized the role of the family in the development of the individual’s 
symptoms, he made little attempt to see family members together in therapy. On the 
contrary he left a legacy of conviction that it was unhelpful and possibly dangerous to 
work therapeutically with more than one family member (Gurman and Kniskearn, 1991. 
p. 19). The reasons for this are not wholly clear from his writings but it is likely they 
related to concerns about impartiality and the potential for multiple transference and 
countertransference complications arising. Whilst many analysts accepted the 
prohibition against seeing family members together, family/systemic psychotherapy 
nonetheless emerged in the 1950s in the context of growing dissatisfaction with existing 
psychotherapeutic techniques that were primarily psychoanalytic in nature and which 
were focused on the individual. There was for example, a growing recognition that 
when one person in a family recovered from difficulties relating to their mental health, 
another member sometimes developed symptoms and also when some hospitalized 
patients were discharged to their families they were more likely to suffer a relapse than 
those living alone (Hayes, 1991). In child and adolescent mental health services, 
interventions with the family group began to be applied pragmatically against a 
background of concern that more than one child in a family was often in difficulty and 
that multiple individual treatments for one family group were uneconomic and 
impractical. The traditional focus of psychoanalytic therapy on the intrapsychic world of 
the individual was replaced by a relational focus on the family group and the 
communication patterns and sequences within this group. Individual symptoms were 
understood and addressed in the context of the family system. 
 
Initially this method of treatment, which involved seeing family members together, 
developed mainly in North America in a number of diverse locations, but by the end of 
the 1950s had formed itself into a more cohesive movement (Ackerman et al., 1967; 
Guerin, 1976; Gurman and Kniskern, 1991; Kaslow, 1980). Family therapy was deemed 
“systems” therapy or “systemic” therapy since it considered the system as a whole. It 
represented a radical departure in therapeutic treatment and was pioneered by a 
generation of therapists, many of whom had already trained within the psychoanalytic 
fold but who regarded the treatment they offered as fundamentally different from 
psychoanalysis. They also drew extensively on theoretical sources that were very 
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different from psychoanalytic theory, notably cybernetics (Wiener, [1948]1954) and 
general systems theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1968). In the years since then, the institutional 
separation of the psychoanalytic and systemic orientations has masked recognition of 
continuity between developments unfolding in each discipline. However since the 
1990s, an important debate has been gaining momentum in the systemic field which 
challenges the historically oppositional relationship between systemic and 
psychoanalytic perspectives and explores opportunities for the enrichment of systemic 
thinking through re-engagement with psychoanalytic ideas (Donovan 2003, 2005; 
Flaskas, 1996, 1997; Flaskas and Pocock, 2009; Pocock, 1997; Larner, 2000). 
Conversely it is also the case that within mental health services, particularly those for 
children, adolescents and their families, where family therapy is a key treatment 
modality, many of the core ideas of the systemic orientation have been assimilated into 
the thinking and practice of other clinicians, including those with a predominantly 
psychoanalytic training even if this is not always acknowledged.2   
 
Within the systemic field itself the emerging dialogue with psychoanalytic ideas now 
represents one of the most vibrant sources of new thinking and as indicated earlier, this 
study aims to contribute to this dialogue through exploration of ethical themes across 
the two orientations. Undoubtedly one of the key developments leading to a more 
creative engagement with psychoanalysis is the increased concern with relational 
themes in contemporary psychoanalytic approaches. This makes for a level of 
compatibility with the vigorously relational focus of systemic psychotherapy that was 
absent in the era of classical psychoanalysis. Another important trigger for interest by 
systemic theorists in psychoanalysis is the perception of common ground in the 
hermeneutic and postmodernist influences that to varying degrees now permeate both 
fields. This thinking typically finds expression in the social constructionist stance within 
systemic therapy, which will be discussed below and which emphasizes the way that 
reality inevitably grows out of our experience as language using social beings. When 
people talk to each other the world, as we know it gets constructed. This stance 
contrasts sharply with the early development of family/systemic therapy when a 
predominantly positivist outlook prevailed, with considerable investment in the idea of 
                                                 
2  See Bateman (2000) for general discussion of the frequently unacknowledged integrative tendencies in 
psychotherapeutic practice (In this discussion his specific clinical focus is integration between cognitive 
behavioural therapy and psychoanalysis).     
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the therapist’s objectivity and separation from the family systems in which he/she 
intervened. 
 
Early pioneers in the development of family therapy included Gregory Bateson (1972, 
1979), an anthropologist and philosopher who adopted ideas from Von Bertalanffy’s 
(1968) general systems theory to the study of family systems. Other founding members 
of family therapy included Don Jackson (1959, 1968) who in 1959 established the first 
family therapy centre for training, research and treatment in California. Salvador 
Minuchin (1967, 1974) was another pioneer who founded what has come to be known 
as the structural school of family therapy in Philadelphia, drawing on his experience of 
working with poor and socially disadvantaged families in which he observed extreme 
disorganization and unclear hierarchies and which became the focus for his treatment. 
Jay Haley (1971, 1976), another member of this early group of American family 
therapists, established the strategic model of family therapy. A further pivotal 
development occurred in the late 1960s when a group of Italian clinicians with 
psychoanalytic backgrounds, came together to formulate what came to be known as 
Milan systemic therapy (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1978, 1980a, 1980b), which has exerted 
considerable influence on all subsequent developments in the field.  
 
In its early years family therapy was very much in thrall to the concepts that were 
borrowed from cybernetics and general systems theory. Parallels were drawn between 
communication processes in families and information exchange processes in inanimate 
systems (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). The family was viewed as a cybernetic 
system governed by rules and homeostatic mechanisms, which the therapist sought to 
uncover with a detachment not unlike that of the natural scientist. Much attention was 
focused on the attributes of the system as a unified whole consisting of interrelated parts 
and on the processes and patterns as distinct from the content of family communication. 
As in the development of psychoanalysis, a positivist outlook prevailed. The therapist 
uncovered the implicit rules of the system from an outsider perspective and on this basis 
made strategic interventions which destabilized the system and made change possible. 
This idea of the therapist as an expert technician who could engage in the technical 
manipulation of variables to bring about change, underpins Jay Haley’s (1971) 
controversial assertion that “change really comes about through interactional processes 
set off when a therapist intervenes actively and directively in particular ways in a family 
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system and quite independently of the awareness of the participants about how they 
have been behaving” (p. 7). 
 
It is not my intention to dwell on the various methodological differences between the 
early schools of family therapy, since from the perspective of this study what is more 
important is the shared epistemological ground between them, which also sets them 
apart from subsequent developments in family therapy that occurred during the 1980s 
and later, in which hermeneutical and postmodernists influences come to the fore. What 
is important to emphasis is that during this early period, family therapy developed a rich 
repertoire of techniques for intervening with families, many of which remain in use 
today. Of these one of the most significant is the distinctive style of asking questions 
which has evolved in family therapy, and which is known as circular questioning. The 
thinking behind this technique was first developed by the Milan group of systemic 
therapists (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980a), but is now used widely in both family 
therapy and in a range of other therapeutic disciplines. This technique emerged from the 
Milan group’s application of Bateson’s (1972) ideas about circular, patterned 
relationships between elements in a system. Circular questioning (Brown, 1997; Penn, 
1982) aims to draw connections and make distinctions between members of the system 
whilst defusing strong emotions in a way that allows space for potentially helpful 
conversation to emerge. The behaviour of one person is shown to be connected to the 
behaviour of others in a circular manner rather than in a linear focus on cause and 
effect. Instead of exploring why somebody is depressed for example, a circular form of 
therapeutic questioning would be more likely to enquire about when somebody showed 
this depression and what other family members do when this is happening. Here the 
therapist is trying to construct a map of interconnections between family members that 
allows problems to be framed in new ways. During this process, family members are 
continuously exposed to feedback from others in the family. The process of questioning 
becomes a therapeutic intervention in itself rather than an exercise in information 
gathering for the therapist. Techniques such as circular questioning emerged against a 
background of engagement with cybernetics and general systems theory and whilst 
these theories have long been jettisoned, the highly effective techniques from this era of 
family therapy have not only survived but remain at the centre of contemporary 
practice.                                                 
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Postmodernist and hermeneutic influences in systemic psychotherapy  
 
By the mid 1970s a vigorous critique of the assumptions and practices of the first wave 
of family therapy, which came to be known as first order family therapy, was emerging. 
Much of this emanated from a feminist perspective and feminist writers within the field 
were instrumental in moving the systemic agenda forward (Bograd, 1984, 1999; 
Goldner, 1985; Hare-Mustin, 1978). They did so through their insistence on the 
moral/political dimensions of family life and relationships and through their exposure of 
first order therapists’ implicit engagement with a particular normative model of family 
functioning beneath the veneer of scientific neutrality. In her seminal text, The Family 
Interpreted, Luepnitz (1988) elaborates many of the criticisms of first order family 
therapy which began to emerge from the 1970s onwards. Titles of papers from that era: 
Prisons of Love: the reification of the family in family therapy, (Pearson, 1974) or 
Tricks of the Trade: questionable theory and practice in family therapy, (Whan, 1983) 
are also evocative of this critical standpoint. They reflect a deep unease with cybernetic 
epistemology and in particular the mechanistic aspects of this thinking which ripped 
family structure out of wider social structure and depoliticized human conflict in 
families with its view of the family as a self-regulatory cybernetic system. 
 
Following on from this critique, the 1980s witnessed a major shift in family/systemic 
psychotherapy from the predominantly natural scientific paradigm of earlier decades to 
a hermeneutic/social constructionist orientation and from a conceptualization of the 
therapist as technical expert to a more symmetrical formulation of the therapist/family 
relationship. The role of the therapist was no longer defined in terms of privileged 
access to definitions of change; a shift epitomized in the development of the reflecting 
processes/reflecting team perspective by a group of Norwegian family therapists led by 
Tom Andersen (1987, 1989, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1995, 1998). This approach was 
initially developed as a practice based innovation and was later elaborated within a 
theoretical framework that made strong links with hermeneutic and postmodernist 
themes. The reflecting processes/reflecting team format is now used extensively in the 
clinical training and supervision of family therapists in the UK and has exerted a 
profound influence on the field since the 1980s. 
Because of the highly complex and emotionally demanding nature of therapeutic 
intervention with whole family groups, family/ systemic therapists have tended to 
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favour a style of practice in which they work alongside a supporting team. Traditionally 
the team observed the therapy in progress from behind a one way screen and offered 
live supervision perhaps via a telephone link to the therapist or mid session discussion 
in which the therapist left the family in order to consult privately with the team. The 
central strand of the reflecting team approach was a very simple yet revolutionary shift 
in therapeutic practice. The anonymous expertise of the observing team behind the one 
way screen was replaced by a style of practice in which the team offered their thoughts 
to the therapist and family together. They did so in the shape of an evolving 
conversation amongst team members, which might happen either once or at intervals 
during the therapy session. The family and therapist listened and observed the team’s 
thinking in the making but did not participate directly, although it was anticipated this 
thinking would subsequently inform the flow of the therapy session.  
 
Nowhere was the impact of the reflecting team and related approaches more apparent 
than in the changed position of the therapist vis-à-vis the client/family. Gone were the 
old style certainties of an earlier strategic model of family therapy which held that 
change comes about through interactional processes set off when a therapist intervenes 
independently of the awareness of the participants about how they have been behaving 
(Haley, 1971, p. 7). In its place comes an emphasis on the therapist’s joining with the 
client/family system in conversations that have an indeterminate outcome. This practice 
based reflecting team development was perhaps the most tangible sign of a changing 
culture of ideas within the field and it is not surprising that when those who initiated 
this development looked for a conceptual framework in which to explore and develop 
their thinking, they turned to hermeneutics and postmodernism. This is notably 
represented in the writings of Tom Andersen, the best known exponent of the reflecting 
team approach, who uses the hermeneutic circle as a paradigm for exploring the 
dynamics of reflecting team conversations and draws together hermeneutic and social 
constructionist strands of thinking in his work as in the following:  
  
Gadamer says we are inevitably prejudiced when we meet with a person we are 
to understand; we have started to understand them even before we meet him/her. 
Gadamer used the work prejudice and Heidegger used the work 
“preunderstanding” for this. Some people assume (have brought with them a 
preunderstanding) that what a person says and does is generated from an “inner 
core” of the person….An alternative preunderstanding to that of an inner core is 
that the center of a person is outside the person- in the conversations and 
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language the person takes part in. The other person will be best understood by 
concentrating on his/her conversations and language. (Ibid., p. 12) 
Alongside the reflecting team perspective a second manifestation of what might loosely 
be termed the postmodernist turn in systemic psychotherapy, was the growing influence 
of the narrative metaphor and the development of narrative therapy. This approach is 
most closely associated with an Australian family therapist Michael White (1984, 1995, 
1997, 1989, 1990), whose theory was influenced by the work of Michel Foucault 3 and 
whose formulation of the narrative approach has been extremely popular in recent 
times. In his work, White takes up Foucault’s idea of the intimate relationship of power 
and knowledge and the extent to which power comes to be exercised through 
knowledge. Dominant discourses are established which censor and marginalize other 
discourses and ways of understanding. White’s concern is the way this social context 
impacts on individual lived experience and to this end he attaches Foucauldian ideas to 
the metaphor of narrative. He then considers how our individual dominant stories about 
ourselves have been shaped by familial, interpersonal and social contexts and how these 
stories restrain us from exploring and knowing other versions of ourselves and our 
experience. In Flaskas’ (2002) words, “therapy thus becomes a process of 
deconstructing dominant stories and reconstructing alternative narratives which free up 
the possibility of difference and change” (pp. 44-5). Clients are encouraged to locate the 
problem outside the self and helped develop creative strategies for counteracting its 
effect.4 As Flaskas observes, White’s work represents a very selective and idiosyncratic 
interpretation of Foucauldian thinking. It is also fair to say that his particular 
interpretation of Foucault has not been at the forefront of systemic engagement with his 
work where the focus has been on clinical issues and in particular White’s techniques 
around deconstructing dominant narratives in conversations with clients.5 
 
A third and related strand within postmodernist influenced contemporary approaches in 
systemic therapy is the contribution of two American therapists, Harlene Anderson and 
Harry Goolishian (1988, 1992) who formulated what has come to be known as the 
collaborative language systems approach and which they characterize as postmodern 
                                                 
3  See Chapter 5  pp. 117-25.  
4  This practice of externalizing the problem and relating to it as if to an external entity was famously 
devised by White (1984) in treating children suffering with encopresis. 
5  Flaskas (2002) singles out an article by Fish (1993) as a rare exception in this neglect of White’s 
engagement with Foucault.   
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therapy. Social constructionist thinking plays a central part in the development of their 
model and their account of the social constructionist perspective has become a key 
reference point for practitioners in the field. Their work is heavily influenced by the 
theory of an American social psychologist Kenneth Gergen (1991, 1994) and during the 
1990s his writings also emerged as a major reference point for social constructionist 
thinking in systemic discourse. In essence, Gergen’s work underlines the primacy of 
language in the construction of the world as we know it and the primacy of relationship 
as the generative context in which this process of social construction unfolds. Included 
in this is a perspective on the social construction of the self and a rejection of the idea of 
an irreducible inner reality as represented by such words as cognition or emotion. Our 
descriptions are viewed not as maps of reality but as the products of our communal 
exchange. In the work of Anderson and Goolishian, this translates into an understanding 
of “problems” in therapy as constructions in language, whilst the therapy itself is 
framed as a “problem dis-solving system” (1988). They adopt the metaphor of therapy- 
as- conversation and the idea of the therapist as taking an “unknowing” stance in the 
work. The process of therapy becomes one of collaborative conversation in which new 
meanings and narratives might emerge. The ethos of this approach is about the therapist 
adopting a position of uncertainty, non directiveness and being client led.  
 
As in my earlier discussion of first order systemic psychotherapy, I do not intend to 
focus on differences between these systemic approaches that have evolved since the 
1980s and which are often referred to as second order therapy. What is of primary 
interest here is the shared post-structuralist, postmodernist and hermeneutical backdrop 
to these approaches, which separates them from earlier modernist formulations of 
family therapy that drew on cybernetics and general systems theory. Second order 
perspectives are, as Tomm (1998) notes, marked by a shift from the idea of the family 
as an observed system to an idea of therapy as the observing system. The influence of 
observing is seen as recursive and the therapist is seen as an integral part of the 
relational field that constitutes the therapy system. Reflexivity emerges as a key 
concept, understood essentially in the dictionary sense as “the bending or folding back 
of a part upon itself ” (Hoffman, 1993, p. 126). In the reflecting team format for 
example, the team of therapists is no longer a protected species, observing the family 
anonymously from behind a one-way screen. Now the family has the opportunity to 
reflect back on the team’s reflections in a recursive spiral. The ethos is in Hoffman’s 
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words, one of “making the expert disappear” (ibid., p. 127). For her the concept of 
reflexivity is at the heart of collaborative second order approaches and she underlines 
that it implies an ideal of partnership:  
 
To me the word implies that there is an equity with regard to participation even 
though the parties may have different positions or different traits…..one might 
say that the formats that are most characteristic of this new approach all “fold 
back upon themselves” .The developments around the reflecting team, the use of 
reflecting conversations and reflexive questioning, the prevalence of “co-” 
prefixes to describe a therapeutic conversation (“co-author”, “co-evolve”) 
indicate a preference for a mutually influenced process between consultant and 
inquirer as opposed to one that is hierarchical and unidirectional. In particular, 
this approach calls into question the high- level status of the professional. (Ibid. 
pp. 126-27) 
As part of the growing interest in reflexivity, the systemic technique of reflexive 
questioning was also formulated during the 1980s (Tomm, 1987a, 1987b). In certain 
respects it represented a development of the first order practice of circular questioning 
formulated by the Milan group whilst at the same time locating the concept of 
reflexivity firmly within systemic methodology. For Karl Tomm, the family therapist 
who elaborated reflexive questioning, reflexivity is that which draws attention to 
processes in which one is both performing and at the same time audience to one’s own 
performance. Within the therapeutic context he characterizes it as a process of helping 
to make connections between different levels of meaning in families (1987b). An 
example of reflexive questioning by the therapist might be a line of enquiry that very 
deliberately concentrates attention on the future and in so doing implicitly triggers in 
families, stuck in problem saturated past and present lives, the thought that it might 
actually be possible to create a future involving choices and alternatives. One of the 
arguments of this study which I develop in Part 111, is that the concept of reflexivity 
and the endeavour to embed it within therapeutic discourse  represents a key 
methodological development whose full potential has yet to be recognized and 
explored. Arguably this is impeded because of its entanglement with the postmodernist 
therapeutic stance. Unfortunately within systemic discourse, postmodernist and 
hermeneutical thinking tends to slide away from issues of method and technique in a 
context that idealizes the therapeutic encounter as a collaborative, “co- constructed” 
engagement between equals. It also slides away from ethical issues in a context that 
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privileges diversity and difference and I will now consider these difficulties more 
closely in the case of the reflecting team approach.                            
 
 
Ethics and hermeneutic/ postmodernist influenced systemic psychotherapy 
 
Within second order, postmodernist influenced therapeutic perspectives outlined above, 
the therapist is embedded in the process of therapy to a degree that is as far removed 
from the first order cybernetic analogy as it is possible to imagine. As such they could 
be seen as the successful culmination of a lengthy process of discarding the excesses of 
an earlier objectivistic era in family therapy. Reimers (2000) describes this vividly:  
 
As practitioners we should never forget some of the excesses that preceded the 
postmodern challenge. Clients were often seen as people whose strategies had to 
be outwitted. Military and boxing metaphors proliferated, and unseen teams 
were used to help the therapist deal with both compliant and defiant families 
(e.g. Papp, 1980). Functional families were often distinguished from 
dysfunctional families as sheep from goats. (2000, pp. 24-5)  
Viewed from this perspective, the second order postmodernist influenced contribution is 
indeed immense. However a question at the heart of this study is whether the scales 
have moved too far in the opposite direction whilst retaining the difficulties of an earlier 
era regarding the conceptualization and justification of the normative/ethical dimension 
of psychotherapeutic intervention. First order family therapy operated within a natural 
science paradigm which upheld a clear divide between science and ethics; between what 
was viewed as the disinterested and value neutral pursuit of knowledge on the one hand 
and the ethical framework surrounding its application in practice on the other hand. In 
the case of psychoanalysis we have considered the marginalization of ethical debate 
which this positivist orientation entailed. This was replicated in the case of first order 
family therapy until it was challenged by the feminist influenced critique of the 1970s 
and 80s. However what is most striking in the present context is that the radical 
paradigm shift following on from this critique, has done so little to challenge the 
marginalization of ethical debate in systemic discourse and the associated diversion into 
a narrow preoccupation with professional codes of ethics.6  
 
                                                 
6  In Part 11, I will argue that, what we might describe as a refusal of conceptualization around ethics in 
the contemporary psychotherapeutic field can be linked to the hermeneutical, post-structuralist and 
postmodernist strands of influence within psychotherapy since the 1980s. 
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Inger and Inger (1994) talk about the personal ethical crisis that propelled Tom 
Andersen towards initiating the reflecting team approach, namely his personal unease 
with the hierarchical nature of existing practice. Early commentators on the reflecting 
team approach are also keen to emphasize the ethical significance of this way of 
working. In Hargens’(1990) words it, “entails some kind of deep respect for people 
based on some kind of ethics- often a neglected or overlooked issue when working ‘this 
way’” (p. 13). What can be gleaned from Andersen’s own writings about the “kind of 
ethics” that his work entails? In fact there is little explicit engagement with ethics as 
such, something that Andersen (1993) himself appears to acknowledge in asking if 
“maybe an identification of our ethical standards ought to be the most important issue 
we reflect on” (p. 311). Hargens is right to draw attention to the value base of “deep 
respect for people” identifiable in the reflecting team and related therapeutic 
approaches, which draws sustenance from postmodernist influenced thinking in 
psychotherapy regarding “relativism in expressions of identity” (Gergen and Kaye, 
1992, p. 179) and “uniqueness of each individual client’s narrative truth” (Anderson and 
Goolishian, 1992, p. 30). But for those who undertook prior clinical training particularly 
in the allied discipline of social work, during an era when modernist thinking prevailed, 
such phrases as “respect for persons” and “uniqueness” are also evocative of an ethical 
stance that was heralded as constituting the value base of clinical work at that time and 
which was explicitly grounded in the modernist philosophy of Kant (Butrym, 1976). 
However this continuity is rarely if ever acknowledged.  
 
Speed (1996), writing about the implications of the move to second order thinking and 
practice in systemic therapy, touches on the confusing sense of déjà vu that can result:  
 
            Some of the ideas of Hoffman (1993) and Anderson and Goolishian (1992) seem 
to overlap with what many of us learned years ago in our social work courses. 
The relationship once again is central …..Empathy once again becomes 
respectable, along with positive regard, respect, a non-judgmental stance, 
silence, tentativeness on the therapist’s part. (p. 115)  
Yet as Speed also points out, one of the main reasons that many clinicians undertook 
further training as family therapists was precisely to acquire technical skills that might 
deepen and enhance their work beyond a narrow preoccupation with the therapeutic 
relationship. Her observation serves as a reminder of the extensive repertoire of skills 
and expertise in working therapeutically with families that accumulated during the era 
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of first order systemic thinking and practice. The postmodern perspective is rightly wary 
of the technocratic impulse in first order perspectives. However, the danger arises that 
psychotherapeutic approaches which minimize knowledge and expertise risk obscuring 
the potentially authoritarianism of a therapy that hides its expertise in ‘unknowingness’ 
and supposed equality. Beyond this also lies the danger that minimizing technical 
expertise and knowledge may ultimately undermine the impact of therapy through the 
erosion of taken for granted first order expertise. Here one is reminded of Fonagy and 
Target’s (2003) acerbic remark regarding the postmodernist influenced relational 
psychoanalytic tradition: “While interpersonal-relational theorists have successfully 
established that psychoanalysis is an inherently interpersonal enterprise they have failed 
to demonstrate that the interaction of two people on an equal footing is a valid form of 
therapy” (p. 229).  
 
In Tom Andersen’s writings there is a telling example of the difficulty that arises once 
the anchor of first order certainty in family therapy is loosened. This occurs when 
Andersen (1993) suggests that “maybe we should encourage only those who are 
currently able to listen and see each other without interrupting to come to “therapy” and 
let those who are not ready to do so eventually join later” (p. 310). From a therapeutic 
perspective this is wholly unrealistic given the challenging clinical contexts in which 
therapists work. It points to a therapeutic perspective that is overly in thrall to a model 
of conversation and dialogue unfolding against a background consensus. It introduces a 
note of caution into clinical practice which contrasts sharply with the pioneering spirit 
of first order family therapy that was so effective in extending the reach of 
psychotherapy to those not readily amenable to traditional insight oriented 
psychoanalytic intervention. Here it is difficult not to make comparisons with first order 
family therapists such as Salvador Minuchin (1967, 1974) who had no hesitation in 
introducing new ways of communicating to families with little capacity to “listen and 
see each other without interrupting”. This he did, for example, by taking some family 
members behind the one way screen to observe the rest of the family communicating 
and in that sense forcing them quite vigorously into a less action oriented mode of being 
in the session. He undertook this work with families living in acute socio-economic 
deprivation who were generally regarded as beyond the reach of insight-oriented 
psychotherapy. Arguably certain ideas contained in Minuchin’s structural family 
therapy could be seen as precursors of Andersen’s reflecting team approach. The 
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polarization of modernist and postmodernist perspectives in systemic discourse means 
that continuity of methodological developments is effectively obscured in a way that 
risks alienating clinicians from the richness of their methodological inheritance. What 
gets lost from view in this ideological split is that the issue is one of difference between 
two modes of enquiry, one in which explanatory engagement with objectified processes 
from an outsider perspective is privileged and another in which interpretative 
engagement with subjectivity and meaning from an insider perspective is privileged.  
 
Arguably the challenge for psychotherapy lies in resolving the tension between these 
paradigms in a way that secures and preserves what is best in both traditions. In 
different ways what both Minuchin’s and Andersen’s contributions lack is a reasoned 
defence of the ethical stance underlying their work. Minuchin and his contemporaries 
were writing in an era when the dominance of first order positivist thinking disguised 
the need for such justification and the fact that some of their assumptions about 
appropriate patterns of communication might warrant critique. Andersen writes from 
within a hermeneutical/postmodernist paradigm, in which he struggles to articulate an 
ethical stance, lapses into an idealization of the therapeutic encounter as a co-
constructed entity, and settles for a contemporary variation of the modernist Kantian 
ethic of respect for persons, without making this explicit. Flaskas (2002, p. 43) offers a 
similar observation in the case of Anderson and Goolishian’s collaborative language 
systems approach, when she reflects that they firmly embed their social constructionist 
orientation in an ethical and political position emphasizing respectful and client led 
practices which in fact have a great deal in common with the traditional humanist values 
of earlier therapeutic approaches. Ultimately it may be argued that despite the sharp 
polarization of modernist and postmodernist perspectives in systemic theoretical debate, 
the latter does not unequivocally represent the radical paradigm shift to which it aspires. 
Instead it reveals the enduring influence of a modernist perspective on ethics as 
belonging to a de-politicized domain of individual consciousness and encapsulated in 
abstract ideals such as respect for persons.  
 
I would argue that family therapists as diverse as Minuchin and Andersen are straining 
towards a very different formulation of ethics, namely an ethics of communication, 
which takes account of the radical paradigm shift in psychotherapy from a primary 
concern with what happens inside individuals to what happens between them in 
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relational contexts when they try to communicate. In Chapter 4 we will explore 
Habermas’ view that in the case of critical social theory, reflection cannot be tied to a 
model of dialogue given that language is also a medium of power and domination. One 
could make this argument in the case of psychotherapy also where the optimum 
conditions for relatively unconstrained dialogue rarely if ever apply. In family meetings 
for example it is often the case that communication processes are infused with elements 
of force and coercion. Frequently the work of the therapy is precisely that of helping 
individuals and families move towards the point where relatively unconstrained 
communication might begin to be possible either within the therapy itself or elsewhere. 
I will therefore argue for the relevance in psychotherapy of Habermas’ formulation of 
an ethics of communication and his framework for thinking and practical engagement in 
which modernist and postmodernist themes are dialectically intertwined. 
 
Within the systemic field, postmodernist influenced approaches now occupy a dominant 
position in theoretical debates and overt criticism is muted. Yet as Reimers (2000) 
acknowledges, research findings (Bor et al. 1998) also suggest that in its purest form, 
the postmodernist perspective has not gained as much of a grip on therapeutic practice 
as one might imagine from reading the literature. What seems to happen is that those 
aspects of postmodernism which are perceived to be at odds with therapeutic discourse 
are screened out. There is also a marked absence of direct engagement in the systemic 
literature with key post-structuralist, postmodernist or hermeneutical thinkers including 
Foucault and Gadamer who will be considered in Part 11. Instead their contributions 
come in a prepackaged format in which those aspects that are deemed incompatible with 
therapy are either ignored or supplemented. Flaskas (2002) uses Anderson and 
Goolishian’s fleshing out of social constructionist theory with more traditional humanist 
values as an example of this tendency. The contributions of Frosh (1995) and Pilgrim 
(2000) stand out as offering a more explicit questioning of the compatibility of 
postmodernist thinking and psychotherapy. In Frosh’s contribution he argues that the 
postmodernist tendency towards fragmentation and celebration of irrationality are at 
odds with the therapeutic search for meaning that has some constancy. Pilgrim sees the 
abandonment of a realist ontology within postmodernist orthodoxy as the main source 
of difficulty. Referring to the enduring relevance of social structure and the causal 
impact of disadvantages rooted in economic and power differentials, he argues;  
 
79 
            Recording and generating one narrative after another will not suffice in this 
regard. Some notion of hard reality and its impact on mental health status is 
required as a point of reference to understand mental health professionals and to 
guide social policy decisions to prevent or ameliorate mental health 
distress....Postmodernism is more likely to obscure than clarify the full political 
picture about the role of family therapy in society. (2000, pp. 21-2)  
This line of criticism is similar to that of first order family therapist, Salvador Minuchin 
(1991) who observes that for socially and economically disadvantaged clients, reality is 
not so much a social construct, as “a stubbornly concrete world”.  
 
Flaskas (2002), writing from a second order systemic perspective, finds herself in some 
sympathy with Minuchin’s views and in her work she is also concerned with powerful 
social realities such as poverty and racism that carry a destructive force. This leads her 
to argue for the reclamation of some idea of reality and of truth in contemporary 
systemic psychotherapy. Significantly she locates her analysis firmly within the 
discourse of emotionality rather than a discourse around ethics, implicitly drawing our 
attention to the marginal status of ethics in systemic theoretical debate. Using case 
vignettes, she paints a vivid picture of the search by her clients for the truth of their 
experience, for example of sexual abuse, and she also reflects on the therapeutic 
importance of “bearing witness” to the reality of people’s livid experience. She believes 
that the privileging of multiple or diverse meanings over truth in postmodernist 
influenced psychotherapy, undermines this important therapeutic process of “bearing 
witness”. In Part 111, I will link this theme with Axel Honneth’s moral theory of 
recognition, as a way of bringing critical theory closer to the subjective concerns of 
psychotherapy and conversely as a way of drawing Flaskas’ ideas around truth and 
“bearing witness” into the arena of moral/ethical discourse.      
 
My underlying question throughout, is whether the noticeable failure of post-
structuralist, postmodernist and hermeneutical thinking to impact significantly on 
mainstream ethical debate in psychotherapy is rooted in the limitations of these 
paradigms. On the one hand we have seen that contributors to ethical debate in 
psychotherapy register their interest in postmodernist thinking. But beyond a passing 
engagement we have also seen that they struggle to locate accessible points of dialogue 
with this perspective. Whilst modernist and postmodernist forms of thought may 
become polarized in the context of theoretical debate in psychotherapy, more commonly 
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they operate alongside each other without any satisfactory mediating discourse. In the 
case of ethics the resulting difficulties are especially acute given the poor articulation of 
moral/ ethical themes in modernist versions of psychotherapy, which is then replicated 
in postmodernist influenced psychotherapy. Hermeneutic and postmodernist influences 
have undoubtedly challenged the pseudo-objectivity of traditional psychotherapy. 
However the failure to engage convincingly with the ethics of therapeutic practice 
weakens and undermines their critique. My argument is that they need to be 
supplemented by ongoing dialogue with philosophical and social theoretical 
perspectives that can shed light on moral/ethical themes in psychotherapy and help 
elucidate what is most progressive and creative in current practice. To this end I turn to 
an elaboration of Habermas’ communicative ethics. However before concluding this 
discussion, I will revert briefly to the issue of therapeutic technique in order to underline 
that, alongside ethical considerations, this dimension of therapeutic intervention is also 
poorly articulated within the postmodernist stance in systemic psychotherapy. This 
relates in particular to the theme of reflexivity which is embedded in postmodernist 
thinking in psychotherapy and which arguably has much greater methodological 
significance than is recognized or theorized in this stance. The subject of reflexivity has 
an added resonance in the context of this study since it not only connects with wider 
themes in social theory but with similar methodological challenges and developments in 
psychoanalytic discourse and thus underlines the shared ground between the two 
orientations. 
 
 
Reflecting processes and reflective functioning 
 
We have seen that in second order systemic therapy reflexivity is a key concept which 
denotes the idea of flexible movement between different level of meaning and 
communication. We have also seen that a number of technical approaches have been 
formulated to help increase reflexive capacities in those who attend for therapy, which 
include the reflecting team approach and the practice of reflexive questioning. This 
focus on reflexivity and the task of formulating technical approaches that address 
difficulties in this area of psychological functioning are echoed in contemporary 
psychoanalytic discourse, notably in the model of mentalization or reflective 
functioning discussed in Chapter 1. Within this model the capacity to mentalize denotes 
our ability to conceptualize mental processes in self and others: in other words, the 
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ability to interpret one’s own and others’ actions in terms of mental states including 
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires, intentions and so on. The concept of mentalization or 
reflective functioning is an attempt to formulate and understand difficulty in this area, 
drawing on a developmental psychological perspective. We have seen that this theory 
emerged in response to the challenge of working analytically with people who are not 
readily amenable to a classical analytic interpretive approach: people who have been 
described as un-psychologically minded or concrete thinkers. These were the “wrong” 
clients of a previous era who might well have been viewed as unsuitable for 
psychoanalytically oriented intervention. In general, their difficulties are deep-seated 
and challenging and they are often in considerable personal distress. Crucially these are 
people who also present very frequently in child and adolescent mental health clinics 
with problems that may be relational in origin but which are presented as firmly and 
concretely located in their children. They are likely to be well represented in the 
caseloads of most family therapists working in such settings.  
 
Similarity between the systemic concept of reflexivity and the psychoanalytic concept 
of reflective functioning is striking. This similarity might very simply be described as a 
shared interest in engaging clients in the reflexive process of thinking and talking about 
their thinking and talking and in helping those for whom this reflexive capacity is 
deeply compromised. The theory of reflective functioning (Fonagy and Target, 1996, 
1998, 2003) has emerged in the psychoanalytic field as an important contribution to the 
debate about appropriate therapeutic response and technique in working with people 
presenting with difficulties on this spectrum and offers much scope for creative 
exchange across the traditional systemic/psychoanalytic oppositional divide. In Part 111 
this shared ground serves as the springboard for connecting with similar themes in 
social theory and for conceptualizing  psychotherapy as a reflexive resource in social 
and personal contexts, helping to develop reflexive capacities that will in turn facilitate 
participation in discursive communicative contexts as these are characterized in 
Habermas’ theory of communicative ethics. In Part 11, I now turn to the elaboration of 
Habermasian theory as the first step in arguing for its relevance to ethical debate in 
psychotherapy and to the conceptualization of the moral/ethical ethos of contemporary 
practice.     
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Part II 
 
 
The moral ethos of contemporary psychotherapy: connections with 
social theory 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Contemporary psychotherapeutic discourse, as represented both by psychoanalytic and 
systemic perspectives, is significantly influenced by strands of post-structuralist, 
postmodernist and hermeneutical thinking. Whilst this influence has impacted on 
theoretical and clinical processes as discussed in Part 1, its impact on psychotherapeutic 
formulations of the ethical underpinning of clinical practice is less clear. On closer 
examination much of what passes for new thinking on ethics remains firmly rooted in 
the Kantian tradition of abstract individualism favoured by previous generations of 
“helping professionals”. I have argued that this is deeply problematic. Crucially the 
individualistic ethos of this perspective fails to encapsulate the radical paradigm shift in 
contemporary psychotherapy from an exclusive focus on intrapsychic processes to one 
in which relational themes now dominate. This results in a disjuncture between ethical 
considerations and wider theoretical debate, as a consequence of which both domains 
are mutually impoverished and deprived of potentially creative input.  
 
In this study I am arguing for the reformulation of ethical debate in psychotherapy in 
terms that take account of contemporary engagement with relational themes. I am 
arguing for an understanding of ethics that is firmly rooted in processes of 
communication and to this end I engage in a dialogue with current themes in social and 
political theory that could potentially inform and enrich psychotherapeutic discourse. 
One of the difficulties with current thinking in the field is the lack of direct engagement 
with social and political theory and a heavy reliance on derivative texts, which lends 
itself to much confusion and lack of a critical perspective. It also cuts psychotherapy off 
from the richness and complexity of wider theoretical debates. In focussing on key 
social and political theorists, whose work connects with postmodernist thinking but 
which lies somewhat outside the postmodernist fold, I am also hoping to broaden the 
framework of debate beyond current influences, in the direction of a more satisfactory 
engagement with ethical themes. 
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Chapter 4 explores Jűrgen Habermas’ discourse ethics and locates it within the broader 
context of his work. This discussion serves as an anchor for later dialogue between 
discourse ethics and psychotherapeutic concerns which this study seeks to promote and 
for consideration of other theorists whose work is loosely sympathetic to, or consistent 
with the tradition informing Habermas’ thinking. Chapter 5 explores similarity and 
difference between Habermas and the hermeneutical and post-structuralist perspectives 
that influence psychotherapy. I begin by considering Habermas’ engagement with 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical perspective and argue that Habermas’ critique implicitly 
highlights the limitation of philosophical hermeneutics as a paradigm for 
psychotherapy. The focus then switches to his equally important critique of Foucault’s 
post-structuralist thinking which paves the way for consideration in Chapter 6 of 
contemporary postmodernist influenced thinking about ethics represented notably in the 
work of Zygmunt Bauman. This chapter concludes by drawing the discussion back to 
critical social theory with a focus on Axel Honneth’s moral theory of recognition which 
serves to supplement Habermas’ theory of communicatives ethics in order to provide a 
more fleshed out formulation of an ethical stance that we might consider appropriate for 
psychotherapeutic practice. Throughout Part 11, the underlying argument is that 
Habermas’ discourse ethics addresses the limitation of current hermeneutical, post-
structuralist and postmodernist influences in psychotherapy in a way that underscores its 
relevance for future moral /ethical debate in the field.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Habermas’ Discourse Ethics 
 
 
The work of Jűrgen Habermas belongs to the tradition of the Frankfurt School of critical 
theory and represents an ongoing dialogue with this heritage.1 At the heart of his work 
is an exploration of the idea of a critical theory of society and an attempt to establish its 
normative foundations. Alongside his engagement with the Frankfurt tradition and more 
generally with Western Marxism, Habermas’ early work encompasses distinctive 
strands of debate that, from the standpoint of this study, have a clear resonance for 
psychotherapeutic discourse. In his work of the 1960s ([1962] 1989, [1963]1974, 
[1968a]1978, [1968b, 1969] 1971, [1971] 1990), he is centrally concerned with 
philosophical and sociological issues raised by the scientistic reduction of knowledge to 
that offered by the empirical sciences, where these are viewed as an unproblematic 
reflection of reality. The influence of this scientistic tendency within psychoanalytic and 
systemic psychotherapy has already been discussed along with the opposing swing 
towards a postmodernist and hermeneutically infused perspective in more recent 
decades.  
 
Another important strand of debate in Habermas’ work ([1967]1990b) is his critical 
engagement with the hermeneutical tradition as represented notably in the work of 
Heidegger([1927]1996) and Gadamer ([1960]1991). On the onehand Habermas accords 
great significance to the hermeneutical tradition but he is also deeply critical of what he 
regards as its conservative bias. In his work he strives to uphold what he sees as being 
of value in this tradition in order to construct a critical hermeneutical position. One of 
the most significant aspects of Habermas’s engagement with hermeneutics is that it 
reinforces the linguistic turn in his work that became explicit from the 1970s onwards 
and that leads into his formulation of an ethics of communication (1970, [1976]1979, 
[1981a]1984,1987a, 1990a). Where he departs from the hermeneutical perspective most 
significantly and also from post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives, is in his 
commitment to a universalistic perspective on ethics. His elaboration of a discourse 
                                                 
1  See Held (1980) and (Jay (1973) on the Frankfurt School tradition.  
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ethics is central to this project and I will begin by locating this ethical perspective 
within the wider evolution of Habermas’ work. 
 
Habermas’ constant search for a rational grounding of ethics in his work and his defence 
of a method of critical social enquiry or “depth hermeneutics” that is distinct from, 
though related to the hermeneutical standpoint was underpinned by his own formative 
experience of growing up in Nazi Germany. The Frankfurt School of critical theory 
went into exile at that time and continued with their radical agenda of social critique, 
whilst Heidegger’s hermeneutics was tainted by his sympathy for Nazism. Habermas 
(1983, 1987b) sees the latter not as a sign of philosophical naivety but much more 
seriously as reflecting the inner logic of a system of thought which veers into idealism 
and mysticism of “being” and loses the sense of philosophy as critique and as that 
which is morally and politically engaged. For Habermas therefore, philosophy is 
necessarily a critical theory of society, a form of reflection that should seek to further 
and promote the ideal of emancipation from any form of domination. The recognition 
that language develops historically and can be as much a medium for power as for 
communication is at the heart of Habermas’ work and his theory of communicative 
ethics evolved out of his search for a critical standpoint from which one might begin to 
judge structures of domination and distorted communication. It is this concern with 
distortions in communication and the search for a critical standpoint that also points 
towards potential convergence with the concerns of psychotherapy and the ethical 
demands of this practice based endeavour.  
 
 
Knowledge and human interests 
 
In Habermas’ early work ([1963]1974, [1968a]1978), a key element in his 
reformulation of Marxism was the distinction between work and interaction, or in 
Habermasian terminology, that between instrumental and communicative action. This 
distinction also became central to his critique of positivist thinking. The starting point 
for his perspective on Marxism is the unresolved tension between the categorical 
framework of Marx’s interpretation of history and his material investigations. At the 
latter level Marx viewed social practice as encompassing labour and interaction. He 
viewed the self formative process of the human species as involving these two 
dialectically related dimensions: on the one hand the historical development of the 
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forces of production as human beings reproduce the material conditions of their lives; 
and on the other hand, the historical formation of consciousness and institutions, that 
regulate the interaction of human beings among themselves. The institutional 
framework determines the extent of repression by the unreflected force of social 
dependence and political power. Within this framework, the burdens and rewards of 
production are distributed according to social laws. However, while Marx’s concept of 
social practice encompasses both labour and interaction, the latter is not included in his 
philosophical frame of reference. Here, he comprehends the self creation of the human 
species solely on the basis of the logic of its activity in the production of objects.  
 
Progress within the realm of labour or instrumental action is marked by new 
technologies and here the ultimate goal is the emancipation of the species from 
necessary labour through the complete substitution of machines for people. However, 
progress within the social self formative process is marked, not by new technologies, 
but by “stages of reflection through which the dogmatic character of surpassed forms of 
domination and ideologies are dispelled” ([1968a]1978, p. 55). Here the ultimate goal is 
the development of self consciousness to the point where it is freed from all ideological 
delusion through critical reflection; where institutions based on force are replaced by an 
organization of social relations bound only to communication freed from domination; 
and where self conscious control of the social life process is thus achieved. Progress 
towards this goal of social freedom is undoubtedly prompted by scientific-technical 
progress but it does not occur directly through the latter. It can be attained, only through 
a process of enlightenment. Developments within the realms of labor and within the 
social self formative process of the species are interdependent, yet they are mutually 
irreducible. Habermas argues that, while Marx tried to capture this relation in the 
dialectic of the forces and relations of production, he failed to do so, because at the 
epistemological level of his analysis he camouflages the difference between productive 
and reflective knowledge. On the latter level, Marx’s insight into the dependence of the 
human self formative process on both labour and interaction would have required a 
concomitant distinction between the human species as a tool-making animal and as a 
language using animal. For Habermas, Marx’s scientistic self- misconception, together 
with subsequent objectivistic misinterpretations of his theory are logical consequences 
of a categorical framework restricted to instrumental action. 
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As in his critique of Marxism, Habermas’ critical perspective on positivism is 
underpinned by the distinction between instrumental and communicative action. 
Positivism in essence argued for the application of the methods of the natural sciences 
to the social sciences, thereby advocating a unified science (Delanty, 2005). For 
Habermas on the otherhand, the social sciences differ fundamentally from the natural 
sciences not just in their subject matter but also in their methodology. Social scientists 
cannot be separated from their objects of research in the way that proponents of a 
positivist stance imply. Access to a symbolically pre-structured reality cannot be gained 
by observation alone since this access also includes a hermeneutic engagement with 
meaning. For Habermas, this also excludes any possibility of methodological dualism 
arising from the separation of the natural and human sciences. The social sciences have 
to resolve this tension between the two approaches. Positivism falls for the illusion of 
pure theory and neglects the hermeneutical dimension involved in social science which 
cannot separate itself from what he terms “knowledge-guiding interests”. The 
publication of his major work Knowledge and Human Interests in 1968 sets out this 
position comprehensively. 
 
It is Habermas’ contention that the human species organises its experience in terms of 
anthropologically rooted knowledge- guiding interests. His starting point for this 
hypothesis is that we are a tool making but also language using species. We have an 
interest in the creation of knowledge which will make it possible to control objectified 
processes and also to maintain a consensus based on mutual understanding without 
which severe conflict would result. These are referred to as the technical and practical 
knowledge guiding interests. For Habermas, the natural sciences on the one hand and 
the human or cultural sciences on the other hand formalize the procedures required for 
success in each of these spheres of activity. In the natural sciences, reality is constituted 
as being, subject to general laws. The process of inquiry is organized within the 
framework of instrumental action governed by technical rules based on empirical 
knowledge which realizes defined goals under given conditions. In the human sciences, 
reality is constituted as the community of speakers and actors. The process of inquiry 
takes place at the level of communicative action where participants are primarily 
oriented to the achievement of understanding and agreement. However, besides the 
technical interest in the mastery of nature and the practical interest in furthering mutual 
understanding and agreement, human beings have in Habermas’ schema a third interest, 
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an emancipatory cognitive interest which aims at the pursuit of reflection. This interest 
is rooted in our capacity to be self reflective and self determining.  
 
With regard to the emancipatory interest of knowledge, the relationship between 
knowledge and interest, between theory and practice, is different than for the technical 
and practical interests. Here, theory and practice are inherently connected in the process 
of self reflection. Self knowledge, generated through self reflection, makes us aware of 
forces which have heretofore exerted an influence behind our back. The act of knowing 
and the goal of the interest namely emancipation as a subject, coincide. At the level of 
scientific inquiry, the emancipatory interest finds expression in the critically oriented 
sciences, whose goal is to facilitate self reflection and to dissolve those forces which 
impede the self conscious development of life. Habermas cites Marx’s theory of society 
and Freud’s metapsychology as examples of this critically oriented approach. However, 
just as Marx tended to classify his theory with the natural sciences, likewise, Freud was 
guilty of a scientistic self misunderstanding of his metapsychology.2  He did not take 
methodological cognizance of that which distinguishes psychoanalysis from both the 
natural and the human sciences. Nonetheless, in Habermas’ view, Freud went beyond 
Marx in some respects in opening up perspectives which provide the key to the logic of 
a reflective science and thus to the construction of a critical social theory. Habermas’ 
later work took him in a rather different direction from that set out in Knowledge and 
Human Interests and as part of that development he lost interest in psychoanalysis as a 
paradigm for critical social theory. We have seen that psychoanalysis has also moved 
beyond classical Freudian theory with its emphasis on instinctual processes to an object 
relations orientation. Notwithstanding these changes it is helpful in the present context 
to explore Habermas’ engagement with classical Freudian theory in his early work both 
in terms of outlining the background to his communicative ethical theory but also as an 
historical marker for the dialogue between social theory and contemporary therapeutic 
discourse which this study seeks to promote. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  Habermas defines the “metapsychological framework” of Freudian thinking as,“ the basic categories of 
the new discipline, the conceptual constructions, the assumptions about the functional structures of the 
psychic apparatus and about mechanisms of both the genesis of symptoms and the dissolution of 
pathological compulsion” ([1968a]1978, p. 252).  
89 
The psychoanalytic paradigm for critical theory 
 
We have seen that for Marx, the focus of attention was man as a tool-making animal. He 
assumed that we elevated ourselves from the animal species when we began to produce 
our means of subsistence. We have also seen that this focus on the categorical 
framework of production had serious implications for Marx’s theory in terms of 
blurring the distinction between productive and reflective knowledge. For Freud in 
contrast, the focus of attention was not the labour process but the family. He assumed 
that the distinction between the human and animal species arose with the invention of 
an agency of socialisation for offspring whereby instinct governed behaviour was 
transformed into communicative action: “What interests him, is the destiny of the 
primary impulse potentials in the course of the growing child’s interaction with an 
environment, determined by his family structure, on which he remains dependent during 
a long period of upbringing” (Habermas, [1968a]1978, p. 283). Because he conceives of 
the institutional framework of society in connection with the repression of instincts, 
Habermas believed that Freud’s theory allowed for the conceptualization of power and 
ideology in a way that evaded Marx.  
 
For Freud, the motive of human society is in the last resort an economic one. Since it 
does not possess enough provisions to keep its members alive unless they work, it must 
restrict the number of its members and divert their energies from sexual activity to 
work. Because this fundamental conflict between self preservation and libidinal 
impulses is defined by the level of technical control over nature, the degree of 
instinctual repression is historically variable. It is dependent on the degree of technical 
control over natural forces as well as the organisation of their exploitation and the 
distribution of what is produced. Because of the constraint of reality, not all interpreted 
needs can be satisfied. Therefore, the institutional framework involves compulsory 
norms and roles which suppress and transform linguistically interpreted needs. These 
norms derive their force by imposing substitute gratifications which reconcile and 
compensate for imposed renunciations. 
  
With the rapid development of the forces of production, the historical necessity for 
existing forms of renunciation is undermined and it is in this context of repression, 
going beyond what is socially necessary, that the power of ideology or ‘illusions’ is 
90 
threatened. As distorted communication, these “illusions” represent the unconscious of 
society where motives which have been split off from communication are channelled 
into substitute gratifications. For Habermas, an understanding of the origins of the 
institutional framework in structures of distorted communication brings the 
emancipatory potential of self reflection into focus. The history of the species is 
determined both by a process of self production through labour and of self formation 
under conditions of distorted communication. Developments at the level of the forces of 
production provide the objective possibility of reducing repression at the institutional 
level, but they cannot guarantee the realisation of the utopian contents of ideology. This 
can occur only through enlightenment leading to the destruction of distorted self 
limiting communication and a corresponding transformation of the institutional 
framework. 
 
An engagement with psychoanalysis is deeply rooted in the Frankfurt tradition of 
critical theory and this is an important backdrop to Habermas’ contribution. First 
generation critical theorists, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, were prominent in 
attempts to bring psychoanalysis into dialogue with social theory and within Freudian 
drive theory they identified a source of resistance to what they perceived to be an 
increasingly authoritarian, bureaucratized and rationalized world.3 From this 
perspective, “Freud’s drive theory expressed the unalterable opposition between actual 
human needs and a historical world that demands the suppression of these needs as the 
apparent price of civilization” (Alford, 1987, p. 7). In the work of Marcuse 
([1955a]1987) in particular, an engagement with psychoanalysis evolved into 
consideration of possibilities for transcending the opposition between human nature and 
the external world through radical transformation of the latter. For Marcuse, the 
existence of the instinctual dimension of mental life thus represents a deeply optimistic 
idea. It implies that whatever repressions are in place there is always an alternative 
residing in the unconscious. However as Frosh (1999) points out, it is the individual’s 
instincts and liberation of individual desire that is Marcuse’s focus. Comparing aspects 
of his work with that of Wilhelm Reich’s ([1933]1975, [1942]1983) engagement with 
psychoanalysis, Frosh concludes that both theories reflect libertarian and individualistic 
tendencies in their consistent failure to consider the institutions of a liberated society: 
                                                 
3 For example, see Horkheimer ([1936]1972); Adorno et al. ([1950]1969; Marcuse ([1955a]1987).    
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Neither theorist has a detailed view of a society structured to allow a different 
order of sexuality which would be less repressive (to the individual) and 
oppressive (to others) at the same time. Instead they paint a picture of a world in 
which there is no organization, in which play is the highest good, sexuality 
busting out libidinously and energetically, aggression conveniently having 
withered away in the process. There is no society in this view: social relations 
are reduced to pure, unproblematic and unmediated encounters between totally 
unalienated individuals. (p. 174).4 
Whilst Habermasian theory is influenced by the same classical version of 
psychoanalysis that informed the first generation of critical theory, Freudian drive 
theory does not hold the pivotal position that it commands in Marcuse’s work, for 
example. Thus whilst Habermas does not reject drive theory as such, in the evolution of 
his theory the source of opposition to oppressive societal organization is no longer 
located within the individual but within the structures of language (Alford, 1987). On 
Habermas’ reading of Freud, the latter’s metapsychology understood as a theory of 
distorted communication, brings into focus the creative role of language as the bridge 
between the unconscious and conscious. However, this theory evolved in the absence of 
a comprehensive theory of language, which in Habermas’ view had repercussions for 
Freud’s understanding of deformations in language. Habermas’ explication of Freudian 
metapsychology as a theory of distorted communication was influenced by later 
developments, notably the work of Alfred Lorenzer (1974, 1976) in the field of 
linguistic analysis. Furthermore because Freud was caught in a scientistic self-
understanding of his theory he was unable to preserve it from a false objectivism which 
finds expression in his energy distribution model. In Freud’s view:  
 
            the future may teach us to exercise a direct influence, by means of particular 
chemical substances, on the amounts of energy and their distribution in the 
mental apparatus…. But for the moment we have nothing better at our disposal 
than the technique of psychoanalysis…..” 5  
Habermas’ argues that in assuming the existence of a non linguistic substratum, Freud 
failed to recognise that the concept of instinct is already rooted in a linguistically 
interpreted life world. Freud’s energy distribution model also contradicts his own 
                                                 
4  Whilst observing this common ground between Marcuse and Reich, Frosh (1999) also acknowledges 
that Marcuse is a more rigorous and sophisticated social theorist who does resist the simple reduction of 
emancipation to sexual freedom but nonetheless shares with Reich the failure to consider adequately the 
institutions of an emancipated society that would allow a different order of sexuality (pp.174-5).      
5  Freud, S.(1940) An outline of psychoanalysis, in The standard edition of the complete psychological 
works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 23, p. 182, quoted by Habermas ([1968a]1978, p. 247)      
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realisation that for psychoanalysis to be successful, it must lead to the conscious 
appropriation of repressed material by the analysand. It was this realisation, which led 
to his dissatisfaction with the technique of hypnosis since the latter did not lead to self 
reflection by the analysand but only to the manipulation of consciousness and therefore 
remains at the level of technical control over psychic processes. In moving away from 
hypnosis, Freud recognises the hermeneutic dimension of psychic life.6 For Habermas, 
psychoanalysis thus comes of age when it distinguishes itself from hypnosis and seeks 
to restore meanings that were previously lost by the analysand. In Jessica Benjamin’s 
words: “ Freud’s move away from hypnosis is of a piece with a gradual process of 
lessening the doctor’s grip on the patient’s mental activity, of relinquishing coercion 
and control by the doctor, with a concomitant freeing of the analysand, whose autonomy 
should be realized within the analysis itself” (1998, p.13). However Benjamin is also 
quick to observe that whilst Freud’s movement away from hypnosis may well have 
displaced the “hierarchical binaries” of the therapeutic relationship, it by no means 
eliminated them. This power differential in the therapeutic relationship is integral to any 
consideration of the ethics of the therapeutic endeavour.   
 
Psychoanalysis seeks out the meaning of a distortion which is inaccessible to the 
analysand because it has been split off or repressed. This it does by combining  
understanding with causal explanation, because the unconscious motives which assert 
themselves behind the back of the analysand have the status of causes. Explanation, in 
the form of a reconstructed life history, seeks to close the gaps of memory and thereby 
enable the analysand to reflectively dissolve the causal connection between an original 
scene of conflict and his/her present symptoms. It can do so only when the analyst’s 
explanatory hypothesis enables the analysand to relate his/her own history and to 
understand that which has blocked the path of self reflection. In this respect the general 
interpretations of psychoanalysis differ fundamentally from the general theories of the 
natural sciences. The methodological separation between the object domain of the latter 
and their theoretical statements does not apply in the case of general interpretations. 
Here we find that the subject cannot obtain knowledge of the object unless it also 
becomes knowledge for the object. A general interpretation does not give the analyst 
technical control over the psychic apparatus. On the contrary, by overcoming causal 
                                                 
6  See also Chapter 1, pp. 17-22.  
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connections themselves, psychoanalysis gives power back to the ego: “The neurotic 
patient presents us with a torn mind, divided by resistances. As we analyse it and 
remove the resistances, it grows together; the great unity which we call his ego fits into 
itself all the instinctual impulses which before had been split off and held apart from 
it”.7  The ego gains conscious mastery of the instincts and asserts its identity 
independent of social roles and norms. The intrapsychic confrontation between 
instinctual and social needs, or between private and public language, is no longer 
worked out behind its back. 
 
The intense focus on psychoanalysis in Habermas’ early work is rooted in the 
conviction that it offered a paradigm for critically oriented science. Within social theory 
this use of psychoanalysis had a rather sceptical response however and as Outhwaite 
(1994) observes, it has been associated with much misunderstanding of Habermas’ 
intentions, notably the idea that social theorists were being cast as social psychoanalysts 
in relation to society. This was not what Habermas had in mind. His concern was rather 
to draw comparisons between the relatively abstract conceptual and methodological 
features of two theoretical perspectives, critical theory and psychoanalysis. He was not 
proposing that the addressees of critical theory, or indeed society itself could be 
approached as a macro-subject whose eyes the social theorist seeks to open. It is also 
important to emphasise that Habermas was not giving any particular weight to 
psychological transformation as a political project (Keat, 1981). Whilst criticism of his 
use of psychoanalysis in his early work can be linked to such misunderstandings, it is 
also the case that Habermas himself came to recognise the limitation of the 
psychoanalytic paradigm for critical theory and lost interest in it as his work unfolded in 
new directions.                
 
A second strand of criticism of Habermas’ engagement with psychoanalysis holds 
greater significance in the present context. It charges him with a serious 
misunderstanding of unconscious processes as outlined by Freud and suggests that the 
limitation of his engagement with psychoanalysis reveals an underlying weakness 
throughout his work, including his later focus on discourse ethics (Elliott, 1999). In 
essence this criticism relates to the excessively cognitive thrust of Habermas’ oeuvre. In 
                                                 
7  Freud, S.(1919) Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy, in The standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 17, p.161, quoted by Habermas ([1968a] 1978), p. 233. 
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his early engagement with psychoanalysis this reveals itself in his negative view of the 
unconscious that links it mainly to distortions in communication and which allows little 
space for more positive or creative features to emerge. This difficulty is also evident in 
his rather idealised view of the analytic situation, emphasizing self reflection and 
emancipation to an extent that suggests it might almost be possible to leave the 
unconscious behind and which is at odds with psychoanalytic perspectives on the 
unconscious as ultimately unknowable. Arguably it is Habermas’ assimilation of the 
unconscious to the linguistic realm that underpins this divergence from Freud. In 
Elliott’s words: “unconscious processes….which exist prior to the mastery of language 
are of an entirely different order to the communicative utopia posited by Habermas” 
(1999, p. 101). Echoing an earlier critique by Whitebook (1985), Elliott continues:  
 
Freud’s prelinguistic realm of the unconscious cannot be contained within 
Habermas’ ‘linguistic idealism’. ….Habermas’ excessively rationalistic account 
of the conscious/unconscious dualism fails to capture, in short, Freud’s 
fundamental emphasis on an ‘inner foreign territory’ of the self. (p. 101).  
Whilst the criticism of cognitive abstraction and excessive formalism in Habermas’ 
work should not be minimized, paradoxically in a dialogue with psychotherapeutic 
discourse this need not represent the same hurdle as in other contexts. On the contrary, 
as Steuerman (2000) observes, psychoanalytic thinking can helpfully supplement 
Habermas’ cognitive orientation with an account of intersubjectivity that is closely tied 
to an understanding of emotional life. Here Habermas’ abandonment of psychoanalysis 
in the development of his work begins to look like a missed opportunity and later 
discussion of the work of Axel Honneth (1995) will show that it is possible to 
supplement Habermas’ cognitive and formalistic stance with an allied perspective that 
creatively resurrects the dialogue with psychoanalysis. In drawing to a close this 
discussion of Habermas’ early work it should also be emphasized that he relied on a 
classical formulation of psychoanalysis which has been superseded by developments 
that place greater emphasis on the relational dimension of intrapsychic life and on the 
relational dynamic between analyst and analysand as the focus of therapeutic interest. 
These developments, loosely grouped under the heading of object relations 
psychoanalysis have been explored in Part 1 as have the ongoing difficulties in 
formulating the ethical underpinning of this work. Following Knowledge and Human 
Interests, Habermas’ own work also took a new direction in which much of the thinking 
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from this earlier phase was superseded by new developments and within which his 
social theory of communication comes increasingly to the fore. Whilst he continued to 
refer to the model of cognitive interests occasionally and did not jettison this 
completely, he moved his own model of critical theory much more in the direction of a 
theory of communicative action culminating in the publication of his two volume major 
work, The Theory of Communicative Action in 1981. 
 
 
Communication and discourse ethics 
 
Habermas’ starting point for an attempt at a rational grounding of ethics in 
communication is a return to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, from which so 
many of our contemporary ideas about morality still derive, not least our ideas around 
respect for others. Central to Kantian philosophy is the idea of the individual as 
potential moral agent who represents an end in him\herself and as such warrants respect. 
It is the individual’s inherent status as potential moral agent that makes him\her worthy 
of respect and not the conjunction of any particular empirical qualities which he\she 
might possess. Reason exists to inform the individual’s will about its duty and so create 
a good will (Kemp, 1968; Kroner, 1956). For Kant, to will is not to desire but to decide 
on a course of action and such a decision is morally good only if taken for the sake of 
doing one’s duty. This duty presents itself as obedience to a law that is universally 
binding. We must act in such a way that the principles of our actions may have without 
inconsistency, the force of a universal law. In other words, “do as you would be done 
by”, that is each of us should act as we would wish anybody else to act in similar 
circumstances. This is the principle of rationality underlying Kantian morality. We 
should never treat other beings simply as a means but always as ends in themselves. The 
constraint on each individual is that of respecting the freedom of all. Kant’s principle of 
universalizability or categorical imperative, according to which any action contravening 
ethical norms contains a self-contradiction, is his attempt to provide a rational 
grounding for ethics. As such it has proved enduringly popular through its identification 
of the formal principle that determines content, which seemingly raises morality out of 
the realms of the irrational, the arbitrary or the religious.  
 
Kantian morality has been critiqued for the emptiness of its conception of morality and 
the fact that given sufficient ingenuity and qualification, almost any action can be 
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universalized consistently (Lukács, 1971). Here the danger is that it becomes available 
to provide a motive for particular duties, which a society may prescribe. Duty becomes 
a clarion call to conformity and the freedom of the individual is directed wholly 
inwards: “The ‘eternal iron’ regularity of the processes of nature and the purely inward 
freedom of individual moral practice appear at the end of (Kant’s) Critique of Practical 
Reason as wholly irreconcilable and at the same time as the unalterable foundations of 
human existence” (ibid., p. 134). Gilligan (1982, 1983), writing from a feminist 
perspective, has also issued a provocative challenge to the Kantian tradition by looking 
at the particular qualities of moral thinking in women. She contrasts the Kantian style 
ethic of justice, which emphasizes rights, balance, autonomy and separation, with an 
ethic of responsibility and care, which she identifies in how women typically think 
about moral issues. Here the focus is on compassion, connectedness, context-sensitivity 
and avoidance of harm. Gilligan argues for an idea of morality and moral development 
in which the two voices of morality, that of individual integrity and autonomy and that 
of care and connectedness are integrated. Habermas (1990a, pp. 175-82) has considered 
Gilligan’s research and concludes that his project of formulating an ethics of 
communication is largely compatible with her ideas about morality in which “dialogue 
replaces logical deduction as the mode of moral discovery” (Gilligan, 1983, p. 45, 
quoted by White, 1988, p. 84). However as White observes, Habermas’ ethical theory is 
also reliant on analyses such as that of Gilligan to compensate for the lack of 
engagement with subjectivity and emotionality in his own theory. White concludes that 
Habermas’ communicative ethical perspective is “crippled” if it proceeds in an 
emotional vacuum (ibid., p. 85).8 
 
Whilst Habermas is also critical of Kantian philosophy of consciousness and is keenly 
aware of the need to take the linguistic turn, he is respectful towards the Kantian ethos 
and retains the critical reflective impetus of uncovering a rational foundation for ethics. 
This singles him out from the postmodernist perspective and in many ways it is more 
accurate to describe his oeuvre as an attempt to rework the philosophical project of 
modernity. At the centre of his theory of ethics is a rather simple and even obvious idea, 
namely that when we speak, our utterances carry deep within them an ethical ideal, 
which transcends specific situations and language games and which he suggests, has a 
                                                 
8  See also Chapter 6 pp. 155-9 and Chapter 9 p. 224 for further discussion of this issue.  
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universal status. It is this ethical ideal which Habermas seeks to reconstruct in his theory 
of communicative ethics. In A reply to my critics (1982), Habermas quotes approvingly 
the following description of the shift from the Kantian categorical imperative to an 
ethics of communication and the attempt to locate the principle of universalization in 
the framework of intersubjectivity: “The emphasis shifts from what each can will 
without contradiction to be a universal law, to what all can will in agreement to be a 
universal norm” (McCarthy, [1978]1984, p. 326, quoted by Habermas, 1982, p. 257). 
 
 Like the postmodernist and hermeneutical perspectives, Habermas recognizes that our 
ideas about objective truth or morality always remain inside language. It is within 
language that we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge.  We might as natural 
scientists decide to abstract ourselves from this world to some extent in order to get on 
with what we do, but natural science and the validity of its findings, as much as any 
other activity takes place within the hermeneutic context of language. What interests 
Habermas is not so much the relativity of truth, which this implies. He takes a different 
path in asking what it is that can rationally motivate a hearer to accept something as 
truth. Staying inside the framework of language, Habermas (1990a) continues: “The fact 
that a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept such an offer is not due to the 
validity of what he says but to the speaker’s guarantee that he will, if necessary, make 
efforts to redeem the claim that the hearer has accepted” (p. 58). 
 
This redemption when called for must of necessity also take place within language but 
at a heightened or reflexive level of communication, a level of “discourse” where we 
stand back from our routine everyday communication to some extent in order to engage 
in a more reflective consideration of the claim to truth that has been brought into 
disrepute. Central to Habermas’ formulation of an ethics of communication 
([1976]1979, [1981a]1984, 1987a, 1990a) is this suggestion that whenever we speak, 
our utterances implicitly raise a number of universal validity claims of which the claim 
to truth is one. Furthermore, if the background consensus between speakers is brought 
into disrepute, our utterances already implicitly suggest that these validity claims could 
be vindicated or redeemed in discourse. Essentially what he is trying to do is reconstruct 
the very minimal conditions that make communication possible on a routine basis and it 
is here that the interest of the philosopher\critical theorist and the therapist potentially 
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coincide in this area where the minute details of why communication does or does not 
happen, are being explored. 
 
Habermas identifies three key validity claims contained in the utterances that we make 
and which we use implicitly as a means of rationally motivating the hearer to accept 
what we are offering. These are the claims to propositional truth, normative legitimacy, 
and authenticity or truthfulness. These correspond to three attitudes towards our world; 
the objectivating, the norm-governed, and the expressive attitudes respectively; and 
three interlocking spheres of our world; the objective, social and the subjective. 
Habermas then proceeds to consider what might constitute rationality in relation to each 
of these validity claims.  
 
In contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not only if he is 
able to put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it 
by pointing to the appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an established 
norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the 
situation in the light of legitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if 
having made known a desire or intention…etc., and is then able to reassure 
critics in regard to the revealed experience by drawing practical consequences 
from it and behaving consistently thereafter. ([1981a]1984, p. 15)  
In situations where the participants continue to be motivated by the communicative 
interest in reaching understanding and agreement, claims to truth or normative 
legitimacy when questioned can only be addressed by moving to a level of 
communicative argumentation which Habermas calls “discourse”. He further suggests 
that each of us through our ordinary communicative competence implicitly holds an 
idea of the kind of discourse in which contested validity claims could be redeemed. His 
excavation of these implicit assumptions about discourse leads him towards the notion 
of an “ideal speech situation”. This ideal is immanent in the way in which we routinely 
draw on language but remains as an ideal that guides our communication rather than 
something, which we would ever concretely realize in practice. Before considering the 
parameters of this ideal speech situation I will comment briefly on Habermas’ 
justification for his theory of ethics thus far.  
 
In the case of the validity claims Habermas suggests that anybody who tries to contest 
the idea that such claims underlie our communication is immediately caught up in a 
“performative contradiction” (1990a, p. 89), since that person is already asserting 
99 
his\her own validity claims. Thus whilst we might contest the detail of Habermas’ 
claims we cannot contest the central plank of this “depth hermeneutics” without 
departing the sphere of communicative engagement. If we claimed that “it is untrue” for 
example, we are already implying the idea of conversation with another person\s in 
which we might justify this claim, thereby confirming his argument in a minimal sense. 
For Habermas, it is here in these conversations implied by our utterances, even if they 
are not realized, that he wants to locate our ideas about ethics. For him ideas about 
ethics are fundamentally ideas about the kinds of conversations we might have in which 
it is possible for us to redeem validity claims and thereby remove constraints to ongoing 
communication. Here in Habermasian thinking, we reach the ethical heart of our being 
as linguistically constituted subjects. Thus even in situations where we might act 
strategically within communicative action, by deciding to tell a lie for example, we still 
rely on the validity claims, their implicit acceptance by the hearer and presumption that 
they could be redeemed, in order to secure the “success” of our strategic action.  We 
draw on and connect with the ethical undercarriage of communication in general even 
as we might flaunt it in the particular situation.  
 
Habermas suggests that participants in discourse concerning a disputed validity claim 
either of truth or normative legitimacy cannot avoid certain “idealizing presuppositions” 
immanent in such situations which can be reconstructed as rules of rational discourse. 
Briefly, this reconstruction leads him towards the conclusion that our presuppositions 
about rational discourse effectively represent communicatively based formulations of 
such ideals as respect, fairness, equality and justice. In situations of argumentation 
where we remain committed to the goal of reaching a rationally motivated agreement, 
we are likely to assume for example that all participants are allowed to initiate and take 
part in the discourse; that everyone is allowed to question any assertion made; that 
everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion into the discourse; that everyone is 
allowed to express his\her attitudes, desires and needs; and that speakers will not be 
prevented by internal or external coercion or constraint from exercising these rights 
(1990a, p. 89). These are ethical assumptions and ideals that we implicitly uphold as 
members of an intersubjective communication community even in situations where we 
might, as individuals or groups, strategically manipulate such ideals to our own ends.  
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Whilst criticism from a postmodernist perspective that Habermas is not so much 
drawing on universalist as on modernist assumptions about what might constitute an 
ideal speech situation is broadly accepted within the communicative ethical debate, 
defenders of this ethical perspective would argue that the ideal itself retains its universal 
status even if the question of how we fill it is closely entwined with our place and time 
in history (Benhabib, 1990). This post- universalist perspective which seeks to 
transcend the dualism of universalism and relativism is reflected for example in 
Benhabib’s argument that once the oppositional framing of universalism and historicity 
within moral philosophy is challenged, the situation regarding communicative ethics 
can be seen in a new light. In her engagement with communicative ethics she argues for 
a “historically self- conscious universalism” in which, following on from Habermas, she 
sees the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity as representing 
our “philosophical clarification of the constituents of the moral point of view from 
within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (1990a, p. 339). Even amongst 
those who distance themselves from the universalist stance it is observed that there 
persists a tendency to assign a favoured status to moral appeals which stress equality 
and mutual recognition (White, 1988, p. 2). Here the great appeal of Habermasian 
theory is that it attempts to provide a systematic elaboration of such appeals, to give 
them a measure of universal validity and to show that ideas of equality and mutual 
recognition need not be completely indeterminate.  
 
In her defence of the universalist perspective, Nussbaum (2000) reflects on the 
confusion that can arise between ideas relating to respect for diversity and ideas of 
relativism, noting that some find the latter attractive on the assumption that it indicates 
respect for different ways of life. However as she goes on to reflect it does no such 
thing: “By making each tradition the last word, we deprive ourselves of any more 
general norm of toleration or respect that could help us limit the intolerance of cultures” 
(ibid., p. 49). For Nussbaum, a universalist theory that is framed in terms of what she 
describes as human capabilities offers the best framework within which to locate our 
thoughts about difference. She argues that certain basic aspirations towards human 
flourishing are recognizable across differences of culture, class and other variables and 
uses this thinking as the basis for an account of general human capabilities for which 
she claims universal status. Within this approach, capability denotes what people are 
able to do and be, “in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of 
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dignity and respect” and an idea of the person as an “end”, not a “tool of the ends of 
others” (ibid., p. 5).  
 
In Habermasian theory it is clear that the communicative competence to enter 
“discourse” presupposes certain cognitive capacities alongside a willingness to do so, 
rather than simply repeating one’s assertions in a dogmatic fashion (Outhwaite, 1994). 
As the argument of this study unfolds it will become clear that this also extends to 
emotional capacities and that together these capacities or- borrowing Nussbaum’s 
terminology- capabilities for participation in discourse raise particular challenges in the 
psychotherapeutic context. This arises because of the considerable difficulty many 
psychotherapy clients experience engaging in reflexive discursive deliberation due to 
underlying problems of a cognitive or emotional nature which contribute to rigid and 
concrete thinking processes and difficulty in moving between different levels of 
communication. From a psychotherapeutic perspective, Nussbaum’s use of the 
expansive language of capability is therefore helpful in redressing the imbalance 
towards cognitive abstraction in Habermasian theory and offering an emotionally 
grounded engagement with the detail of our human potential to flourish and realise our 
communicative competence in favourable circumstances. In that sense her theory, like 
Gilligan’s mentioned earlier, could be seen to supplement the lack of engagement with 
subjectivity and emotionality in Habermasian theory. Later I will argue that the moral 
theory of recognition put forward by Axel Honneth, who writes within the same 
theoretical tradition as Habermas, offers an invaluable perspective that addresses these 
lacunae in Habermas’ work. Honneth’s own work has developed against the backdrop 
of an evolving postmodernist discourse and his appraisal of the relevance of this 
perspective, in particular the “ethical turn” of postmodernism in recent decades, for 
Habermasian ethical theory will also be considered in Chapter 6.       
 
In summing up we may say that the key contribution of Habermasian theory to current 
debates is his reworking of the Kantian principle of universalisation in terms of the 
transcendental pragmatic conditions of communication. He argues that we start from a 
situation of intersubjectivity and that it is only within this intersubjectivity that moral 
phenomena and moral problems arise. This situation of intersubjectivity implies certain 
unavoidable presuppositions of communication, namely that in order to communicate 
we share an ideal of agreement between equal partners towards which we strive, in 
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discourse. It is no longer the universalization of isolated subjects seeking to prescribe to 
all; it is now a discursive test amongst partners in communication of what could be 
agreed by all to be a universal norm. In this way Habermas moves towards a 
formulation of ethics that is consistent with the radical paradigmatic shift in 
contemporary thinking from consciousness to language. In essence what he achieves is 
to create possibilities for a different kind of engagement with ethical issues that takes 
account of other fundamental changes in how we think about ourselves and our world.  
 
From the practice based psychotherapeutic perspective of this study, one of the key 
questions that emerges in considering discourse ethics is whether the price that 
Habermas pays for his univeralist perspective and for salvaging a moment of ethical 
certainty in his work is that it becomes too formal and abstract to be of much practical 
significance. In essence the argument of this study is that on balance this is not the case 
and that his theory can be linked productively and creatively with psychotherapeutic 
concerns notwithstanding its abstraction. Furthermore difficulties in the latter regard can 
be addressed by supplementing Habermas’ ethical theory with perspectives that are 
more closely tied to practical and historical concerns and with perspectives – including 
those from within psychoanalysis itself- that are more closely tied to an understanding 
of emotional life. In drawing this discussion to a close the point I wish to underline is 
that notwithstanding its limitations and incompletion, the value of Habermas’ 
contribution is in offering an overarching philosophical framework for scientific 
enquiry and engagement in which ethics is firmly anchored and in what follows I 
outline some key debates in which he engaged with other leading thinkers of the 20th 
century, Gadamer and Foucault. These debates offer additional clarification of 
Habermas’ own perspective on ethics and that which separates his position from the 
hermeneutical, post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives. I then move on to 
consider more recent developments within postmodernism and critical theory with a 
specific focus on the work of Zygmunt Bauman and Axel Honneth. Throughout this 
discussion my overriding concern is to make helpful connections with social and 
philosophical theory and to develop a framework for conceptualizing the nature of the 
psychotherapeutic endeavour and our ethical engagement therein. 
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Chapter 5  
 
 
Critical Debates: Habermas Contra Gadamer and Foucault  
  
 
Two deeply significant strands of debate in Habermas’ work are his engagement with 
Foucault’s post-structuralist theory and with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.  In 
this chapter I consider his dialogue with hermeneutics before moving on to the debate 
with Foucault. The encounter between the thinking of Habermas and the hermeneutical 
tradition as represented in the work of Heidegger ([1927] 1996) and especially Gadamer 
([1960]1991) has been the focus for much attention within philosophical discourse.1 We 
have already seen that alongside postmodernist influences, hermeneutical thinking has 
also had a significant impact within contemporary psychotherapy. It has been 
particularly influential for those seeking alternative perspectives to the positivist 
influences of an early era. In the case of systemic psychotherapy this is reflected in the 
shift from first to second order thinking and practice and the abandonment of the first 
order natural science paradigm in favour of a hermeneutic/social constructionist stance 
in second order approaches.2 The therapist is no longer seen as holding privileged 
access to knowledge or definitions of what needs to change. Instead there is much 
emphasis on joining with clients in conversations that have an indeterminate outcome. 
In the context of this study which seeks to explore the potential contribution of 
Habermasian thinking to current themes in psychotherapy particularly relating to ethics, 
it is therefore important that we consider the common ground but also points of 
difference between Habermas and the hermeneutical tradition. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
has been the most influential voice in the development of contemporary hermeneutics 
and the encounter between him and Habermas will serve as a reference point for 
exploring the latter’s relationship with hermeneutics and the relationship between 
hermeneutics and psychotherapy.   
 
                                                 
1  The debate between Habermas and Gadamer was initiated in 1967 when Habermas published Zur logik 
der sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp) which included a critique of Gadamer’s (1960) Truth and 
Method (See Habermas, [1967]1990b). A debate between the two theorists followed which was published 
in 1971 in Hermeneutik und ideologiekritik (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp). For analysis, see for example, 
Harrington ( 2001), How (1995), McCarthy ([1978]1984), Mendelshon (1979), Misgeld (1976), Ricoeur 
(1981) and Warnke (1987).      
2  See Chapter 3  pp. 69-74. 
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Habermas’ Dialogue with Gadamer 
 
 
The Hermeneutical Tradition 
 
In essence “hermeneutics” denotes interpretation and is generally taken as referring to 
the interpretative processes of communication. The term is sometimes linked to the 
Greek myths where Hermes acted as the messenger of the Gods (Schmidt, 2006). As a 
methodological concept hermeneutics has its origins in seventeenth century German 
philology where it applied to biblical interpretation. This was against the background of 
the rise of Protestant theology where issues relating to the interpretation of scripture 
came to the fore. The model of a form of textual interpretation that was not dependent 
on the authority of the priest continued to guide the hermeneutical tradition and in the 
context of the Enlightenment it shifted to more general use, evolving into a science of 
textual interpretation. From the late nineteenth century onwards two strands within the 
tradition can be identified (Delanty, 2005); firstly, the tradition of hermeneutics leading 
from Dilthey and Neo- Kantian thinkers, such as Windelband and Rickert, to the 
sociology of Weber and Freudian psychoanalysis; secondly, the tradition of the 
philosophy of language from Heidegger and Wittgenstein through to Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. 
 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is generally regarded as the first to unite the various 
discipline specific hermeneutical theories into a universal hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1981; 
Schmidt, 2006). He believed that hermeneutics as the interpretation of meaning was 
applicable to all forms of communication. His work also encompasses the idea of the 
“hermeneutic circle” which underlines the interdependence of whole and parts. At the 
level of the text this implies that while the text can only be understood from an 
understanding of its sentences, the meaning of these sentences can only be understood 
from out of the whole. One cannot understand the whole without understanding the 
parts and one cannot understand the parts until one has understood the whole.  For 
Schleiermacher, this circle is only an apparent circle however. With a sufficient level of 
understanding of the language one can begin the hermeneutical task with a general 
overview and then return to a more detailed interpretation of the parts. This 
hermeneutical thinking also encompassed a marked psychologism in that the essence of 
105 
the hermeneutical method was for the reader/ interpreter to enter the mind of the 
author/speaker in what is known as the method of divination (Warnke, 1987, p. 13).The 
interpreter identifies with the author of the work being studied and imaginatively relives 
the thoughts and experience that brought about the work. This tradition of interpretation 
which takes the reconstruction of the author’s intention and thinking as its focus, 
continued after Schleiermacher in the work of Dilthey (1833-1911) and later becomes 
the object of critique in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.3 
 
The influence of Kantian philosophy in the movement towards a universal or general 
hermeneutics is evident. In Ricoeur’s (1981) words:  
 
Kantianism constitutes the nearest philosophical horizon of hermeneutics ….it is 
easy to see how, in a Kantian climate, one could form the project of relating the 
rules of interpretation, not to the diversity of texts and things said in texts, but to 
the central operation which unifies the diverse aspects of interpretation. (pp. 45-
6).  
In addition there was considerable unease in the neo-Kantian era with the focus of 
Kantian philosophy on the natural sciences and the fact that it had little to say regarding 
the human or cultural sciences. Kant’s critical philosophy did not encompass a theory of 
the human sciences and the neo- Kantian thinking of writers such as Rickert and 
Windelband can be seen as an extension of Kant’s critique of pure reason to the critique 
of historical reason.4 Neo- Kantians argued for a science of the conditions of possible 
cultural knowledge and demanded the separation of the human sciences from the natural 
sciences. Dilthey was closely linked to the Neo-Kantian tradition and is one of the key 
thinkers within the hermeneutical tradition, whose work encompasses a systematic 
defence of the autonomy of the human sciences.5 This was in the context of the 
                                                 
3  See Rickman, H.P. (1976) Dilthey, selected writings. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. It is 
worth noting that Dilthey’s writings also moved in the direction of a more sociological focus on the 
hermeneutic interpretation of cultures (Delanty, 2005, p. 50; Outhwaite, 1975, p. 26). 
4  Unlike Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband did not conceptualise methodology in psychologistic terms 
(Delanty, 2005). An important debate between them concerned the human as distinct from the cultural 
sciences, with Rickert arguing for the exclusion of psychology from the cultural sciences and Dilthey 
arguing for its inclusion as a human science.    
5  Whilst Dilthey’s work is grounded in a deep understanding of Kantian philosophy, unlike the Neo-
Kantians he recognises that the distinction between the human and natural sciences rests on a difference 
in modes of experience rather than objects of experience alone and that the human sciences are grounded 
in the historicity or temporality of experience. Whilst this is his appeal for Gadamer, the latter also 
believed that Dilthey’s objectivist tendencies ultimately undermined his own insights by leading him to 
conclude that the legitimacy of the human sciences rested on methodological foundations (see Warnke, 
1987, pp. 26-34).  
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positivist demand that the model of all knowledge be taken from that of empirical 
observation and explanation, which typified the natural sciences.  
 
Dithey’s focus was on the elaboration of a methodology and epistemology for the 
human sciences that would secure their objectivity and thus put them on a par with the 
natural sciences. To this end he differentiated two modes of knowing that produce 
universally valid propositions. Explanation occurs in the natural sciences and 
understanding in the human sciences. The natural sciences explain phenomena by 
subsuming them under universal causal laws and theories while the human sciences 
understand meanings that are expressed in external empirical signs. In the natural 
sciences we explain phenomena in terms of cause and effect and in terms of the general 
and particular whereas in the human sciences we understand in terms of the dialectical 
relation between part and whole, that constitutes the hermeneutic circle.  
 
Central to Dilthey’s thinking was the concept of Erlebnis or lived experience which 
stands in contrast to natural scientific abstraction and which encapsulates the distinctive 
subject matter of the human sciences. This concept signifies that the subject matter of 
the human sciences is already meaningfully constituted. Human beings unlike physical 
objects have an inner mental and emotional life and we cannot observe another’s inner 
life directly but must gain access to it through its external manifestations. 
Methodological understanding is the process by which we gain access to the 
manifestations of other people’s lives both past and present and it is in the sphere of 
psychology that Dilthey looks for the distinctive features of this understanding. He 
belonged to that generation of neo-Kantians for whom the pivot of all science was the 
individual and this is the wider context in which he takes psychology as the model for 
the human sciences. For him all human sciences presuppose the innate capacity to 
transpose oneself imaginatively into the inner mental life of others.         
 
For Dilthey and the neo-Kantians the focus was primarily on the human sciences in the 
shape of history, psychology or economics and it was only with the arrival of Weber 
(1949) that social science began to assume a distinctive identity (Delanty, 2005). Whilst 
Weber also belonged to the neo- Kantian tradition he differed from the other thinkers in 
his belief that the social sciences must combine explanation and understanding in their 
methodology. His work signals the transition from an older hermeneutic tradition to 
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interpretative social science. As a social scientist his focus was on social action rather 
than textual interpretation. His explanatory-understanding sociology was essentially an 
investigation of the motivations that might explain social action. However whilst he 
conceived of social action as social he nonetheless adopted a stance of methodological 
individualism in that understanding for him meant understanding the actions of an ideal 
individual (Delanty, 2005; Outhwaite, 1983). The emergence of Freudian 
psychoanalytic thinking also has its place within this tradition and was a further 
important expression of the emerging interpretative method that claimed scientific 
objectivity. Whilst the neo-Kantians and Weber worked on the basis of conscious 
intentionality, Freud’s starting point was the unconscious. Instead of the text as the 
focus for interpretation, Freudian hermeneutics focussed on the dream as its subject 
matter. Whilst Freud himself moved towards a self- understanding of his work that was 
heavily influenced by the model of the natural sciences, his thinking had a deeply 
significant impact on the self understanding of the social sciences for future generations 
of social theorists including Habermas. It is therefore important to locate psychoanalysis 
within the wider context of hermeneutical thinking and its development.            
 
The hermeneutical tradition from Dilthey and the neo- Kantians, through Weber to 
Freudian psychoanalysis held firmly to the idea that the scientific study of human 
meaning could claim objectivity. A second strand of hermeneutical thinking shifts the 
emphasis much more onto the subjective dimension of interpretation as context bound. 
This tradition known as philosophical hermeneutics starts with Heidegger ([1927]1996), 
continues in the later work of Wittgenstein (1953) and marks a radical paradigm shift 
from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language. For Dilthey and 
the neo-Kantians, consciousness remained their reference point. Now language comes to 
the fore as that which constitutes reality, as we know it, including our scientific 
knowledge. Language is in Heidegger’s terminology the “house of Being”.6 It is not 
possible for interpretations to transcend this life world context of language. This 
recognition of the linguistic constitution of the social has been pivotal for subsequent 
developments in social and philosophical theory including postmodernist thinking. It 
                                                 
6  Language holds a central place in the later works of Heidegger. See Heidegger, M (1947) Letter on 
humanism, in Basic Writings (1993, Revised and Expanded edition) David F. Krell (Ed.), New York, 
Harper Collins. 
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has also served as the foundation for contemporary philosophical hermeneutics 
represented notably in the work of Gadamer.   
 
In his influential text, Truth and Method ([1960] 1991) Gadamer rejects the traditional 
hermeneutic model of understanding with its emphasis on objectivity. Hermeneutics for 
him is no longer to be regarded as a discourse on methods of objective understanding. 
Instead it seeks to offer an account of the conditions of the possibility of understanding 
in general. What Heidegger did was to demonstrate that understanding is part of our 
primordial being- in- the world and following Heidegger, Gadamer argues that 
understanding is always tied to the linguistic and cultural context of the interpreter. His 
objective is to offer a philosophical justification for the experience of truth that 
transcends the domain of scientific method and resides in the ontological structure of 
understanding. Such experiences of truth he argues occur in art, philosophy and the 
human sciences. He identifies two distinctive hermeneutic tasks, reconstruction and 
integration and is strongly critical of the historical shift to reconstruction in the 
hermeneutical tradition, which he links with Schleiermacher. On Gadamer’s account, 
Schleiermacher proposes a radical change in the task of hermeneutic interpretation. 
Previously the interpretative focus was around understanding the truth of a text and 
integrating this into the interpreter’s life. In the case of biblical interpretation for 
example there was a presumption of its normative validity and authority and the task of 
hermeneutics was pedagogical. It sought to elaborate the truth content of the text so that 
people could understand and learn from it. With Schleiermacher came a shift away from 
this process towards the reconstruction of the creative process of the author in order to 
understand his/her intended meaning.  
 
For Gadamer this emphasis on psychological interpretation is problematic in shifting the 
focus away from the subject matter under discussion. His position is that one can never 
enter fully into the mind of another person but one can enter into dialogue and bring 
about what he calls a “fusion of horizons”. He rejects the suggestion of Schleiemacher 
that it is possible to escape the hermeneutic circle of understanding. Instead following 
Heidegger he argues that there is no escape from the fore - structures of understanding 
that one brings to a new situation based on the historical context in which one is always 
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already embedded.7 Contrary to theories of direct sense perception or intuition, 
Heidegger’s position was that interpretation could never be a presuppositionless 
grasping of something previously given directly to the senses or the intuition. From a 
Heideggerian perspective what is important is not to get out of the hermeneutic circle of 
understanding but to enter into it correctly. The interpreter needs to engage in a 
continuous checking that provisionally accepted conceptions in the fore-understanding 
which she/he has are appropriate to what is being interpreted and not simply based on 
popular conceptions.  
 
Where Heidegger refers to fore-structures of understanding, Gadamer somewhat 
provocatively uses the term prejudices to encompass everything one knows consciously 
or unconsciously. All understanding begins from our prejudices he believes. Through 
our language, our education and our upbringing we acquire the prejudices from which 
our understanding proceeds. For Gadamer prejudices may be legitimate or illegitimate 
and for him the term has a neutral connotation contrary to its negative connotation in 
everyday use. In Truth and Method, he seeks to demonstrate the process of 
legitimisation and of refuting illegitimate prejudices that unfolds in understanding 
something. Central to this project is his wish to rehabilitate the authority of tradition in 
order to demonstrate that it can be a possible source of legitimate prejudices, which get 
passed on to the next generation. For something to survive in tradition does not give it 
an absolute authority. However it does suggest that it was judged to have been of value 
by those who embraced it. We study the past because of our belief that we might learn 
something from this process.  
 
We saw in Chapter 3 that hermeneutical thinking has had an influence within 
psychotherapy and it is not difficult to see why psychotherapists might gravitate 
towards Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s accounts of human beings relating to their lives in 
a continuous process of self interpretation, experience and re-interpretation. In the case 
of Gadamer’s model of textual interpretation, for example, the connection with 
psychotherapeutic processes is obvious. In essence Gadamer’s model for interpretation 
                                                 
7  Heidegger demonstrated that all interpretations are preceded by our pre-structured understanding of the 
world deriving from our historical tradition (How, 1995). In Being and Time (1927) he identified three 
interrelated fore-structures of understanding which one brings to a new situation of understanding; fore-
having which means what one has before; fore-sight which means a previous looking towards; and fore-
conception which means what has previously been grasped conceptually. 
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is that of a dialogue in which the aim is to come to agreement about the subject under 
consideration. The interpreter listens to the other in the shape of the text, is open to the 
truth claim of the text and to having a new experience. Central to Gadamer’s thinking 
about the shape of dialogue is the dialectic of question and answer as the logical form of 
openness to new experience. Questions already point in the direction in which they are 
enquiring. In Gadamer’s terminology the question has a horizon. It places what is being 
questioned in a particular perspective and to ask the question correctly it must be framed 
in the correct horizon. Whilst we might talk about discovering the solution to a problem 
it is perhaps more likely, to borrow Gadamer’s words, that “a question occurs to us that 
breaks through into the open and thereby makes an answer possible” (1991, p. 365). 
This type of thinking is very much echoed in theoretical perspectives about the nature of 
the psychotherapeutic process that emerged in the systemic field in the nineteen 
eighties.   
 
In a seminal paper by the systemic writer Karl Tomm (1987b), he gives a telling 
account of how the therapeutic technique of reflexive questioning first emerged. In this 
account he underscores the enormously healing potential in asking the right kind of 
question in the course of a therapy session. He describes the growing realisation of 
family therapists in that era that some questions can themselves function as a 
therapeutic intervention resulting in fundamental changes in perception for individuals 
and families without the need for a more formal or packaged interpretation, traditionally 
delivered by the therapist towards the end of a family therapy session. Whilst this 
thinking is now taken for granted in systemic discourse it is difficult to exaggerate its 
ground - breaking status at that time. Tomm’s vivid account of how a particular 
question emerged from the reflecting team during a tense family session with 
unexpected and very helpful results brings to mind Gadamer’s thoughts on the question 
that “breaks through into the open thereby making an answer possible”. Not surprisingly 
when systemic clinicians began to construct a theoretical framework around their 
practice based innovations they drew on the hermeneutical tradition for inspiration. This 
is evident for example in the work of the systemic psychotherapist Tom Andersen who 
pioneered the reflecting team approach and whose writings, as we have seen earlier are 
suffused by hermeneutical thinking.8 This influence shows in Andersen’s emphasis that 
                                                 
8  Chapter 3  pp.  69-71. 
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we are inevitably prejudiced when we meet with somebody whom we aim to understand 
and in the emphasis of his therapeutic approach on conversation and language as the 
precursor of thinking. Its overall subjectivist ethos is in marked contrast to earlier 
formulations of family therapy and arguably serves as an important antidote to the 
positivist excesses of that which preceded it. In that sense the contribution of 
hermeneutical thinking to systemic psychotherapeutic discourse is beyond dispute. 
However I will argue that the limitations in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, to 
which Habermas draws our attention, can also be detected in that strand of systemic 
thinking, which has been influenced by hermeneutics. I am also proposing that 
Habermas’ model of critical social theory, normatively grounded in a theory of 
communicative ethics, offers a more helpful and less restrictive paradigm for the 
psychotherapeutic process than that of philosophical hermeneutics.         
 
 
The Habemas /Gadamer debate 
 
For Gadamer, like Heidegger, language is disclosure of the world and there is no 
language that would disclose the world in itself (1991, p. 474). Language is the medium 
of interpretation and there is no single interpretation which is correct in itself. Rather the 
interpreter will bring a horizon of understanding to the text that is shaped by their place 
in history and therefore the correct understanding of what a text has to say will be 
different at different historical times. This points to the relativist perspective at the heart 
of philosophical hermeneutics but it does not mean that misinterpretations are 
impossible within this perspective. In essence it is Gadamer’s contention that at some 
point in the dialogue between the interpreter and text where various possible 
interpretations emerge, one shines forth and convinces the interpreter of its truthfulness. 
This on Gadamer’s account is the hermeneutic event of truth, when everything falls into 
place and the fusion of horizons happens. The hermeneutic discipline and rigour of 
questioning can by itself lead us to truth without reliance on scientific methodology. It 
is here that Habermas’ model of critical hermeneutics diverges from Gadamer and 
where his dialogue with the latter becomes especially relevant to our discussion.  
 
It should be emphasised that Habermas attaches great significance to the hermeneutical 
tradition but he is highly critical of its conservative stance towards tradition. In his own 
work he seeks to develop a critical hermeneutical theory which moves beyond 
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hermeneutics whilst retaining what he sees as being of value within the hermeneutical 
tradition. He recognises its substantial contribution in establishing a clear demarcation 
between the natural and human sciences at both the methodological and ontological 
levels and he is strongly in agreement with the linguistic turn in twentieth century 
philosophy associated with philosophical hermeneutics. In the development of his 
theory of communicative action and communicative ethics he recognises that his 
original conception of reflection was overly reliant on the paradigm of consciousness 
and needed to be tied in much more to processes of communication. He agrees with 
Heidegger and Gadamer that all understanding starts with the fore- structures of 
understanding and with their critique of the positivist stance towards social scientific 
enquiry. But Habermas also believes that Gadamer goes too far in his strict opposition 
of truth to method and in his critique of methodology.  
 
In A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method ([1967] 1990b), Habermas argues that 
whilst Gadamer’s criticism of objective science is justified this “cannot lead to a 
suspension of the methodological distanciation of the object, which distinguishes a self 
–reflective understanding from everyday communicative experience” (ibid., p. 235). In 
self- reflective understanding the interpreter takes up a distanced position towards the 
object of study that can allow for the application of method in a way that is different 
from the natural sciences. Gadamer fails to recognise the power of reflection that 
develops in understanding. In Habermas’ view reflective reconstruction of tradition can 
clarify the conditions under which a prejudice has been accepted. It is possible that the 
process of reconstruction will reveal structures of power and dogmatic authority 
underlying the original acceptance and solidification of a prejudice as part of tradition. 
In this case those who come to understand through the power of reflection are able to 
reject the prejudice and criticise the tradition. Whilst accepting that an interpreter cannot 
escape from the horizon of language, nonetheless the power of reflection can make 
possible the transcendence of the particular circumstances of the interpreter’s inherited 
language. We have seen how Habermas draws on Marxist theory and Freudian 
metapsychology as instances of this critically oriented mode of enquiry. In his work the 
objective is to radicalise hermeneutical thinking by steering it in a critical direction. 
Here the idea of a fusion of horizons gives way to a critique of ideologically distorted 
communication.  
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In Gadamer’s response, Reply to My Critics ([1971]1990) one of his counterarguments 
concerns Habermas’ use of the model of classical psychoanalysis as a paradigm for 
critical hermeneutics with an emancipatory interest. Transposed to the social level this 
conjures up an image of social analysts holding superior knowledge and expertise with 
all the potential for dogmatism, which that implies. We have seen that Habermas 
himself also moved away from this paradigm as his work evolved in the direction of a 
theory of communicative action and communicative ethics and in that sense the debate 
with Gadamer serves as an historical marker in the evolution of his own theory. From 
the point of view of this study the key significance of the debate between Gadamer and 
Habermas is that in holding out for a universalist perspective on ethics, Habermas’ work 
serves as a challenge to the subjectivist and relativist ethos of hermeneutics. In the 
present context the debate between the two theorists is also deeply significant in another 
respect which is that Habermas’ critical approach brings methodology firmly back into 
the equation in a way that highlights the limitations of philosophical hermeneutics as a 
paradigm for psychotherapy.  
 
I have noted common ground between aspects of Gadamer’s thinking and developments 
in systemic psychotherapy that began to take shape from the 1980s onwards and as 
outlined in Chapter 3. In the case of the reflecting team approach this is reflected in 
Andersen’s (1992, 1998) use of concepts such as “prejudice” and the “hermeneutic 
circle” in elaborating his work. The systemic tradition was also keen to explore the 
power of questions in a way that echoes the centrality of the discipline of questioning in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory. But this is where the lack of fit also becomes evident. 
For Gadamer on the one hand there is no such thing as a method of learning to ask 
questions or of learning to see what is questionable. It is simply that the correct question 
breaks through into the open making an answer possible. For psychotherapy as a 
discipline on the other hand, any downplaying of methodology and technique holds 
enormous risk and raises complex questions concerning the status of its own 
methodological base. With the emergence of second order systemic therapy, 
conversation and meaning now come to the fore as the focus for intervention and 
change. Dialogue becomes the paradigm for the therapeutic encounter and the therapist 
is urged to adopt an “unknowing” stance in the work. Methodology and expertise are 
downplayed in a way that is essentially in keeping with the hermeneutical spirit of this 
therapeutic approach. An oppositional relationship between first and second order 
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approaches is set up in which the methods and techniques that evolved during the 
pioneering decades of first order systemic therapy are at risk of being eroded and 
devalued. We have also observed the gaps in psychotherapeutic thinking around ethical 
issues that have persisted in this second order perspective.  From our discussion thus far 
it should be clear that all of these trends are broadly in keeping with the hermeneutical 
thinking that inspired or affirmed some of the innovations in systemic psychotherapy 
from the nineteen eighties onwards. The argument of this study is that hermeneutics 
along with post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives which will shortly be 
discussed, fail to offer a satisfactory paradigm for that mode of enquiry and practical 
engagement we call psychotherapy and which therefore needs to seek out new sources 
of inspiration. It will also be argued that Habermas’ model of a critical theory holds 
considerable potential both as a framework for reformulating the theory/ practice 
relationship and for reformulating ethical debate in psychotherapeutic discourse.  
 
It is Habermas’ view that in the case of critical social theory reflection cannot be tied to 
the model of dialogue given that language is also a medium of power and domination 
([1967]1990b). One could make this argument in the case of psychotherapy also where 
the optimum conditions for relatively unconstrained dialogue rarely if ever apply. In 
family meetings for example it is often the case that communication processes are 
infused with elements of force and coercion. Frequently the work of the therapy is 
precisely that of helping individuals and families move towards the point where 
relatively unconstrained communication might begin to be possible either within the 
therapy itself or elsewhere. For this challenge the hermeneutic paradigm of dialogue is 
wholly inadequate. In fact the difficulty in adopting this paradigm for psychotherapy is 
neatly if inadvertently reflected in Andersen’s suggestion, discussed in Chapter 3, that 
“maybe we should encourage only those who are currently able to listen and see each 
other without interrupting to come to “therapy” and let those who are not ready to do so 
eventually join later” (1993, p. 310). I have argued that this is totally unrealistic given 
the clinical contexts in which we are often required to work and points to a therapeutic 
perspective that is overly in thrall to the hermeneutic model of dialogue unfolding 
against a background consensus. Unfortunately it also introduces an element of 
cautiousness into clinical practice which contrasts with the adventurous spirit of first 
order systemic approaches that were so effective in extending the reach of 
psychotherapy to those not readily amenable to traditional insight oriented therapy. 
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Here one is reminded notably of the first order therapist Salvador Minuchin (1967, 
1974) who had no hesitation in introducing new ways of communicating to families 
with little capacity to “listen and see each other without interrupting” for example, by 
taking some family members behind the one way screen to observe the rest of the 
family communicating and thus, in a sense, forcing them into a less action oriented 
mode of being in the session. I have argued that that some of these therapeutic strategies 
involving creative use of the one way screen could be seen as precursors of Andersen’s 
reflecting team approach. However in the first and second order split that subsequently 
took hold in systemic discourse, this continuity at the methodological level is effectively 
obscured and this in turn risks alienating contemporary clinicians from the richness of 
their methodological inheritance. Within this ideological split we lose sight of the fact 
that the key issue to address is one of difference between two modes of enquiry, a 
natural scientific logic of enquiry favoured by the first order approach and a 
hermeneutic logic of enquiry favoured by second order therapy where explanatory 
engagement with objectified processes from an outsider perspective is privileged by the 
former and interpretative engagement with subjectivity and meaning from an insider 
perspective is privileged by the latter. I am arguing that the challenge for contemporary 
psychotherapy is that of resolving the tension between these two paradigms in a way 
that secures what is best in both therapeutic traditions. 
 
Within the human and social sciences, Habermas is not alone in voicing unease at the 
manner in which the hermeneutical tradition seeks to resolve the tension between the 
explanatory and interpretative paradigms. The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1981) 
and as well as the German philosopher Karl Otto- Apel (1980) share similar 
reservations to those of Habermas and between them they articulate a perspective that 
might loosely be termed critical hermeneutics (Thompson, 1981). For Ricoeur the 
challenge is that of going beyond the “ruinous dichotomy” inherited from Dilthey 
between explanation and understanding and the conviction that an explanatory attitude 
belongs exclusively to the natural sciences (1981, p. 92). In his view hermeneutics can 
no longer regard issues of method as secondary and derivative which happens in 
Gadamer’s work. However Ricoeur is also keen to preserve and defend the richness of 
the hermeneutical contribution. He concludes that it is important not to abolish 
differences between hermeneutics and the critique of ideology as proposed by 
Habermas: “Each has a privileged place and, if I may say so, different regional 
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preferences: on the one hand an attention to cultural heritages, focused most decidedly 
on the theory of the text; on the otherhand, a theory of institutions and of phenomena of 
domination, focused on the analysis of reifications and alienations” (1981, p. 100). He 
also cautions against “deceptive antinomies” between the two perspectives, a theme 
which is echoed in Harrington’s (2001) suggestion that the difference between Gadamer 
and Habermas can be exaggerated in a way that distracts attention from significant 
agreement between them on the nature and structure of understanding (p. 23). However 
from Harrington’s perspective one difference which does matter is Habermas’ wish to 
restore argumentative parity of interpreters with their subjects and to rectify Gadamer’s 
privileging of the authority of the subject over the interpreter. In a similar vein Warnke 
(1987) reflects that perhaps Gadamer did not take Dilthey’s fear of relativism seriously 
enough: “The question is whether the reflection that evolves out of history and 
experience is enough or whether some methodological assurance of its reliability is 
required” (p. 34).  But Warnke is also keen to defend what she regards as Gadamer’s 
wish to retain the concept of reason in his work: “If others have used the insight into 
historicity to jettison the concept of reason itself, Gadamer does not. Our historical 
situatedness does not only limit what we can know with certainty; it can also teach us 
how to remember and integrate what we must not forget” (1987, p. 174).  
 
From the above it is clear that whilst differences between Habermas and Gadamer are 
more nuanced than might at first appear, there are important distinctions between their 
positions. Here it should be emphasized that my intention is not to take issue with the 
potential contribution of hermeneutical thinking to psychotherapeutic discourse as such. 
If anything it is arguable that this contribution has not been adequately explored. My 
argument is rather than any such consideration must also take careful note of other 
perspectives within philosophy and social theory that not only criticize but also 
supplement the hermeneutical perspective and thereby move the debate forward. In 
Habermas’ writings he proposes a model of critical hermeneutical enquiry that follows 
Weber’s synthesis of explanation and understanding. Unlike Weber however this takes 
the form of a critical social theory with an emancipatory interest, where explanation and 
understanding are inherently connected in the process of self reflection. I am proposing 
that this methodological integration of explanation and understanding provides a more 
realistic model for the clinical challenges of psychotherapy and one that is more 
appropriately attuned to the particular object domain in which psychotherapy operates. 
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In addition Habermas’ grounding of his work in a theory of communicative action and 
communicative ethics serves as an anchor for reformulating ethical debate in 
psychotherapy in line with the relational ethos of contemporary practice. Both of these 
arguments concerning the potential contribution of Habermasian thinking to 
psychotherapy will be taken up and developed in Part 111.    
                                     
 
 Habermas’ dialogue with Foucault     
 
Alongside Habermas’ dialogue with the hermeneutical tradition, a second deeply 
significant strand of debate in his work is his engagement with the post-structuralist 
theory of Michel Foucault. We have seen that alongside hermeneutics, Foucauldian 
thinking has also impacted significantly on what might loosely be termed the 
postmodernist perspective in contemporary psychotherapy. In what follows I begin with 
an outline of key aspects of Foucauldian thinking, with an emphasis on those that 
connect with psychotherapeutic discourse. I then draw on Habermas’ critique of 
Foucault in the context of considering Foucauldian influences in contemporary 
psychotherapy. In essence my argument is that the limitation of Foucault’s theory to 
which Habermas draws attention, in particular that relating to moral/ethical 
considerations, is also evident in psychotherapeutic perspectives that draw their 
inspiration from Foucault.  
 
 
The post-structuralist theory of Michel Foucault 
 
Whilst the philosophy of Kant provides a common reference point for Foucault and 
Habermas, it is their very different approaches to recasting the Kantian project of 
critique which crucially sets them apart (Owen, 1999). For Habermas the central feature 
of Kant’s critical project resides in its recognition of the limits of reason and at the same 
time its preservation of the critical transcendental capacity of reason to ground claims to 
truth and normative appropriateness. We have already considered key aspects of 
Habermas’ reformulation of Kantian philosophy of consciousness in terms of a theory 
of intersubjectivity, focused on reconstructing the rational structure of communication 
orientated to understanding and agreement. For Foucault (1984, 1996) on the other hand 
the key challenge of Kantian philosophy is that of taking up a critical attitude towards 
the limits of the present and it is this critical ethos which he sees as guiding his own 
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work. Foucault also observes that within Kantian philosophy there is a slippage from 
this critical ethos towards the more formal concept of critique as that which focuses on 
the apriori conditions of knowledge and experience. He sees his own historical analyses 
as reversing this trend and reinstating the conception of enlightenment as a critical 
attitude. His intention is “to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression” (1984, 
p. 45). His method of conducting this critique, he terms “archaeological”: 
  
Archaeological – and not transcendental- in the sense that it will not seek to 
identify the universal structures of all knowledge or all possible moral action but 
will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think and do 
as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense 
that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us 
to do and to know; but it will separate out from the contingency that has made us 
what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, 
do, or think. (1984, p. 46)         
In his seminal text The Archaeology of Knowledge ([1969]1972), Foucault offers a 
detailed retrospective formulation of his archaeological method, which he develops in 
three historical works written in the 1960s; his doctoral thesis, The History of Madness 
([1961]2006), The Birth of the Clinic ([1963]1973) and The Order of Things 
([1966]1970). In a subsequent work on the history of the prison, Discipline and Punish 
([1975]1977) his closely related genealogical method emerges more clearly. In all of 
these works, Foucault systematically seeks to demonstrate that the structures we think 
of as immutable have in fact changed over time and have not always existed. He sees us 
as profoundly historical beings that produce forms of knowledge also governed by 
history. There is no universal template of order but rather each historical phase requires 
critical reflection and archaeological investigation in order to identify those patterns of 
order which it encapsulates and through which relations of power and social regulation 
operate.  
 
Foucault’s archaeology is closely linked, firstly with the idea that language is a source 
of thinking in its own right and secondly with the idea that in any given historical phase 
there are implicit rules that restrict the range of thinking (Gutting, 2005, pp. 32-3). 
Going beyond obvious constraints of grammar and logic which render certain 
formulations meaningless, the archaeologist of thought focuses on deeper constraints 
which make certain things unthinkable. Whilst we may now think of “madness” as 
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mental illness, for example, Foucault’s archaeological perspective reconstructs 
considerable differences in how it was thought about in previous historical periods. His 
concern is not so much with a history of ideas as it is with the underlying structures that 
form the context for these ideas. Here his analyses, particularly those in the early works 
([1963]1973, [1966]1970) connect with structuralist methodology, notably that of De 
Saussure ([1916]1966) and Levi- Strauss ([1958]1963). However from The 
Archaeology of Knowledge onwards he was keen to distance himself from 
structuralism. Where he diverges significantly is in the historical thrust of his work and 
his concern with differences and discontinuities that arise. Rejecting the structuralist 
idea that the linguistic phenomenon of discourse is autonomous and constitutive of 
reality, he shifted towards social analysis. Here his genealogical perspective also 
develops to complement his archaeology as he searches for a method of causal 
explanation of changes and discontinuities between systems of thought. As this happens 
the theme of power emerges into the foreground as the engine of change, which not only 
constrains but also produces new forms of knowledge.  
 
Central to Foucault’s thinking is the conceptualization of knowledge in terms of a 
power struggle that is played out in various social discourses. In his theory “discourses” 
can be compared to the paradigm in the writings of Kuhn (1970) in that they structure 
the domain of knowledge (Delanty, 2005, pp. 110-11). He suggests that in modern 
society all spheres of life are the focus of investigation, surveillance and regulation in 
and through discourse and his early studies included the ground breaking historical 
analysis of the rise of the discourse of psychiatry as madness becomes increasingly 
absorbed into the realm of medicine ([1961]2006). In these early works the impression 
given is that of power inhering in institutions such as the prison, hospital or asylum and 
the sense of individuals’ powerlessness in the face of such effective and diffuse forms of 
social control. As his thinking evolved this sense of power contributing only negatively 
to the historical formation of subjects gives way to its conceptualization as a more fluid 
entity, a pervasive human dynamic determining our relations with others. Power is not 
just about constraint, it can also be productive. It is not possessed but rather exercised 
and it “exists only when it is put into action” (1982, p. 219). Foucault also believed that 
where there is power there is always resistance and the element of freedom in his 
understanding of power gains prominence ([1976]1980, pp. 95-6). Although domination 
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may be a part of some power relations, in itself the exercise of power is not synonymous 
with domination or violence (1982, p. 220). 
  
For Foucault a key theme is that modern forms of power are constructed around a 
discourse of subjectivity or individuality. The subjectification of “Man” is both the 
creation of power, the means by which power is mobilized and is also of relatively 
recent origin. This is a key element in his critique of humanist discourse with its 
emphasis on principles of individual autonomy, self determination and self mastery, 
perceived as grounded in a universal, timeless human nature (1984). For Foucault it is 
“a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet 
two centuries old, a wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon 
as that knowledge has discovered a new form” (Foucault, 1970. p. xxiii, quoted by 
Delanty, 2005, p. 110). Given the Kantian humanistic ethos that pervades 
psychotherapeutic engagement with moral/ethical themes, in particular the emphasis on 
respect for personal autonomy, self determination and so on, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Foucault’s critique of humanism is especially pertinent in the present context. It is also 
deeply significant for Habermas’ critique of Foucault which will be considered shortly. 
   
Whilst in very simple terms we might describe the humanistic stance as that which 
focuses on the subject of “man” and places this subject at the centre of life, Foucault 
observes that what is called humanism has also varied greatly in terms of its content and 
the values it has promoted: “at least since the 17th century, what has been called 
humanism has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man borrowed 
from religion, science or politics. Humanism serves to colour and to justify the 
conceptions of man to which it is after all, obliged to take recourse” (1984, p. 44). This 
critique is similar to that cited earlier in this study concerning the formal emptiness of 
the Kantian conception of morality and the likelihood of it therefore becoming a basis 
for conformity to whatever duties a particular society might prescribe.1 For Kant, “man” 
is the transcendental arbiter of reason but for Foucault “man” cannot be set apart from 
history in this way. His conception of the subject sees it as having no particular unity or 
universal essence. On the contrary, throughout his writings he is deeply preoccupied 
with the complex historically unfolding processes in and through which social 
discourses shape the subject. In his later work which has a particular resonance for 
                                                 
1  Chapter 4  p. 95-6. 
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psychotherapy, he extends this thinking on the subjectification of “man” to a view of 
sexuality that sees it in strictly historical terms ([1976]1980, 1985, 1986). 
 
 
Foucault’s perspective on psychotherapy 
 
In The History of Sexuality Vol.1 (1980) Foucault seeks to demonstrate that power and 
sexuality are intricately linked and that power serves to construct sexuality. As we know 
it, sexuality is the result of an ongoing process of monitoring, classification and 
medicalization of this domain and his focus is on the way in which sex, desire and 
power thus intermingle. Medical experts, psychologists and other specialists use 
knowledge to separate normality and pathology and in that sense regulate and shape 
sexuality. From his perspective modern society is typified by an ongoing expansion of 
discussion of sex, which becomes the focus for our contemporary concern with personal 
identity and with the true self. Sexuality becomes the most revealing sign of our true 
selves. People are preoccupied with the cultivation of the self in and through sex in a 
way that for Foucault amounts to a self- policing of sexuality.  
 
Foucault regards the Roman Catholic confessional as an historical marker in this 
movement towards the self-regulation of sex. This was later reconstituted as a scientific 
discourse and with this came the creation of networks of knowledge and power 
including the emergence of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Instead of sex being 
regulated by external sources it becomes much more a matter of internal attitudinal 
discipline and he sees psychoanalysis and psychotherapy as key instances of this trend 
towards self-policing. Information divulged in this setting is treated as liberation from 
repression and the means to freedom. He traces the historical trajectory of this idea from 
its beginnings in Christian confession and penance and concludes that the 
subjectification of “man” as a confessing entity has emerged through centuries of 
coercion (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1977, 1980). Hence his critique of the 
humanistic orientation of psychoanalysis towards personal autonomy achieved through 
the bringing to consciousness of what has been repressed. For Foucault (1980) this 
Freudian perspective on the repression of sexuality is extremely problematic. It is not so 
much a case of the person discovering their true self and of sexuality being set free 
when an expert is consulted but more a case of the person being subjected to a socially 
constructed “regime of truth”.                         
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In effect Foucault sees psychotherapeutic discourse as part of a structure of cultural 
conventions in and through which sex is subjected to public scrutiny and through which 
psychotherapy becomes another means of social control (Elliott, 2001). His analysis of 
the Freudian perspective on the Oedipus complex underlines this point. For Freud, 
Oedipus’ search for the truth of his identity can be compared to the task of 
psychoanalysis in searching for the truth of identity hidden far from conscious 
awareness and tied to the dimension of sexuality and desire. The oedipal triangle of 
father/mother/child, which for Freud is the key metaphor for understanding the 
individual, is in Foucauldian thinking a conceptual instrument used by the 
psychoanalyst for governing individuals. He does not regard the Oedipus complex as 
reflecting any particular truth but rather as an instrument of compulsion which forces 
desire into a conventional family structure (Bernauer and Mahon, 1994). Oedipus is in 
effect an instrument of power which society, the family and political power establish 
over the individual within a framework that fuses subjectivity, sexuality and truth. 2                                      
 
I have elaborated aspects of Foucauldian thinking in some detail, not least his focus on 
the links between psychoanalysis/psychotherapy and social control since this is a 
subject of considerable significance to which I shall return in Part 111, in the context of 
a more general dialogue between social theory and psychotherapy. Foucault’s theory 
unquestionably offers a useful frame in which to think about the intermingling of power 
and knowledge in the psychotherapeutic field; the political battles for supremacy 
between different strands of psychotherapy; the monopolization of zones of expertise 
such as the “unconscious” by certain groups; the development of exclusive therapeutic 
language games to stake out specialist territory and to underscore difference from other 
approaches and so on. Critical engagement with these and other phenomena 
undoubtedly owes a huge debt to Foucauldian thinking. But there is also a weakness in 
Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy which is consistent with a 
more general criticism of his work, namely that he is too quick to make the assumption 
that people are the passive recipients of discourse: 
                                                 
2  In his essay, “Against interiority: Foucault’s struggle with psychoanalysis”, Whitebook (2005), 
observes that “Foucault could never successfully exorcise the spectre of Freud. He kept returning to Freud 
throughout his career” (p. 312). Thus, in Whitebook’s view, whilst Foucault may appear to have refuted 
the claims of psychoanalysis in The history of sexuality, Vol.1, his relationship to Freudian thinking and 
practice was much more complex and conflicted than this might indicate:            
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In Foucault’s approach to sexuality it is discourse which produces human 
experience rather than experience (psychic dispositions, emotional desires, 
personal biographies) producing the discourse. The strength of Foucault’s 
position is that he underlines the extent to which individuals in defining 
themselves as sexual subjects become fixed in relation to symbolic discourses 
and social prohibitions. The making of sexual identities, says Foucault, is always 
interwoven with a mode of social control. However the weakness of this 
standpoint is that it bypasses the psychic makeup of the individual so that issues 
of agency, knowledgeability, desire and emotion are not analytically addressed. 
(Elliott, 2001, pp. 92-3)  
There is a downplaying of the complexity of psychic makeup and human experience 
and the individual as a by-product of social discourse overshadows consideration of the 
individual as capable of critical reflection. In Elliott’s view this reductive and one 
dimensional tendency also leads Foucault to a simplistic linkage of therapy and the 
confessional in which the complexity of the therapist’s conceptualization of human 
experience and how it is structured internally is completely lost. Whilst this is 
undoubtedly a weakness in Foucault’s critique of psychotherapy, more importantly it is 
central to an understanding of the difficulties that arise when constructive efforts are 
made to integrate Foucault’s critical thinking into therapeutic approaches as happens in 
contemporary post-structuralist/ postmodernist influenced psychotherapy, which I shall 
consider shortly.         
 
Whilst Foucault viewed his work as opening a space for individuals to experiment with 
their self- definition, another widely held criticisms of his work is the neglect of the 
self’s relations with others (Thompson, 1999, p. 199). It is true that in his later work, 
Foucault turned increasingly to the subject of the ethical formation of the self in the 
context of a general move towards a less pessimistic and more flexible view of human 
agency. Thus in his genealogy of the modern sexual subject for example, processes of 
subjectification are no longer presented as strictly coercive in the way they might have 
been in his early work. Power relations are also seen to manifest themselves in 
productive discursive practices (Conway, 1999, p. 65) Foucault’s engagement with the 
ethical formation of the self is also evident in his later analyses of ancient Greek and 
Roman views on sexuality and the self (1984, 1985). Since the progression of this later 
work was cut short by his death, it is unclear how he might have developed his thinking 
about an ethics of truth as a way of living. Nonetheless it is noteworthy that his 
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formulation of ethics is one that is very closely tied to aesthetics, where the primary 
criterion would seem to be the will “to live a beautiful life and to leave to others 
memories of a beautiful existence” (Foucault, 1983, p. 230). As White (1988) observes, 
Foucault’s ethics of aesthetic self-formation have “the unavoidable connotation of 
solitude” (p. 151). In Foucault’s work the self appears primarily as a monadic entity 
shut off from emotional intimacy and from communal ties. Foucault’s concern was to 
loosen the grip of what holds people captive. His work is concerned with,  
 
            disrupting certainties, with acting with untimely deliberation upon the present, 
with finding ways to move beyond our current moral certainties; its utopian 
telos, its regulatory idea, being the possibility that we might make of ourselves 
not creatures that conform to our knowledge of ourselves but something like 
works of art. (Osborne, 1999, p. 57) 
Amongst feminist writers, Foucauldian theory has been the focus for much debate and 
differences of perspective on its potential contribution to feminist approaches (Hekman, 
1996). In her largely positive engagement with the potential in Foucault’s later work to 
contribute to feminist thinking, Sawicki (1996) admits that the relationship between 
Foucault and feminism has not always been entirely happy and that criticism of his 
work emanates from both sympathetic and more hostile camps with most feminists 
pointing to Foucault’s androcentric gender blindness. Whilst some do not regard this as 
a fatal flaw in his work, others believe it contaminates his entire project.  Hartsock 
(1990), who falls into the latter category argues that his post-structuralist theory cannot 
provide a theory of power that might apply to women. Amongst other things she 
observes that because power in Foucault’s conceptualization is not seen in terms of an 
individual dominating another individual or in terms of one group dominating others, 
his theory makes it very difficult to locate domination including that within gender 
relations: “his account only makes room for abstract individuals not women, men or 
workers” (1990, pp. 168-9). This critique of the implicit abstract individualistic bias in 
Foucault’s theory is integral to an understanding of the limitation of Foucauldian 
thinking in connecting with the relational ethos of psychotherapeutic discourse. I will 
argue that it is also integral to an understanding of the problematic continuity between 
Foucauldian influenced psychotherapy and modernist formulations in terms of their 
individualistic moral/ethical bias.  
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Throughout this study much emphasis has been placed on the vigorously relational 
ethos of contemporary psychotherapy and on the disjuncture between this ethos and the 
highly individualistic orientation of traditional psychotherapeutic moral/ethical 
formulations. Arguably the most important distinction between Habermas and Foucault 
from the perspective of psychotherapy is therefore Habermas’ insistence on entering 
moral/ethical territory in a way that Foucault steadfastly resisted. This applies notably to 
Habermas’ project to detach humanist ethics from the Kantian standpoint of the 
philosophy of consciousness and the paradigm of the individual. His communicative 
reconstruction of Kantian ethics is, in Fraser’s words, “an attempt to divest the humanist 
notion of autonomy of some of its Cartesian trappings (its “monologism” and its 
ahistorical formalism) while preserving its efficacy as an instrument of social criticism” 
(1985, p. 172). Habermas engages with communicative and relational themes that are of 
urgent concern in everyday psychotherapeutic practice: “unlike Foucault, he is a 
committed intersubjectivist whose theory depends significantly on the idea that our 
identities are first formed and then sustained by our relations to others” (Thompson, 
1999, p. 205). These and other distinctions have fuelled the debate between Habermas 
and Foucault, which I shall now consider in terms of its relevance for psychotherapeutic 
themes and concerns.     
 
 
The Habermas/ Foucault controversy  
 
As in the encounter with hermeneutics, that between Habermasian and Foucauldian 
thinking has been the focus for much debate in philosophical discourse (Ashenden and 
Owen, 1999a, Flyvbjerg, 1998, Ingram, 2005, Kelly, 1994a). Although Habermas and 
Foucault did meet at least once, they never debated in any formal sense and therefore 
the “debate” as such is one that has largely unfolded in the years since Foucault’s death 
in 1984. In the view of some commentators it has been skewed in Habermas’ direction 
because of this fact (Kelly 1994b). Issue has also been taken with the tone of debate set 
by Habermas, which in the view of some, takes the form of an uncharitable polemic 
(Ashendon and Owen, 1999b). Habermas’ Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(1987b) which includes a lengthy consideration of Foucault was published after his 
death and therefore received no reply. However the controversy started some years 
earlier and famously included Habermas labeling Foucault a “Young Conservative” 
(1981b). Habermas’ accusation is that Foucault’s work aims less at a resolution of the 
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problems of modern societies than a radical rejection of modernity whilst at the same 
time presupposing some of the categories of modernity which it claims to have 
surpassed. Regardless of its aspirations, it is in Habermas’ view at best modern and at 
worst antimodern (Fraser, 1985).  
 
In essence the criticisms of Foucauldian theory presented by Habermas (1987b) are that 
the overall coherence of this historical approach is undermined  
  
 (1) by the involuntary presentism of a historiography that remains 
hermeneutically stuck in its starting situation; (2) by the unavoidable relativism 
of an analysis related to the present that can understand itself only as a context- 
dependent practical enterprise; (3) by the arbitrary partisanship of a criticism 
that cannot account for its own normative foundations. (p. 276, his emphasis) 
For Habermas, Foucault’s approach leads to a “historiography that is narcissistically 
oriented to the standpoint of the historian and instrumentalizes the contemplation of the 
past for the needs of the present” (ibid., p. 278). He also objects to Foucault’s work on 
the basis that it fuses the situation of being context-dependent with being context-bound 
whilst he sees his own work as using criteria of rationality that are context-transcending. 
Furthermore because Foucault cannot account for the normative foundations of his 
critique he cannot answer the question “why fight?” As Ashendon and Owen (1999b) 
observe, this latter point is one that is likely to be accepted at least partially even by 
sympathetic readers of Foucault. Habermas’ criticism is of course based on his view 
that it is necessary to provide a general answer to the question “why fight?” and to do so 
by offering a grounding for universal norms that can in turn offer an answer to the 
question as to why we might resist oppressive regimes of power. As we have seen 
Habermas addresses this challenge by seeking to reconstruct the universal 
presuppositions of rational argumentation. Whether one accepts the terms on which his 
criticism of Foucault is presented is thus closely linked with whether one accepts the 
cogency of his own contribution. 
 
On the other side of this encounter Foucault professes to be a little more in agreement 
with Habermas than the latter is with him, but he has difficulty with what he regards as 
the utopian tendencies in Habermas’ work. Instead he speaks of finding it difficult to 
believe in a society without relations of power and that such relations are not something 
bad in themselves: 
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            I am quite interested in [Habermas’] work, although I know he completely 
disagrees with my views. While I, for my part, tend to be a little more in 
agreement with what he says, I have always had a problem insofar as he gives 
communicative relations this place which is so important and, above all, a 
function that I would call ‘utopian’. (Foucault, 1997, p. 298, quoted by Owen, 
1999, p. 39)  
What for Foucault is “utopian” is for Habermas a regulative idea against which actual 
communicative contexts suffused by relations of power can be evaluated. 
Contrary to Foucault’s implication, Habermas does not believe in a society without 
relations of power and in this respect there appears a kernel of common ground between 
the two theorists from which a more creative dialogue might be possible but which is 
not immediately apparent from their rather polarized exchange. This perspective on the 
Habermas/ Foucault encounter as potentially representing less oppositional, more 
complementary positions is one that is taken up by some commentators (Ingram, 2005; 
Strydom, 2000; Thompson,1999; Tully, 1999).  Amongst other things, the shared 
Kantian reference point of both theorists is offered as a supportive framework for this 
argument: 
 
Foucault’s approach aims to enable us to think and act differently by means of 
critical histories that exhibit the singularity, contingency and arbitrary 
constraints of our forms of subjectivity. Habermas’ approach aims to discover a 
universal form of the subject, the decentered subject implicit in our forms of 
subjectivity, by means of universal pragmatics and development logic and to use 
it as a regulative idea to evaluate existing practices. These two philosophical 
orientations are not necessarily opposed. They could complement one another; 
one clearing away the contingent and the other explicating the universal … On 
Foucault’s interpretation, Kant saw the two critiques in this complementary 
way…. ( Tully, 1999, pp. 107-8)         
For Osborne (1999) however, it is not so much a matter of uncovering complementarity 
between Habermas and Foucault but one of accepting that the similarities and 
dissimilarities between them are “just not all that interesting” (p. 57). From all of this 
we might conclude that it is possible for psychotherapeutic discourse to engage in an 
exploratory dialogue with both philosophical perspectives without undue concern for 
the finer detail of the controversy between them. But this is precisely the tendency 
within psychotherapeutic discourse which I have already criticized in this study, namely 
a simplistic and uncritical engagement with philosophical and sociological theories 
which isolates them from the complex debates to which they belong. The richness of 
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Foucault’s insights including his critique of psychotherapy is beyond question but my 
earlier discussion also raised concerns that are especially relevant given contemporary 
attempts to integrate Foucauldian thinking into psychotherapeutic practice based 
approaches.3 These are firstly that his theory reveals a reductionist tendency that 
downplays the complexity of psychic make up and of human experience. Secondly it 
neglects the self’s relations with others, a view that is crystallized in Hartsock’s (1990) 
feminist based critique that Foucault’s theory of power only makes room for “abstract 
individuals”. On closer inspection Habermas’ critique of Foucault also holds much 
relevance for psychotherapy. This relates in particular to the charge of a 
“cryptonormative” allegiance to humanism which he levels at Foucault (1987b, p. 276) 
and which I will argue can also be detected in contemporary Foucauldian influenced 
psychotherapeutic approaches.     
 
In essence Habermas’ reference to “cryptonormativity” focuses attention on the 
unacknowledged appeal by Foucault to a hidden framework of norms and ideals relating 
to autonomy and creativity, which reveals the residual humanism of Foucault’s own 
theory, notwithstanding his overt opposition to the traditions of humanism (Conway, 
1999; Fraser, 1983). Why we might ask does Foucault appear to side more with 
prisoners than wardens or with sinners than confessors in his studies? (Conway, p. 77).  
For Habermas the answer lies in a silent normative commitment that includes a “picture 
of an undamaged intersubjectivity” (1987b, p. 337) and which cannot be accounted for 
within the terms of Foucault’s own theory given the radical nature of his critique of 
reason. As Fraser (1983) observes, the unmasking of coercive power in his historical 
analyses draws its political force from “the reader’s familiarity with a commitment to 
modern ideals of autonomy, dignity and human rights” (p. 59). From Habermas’ 
perspective these analyses are unable to be genuinely critical in the absence of explicit 
normative standards against which discourses can be judged.  
 
Throughout Foucault’s work the precise grounding and extent of his rejection of 
humanism remains ambiguous and has given rise to divergent views amongst his 
interpreters. Is he rejecting the Cartesian philosophical underpinning of humanism 
whilst holding on to the substance of humanist ideals or is he claiming that humanism is 
intrinsically undesirable and a formula for domination “tout court” (Fraser, 1985). 
                                                 
3  See Chapter 3  p. 71. 
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Fraser observes that Foucault did not have one consistent position and she finds 
Habermas’ critique insufficiently nuanced in this respect.4 Nonetheless she is 
sympathetic to the Habermasian conclusion that in the absence of a “nonhumanist 
ethical paradigm, Foucault cannot make good his normative case against humanism” (p. 
182). This lacuna in Foucault’s work and the Habermasian charge of cryptonormative 
allegiance to humanism, underscore the immense potential for confusion in any attempt 
to apply Foucauldian thinking in psychotherapeutic contexts. This is particularly the 
case given psychotherapy’s own troubled engagement with moral/ethical considerations 
as outlined in Part 1 and given what we might now describe, in Habermasian 
terminology, as psychotherapy’s own tendency towards cryptonormative allegiance to 
humanistic values notably in those approaches that align themselves with the 
postmodernist banner.5         
 
   
Implications for psychotherapy 
 
In my earlier account of contemporary trends in systemic psychotherapy in Chapter 3, 
reference was made to the impact of Foucauldian thinking, notably in the hugely 
influential narrative therapy approach of the Australian therapist Michael White (1987, 
1989, 1990). We have seen that this therapeutic approach takes up Foucault’s thinking 
about the intimate relationship of power and knowledge, the way in which power is 
exercised through knowledge and the idea of dominant discourses which censor and 
marginalize alternate discourses and ways of thinking. Using the metaphor of narrative, 
White draws on these ideas to explore the way that our dominant stories about ourselves 
and our experience are shaped by familial, cultural and social contexts and relationships 
and the way in which these stories can restrain us from thinking about and knowing 
other stories about ourselves. In White’s work, therapy becomes an arena in which 
dominant narratives are deconstructed and alternative stories reconstructed which allow 
space for difference and change.  
 
                                                 
4  Fraser (1985. p. 167) cites Hoy (1981) as an example of those interpretations that have seen Foucault as 
“a merely conceptual or philosophical rejectionist of humanism” without giving up on the critical core of 
humanism. In Fraser’s view this interpretation of Foucault is incomplete and unsatisfactory. She argues 
that his work reveals a stronger version of rejectionism and cites Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) as an 
example of that interpretation which see Foucault as a “substantive, normative rejectionist of humanist 
values”. This latter reading is – or at least should be in Fraser’s view- the real focus of Habermas’ 
critique.    
5  See Chapter 3  pp. 69-73.  
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White’s application of what might very loosely be termed Foucauldian thinking to his 
engagement with individual lived experience in the therapeutic context is undoubtedly 
highly selective and idiosyncratic. However as Flaskas (2002) observes, there is no 
doubt that White himself considers this application entirely harmonious with the spirit 
of Foucault’s project. Furthermore, critical engagement with this aspect of White’s 
work has been almost entirely absent in the therapy literature despite the extensive 
influence of his narrative therapy. Other approaches within, what is loosely termed the 
postmodernist perspective in systemic psychotherapy that were also discussed in 
Chapter 3, whilst not engaging directly with Foucault in the manner of White, similarly 
make considerable use of thinking that is heavily influenced by Foucault, for example in 
their emphasis on the historical and cultural relativity of knowledge, the centrality of 
discourse in the social construction of subjectivity and their rejection of the idea of an 
inner, true or essential nature to be discovered in psychotherapy or elsewhere.6 However 
as in White’s work, the tendency is towards a superficial and uncritical engagement 
with their theoretical sources.  
 
The work of the Australian family therapist Flaskas is noteworthy in reflecting unease 
with this uncritical and idiosyncratic engagement by systemic psychotherapy writers 
with philosophical and social theoretical source material. In her text, Family Therapy 
beyond Postmodernism (2002), Flaskas systematically maps out the various strands of 
contemporary postmodernist influence in systemic psychotherapy and their theoretical 
roots notably in social constructionist and Foucauldian thinking. Whilst Flaskas mostly 
steers clear of direct critique of these theoretical influences, she does address the 
difficulties that arise in attempting to mould them to psychotherapeutic concerns. Here 
she is particularly concerned with their limitation in addressing the richness and 
complexity of human experience as encountered in therapeutic practice. Flaskas is 
prominent within a group of contemporary systemic writers who challenge the 
traditional opposition to psychoanalysis within systemic psychotherapy and who 
promote the selective integration of psychoanalytic thinking into systemic discourse.7  
Not surprisingly her critique of postmodernist influence in systemic discourse takes her 
in the direction of psychoanalysis in search of a more satisfactory engagement with the 
complex psychic and relational processes that shape human experience consciously and 
                                                 
6  See Chapter 3 pp. 69-73. 
7  See Introduction p. 2.   
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unconsciously. Here she also encounters postmodernist influence and quotes Sass’s 
(1992, p. 178) critique of the “thinning or hollowing-out of existence” evident in such 
influence.  
 
Whilst Flaskas’ critique is deeply rooted in psychotherapeutic discourse and debates 
therein and is not directed at the post-structuralist theory of Foucault per se, it is 
interesting nonetheless to make connections with Elliott’s (2001) social theoretical 
critique of Foucault mentioned above. Elliott’s argument relates to the reductionist 
tendencies in Foucault’s work which lead to a downplaying of the complexity of 
psychic make up and human experience. In their sympathetic account of psychoanalysis 
“navigating the postmodern turn”, Elliott and Spezzano (1996, p. 74) similarly agree 
with the criticism that unconscious and libidinal processes are rendered mere products 
of social processes of power and knowledge in Foucault’s work. It is difficult not to 
conclude that this is a major limitation in any attempt to integrate Foucauldian thinking 
into psychotherapy and arguably one that is inadequately addressed in current debates 
given the reluctance to engage more critically and in a less formulaic manner with 
philosophical and social theoretical sources of inspiration.  
 
Given Foucault’s critique of the psychotherapeutic enterprise as implicated in 
disciplinary power, the enthusiastic adoption of his thinking or derivatives of his 
thinking within the post-structuralist/postmodernist paradigm in psychotherapy is not 
without irony. This point is mostly obscured by the modernist/postmodernist split in 
psychotherapeutic discourse which presents the latter in terms of a radical break with 
the former and by implication a radical break with all its associated difficulties. Yet, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, paradoxically postmodernist influenced therapeutic approaches 
are also routinely presented with an overlay of humanistic values emphasizing 
principles of autonomy and respect for the uniqueness of each client’s “narrative truth”. 
These individually oriented traditional humanistic values, albeit packaged in the 
contemporary language of the narrative metaphor, either remain implicit or are 
presented uncritically as the normative foundation of postmodernist influenced practice 
devoid of recognition of their modernist credentials. Here it is interesting to note the 
criticism leveled at the narrative approach in systemic therapy by Salvador Minuchin 
(1967, 1974) whose own work was so influential in the early development of the family 
therapy movement. This criticism is neatly summarized in the title of his article, “Where 
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is the family in narrative family therapy?” (1998) and raises the concern that a renewed 
focus on the individual story and on individual experience in narrative therapy may 
dilute the vigorously relational ethos that has typified systemic psychotherapy. This 
ethos is represented graphically in the choice of seeing family members together with a 
strong therapeutic focus on the here and now of relational processes. At the very least 
this raises a concern that what we might describe as the postmodern humanist stance in 
psychotherapy infused with individualistic values is not simply out of step with the 
relational ethos of contemporary clinical practice. It may actively dilute or undermine 
this ethos in subtle and silent ways that are unavailable to debate given the 
impoverished quality of current moral/ ethical deliberations and the restrictive focus on 
professional ethics.                        
 
 
Beyond the Habermas/ Foucault debate   
 
In this study, I am raising the concern that postmodernist influenced therapeutic 
approaches appear unable to transcend the difficulties of an earlier positivist era in 
conceptualizing the normative/ethical dimension of psychotherapy. I am arguing for an 
engagement with alternative sources of inspiration that might help address this difficulty 
and in particular the difficulty in moving beyond the abstract individualistic bias of 
traditional moral/ethical formulations. From the perspective of this study it is deeply 
relevant that at the heart of Habermas’ critique of Foucault, is a concern regarding the 
silent normative commitment to traditional humanist values which cannot be accounted 
for within the terms of Foucault’s own theory. To borrow Conway’s (1999, p. 76) 
words, Habermas’ is “certain the game of normativity is best played in the light of day”, 
and it is this conviction that makes his work so relevant to the concerns of 
psychotherapy in engaging with the moral/ethical challenge of therapeutic practice. 
Notwithstanding the undoubted richness of Foucault’s theory, the lacuna in terms of 
articulating the normative foundations of his work limits its potential relevance to 
psychotherapeutic practice. My conclusion is that on balance, Habermas’ persistent 
engagement with relational themes in the context of his communicative reformulation of 
Kantian ethics ultimately renders his contribution more relevant to the contemporary 
challenges of psychotherapy.   
                                                                                                                                 
133 
This is not to suggest that Habermas’ own work is without problems. As Fraser (1985) 
observes in her discussion of the Habermas/Foucault controversy, the ideal of autonomy 
in Habermas’ communicative reformulation of Kantian ethics also remains vulnerable to 
feminist critique such as that of Gilligan (1982) cited earlier. This critique contrasts the 
Kantian ethic of justice emphasizing rights, autonomy and so on with an ethic of care 
and responsibility. Here the emphasis is on compassion, connectedness and context 
sensitivity. We have noted that Habermas considers his project compatible with this 
perspective but concern about the abstraction of his theory persists: 
  
 Habermas is often criticized, even by sympathetic readers, for not attending 
adequately to the role in reciprocal communication of passion, affect and all 
other non-reasonable elements of human intercourse. The project of universal 
pragmatics is often described as promising, yet sterile, as pertaining more     
appropriately to angels than to the mortals. (Conway, 1999, p. 75) 
From the practice based perspective of psychotherapy this obviously presents 
challenges. Paradoxically it can also be a focus for creative exchange as Steuerman 
(2000) suggests in her dialogue between Habermas, Lyotard and Kleinian 
psychoanalysis where she makes the case that Habermas’ thinking can be supplemented 
by accounts of intersubjectivity that are more closely tied to an understanding of 
emotional life notably those offered by contemporary object relations psychoanalysis. 
Whilst Habermas lost interest in psychoanalysis as his own work developed, this 
potential for further creative exchange has been taken up and developed by Axel 
Honneth (1995) whose moral theory of recognition draws significantly on the object 
relations psychoanalytic thinking of Winnicott. 
  
Within the tradition of critical social theory, Honneth’s theory of recognition elaborates 
a theme which also plays an essential part in Habermas’ theory of communicative 
ethics, and in so doing it brings this project closer to the practice based arenas of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity in which psychotherapy operates. Within 
postmodernist discourse, developments in recent decades also merit attention. These 
relate, in particular, to the “ethical turn” in postmodernism which, as Honneth (2007) 
observes, presents a challenge to Habermas’ theory. Although Foucault did not classify 
his work as “postmodernist” he played a major role in creating the conditions for 
subsequent developments in postmodernism. (Delanty, 2005, p. 110; Elliott and 
Spezzano, 1996, p. 74). We have noted that Foucault’s work on ethics was cut short by 
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his death and it is important to consider the fate of ethics in the subsequent development 
of postmodernist thinking. The following chapter addresses this theme with particular 
reference to Zygmunt Bauman whose thinking also resonates in contemporary 
psychotherapeutic discourse. The chapter concludes with a consideration of Honneth’s 
theory of recognition. Both contributions will be addressed in relation to Habermas’ 
theory of communicative ethics and in terms of their relevance for moral/ethical debate 
in psychotherapy.                             
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Beyond Foucault and Habermas: Contributions from  
Bauman and Honneth 
 
 
Throughout this study I am arguing for the reformulation of ethical debate in 
psychotherapy in terms that take account of contemporary engagement with relational 
themes. In particular I am arguing for an understanding of ethics that is more firmly 
rooted in processes of communication and to this end I engage in a dialogue with 
current themes in social and political theory that could potentially inform and enrich 
psychotherapeutic debates. Habermas’ discourse ethics is at the centre of my endeavour 
to make links between psychotherapy and social theory as are the key debates in which 
he engaged with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Foucault’s post-
structuralist thinking. In essence my argument thus far has been that the limitations of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Foucault’s post-structuralism, which are underlined by 
Habermas, in particular those relating to moral/ethical considerations, are also evident 
in psychotherapeutic perspectives that draw their inspiration from these sources. In what 
follows I continue this dialogue between psychotherapy and social theory focusing on 
the postmodernist influenced work of Zygmunt Bauman and the critical theoretical 
perspective of Axel Honneth.   
 
We have seen that contemporary psychotherapeutic discourse is significantly influenced 
by strands of hermeneutical, post-structuralist and postmodernist thinking. Whilst this 
influence has impacted on theoretical and clinical processes as discussed in Part 1, its 
impact on psychotherapeutic formulations of the ethical underpinning of clinical 
practice is less clear. On closer inspection much of what passes for new thinking on 
ethics within the postmodernist perspective in psychotherapy remains firmly anchored 
in the Kantian tradition of abstract individualism favoured by previous generations of 
“helping professionals”. I have argued that this is deeply problematic. The 
individualistic ethos of this perspective fails to encapsulate the radical paradigm shift in 
contemporary psychotherapy from an exclusive focus on intrapsychic processes to one 
in which relational themes now dominate. This results in a disjuncture between ethical 
considerations and wider theoretical debate, as a consequence of which both domains 
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are deprived of creative input. Chapter 5 traced this problem back to the Foucauldian 
perspective informing much of what is loosely described as postmodernist thinking in 
psychotherapy. 
 
From a psychotherapeutic perspective, areas of particular difficulty in Foucault’s work 
include the tendency to downplay the complexity of psychic experience and neglect of 
the self’s relations with others, its implicit abstract individualistic bias and the 
cryptonormative appeal to a humanist framework of norms and values which is the 
focus of Habermas’ critique. Whilst Foucault’s later work signalled a shift towards 
increased engagement with the ethical formation of the self, this endeavour was never 
fully developed. His post-structuralist theory nonetheless prepared the way for later 
developments in postmodernist thinking. From the perspective of this study, one of the 
most significant of these developments is the “ethical turn” in postmodernism that is 
notably represented in the work of Zygmunt Bauman. His work has an added 
significance in the present context since, as discussed earlier, some albeit limited 
attempts have been made to engage with his thinking in current ethical debate in 
psychotherapy.1 For this reason I am privileging his work over other contributions that 
also reveal the ethical turn in postmodernist thinking, including that of Derrida (1978, 
2005) who is similarly influenced by Levinas (1969, 1985, 1989)2 or that reflected in 
the social postmodernist perspective of Nicholson and Seidman (1995).  
 
In essence the argument which follows is that whilst Bauman’s theory signals a 
welcome shift towards engagement with ethical themes, his reduction of the connection 
between the ethical and the political to something that can only be formulated in deeply 
personal terms means that any engagement with his thinking within psychotherapeutic 
discourse risks reinforcing the latter’s individualistic tendencies. For this reason, I will 
argue that Bauman’s work cannot offer psychotherapy an adequate framework for 
ethical debate and for challenging the persistent marginalization of ethical themes. The 
discussion then moves back to the tradition of critical theory and considers the third 
generation work of Honneth who has been influenced by developments within 
postmodernist thinking particularly relating to the politics of identity. I will argue that 
                                                 
1  Chapter 2  pp. 50-54.  
2  See Honneth (2007b) “The other of justice: Habermas and the ethical challenge of postmodernism”, in 
Disrespect: the normative foundations of critical theory, Cambridge, Polity.    
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his contribution, which addresses the lacuna in Habermasian thinking with regard to 
issues of emotionality and personal identity, offers a helpful bridge for dialogue 
between critical social theory and psychotherapy and that in conjunction with 
Habermas’ theory, it offers psychotherapy a way forward beyond the limitations of 
postmodernist thinking with regard to moral/ethical considerations.                     
 
 
Bauman’s contribution to postmodernist thinking 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a burgeoning interest in Zygmunt Bauman, a Polish 
born theorist of Jewish descent, who has come to be regarded as one of the leading 
social theorists of our times. Although his writings are prolific he has never aspired to 
create a cohesive theoretical system and one of the challenges which his work presents 
is a marked tendency to resist easy or concise classification (Tester, 2004). From the 
1960s through to the 1980s his thinking evolved primarily in dialogue with Marxism 
and his publications from this time reflect his interest in class and social conflict (1972, 
1973, 1982). He was especially influenced by the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci 
(1971) and his work from this period is generally categorized as cultural Marxism.3 
From the 1980s however a significant shift towards the postmodernist perspective 
becomes evident and is represented notably in his text Legislators and Interpreters 
(1987). This was in line with his recognition that the Marxist framework in social theory 
was losing explanatory appeal as the world changed in profoundly important ways. 
These changes would later be encapsulated in his metaphor of the transition from solid 
to liquid modernity (2000b). Whilst others might continue to define him as 
postmodernist or even regard him as the preeminent theorist of the postmodern he has 
distanced himself from this designation, switching to the metaphor of solid and liquid 
modernity. He is especially wary of confusion that arises between the messenger and the 
message in the debate about postmodernism, commenting for example, that the very 
talk of postmodernity has been taken as a sign of joining the “postmodernist” camp: “I 
found myself in the company of bedfellows with whom I would rather not share a bed” 
(Bauman and Tester, 2001, p. 97; Tester, 2004, pp. 13-14).  
 
                                                 
3  Whilst subsequently letting go of the Marxist framework, Bauman has continued to describe himself as 
a socialist (Interview in The Guardian newspaper, 5th April 2003). 
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Like Freud, Bauman conceptualizes modernity in terms of a trade off between 
competing principles. Whilst For Freud these are the reality and pleasure principles, in 
Bauman’s analysis the key terms of reference are security and freedom. In what he later 
terms modernity’s solid form, freedom is significantly compromised to ensure the 
benefits of increased security. This entails the removal of unknowns and uncertainties 
through rules and regulation, categorization, hierarchical bureaucracy and so on. From 
Bauman’s perspective the core issue in understanding modernity is this quest for order 
that forces anomalies into systems of classification holding immense authority. These 
dominant systems of classification are based on processes and patterns of compulsory 
inclusion and exclusion and tend to breed intolerance. Ambivalence is squeezed out and 
for Bauman the height of the modernist attack on ambivalence is unleashed with the 
holocaust. In Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) Bauman makes a strong case for a 
view of the latter as an expression of the instrumentalizing logic of modernity and the 
growing distance between action and responsibility. Born and executed in our modern 
rational society and thoroughly modern in its reliance on the ambitions of social 
engineering, he sees the holocaust as a problem of modernity.4 Postmodernity on this 
account represents a waking up from the modern.5 It is modernity without illusions, 
involving greater pluralism, openness and tolerance of ambivalence. But Bauman is 
keen not to pit postmodernity against modernity in any simplistic sense and whilst his 
work sometimes celebrates the postmodern, he also relates to it as an ambivalent 
development. In particular he recognizes that postmodern tolerance can easily 
degenerate into indifference and selfishness of those who have resources. In Modernity 
and Ambivalence (1991) socialism makes a reappearance towards the end as 
modernity’s last stand, its counterculture, He accepts that refraining from social 
engineering comes at a cost and as Beilharz (2001, p. 12) observes, here we encounter 
some minimal common ground with Habermas, for Bauman agrees that modernity is an 
unfulfilled project. However for him the point is that it is unfulfilled because it is 
unfulfillable.6  
 
                                                 
4  As Delanty (2000, p. 52) observes, this thesis was originally proposed by Arendt (1964).  
5  In Bauman’s writings this development can have either a strong or weak formulation, that is 
postmodernity can be seen as a shift within modernity or alternatively can be seen as something new.   
6  See also Smith (1999, pp. 175-8) for brief overview of the differences in perspective between Bauman 
and Habermas. 
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The metaphor of “liquidity” was introduced by Bauman in Liquid Modernity (2000b) 
and encapsulates what he describes as the flexible nature of the contemporary world. 
Whereas in “solid” modernity an individual’s identity involved accepting sameness, 
conformity and in general “knowing your place” in the class system and so on, in liquid 
modernity this orderly life is dismantled. As security wanes, people’s lives increasingly 
take on the imprint of individualization and individual choice much more than social 
class or other forms of social stratification becomes a key determinant of how life is 
conducted. In contrast to solid modernity, which aspired to a stable social order, liquid 
modernity implies a more flexible, adaptable order encompassing greater risk globally, 
socially and at the individual level. In liquid modernity engagement tends to be more 
short term, transient and less committed with the associated risk of significantly reduced 
social cohesion and solidarity. These changes reflect the transition from a postwar 
European world where security was of paramount importance to the contemporary era 
when the principle of freedom takes precedence. Central to these changes was the 
explosion of individualist and materialist values from the 1960s onwards. In the same 
way that the mines and steelworks formed the industrial working class in a previous 
historical era, now the seductions of the shopping mall shape the consumerist masses. 
This transition also coincides with the shift from a producer to a consumer society 
where freedom is now inextricably bound up with freedom to purchase and consume. 
 
Bauman’s work is compelling in its articulation of the concerns of the contemporary 
world. He focuses on issues that are central to people’s lives and is deeply skeptical of 
theory that does not engage directly with existence as lived. All of this has deservedly 
led to recognition as a leading theorist of the zeitgeist. However his work is not without 
its difficulties, not least the criticism that he puts too much emphasis on processes of 
individualization at the expense of focusing attention on contemporary social 
formations. Against this charge, it can be argued that Bauman’s concern is with 
describing the situation as it is and with reconciling social theory to an already existing 
reality, namely a society of reflexive human beings who are deeply individualistic. 
Supporters would further argue that he never waivers from the position that democracy 
is the ultimate guarantor of individual freedom and that his work entails a thoroughly 
sociological understanding of freedom, recognizing that it is always a social relation 
(Blackshaw, 2005, p. 9). He is also acutely aware of the contradiction at the heart of 
liquid modernity namely that increased opportunity for self assertion coexists with 
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decreased capacity to control the social settings that underpin individualism, resulting in 
growing inequality, insecurity, distrust and social fragmentation. However these 
observations for the most part lead to a pervasive fatalism in Bauman’s work which 
critics would argue, can be traced back to the reductionist slant of his underlying 
conceptual framework. (Delanty, 1999, 2000; Outhwaite, 1999).This shows notably in 
his reduction of modernity to instrumental rationality as evidenced in his analysis of the 
holocaust and as I shall discuss below, in his reduction of the connection between the 
ethical and the political to something that can only be formulated in very personal 
terms.  
 
 
Bauman on Postmodern Ethics 
 
Bauman’s writings bear the hallmark of a profoundly ethical thinker and are noteworthy 
for their engagement in reconciling postmodernism with morality. Drawing on his 
analysis of modernity and the holocaust, Bauman concluded that we are all capable of 
the barbarity which the latter represents and he introduces the idea of evil as a choice. 
The philosophy of Levinas (1969, 1985) serves as a backdrop for his thinking and his 
formulation of ethics has much in common with Levinas’ concept of responsibility for 
the Other:    
 
When God asked Cain where Abel was, Cain replied angrily with another 
question. “Am I my brother’s keeper?” The greatest ethical philosopher of our 
century, Emmanuel Levinas commented: from that angry response to Cain’s       
question all immorality begins. Of course I am my brother’s keeper and I remain 
a moral person as long as I do not ask for a special reason to be one. ……The 
moment I question that dependence and demand as Cain did to be given reasons 
why I should care, I renounce my responsibility and am no longer a moral self. 
(Bauman, 2001, p. 72)  
For Bauman the essence of all morality is the responsibility which people take for the 
humanity of others. Crucially this entails choice and is an entirely open ended matter. 
With the collapse of traditional forms of authority in liquid modernity this choice 
becomes ever more open ended and uncertain. In Postmodern Ethics (1993) Bauman 
addresses the issue of how the postmodernist perspective might offer a new ethical 
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understanding for this situation and he begins by firmly distancing himself from that 
strand of postmodernist thinking which adopts an “everything goes” relativist stance:7  
  
What has come to be associated with the notion of the postmodern approach to 
morality is all too often the celebration of the ‘demise of the ethical’, of the 
substitution of aesthetics for ethics, and of the ‘ultimate emancipation’ that 
follows. Ethics itself is denigrated or derided as one of the typically modern 
constraints now broken and destined for the dustbin of history…..Ours is the era 
of unadultered individualism and the search for the good life, limited solely by 
the demand for tolerance (when coupled with self-celebratory and scruple-free 
individualism, tolerance may only express itself as indifference). (1993, pp. 2-3)  
In contrast Bauman’s starting point is the hope that the advent of the postmodernist 
perspective might enhance the chances for the “moralization” of social life. For him the 
novelty of this perspective towards ethics rests not in the abandonment of what might be 
thought of as typically modern moral concerns but in rejecting modern ways of 
addressing these concerns through coercive normative regulation or the philosophical 
search for absolutes and universal principles. Whilst the great issues of morality such as 
social justice and human rights have not lost their resonance in the contemporary world 
they need to be addressed in new ways he argues:  
 
Modernity had the uncanny capacity for thwarting self-examination; it wrapped 
the mechanisms of self-reproduction with a veil of illusions without which these 
mechanisms, being what they were, could not function properly…. ‘the 
postmodern perspective’ to which this study refers means above all the tearing 
off of the mask of illusions: the recognition of certain pretences as false and 
certain objectives as neither attainable nor, for that matter, desirable. …..It 
remains to be seen whether the time of postmodernity will go down in history as 
the twilight, or the renaissance, of morality. 
(Ibid., p. 3). 
Whilst modernity was animated by the idea of a “non-ambivalent, non-aporetic ethical 
code”, morality when viewed from the postmodern perspective brings into sharp focus 
the inherent ambivalence of human beings. For Bauman this ambivalence and 
associated uncertainty is the very meaning of being moral. Humans are neither 
essentially good nor bad and no logically coherent ethical code can fit the ambivalent 
condition of morality. Neither can the moral impulse be overruled by rationality, but 
merely silenced, for moral phenomena are inherently “non-rational”. They are neither 
                                                 
7  Bauman singles out the work of Gilles Lipovetsky (1992, 2005), as representative of this relativist 
stance within postmodernist thinking.  
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regular nor repetitive in a way that would allow them to be formulated as rule- guided. 
Thus Bauman concludes that moral phenomena cannot be encapsulated by any ethical 
code. To think otherwise is to substitute learnable rules for the moral self, constituted by 
responsibility; to replace answerability to the Other and to moral self-conscience by 
answerability to legislators and guardians of the ethical code. The “solitude of the moral 
subject” is a significant theme in Bauman’s work and is closely connected with this 
understanding of the inherent ambivalence of morality as responsibility for the Other. 
Loneliness in the face of the choices that confront the individual is integral to the moral 
life:  
 
No universal standards then. No looking over one’s shoulders to take a glimpse 
of what other people ‘like me’ do. No listening to what they say they do or ought 
to be doing - and then following their example……One may legislate universal 
rule dictated duties, but moral responsibility exists solely in interpellating the 
individual and being carried individually. Duties tend to make humans alike; 
responsibility is what makes them into individuals. (Ibid., pp. 53-4, his 
emphasis).           
In the case of psychotherapy it is not surprising that even minimal engagement with 
Bauman’s ethical perspective or that of Levinas from whom he draws inspiration, leads 
to unease with the dominant focus on professional codes of ethics and unease with a 
debate that rarely moves beyond this narrow focus. Unfortunately, as we have also seen 
in Chapter 2, theorists who make the connection with Levinas or Bauman appear to 
struggle in taking these insights forward and developing new ways of thinking about 
ethics in psychotherapeutic practice contexts.8 In particular there is a marked failure to 
connect with the psychotherapeutic discourse of method and technique beyond the 
implication that this new thinking involves a certain personal disposition or attitude in 
one’s work. This disposition has for example been described by Lowental and Snell 
(2003, p. 30) as that of seeing “the other as someone we can serve and learn from”. 
What is striking about “postmodern humanism” as Lowenthal and Snell characterize 
their Levinasian influenced ethical stance, is the sense of continuity with the dominant 
Kantian based conception of ethics that has prevailed in psychotherapy and allied 
helping professions. At the level of psychotherapeutic clinical practice the exhortation 
to see the other as “someone we can serve” appears not that different from the Kantian 
based plea to respect others as ends in themselves, in terms of its abstract individualistic 
                                                 
8  Chapter 2  pp. 50- 54. 
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bias and failure to articulate a more fleshed out relational ethical framework consistent 
with the relational thrust of contemporary psychotherapy.9  
 
Postmodern humanism in psychotherapy does not challenge the problematic disjuncture 
between ethical deliberation and wider theoretical and methodological debate. As in 
traditional ethical formulations there is a sense that it entails something deeply personal 
with only limited scope for mediation with wider public and practice oriented 
discussion. Not surprisingly the dominant focus on codes of ethics within these public 
debates therefore persists regardless of postmodernist influenced disengagement or 
disapproval. As Hill and Jones aptly observe: 
 
 Postmodernism may well be exerting subtle influences as a result of the 
 adoption of ideas such as multiple realities, co-construction of stories, and 
 concerns about the question of (whose) ethics, but in terms of day to day 
 practice, ethical thinking generally appears to remain firmly grounded in 
 modernist ideas: principles and values.” (2003, p. 157, their emphasis)  
In essence modernist and postmodernist formulations operate independently on parallel 
tracks without any mediating discourse in a way that reinforces the fragmentation and 
marginalization of ethical debate. The key argument of this study which will be 
developed in Part 111, is that one way to move this creatively stuck situation forward is 
to anchor the debate about ethics much more explicitly in the mediating paradigm of 
communication, but for now my focus remains on the postmodern ethical stance in 
psychotherapy and on tracing its limitation back to a significant theoretical source in 
Bauman’s social and ethical theory. 
 
On Bauman’s (1995) account the problem of ethical responsibility in traditional 
societies was addressed by recourse to religion which simplified the need for choice 
whereas the modernist project heralded the arrival of a different solution, the rule of law 
which offered an ethical code designed to eliminate the ambivalence of choice. Secular 
authorities took over the burden of choice from the individual by privileging the rule of 
the legislator. In this space between the ethical rule of law and the solitude of the moral 
individual, self-identity emerged. Modernity is characterized by the quest for legislative 
                                                 
9  This underlying continuity is clearly, if unwittingly underlined in McFarland Solomon’s (2003, p. 24) 
contribution discussed in Chapter 2, where she explicitly equates Bauman’s ethical stance regarding 
responsibility for the Other with Kant’s categorical imperative and with no attempt made to elaborate 
their differences. 
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certainty but also by concern for the autonomous individual. In the postmodern era 
however the problem of choice cannot be so easily addressed by recourse to established 
authority. The burden of responsibility shifts back to the individual whilst concern with 
the autonomy of the individual which characterized modernity is more fully unleashed. 
Postmodernity represents both opportunity and danger. It dramatically increases choices 
and possibilities but prescribes no solutions. Within Bauman’s framework this is a 
situation where the regulative idea of moral responsibility comes to the fore but only as 
something deeply personal and disconnected from political and institutional domains. In 
Bauman’s work there is little possibility for mediation between the ethical and the 
political (Delanty, 1999, p. 120). Thus whilst his contribution powerfully challenges 
earlier post-structuralist and postmodernist disengagement from ethics and morality, 
this lack of mediation underscores its limitation as a source of ethical insight for 
psychotherapy. Given its formulation of a regulative idea that is couched in very 
personal terms, it is notably lacking in potential as a springboard for challenging the 
individualistic bias of traditional ethical formulations in psychotherapy. My argument is 
that an effective challenge to this individualistic ethical bias requires an underlying 
paradigm shift from individual consciousness to communication and that Habermas’ 
discourse ethics effectively points the way. However, whilst thus privileging the latter’s 
ethical theory over Bauman’s postmodernist stance, this is not to deny that Bauman’s 
theory holds potential insights for psychotherapy and I will consider these further.  
 
 
Bauman and psychotherapy  
 
The metaphor of transition from solid to liquid modernity encapsulates the shift from a 
highly structured society to a more fluid and flexible world where individuality 
dominates, where separation and aloneness are encouraged and where people are 
distanced from earlier formative anchors such as class and community. Bauman 
recognizes that this is a world where personal relationships increasingly represent a 
primary means of self expression and self actualization but he is also concerned that in 
liquid modernity we are losing our ability to establish firm, solid and reliable personal 
relationships. In Liquid Love (2003) he writes: 
 
 This book’s central characters are men and women, our contemporaries, 
 despairing at being abandoned to their own wits and feeling easily disposable, 
 yearning for the security of togetherness and for a helping hand to count on in 
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 a moment of trouble, and so desperate to ‘relate’; yet wary of the state of 
 ‘being related’ and particularly of being related ‘for good’, not to mention 
 forever- since they fear that such a state may bring burdens and cause strains 
 they neither feel able nor are willing to bear….In our world of rampant 
 ‘individualization’ relationships are mixed blessings. They vacillate between 
 sweet dream and a nightmare, and there is no telling when one turns into the 
 other. (p. viii) 
Whilst these relational challenges fuel what he refers to as the contemporary 
“counselling boom”, his verdict on the potential of “counselling” to assist those 
experiencing relationship difficulties is damning: 
 
What they hope to hear from the counsellors is how to square the circle: to eat 
the cake and have it, to cream off the sweet delights of relationship while 
omitting its bitter and tougher bits ….The experts are willing to oblige, 
confident that the demand for their counsels will never run dry since no amount 
of counselling could ever make a circle non circular and thus amenable  to being 
squared…Their counsels abound, though more often than not they do little more 
than raise common practice to the level of common knowledge, and that in turn 
to the heights of learned, authoritative theory. (p. ix) 
Whilst Bauman’s comments appear to be directed at the more populist end of the 
counselling/ psychotherapy spectrum including that represented in magazine advice 
columns, he does not elaborate on this point. There is a sense of all therapeutic 
interventions being tarnished in his critique and it is difficult not to conclude that the 
reductionist tendencies in his conceptual framework also show themselves in this very 
superficial engagement with “counselling” or psychotherapy. One is reminded of the 
systemic family therapist Flaskas’ (2002, p. 97) observation cited earlier, regarding the 
difficulty postmodernist influenced psychotherapeutic perspectives appear to have in 
addressing the richness and complexity of human experience and the sense of a 
“thinning out” of existence which they exhibit. Arguably it is a criticism that might also 
apply to Bauman’s engagement with psychotherapy. It is also difficult not to compare 
Bauman’s superficial stance towards the therapeutic endeavor unfavorably with Axel 
Honneth’s very rich engagement with psychoanalytic theory which will be discussed 
shortly, in which he draws on the insights of the latter to put flesh on key aspects of his 
own moral theory of recognition, in a way that can also be channeled back into 
psychotherapeutic discourse, as I shall argue. 
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In Postmodern Ethics (1993) Bauman draws on Giddens’ concept of the “pure 
relationship” as a framework for elaborating his thinking about the shape of personal 
relationships in the contemporary world. He quotes Giddens’ description of the pure 
relationship as referring to,  
 
a situation where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can 
be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and which 
is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough 
satisfactions for each individual to stay within it. (Giddens, 1992 quoted by 
Bauman, 1993, p. 104)  
What is of interest to Bauman is the extent to which “postmodern intimacy” 
encapsulated in the idea of the pure relationship is characterized by the elimination of 
all references to moral duties and obligations: “ ‘Pure relationship’, I would suggest, is 
the intimacy of persons who suspend their identity of moral subjects for the duration. 
Pure relationship is a de-ethicized intimacy” (ibid., p. 106). In my later engagement 
with Giddens’ thinking and its application in the therapeutic context in Chapter 8, I shall 
argue, contrary to Bauman’s assertion regarding the pure relationship as representing a 
de-ethicized intimacy, that this mode of relating could be conceptualized as intimacy in 
search of an ethic and that the latter can helpfully be framed in terms of an ethics of 
communication.10  
 
From the above it might seem that a dialogue between Bauman’s theory and 
psychotherapy holds little promise beyond that alluded to earlier, namely that he 
contributes towards putting ethics back on the agenda of the postmodernist debate 
whilst challenging the restrictive focus on codes of ethics. However there is another 
aspect of his work that merits acknowledgment, namely that he makes a significant 
argument for putting emotionality back on the agenda of ethical debate. We have seen 
that a key weakness in Habermas’ work is its excessively cognitive orientation. Bauman 
on the other hand offers a perspective on ethics which at the very least accords space for 
emotionality:  
 
 Most ethical arguments follow unstintingly Kant’s invalidation of emotions as 
 morally potent factors: it has been axiomatically assumed that feelings, much 
 as acting out of affections, have no moral significance - only choice, the 
 rational faculty, and the decisions it dictates can reflect upon the actor as a 
                                                 
10  Chapter 8  pp. 202-6.   
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 moral person. In fact, virtue itself meant for Kant and his followers the ability 
 to stand up to one’s emotive inclinations, and to neutralize or reject them in 
 the name of reason. (Ibid., p. 67) 
For Bauman, allowing morality and ethics out of the armour of ethical codes means they 
are “re- personalized”. On the one hand this raises the expectation that his 
postmodernist ethical stance has greater potential compatibility with the emotionally 
charged arenas of psychotherapeutic clinical practice than modernist formulations. 
However as we have seen the weakness of his theory is that it lacks adequate mediation 
with social and political themes and thus risks reinforcing psychotherapy’s 
individualistic inclination. In essence my argument is that his theory cannot offer an 
adequate framework for effectively challenging the marginalization of 
psychotherapeutic ethical debate and associated preoccupation with professional micro 
ethics, nor can it offer a basis for challenging the abstract individualistic bias in 
psychotherapeutic engagement with ethics. This is not to negate the importance of the 
postmodernist critique however and within the tradition of critical social theory the 
challenge of postmodernist engagement with emotionality, with an ethic of care and 
responsibility for the Other and more generally with the theme of recognition of 
difference articulated in the politics of identity has been taken up to some extent in Axel 
Honneth’s moral theory of recognition. Whilst this perspective remains anchored in the 
discourse of critical social theory and is strongly influenced by Habermas’ 
communicative ethics, it has an added advantage in the present context which is that it 
engages in a creative dialogue with psychotherapeutic theory in the shape of 
Winnicottian object relations psychoanalysis. In what follows I consider how Honneth’s 
theory elaborates and supplements Habermas’ communicative ethics and brings our 
consideration of communicative ethics closer to the intimate and personal arenas of 
psychotherapeutic clinical practice.                         
                                                       
 
Honneth’s moral theory of recognition  
 
Whilst modernity can be seen as centrally concerned with the self and with recognition 
of the sameness and equality of the self and other, postmodernity reflects a turning to 
the other and the struggle for recognition of difference (Delanty, 2000, p.150). Although 
these need not represent philosophically oppositional polarities, historically they have 
been embedded in a divisive modernist/ postmodernist debate. It is true that much 
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separates Habermas from Bauman and in Postmodern Ethics (1993) Bauman is very 
dismissive of the modernist project for a universalist ethics. However as the 
modernist/postmodernist debate has evolved there appears more opportunity for its 
complexity and nuances to be addressed. We have noted that Bauman reacts to 
postmodernity as an ambivalent development and endeavours not to pit modernity 
against it. With respect to the Habermas/Foucault debate, it also seems highly unlikely 
that it would have remained on the oppositional and confrontational track on which it 
started, but for Foucault’s untimely death. Habermas has, as previously indicated, taken 
on board some aspects of the postmodernist critique and within the tradition of critical 
theory the work of Axel Honneth ([1992]1995, [2000]2007a), the successor to 
Habermas at the University of Frankfurt, represents a further development of this debate 
in which oppositionality gives way to a degree of mediation and moving forward. 
Throughout the history of the Frankfurt tradition, as Bausure (2010) observes, a history 
of “continuity through rupture” is evident which has ensured the ongoing vitality of this 
tradition. Habermas’ work continued but also broke with the earlier work of 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse and in a similar vein we can think of Honneth’s 
contribution as continuing but also moving beyond Habermas.          
 
In exploring differences between Habermas and Foucault, it was noted that Habermas, 
unlike Foucault, is “a committed intersubjectivist” and this may also be said of 
Honneth. Like Habermas, his theory is rooted in the idea that our identities are formed 
and sustained by our relations with others. For Honneth the relationship to oneself is not 
a case of the solitary ego appraising itself. It is an intersubjective process wherein my 
attitude towards myself emerges through the encounter with the other’s attitude towards 
me. In his work this is taken forward in terms of a theory of recognition, which 
conceptualizes a theme that also holds considerable importance in Habermas’ work but 
is insufficiently elaborated therein (Thompson, 1999). This theme of “recognition” 
which is closely associated with Hegelian philosophy has, as Fraser and Honneth (2003) 
observe, become one of the key words of our times and is central to efforts by political 
theorists to conceptualize contemporary struggles regarding identity and difference. 
 
 Whether the issue is indigenous land claims or women’s carework, 
 homosexual marriage or Muslim headscarves, moral philosophers increasingly 
 use the term “recognition” to unpack the normative basis of political 
 claims….Hegel’s old figure of the “struggle for recognition” finds new 
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 purchase as a rapidly globalizing capitalism accelerates transcultural contacts, 
 fracturing interpretative schemata, pluralizing value horizons and politicizing 
 identities and differences. (Ibid, p. 1) 
For Honneth, recognition is seen as one of the fundamental mechanisms of our social 
existence. Drawing on Hegelian philosophy ([1805-6]1983) and the social psychology 
of Mead ([1934]1974), he formulates a theory of recognition, at the centre of which is 
the proposal that full human flourishing and identity formation is anchored in three 
modes of relating practically to oneself, self-confidence, self-respect and self- esteem. 
In his theory these terms serve as theoretical constructs with meanings that differ 
somewhat from everyday usage (Petersen and Willig, 2002; Zurn, 2000).They are 
neither purely beliefs nor emotional states but involve a dynamic process in which 
individuals come to experience themselves as having a certain status. In The Struggle 
for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (1995) Honneth argues that 
self-confidence, self -respect and self-esteem can only be acquired and maintained 
intersubjectively through recognition by others whom one also recognizes. In his 
schema the three modes of relating to oneself are therefore situated within three 
corresponding modes of recognition: the love and emotional support experienced in 
primary relationships; the cognitive respect experienced in legally institutionalized 
relations of universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons; and the esteem 
experienced within networks of solidarity and shared values. These relationships are not 
pregiven but are secured and extended through the historical unfolding of social 
struggles. As Honneth sees it, social struggles are thus motivated by the experience of 
being denied the conditions for recognition and identity formation.        
 
 The ‘grammar’ of such conflicts is ‘moral’ in the sense that the feelings of 
 outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection of claims
 to recognition and thus imply normative judgments about the legitimacy of 
 social arrangements. (Anderson, 1995, p. xii)              
The violation or withholding of recognition patterns which Honneth refers to as 
disrespect and which includes abuse, the denial of rights, exclusion or denigration can 
be seen as distortions of the good life (Honneth, 1996). The challenge is to elucidate and 
diagnose these processes that may be defined as social pathologies (1996, 2007)  
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Love and self- confidence,  
 
Turning to the first of the three modes of relating to oneself, basic self- confidence, 
Honneth (1995) draws on psychoanalytic object relations theory of early childhood, in 
particular that of Winnicott (1965, 1971)11 to tease out the link between this relation- to-
self and relations of love. Previously in this study, by way of underlining the 
unequivocally relational orientation of contemporary psychoanalysis, I contrasted the 
classical Freudian perspective on the new born infant as a narcissistic entity with the 
object relations view of the infant as an active partner from birth, capable of relating to 
his/her carer. Given the intersubjectivist thrust of Honneth’s work it is not difficult to 
see the appeal of this perspective in which the significance of early emotional bonds as 
distinct from the vicissitudes of the instincts are revealed. We have seen that for 
Winnicott, good enough infant care requires a high degree of emotional and intuitive 
involvement amounting to a state of symbiosis or undifferentiated intersubjectivity from 
which infant and caregiver slowly extricate themselves, learning to recognize and love 
each other as separate, independent beings. At the heart of Winnicott’s work is a 
detailed explication of the process of negotiating the balance between ego dissolution 
and ego demarcation, symbiosis and separateness, or dependence and independence as it 
unfolds in this delicate process and which is seen as providing the basis for relationships 
of love and friendship in later life. An understanding of this intersubjectively constituted 
process is also central to Honneth’s engagement with object relations theory. 
  
Given that Winnicottian theory has been explored previously it is unnecessary to follow 
Honneth’s detailed elaboration here. Suffice to say that two key psychological 
mechanisms identified by Winnicott as significant for successful ego development are 
of particular interest to Honneth. These are the role of destructive impulses and 
transitional phenomena in the child’s development. As the child leaves the place of 
absolute dependence or merger and begins to recognize the mother as an entity in her 
own right outside of the child’s omnipotent control, both of these psychological 
mechanism come into play. A process of disillusionment sets in and the child begins to 
relate to the mother with aggressive attacks. Winnicott (1965) understands these not so 
much as expressions of frustration but as purposive acts by which the child 
unconsciously tests out whether the mother does actually belong to a world beyond 
                                                 
11  See Chapter 1  pp.  29-35. 
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influence and in that sense “objective”. In surviving these attacks without retaliation the 
good enough mother places herself outside the child’s omnipotent control and at the 
same time helps the child recognize his/her dependence on the loving care provided by 
the mother. When all goes reasonably smoothly, the ongoing experience of the mother’s 
reliable and continuous care allows for the growing capacity of the child to tolerate 
periods of separation and allows for a growing confidence in the environment to meet 
his/her needs. This internalized expectation that one’s fundamental needs will be met is 
central to Honneth’s formulation of basic self- confidence as a mode of relating to self.         
 
The early space of relating and separating between child and mother is where one also 
locates the second psychological mechanism which engages Honneth’s attention, that of 
the “transitional object”, the first “not me” possession, for example, a favourite blanket 
or toy. On Winnicott’s (1953, 1971) account  this object represents a transitional space 
between the state of symbiotic merger and one of relating to the mother as a separate 
being. Here we also find the child relating to the transitional object with symbiotic 
tenderness and with attacks of rage, which Winnicott sees as part of the early process of 
reality testing, as in attacks on the mother. For Honneth what is most significant is 
Winnicott’s hypothesis that the child is able to be creatively absorbed or “lost” in 
interaction with transitional phenomena only to the extent that he/she has a basic 
confidence in the continuity of the mother’s loving care. Under the protection of this felt 
intersubjectivity the child begins to develop the capacity to be alone in the sense of 
engaging more with the outside world and discovering his/her own personal life 
creatively without anxiety or fear of abandonment. This also encompasses beginning to 
recognize and assert needs as his/her own and acquiring a sense of confidence in his/her 
own body as a reliable source of signals of need. 
  
Honneth follows Jesssica Benjamin (1988) in introducing the idea of reciprocal 
recognition as an explanatory construct in his engagement with Winnicottian theory, 
pointing out that like the child, the mother also has to come to terms with separateness, 
recognizing for example that the child’s destructive fantasies and impulses must be 
ascribed to the child as an independent person.12 Mother and child learn to recognize 
their separateness but also their mutual dependence on each other’s love without the 
                                                 
12  See Chapter 2 pp.  59-64. 
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need for symbiotic merger. For Honneth following Winnicott, it is this delicate 
balancing of tendencies towards separation and merger anchored in the dynamic of 
mutual recognition that later provides the basis for a positive, undistorted relation-to-
self and for successful adult relations of love. Drawing on Benjamin’s work again, 
Honneth also considers adult love relations that run into difficulty, as distortions of this 
delicate balance of reciprocal recognition in the direction of symbiotic dependence or 
egocentric separateness. He concludes succinctly that “ideally speaking the love 
relationship represents a symbiosis refracted by recognition” (1995, p. 106). Here in 
Honneth’s very rich engagement with Winnicottian theory, we uncover the contribution 
of psychoanalytic thinking to our understanding of the intersubjectivist basis of identity 
formation and the intersubjectivist origins of basic self confidence in relations of love. 
For Honneth such relations are,  
 
 conceptually and genetically prior to every other form of reciprocal 
 recognition. This fundamental level of emotional confidence- not only in the 
 experience of needs and feelings, but in their expression- which the 
 intersubjective experience of love helps to bring about, constitutes the 
 psychological precondition for the development of all further attitudes of self- 
 respect. (Ibid., p. 107)                  
Our experience in primary love relations forms the bedrock for our experience of 
selfhood and establishes the basic affective and behavioral dispositions that we carry 
into the world. It secures the self- confidence which is “indispensable for autonomous 
participation in public life” and for Honneth, echoing Hegel, we can therefore discern 
within it “the structural core of all ethical life” (ibid.). 
   
 
Self-respect and self-esteem    
 
In Honneth’s (1995) conceptual framework there is a strong Kantian component to his 
understanding of self- respect, the second mode of relating to self in his conceptual 
schema. It implies having a sense of oneself as an “end” as opposed to a “means and as 
possessing the universal dignity and respect of persons, in line with Kant’s categorical 
imperative. One respects oneself because one is seen as deserving the same respect as 
every other person and as having the same status as them. In the terminology of 
Habermas’ discourse ethics it implies having a view of oneself as capable of accessing 
one’s speaking rights, raising validity claims and participating in public deliberation or 
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“discursive will formation”. In practical terms this mode of relating- to- self is mediated 
through legal rights and the recognition these imply.  
 
 Just as, in the case of love, children acquire, via the continuous experience of 
 ‘maternal’ care, the basic self-confidence to assert their needs in an unforced 
 manner, adult subjects acquire, via the experience of legal recognition, the 
 possibility of seeing their actions as the universally respected expression of 
 their own autonomy. (Ibid., p. 118) 
Whilst Honneth emphasizes that the attribution of rights needs to be seen in the widest 
sense as including entitlement to material equality and to a life free from sectarianism, 
racism or misogyny for example, he has been criticized for appearing to privilege 
culturally based recognition over issues of material distribution and political economy 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Against this criticism he has continued to assert that 
problems relating to material distribution are better understood if treated as problems of 
recognition entailing the denial of rights or unjust devaluing of the contribution of some 
social groups to society through their work (ibid.).                      
 
Whereas self respect entails viewing oneself as entitled to the same status as other 
persons, Honneth’s category of self- esteem, the third mode of relating to self in his 
schema, refers to the sense of what makes one special and unique. “Solidarity” is the 
term which he adopts for the cultural climate in which acquiring self-esteem becomes 
possible. One speaks of solidarity where shared concerns and values are in play. 
  
 …..a good society, a society in which individuals have a real opportunity for 
 full self-realization, would be a society in which the common values would 
 match the concerns of individuals in such a way that no member of the 
 society would  be denied the opportunity to earn esteem for his or her 
 contribution to the common good. (Anderson, 1995, p. xvii)  
Unlike the sphere of legal rights which represents a medium of recognition relating to 
universal features of persons, solidarity reflects a communitarian particularity. Values 
endorsed by a community are a matter of contingency, the outcome of social and 
cultural struggles, lacking the universal dimension of legal relations. Whereas in the 
latter case one respects oneself because one merits the respect of everyone else, the 
social conditions for self-esteem are determined by the prevailing sense of what 
constitutes a worthwhile contribution to society. In this engagement with issues relating 
to solidarity and self- esteem, Honneth’s focus is similar to that of culturally oriented 
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movements that have impacted on debates about multiculturalism and feminism for 
example. Honneth regards struggles for recognition in which issues of self esteem are 
central as attempts to end social patterns of denigration and demeaning cultural images. 
However for him, self-esteem is intricately linked to the individual’s contribution to the 
common good. Thus whilst eliminating demeaning cultural images does not offer self- 
esteem directly it facilitates the conditions under which people who have previously 
experienced this denigration can secure self-esteem by contributing to society.        
 
For Honneth the three spheres of recognition in relations of love and friendship, legally 
institutionalized relations of universal respect and networks of solidarity and shared 
values satisfy key dimensions of our need for affirmation from others. As indicated, 
Honneth attaches particular significance to love as a mode of recognition and sees it as 
the bedrock of our selfhood which sets in place the basic affective and behavioral 
dispositions that we take with us into the world. This emphasis on recognition within 
primary relationships brings Honneth’s work into close contact with the discourse of 
psychotherapy as indicated by his engagement with Winnicottian theory. In the above 
discussion I have privileged this aspect of his work which intersects with 
psychotherapeutic engagement and serves as a useful foundation for further dialogue 
between Honneth’s recognition theory, Habermas’ discourse ethics and the concerns of 
psychotherapy.           
 
Bauman contra Honneth 
 
My interest is not to pit these different theoretical perspectives against each other but to 
compare their potential contributions to ethical debate in psychotherapy. Whilst 
Honneth leaves no doubt about the centrality of self- confidence and love in his 
conceptual schema, it is also the case, perhaps predictably, that it has received less 
attention in wider debates than have the more explicitly political dimensions of his 
theory (Thompson, 2006). However this aspect of his work is of central interest here 
since it offers an overarching conceptual framework that powerfully mediates between 
the intimate and personal spheres that are the overt focus of psychotherapy and wider 
social and political spheres. It also offers a mediating discourse between the modernist 
emphasis on universal rights, equality and legal codes versus the postmodernist 
emphasis on personal identity and difference. This sets Honneth’s contribution apart 
from Bauman’s postmodernist influenced theory. Like Bauman, Honneth is concerned 
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with social processes in liquid modernity that reinforce processes of individualization 
and lack of solidarity and make the establishment of solid personal relationships very 
difficult. In Honneth’s (2007) framework this is characterized as the dissolution of 
stable forms of recognition and shows itself for example in the fragility and instability 
of contemporary family relations. However, Honneth’s three fold schema helps him 
avoid Bauman’s sociological reductionism in which the dynamics of personal 
relationships are conflated with social processes. We have seen that the only role 
available to Bauman’s “counsellor” with those experiencing relationship difficulties 
appears to be a cynical taking advantage of the social situation to promote their fee 
charging service. Honneth’s more encompassing conceptual schema, including his rich 
engagement with psychoanalytic theory helps him avoid this reductionist tendency.  
 
Honneth’s theory of recognition shows that a very delicate balancing of independence 
and dependence is integral to identity formation. Successful relationships of love both in 
childhood and adulthood, together with the logic of this developmental process, need to 
be understood on their own terms, alongside but not conflated with social trends and 
developments which may support or hinder this developmental process. At the very 
least this creates potential space for a more nuanced and two way dialogue across the 
different spheres of social interaction and integration, and in the present context, across 
the spheres of psychotherapy and social theory. Throughout this study I have argued 
that lack of a mediating discourse between the personal and the social or political and 
between modernist and postmodernist concerns, underpins so much of the difficulty and 
fragmentation in psychotherapeutic ethical debate. In the case of Bauman I have argued 
that a retreat into subjectivity evident in his work compounds existing individualistic 
tendencies in psychotherapy that need to be challenged as part of a creative ethical 
debate. Honneth’s three fold schema challenges the reductionist tendency to conflate 
these interrelated but distinctive arenas of social interaction and in conjunction with 
Habermas’ discourse ethics, I am arguing that it offers a solid foundation for further 
dialogue between psychotherapy and critical social theory.  
 
Habermas and Honneth 
 
On the one hand there is significant continuity between Habermas’ communicative 
ethics and Honneth’s theory of recognition not least because the latter elaborates on a 
theme that is also central to the Habermasian perspective but inadequately theorized in 
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this work. On the other hand there are important distinctions between the two theorists, 
some of which have a particular resonance in the present discussion. One of the key 
differences is that Honneth engages with a broader concept of communication than 
Habermas whose focus is primarily on linguistic communication. As Bausure (2010) 
observes, this more inclusive conceptualization is especially evident in the importance 
which Honneth attaches to pre-linguistic communication in the development of 
subjectivity, notably within the parent/child relationship. For Honneth, 
  
 the normative presuppositions of social interaction cannot be fully grasped if 
 they are defined solely in terms of the linguistic conditions of reaching 
 understanding free from domination; rather we must consider above all the 
 fact that social recognition constitutes the normative expectations connected 
 with our entering communicative relationships. (2007a,  pp. 71-2) 
Honneth does acknowledge that underlying Habermas’ resolute defence of the 
cognitivist stance is a concern regarding the pitfalls of “an affectively shielded 
particularism” and a concern that, 
 
if it is primarily empathy and intuitive understanding that subjects are supposed 
to show for one another, then moral discourse quickly becomes dependent upon 
chance emotional ties and loses the function of being a cooperative search for 
truth based solely on reasons. (2007b, p. 112) 
Nonetheless he is critical of the tendency within the Frankfurt tradition, including in the 
work of Habermas, to judge social pathologies exclusively from the perspective of 
human rationality which in his view leads to “a rational- theoretic narrowing of social 
critique” (ibid., p. 73). Adopting the perspective of recognition theory means that a 
critical diagnosis of social pathologies can no longer be compressed within a theory of 
rationality and in this regard the overall thrust of Honneth’s critique clearly shares at 
least some common ground with other critical commentaries on Habermas that were 
referred to in Chapter 4.13 
 
In Honneth’s essay, The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of 
Postmodernism (2007b) he engages specifically with the postmodernist challenge to 
Habermasian theory. Amongst those commentaries on Habermas discussed earlier was 
that of White (1988) and in Honneth’s essay, White’s (1991) subsequent work including 
the formulation of a “postmodern ethics” is the focus of attention. As Honneth sees it 
                                                 
13 Chapter 4  pp. 93-6.   
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the key dimension of this contribution is the emphasis placed on the virtues of listening, 
willingness to be emotionally involved, and to accept and encourage personal 
particularities and differences: “in short, all those modes of conduct summarized today 
in the concept of ‘care’ ” (Honneth, 2007b, p. 108). We have seen that Habermas has 
also considered the challenge posed by formulations of an ethic of care such as that of 
Gilligan (1982) and has concluded that his communicative ethics is largely compatible 
with her ideas about morality in which dialogue replaces logical deduction as the 
primary mode of moral engagement. In the case of White’s postmodern ethics, Honneth 
similarly draws the conclusion that, 
 
            if, in contrast to Habermas, affective capabilities- as given, for instance, in 
empathy- are also counted among these communicative virtues, then we have 
already reached the point from which we can recognize in White’s postmodern 
ethics the elaboration of an implication of discourse ethics. (Ibid., p. 113) 
Honneth’s verdict is that this formulation of “postmodern ethics” ultimately remains 
within the normative boundaries of Habermas’ Kantian influenced universalist 
framework. However, notwithstanding this conclusion with respect to White’s 
contribution, he is anxious not to underestimate the overall challenge that the 
postmodern ethical perspective presents to modern theories of morality that remain 
within the Kantian tradition. In particular he considers the Levinasian influenced 
contribution of Derrida (1978, 2005), which explores the asymmetrical nature of our 
obligation to provide care and help to another person as a central principle of morality 
and concludes that on balance this work may be seen to extend the normative horizon of 
the Kantian tradition. This is subject to careful qualification by Honneth however:    
 
 Yet in no way should this lead us to conclude- as does Levinas- that care or 
 benevolence be declared not only the genetic but also the logical foundation of 
 all moral principles. What we understand under modern conditions as the 
 “moral point of view” is explained first and foremost by the universalist 
 principle of equal treatment. What has been said so far, however, must also be 
 accompanied by the conclusion that care be again awarded that place in the 
 domain of the moral which it has all too frequently been denied in the Kantian 
 tradition of moral philosophy…..postmodern ethics has taken a small but 
 significant step beyond the normative horizon constituted by the idea of equal 
 treatment, which has hitherto been the determining factor for modernity.  
            (Ibid., pp. 124-5) 
In this study I have considered the influence of Levinasian inspired ethical thinking in 
psychotherapeutic discourse and have argued that it fails unequivocally to transcend the 
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limitations and abstraction of the traditional Kantian influenced psychotherapeutic 
ethical perspective.14 My argument is that Habermas’ grounding of ethics in the 
paradigm of communication represents a creative and accessible starting point for the 
challenge of moving this debate forward and that Honneth’s recognition theory offers 
further invaluable insights from within the framework of critical social theory on how 
this might be achieved. In this respect Honneth’s views on the family are especially 
revealing in terms of conceptualizing how a Habermasian universalist ethical stance 
might be integrated with additional perspectives that can loosely be categorized under 
the heading of an ethic of care.  
 
Honneth (2007) observes that the modern family is an arena where the requirements of a 
morality of justice and universal respect and a morality of love and care need to be 
carefully balanced. He notes the major structural changes that have impacted on the 
family from the nineteenth century onwards such as the ending of child labour and the 
anchoring of the marital relationship in the emotional framework of love. These and 
other changes have gradually enabled the family gain access to a private sphere and to 
evolve autonomously. However they have also brought with them new dangers which 
have impacted significantly on family life. Honneth draws on Giddens’ (1991, 1992)15 
model of the “pure relationship” as the prototype for contemporary couple relationships, 
anchored in feelings of love and trust as distinct from more traditional criteria of kinship 
or duty for example. He then considers the fragility and insecurity within relational 
dynamics that can result. Family relationships become increasingly dependent on 
currents of personal feeling for their survival as a result of which children and women 
are especially - but not exclusively- vulnerable. He suggests that the family represents a 
social space where two distinctive moral orientations continually collide: 
 
 .…family members have to be able to recognize one another as legal persons, 
 because it is only in this way they can protect their personal integrity; on the 
 other hand, they have to reciprocally recognize one another as unique subjects 
 whose individual well-being deserves special attention and care. If the first 
 form of recognition vanishes, then the autonomy of individual family 
 members is threatened; if the second form of recognition evaporates, the 
 emotional bond within the family will be destroyed. On the basis of this initial 
 finding, we can pose the question as to whether we can make any theoretical 
 assertions about the dividing line that has to run between these two moral 
 orientations within the family. (Ibid., pp. 155-6) 
                                                 
14  Chapter 2 pp. 50- 4. 
15  Chapter 8 pp. 198-208. 
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For Honneth the conclusion is that the future of the family would appear to depend on 
its capacity to develop the “discursive reflexivity” with which it might continually 
locate an appropriate balance between the requirements of justice and affective bonds.16 
He also reminds us that it is only by referring to universal principles of equal treatment 
that people who find themselves in situations where further appeals to emotional bonds 
of empathy and affection appear futile can, in his words, “shatter the conventionalism of 
care”. This emphasis on “discursive reflexivity” as a framework for balancing the 
different moral requirements within the personal arenas in which psychotherapy 
routinely practices, will be a recurring theme throughout the remaining chapters of this 
study. 
 
Part 11 began with an outline of Habermasian thinking and emphasized the far reaching 
importance of the paradigm shift from individual consciousness to communication 
which underpins his engagement with ethics. It was subsequently argued that 
Habermas’ theory can be used to shed light on the limitations of current hermeneutical, 
post-structuralist and postmodernist influences in psychotherapy. The limitations of 
Habermasian theory, which the postmodernist perspective brings to light particularly 
relating to emotionality, personal identity and engagement with difference, were also 
acknowledged. In drawing the discussion to a close, I returned to critical social theory 
with a focus on Axel Honneth’s moral theory of recognition which supplements 
Habermas’ theory of communicative ethics in a way that addresses some of these 
limitations and provides a more fleshed out formulation of an ethical stance that we 
might consider appropriate for psychotherapeutic practice. In essence the argument 
which I defend in subsequent chapters is that we may helpfully formulate the moral 
“grammar” of the psychotherapeutic encounter in terms of the closely intertwined 
struggles for understanding and agreement as depicted in Habermas’ discourse ethics 
and the struggle for recognition as elaborated by Honneth. In Part 111, attention now 
turns to a more detailed elaboration of what this means for psychotherapy and for 
moral/ethical debate therein.  
 
                                                 
16  Here Honneth’s argument comes within a similar orbit to Habermas’(1990) earlier engagement with 
Gilligan’s (1982) work in which Habermas  comments on the compatibility of discourse ethics with her 
formulation of an ethic of care. However a crucial difference between Habermas and Honneth of course, 
is the enhanced status which themes associated with an ethic of care command in Honneth’s work.       
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Part III 
 
 
Towards a communicative ethical orientation for psychotherapy 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This study began with the question, what good is served by psychotherapy and argued   
that current attempts to provide answers within the framework of empirical outcome 
research need to be anchored in a critical debate concerning the moral/ethical ethos of 
psychotherapy. In order to assess what constitutes a “good outcome” we need to engage 
in a critical appraisal of the normative orientation of our work. Clients, funding agencies 
and other interested parties may have their own criteria for evaluating outcomes but 
unless we are able to add our voice to this process clearly and effectively, there is a 
danger that what we hold to be of most value in our work and what may have the 
greatest creative potential, will be overshadowed by other priorities and evaluative 
criteria, not least those of social compliance and cost minimisation. Definitions of 
mental or psychological health and illness reflect our social, cultural and personal biases 
as do definitions of a good treatment outcome. The latter cannot be viewed in absolute 
terms: “What is “outcome” or whose outcome is it anyway?” (Fonagy et al., 2002, p. 4). 
In the child mental health field the optimal outcome for one family member may be less 
favourable for other members. When for example, is the preservation of the family unit 
a good outcome and for whom is it so? Within a communicative ethical framework we 
might say that a “good enough” outcome is one in which psychotherapeutic intervention 
has helped create the optimum communicative conditions for these decisions to be 
discussed and decided; communicative conditions that allow space for those involved to 
have their different voices and conflicting interests heard and recognized. 
  
Traditionally, questions relating to the normative orientation of psychotherapy have 
been fused with questions relating to method and technique and were buried under a 
veneer of positivist scientific neutrality. This ethos is very clearly represented in the 
early development of systemic psychotherapy, notably in the cybernetic metaphor 
adopted by the early family therapists as the epistemological foundation for their work. 
In Chapter 3 we also noted the radical paradigm shift in more recent times, which again 
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has been especially marked in the case of systemic psychotherapy. Here the 1980s 
witnessed the abandonment of cybernetics and general system’s theory and its 
replacement by a hermeneutic and postmodernist orientation which is now the dominant 
discourse in the field. In the case of psychoanalysis, similar trends are evident but they 
have evolved less dramatically over a longer time span in what is a more broadly based 
discourse. Postmodernist and hermeneutic influences have explicitly informed the 
development of “relational psychoanalysis” in the North American context1 but this 
influence is also evident in a more general softening of the traditional positivist stance 
of scientific certitude in psychoanalytic discourse. Whilst the object relations 
perspective of Klein, Winnicott and others discussed in Chapter 2, remains the 
dominant paradigm in UK psychoanalysis we have also observed that the work of these 
analysts can be seen as an important precursor to the postmodernist perspective in terms 
of its relational thrust and greater appreciation of the intersubjectively constituted nature 
of knowledge and of the self. Underlying continuity is also evident in systemic 
psychotherapy, despite the overt polarisation of modernist and postmodernist 
perspectives. This continuity is apparent, not least in the ongoing widespread use of 
therapeutic techniques that were developed in the era of modernist, first order family 
therapy. Creative continuity at a methodological level is often masked in a context that 
splits modernist and postmodernist themes and in the absence of an adequate mediating 
discourse.  
 
Another dimension of continuity between modernist and postmodernist perspectives in 
psychotherapy which is a great deal more problematic than that relating to methodology 
and which this study brings into focus is that relating to the vexed question of morality 
and ethics. I have explored the restrictive and limited professional ethical debates, 
rooted in abstract individualism, which typify the modernist perspective in 
psychotherapy and which have persisted notwithstanding the postmodernist influenced 
paradigm shift of recent decades. Ethical perspectives within postmodernist infused 
contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches are strikingly similar to traditional 
formulations of ethical themes even if this is rarely acknowledged. In Part 11, I have 
argued that these difficulties can be traced back to the post-structuralist, postmodernist 
and hermeneutical paradigms upon which these new psychotherapeutic perspectives 
                                                 
1  See Chapter 2  pp.  59-63. 
162 
rely for inspiration and I have used Habermas’ critique of Gadamer and Foucault as an 
anchor for this discussion. My thesis up to this point has been that, notwithstanding the 
significant limitations of explicit ethical debate, there is also evidence that key trends 
and developments in psychotherapy are straining towards a communicative ethical 
orientation implicit in the relational ethos of current theory and practice. Furthermore I 
have argued that the theoretical vacuum around this subject has impeded recognition of 
its full potential. In mapping the contemporary field in both psychoanalytic and 
systemic approaches, my concern has been to underline this relational stance which 
transcends any polarisation of modernist and postmodernist themes. 
 
What then are the implications of Habermas’ communicative ethical perspective and the 
complementary work of Axel Honneth for conceptualizing the moral/ethical orientation 
of psychotherapy? This is the key focus of the rest of this study. In essence I will argue 
that the moral “grammar” of the psychotherapeutic encounter may be framed in terms of 
the struggle for understanding and agreement and the struggle for recognition and that 
both can be anchored in Habermasian thinking around a communicative ethics. 
Notwithstanding the limitations and incompleteness of Habermas’ own work, it offers 
an overarching philosophical framework for scientific enquiry and engagement in which 
ethics is firmly anchored. It also allows for supplementation by theoretical perspectives, 
including those of Honneth (1995, 2007) and Giddens (1991, 1992) that are closer to the 
subjective concerns of psychotherapy and which offer a bridge for thinking about the 
links with critical social theory. In exploring the relevance of Habermas’ and Honneth’s 
moral theories for psychotherapy, I am not proposing any formulaic application of 
theory to clinical practice. My intention is to facilitate a dialogue between critical theory 
and psychotherapy and each of the chapters that follow, adopts a different starting point 
from which to approach this dialogue.  
 
Chapter 7 engages in a critical exchange with psychotherapy from the perspective of 
social theory. It considers the criticism of psychological reductionism and argues that 
challenging this tendency means challenging the abstract individualistic moral/ethical 
ethos which as we have seen is very deeply rooted in psychotherapy. Habermas’ 
alternative communicative ethical perspective is then considered in terms of what it may 
have to offer. The theme of the psychotherapist as professional expert in our society 
runs though this discussion. Options for transcending the restrictive dimensions of the 
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expert position within a communicative ethical framework, and for connecting with 
creative and emancipatory trends in contemporary society are explored. Chapter 8 takes 
up this argument, from a perspective inside psychotherapeutic discourse, drawing in 
particular on the theme of reflexivity as it is formulated and developed in systemic and 
psychoanalytic approaches that were previously discussed in Part 1. It considers how 
these formulations connect with sociological perspectives on reflexivity; how they 
might fit with a view of psychotherapy as a reflexive resource in our society and a view 
of the psychotherapist as helping to increase reflexive capacities in those with whom 
they work. An argument will be made for an idea of psychotherapy as a potential carrier 
of communicative reason helping people develop and enhance cognitive and emotional 
capacities that will in turn help them enter spheres of discursive or reflexive 
communication. Chapter 9 continues this elaboration, this time with a greater focus on 
clinical practice and drawing on clinical vignettes, including some from the author’s 
own practice as a family therapist in a National Health Service setting.                                                     
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Towards a Communicative Ethical Framework for Psychotherapy: 
Perspectives from Social Theory   
 
 
The charge of psychological reductionism is one that is often levelled at psychotherapy, 
sometimes in terms that imply an underlying lack of sympathy or even hostility towards 
the therapeutic endeavour. At its most strident this critique argues for a view of the 
latter as an exclusively conservative force promoting adjustment and accommodation to 
the social and political status quo whilst placing the onus for change onto individuals 
and families. An example is the traditional Marxist view that psychoanalysis represents 
a bourgeois doctrine unable to see beyond the class based interests of the bourgeoisie 
(Brooks, 1973; Timpanaro, 1976). It is also echoed in what Elliott (1999) describes as 
the “Freud bashing” that has characterized much of the debate around psychoanalysis in 
recent decades and which in his view reflects a “preoccupation with external forces as 
determining personal subjectivity, as well as a profound disinterest in issues 
surrounding the complexity of the psyche and the self” (p. x). Aspects of this critique 
are present in the Foucauldian view of psychotherapy as an instrument of social control, 
discussed in Chapter 5, whilst Bauman’s assessment cited in Chapter 6, concerning the 
role of “counselling” in promoting individualization for a fee is another version of this 
rather unsympathetic perspective amongst theorists, for some of whom the opposite 
charge of sociological reductionism might equally apply.1 Yet beyond this oppositional 
exchange there is reason to take seriously some elements of this critique not least 
because they are shared by some writers (Frosh, 1999; Samuels, 1989, 1993, 2001) 
within the psychotherapy field who bring a nuanced understanding of the clinical 
process to their assessment. In this study I have underlined the abstract individualistic 
bias of psychotherapeutic values, which can be seen as reinforcing the reductionism of 
which it stands accused.   
 
Paradoxically, alongside “Freud bashing” and general negativity from certain quarters, 
it is also the case that the impact of psychoanalysis has never been as far reaching as in 
                                                 
1  See also pp. 203-4 below for brief discussion of Christopher Lasch’s (1978) critique of psychotherapy 
and Anthony Giddens’ (1991) response.       
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recent decades, and as witnessed in the engagement with psychoanalytic theory by a 
wide range of academic disciplines (Elliott, 1999, pp. xv-i). I have already noted Jűrgen 
Habermas’ engagement with psychoanalytic theory in his early work and its more recent 
reappearance in the critical theory of Axel Honneth. Alongside evidence of a positive 
and invigorating contribution to debate outside the field, we have also seen, that 
internally psychotherapy has been reinventing itself for sometime and this includes 
articulating a less individualistic, more vigorously relational stance both in theory and in 
method. If anything these developments are being slowed down and impeded by the 
individualistic bias of psychotherapy’s traditional value base coupled with the 
fragmented and marginalized nature of ethical debate generally within the field. I have 
argued that this results in a creatively stuck situation that is impoverishing for 
psychotherapeutic discourse; that a radical paradigm shift at the level of moral/ ethical 
and political conceptualization is required; that imported theoretical sources of 
inspiration from the hermeneutical, post-structuralist and postmodernist traditions fall 
short of meeting this challenge; and that Habermas’ reformulation of Kantian ethics in 
terms of a theory of communicative ethics holds important insights for how it might be 
achieved. In what follows I begin with an overview of key aspects of the critique of 
psychotherapeutic reductionism with particular reference to the neglect of issues of 
power. This leads into a more general consideration of the social construction of 
psychotherapy as a professional discipline and how we might begin to conceptualize 
power in the psychotherapeutic relationship. Options for moving beyond the restrictive 
confines of the expert position within a communicative ethical framework, drawing on 
the thinking of Habermas and Honneth will then be explored. 
 
 
Psychological reductionism in psychotherapy         
 
In recent decades two theorists within psychotherapy, Samuels (1989, 1993, 2001) and 
Frosh (1999) have made noteworthy contributions to its critical appraisal. Both begin 
with an acknowledgment of the promise which object relations theory holds in terms of 
its emphasis on the interpersonal world in the construction of individuality and which 
sets it apart from classical psychoanalytic theory. Both theorists are also clear that it 
stops short of delivering on this promise not least in its unsatisfactory engagement with 
social and political themes both inside and outside the consulting room. In The Political 
Psyche (1993) Samuels discusses the weakness of the object relations perspective when 
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attempts are made to apply its insights beyond the clinical setting. In the earlier 
discussion of Kleinian theory, I noted Rustin’s (1991) analysis of the links between 
racist states of mind and the primitive splitting and projection that characterizes Klein’s 
delineation of paranoid-schizoid functioning. I also noted Kapur and Campbell’s (2004) 
Kleinian influenced analysis of The Troubled Mind of Northern Ireland, as examples of 
the application of object relations thinking to social and political processes. For Samuels 
(1993) the key weakness of analyses that are anchored in object relations thinking is the 
tendency to reduce complex social and political phenomena to the level and time frame 
of individual development and he questions the assumption often made that object 
relations theory lends itself more easily to political analysis than Freudian theory: 
“When the paranoid- schizoid position is offered as an explanation for a particular kind 
of social or cultural malaise, what is accepted and uncritically assumed to follow is that 
the depressive position is the only possible basis for a healthier state, and is ever the 
case” (p. 218). The world is approached as an individual or even an infant whilst 
complex political and social phenomena that do not conform to this “individualistic, 
chronological, moralistic, pathologizing framework” (p. 9) are ignored. For Samuels the 
implication in much of object relations thinking that a good enough environment, 
provided within the first months of life and in the family, is primarily what is required 
for an individual to flourish is, as he puts it, “hopelessly passive” in the context of 
problematic social and political structures.  
 
Within the object relations perspective on clinical processes it is also the case that 
social, political and other collective aspects of presenting problems are given scant 
attention whilst intrapsychic and interpersonal issues at the individual or familial level 
take centre stage. Here it could be argued that by concentrating on the latter, the 
psychotherapist at the very least offers something that is potentially constructive in the 
clinical context by way of addressing the presenting difficulty, however incomplete or 
limited this may be. Here one is also reminded of the Freudian dictum that the limited 
goal of psychoanalysis is to turn hysterical misery into common unhappiness (Freud and 
Breuer, 1895). In Frosh’s (1999) view: “none has described more succinctly and 
accurately than Freud, the limited opportunities for individual change within a 
repressive environment, neither have they always appreciated his insight into how 
important even this amount of change can be” (p. 63). The question is surely how this 
can be executed with integrity, honesty and openness in the therapeutic communication 
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of the clinical setting and how this might serve as a building block for further creative 
change either at the personal or social level. It is here that mainstream theoretical 
analyses of clinical processes generally fall short, not least in addressing power 
differentials in the therapist/patient relationship which impact on the transparency of 
communication between them.   
 
In family therapy as in object relations psychoanalysis the classical psychoanalytic view 
of the individual as a closed system of biological drives is replaced by one that firmly 
locates the individual in a relational context. However as in object relations theory this 
does not necessarily lend itself to enhanced engagement with social and political 
processes either inside or outside the clinical context. As in psychoanalysis, the 
consulting room remains the key setting for family therapy practice and here we have 
seen there is considerable enthusiasm for postmodernist influenced therapeutic 
perspectives such as the narrative approach and collaborative language systems therapy 
discussed in Chapter 3.2 Given the dominance of these perspectives in contemporary 
family therapy it offers a particularly useful context in which to analyze postmodernist 
influence in psychotherapy generally, including how power is addressed in this 
therapeutic stance. We have seen that what may loosely be termed the postmodernist 
perspective in family therapy, incorporating hermeneutic and poststructuralist strands, 
emerged against a background of great unease with the hierarchical nature of earlier 
positivist approaches. The idea of the therapist as objective observer is replaced with 
one that firmly locates the therapist inside the therapy system as a collaborative partner 
in dialogue. Emphasis shifts from objectivity and certainty to diversity, uncertainty, and 
multiple realities. But we have also seen that this opens up the thorny issue of relativism 
in psychotherapy; concern that the therapist appears to lack an independent ethical 
position from which to take a stand; concern about a sliding away from issues of power 
and the abuse of power in family relationships; concern about relativizing reality and 
the danger that therapy as a process of bearing witness to the destructive reality of 
“disrespect” including abuse, is thereby undermined.  
 
Drawing on this earlier critique of imported postmodernist influence in family therapy, 
it seems fair to conclude that like the home grown object relations perspective in 
                                                 
2  Chapter 3  pp. 69-74. 
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psychoanalysis, it falls short in conceptualizing issues of power. Ideas around expertise 
and other hierarchical differences between therapist and patient or family are obscured 
or ironed out in a context that emphasizes equality and “unknowingness” in the 
therapeutic relationship. Herein resides a danger that the potential authoritarianism of a 
therapy that hides its expertise in “unknowingness” and supposed equality is also 
obscured. I have argued that this problem can be traced back to the troubled engagement 
with moral/ethical and political themes within the internal logic of the hermeneutic, 
post-structuralist and postmodernist theoretical traditions that have been imported 
uncritically into psychotherapeutic discourse. Writing about psychoanalytic approaches 
specifically, Frosh (1999) reminds us that there is a significant difference between 
analysts who obscure the power relationship and those who examine it (p. 14). One 
might add there is also a significant difference between theoretical approaches in 
psychotherapy generally that lend themselves to offering a framework in which issues 
of power can be adequately conceptualized and approaches where this is missing.   
 
If we accept the argument that psychological reductionism, including the neglect and 
obscuring of issues of power is the reflection of an innately conservative bias or, to 
borrow Samuel’s (1993) words, “a secret alignment with the existing order” (p. 276) in 
psychotherapy, this simply raises the question of why this might be but also how it 
might be challenged. From the perspective of this study key factors include the severely 
restricted, individualist framework of moral/ethical debate, the conceptual vacuum in 
which this debate occurs and the lack of mediation with social and political themes and 
concerns at this level of debate. Interestingly when Samuels himself explores ways of 
addressing the problem of psychological reductionism, his thinking appears to take him 
beyond the consulting room to questions of how “the therapeutic attitude” and in 
particular that of therapeutic engagement with emotional communication encapsulated 
in the transference/countertransference dynamic might be employed in larger, collective 
contexts. Regardless of how helpful this might be, unfortunately it also takes the debate 
well beyond the horizon of most clinically based psychotherapists whilst questions of 
how these concerns regarding psychological reductionism might be addressed in the  
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clinical setting are left largely unanswered.3 As argued in the introduction to the study, 
this perspective can leave psychotherapists feeling understandably alienated or 
disinterested and needs to be superseded by a more inclusive engagement with 
moral/ethical and political themes that addresses the personal and intimate domains in 
which psychotherapy predominantly operates.           
 
For Frosh (1999), whose critique of object relationships thinking is in many respects 
similar to Samuel’s, the richness of the psychoanalytic contribution to social and 
political critique rests precisely in its focus on subjectivity: “The object of 
psychoanalytic knowledge is subjectivity, the flowing, changing, productive and 
disjointed experience that each of us has of ourselves and the world and the pattern of 
linkages that this subjectivity has with unconscious and with external events” (p. 9). 
Without a theory of subjectivity there can be no complete approach to politics, as he 
observes. Arguably this is clearly demonstrated in the contrast between Honneth’s 
moral theory of recognition and Habermas’ communicative ethics, and specifically in 
the way that Honneth’s theory, drawing on object relations thinking, compensates for 
the neglect of subjectivity in Habermasian theory. In Frosh’s view psychoanalysis is 
capable of offering insights that are congruent with a progressive politics even when it 
restricts itself to the personal concerns of the individual precisely because “at the heart 
of these concerns is a social process” (ibid. p. 244). However like Samuels he is all too 
aware of the charges of conformism directed at psychoanalysis throughout its history, 
which are linked to this tendency to reduce what is social and political to what is 
subjective and personal and to reduce collective and institutional processes to the 
psychological make up of their individual members. In the case of psychoanalysis 
Frosh’s own conclusion is that it can nonetheless contribute to progressive social and 
political change:   
  
Most importantly, different analytic approaches show varying degrees of 
awareness of the power relations present in therapy and of how these can and 
should be worked with. Where these power relations are recognized and used to 
                                                 
3  It is important to acknowledge Samuel’s contribution in helping to establish an organisation known as 
Psychotherapists and Counsellors for Social Responsibility, in 1995, with the aim of using insights from 
psychotherapeutic practice within wider political and public discourse. For a brief outline of this 
organisation’s activities, see Samuels (2003). Whilst it has remained very small in scale and has not 
attracted the support of the vast majority of psychotherapists in the UK, it has campaigned on a variety of 
issues such as the rights of asylum seekers or the rights of lesbian and gay applicants for psychotherapy 
training.     
170 
explore the internalized power structures that have been embedded in the client’s 
personality, psychoanalysis begins to contribute to social change.  
(1999, p. 42) 
The view informing this study is that psychotherapy can make a relevant contribution to 
progressive personal, social and political change and that harnessing what we might 
describe as its emancipatory potential requires rigorous engagement with its normative 
orientation. We need a clear and reasoned understanding of what progressive change 
and “good outcomes” can mean in the psychotherapeutic context. In what follows I look 
at processes of professionalization in psychotherapy as the backdrop to any 
consideration of the therapeutic relationship, the power embedded therein and the 
question of what progressive change and a “good outcome” might mean in this context. 
I then look at the shape of the therapeutic relationship in more detail and include in this 
discussion some aspects of Habermas’ dialogue with psychoanalysis in his early work. 
Whilst he subsequently lost interest in its potential insights for critical theory, this 
thinking continues to have relevance for psychotherapeutic self understanding of the 
internal logic of the therapeutic process. 
 
     
Processes of professionalization in psychotherapy  
 
Adopting the very simple definition of professionals as those to whom power and 
authority is delegated by society, based on the assumption that they have certain 
knowledge and skills not generally available (Tjeltveit, 1999, p. 28), it may be said that 
psychotherapy has a complex and sometimes ambivalent relationship with its 
professional status. For some psychotherapists including those with a background in 
allied professions such as medicine or clinical psychology, there may be a taken for 
granted, unquestioned quality to psychotherapeutic professional status whilst for others 
who lack this background, having it conferred via psychotherapy training may hold 
considerable significance in terms of social status and earning potential. But there is 
also considerable negativity attached to professionalization for others who view it not so 
much in terms of opportunity but in terms of external constraint. Amongst the latter are 
those who hold to a view of psychotherapy and especially its large hinterland of 
counselling practice as more closely linked to the idea of a “social movement” than a 
profession (Bennett, 2005) For this group the roots of many counselling and 
psychotherapy organizations in the voluntary sector, the spirit of service to the 
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community by volunteer counsellors and belief in equality of access to therapeutic 
services, is at the heart of what these organisations represent. They are fearful of this 
spirit being eroded by accelerating professionalization and what they perceive as the 
associated transformation of counselling into a service industry.  
 
For many years an uneasy alliance of conflicting perspectives on professionalization, as 
on many other matters, has been held together by a system of self regulation within the 
psychotherapy field which has offered assurances to the public regarding training 
standards, competency to practice, ethical codes and complaints procedures. This 
system has been managed by the main organizing bodies in psychotherapy. However in 
recent years this arrangement has been overtaken by a new and what is for many, an 
alarming turn with the planned replacement of voluntary registration of 
psychotherapists by a statutory registration scheme which will be managed by a state 
sponsored regulator, the Health Professions Council. In general terms the extent to 
which psychotherapeutic ethical debate has been influenced by external concerns about 
accountability and the discourse of consumer rights, has been noted in Chapter 2 and the 
proposed switch to state regulation may be seen as another step in this process. For 
those who support this development it represents an advance in securing 
psychotherapy’s professional status and its future viability. For others it represents the 
erosion of autonomy and power within the discipline to determine therapeutic priorities, 
values and training criteria and as such is an ominous development. This group includes 
some who are concerned for the future viability of open ended, exploratory, depth 
psychological interventions in a wider political climate that shows a strong preference 
for a positivist therapeutic stance, informed by the medical model of treatment. The 
latter is commonly associated with interventions that adopt an illness model of 
psychological difficulty, are time limited, oriented to behavioural change, adopt clearly 
defined goals and outcome objectives, place considerable emphasis on building a strong 
evidence base in empirical research and tend to view psychotherapy primarily in terms 
of a collection of techniques.4 In psychotherapeutic discourse the therapeutic approach 
that comes closest to this positivist ideal is cognitive behavioural therapy and the 
                                                 
4  Significant elements of this thinking are reflected in what is commonly known as the Layard Report 
(Layard et al., 2006) on depression which has influenced policy relating to state funded psychological 
therapy provision. This report is associated with a Government sponsored initiative known as the 
Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) Programme, where the core therapeutic modality is 
cognitive behavioural therapy. For consideration of the limitations of the medical model of psychological 
treatment see Bentall (2003) and Dowrick (2004).         
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distinction between this orientation and others including the psychoanalytic and 
systemic approaches that are the focus of this study constitutes one of the major fault 
lines of current debate. 5 
  
It is not my intention to enter into the complex and highly charged clinically oriented   
discussions about difference between psychotherapeutic approaches to alleviating 
psychological suffering and promoting change. Arguably what they hold in common 
and what transcends their differences is an underlying orientation to psychotherapy as a 
“talking cure”. It is at this level of common ground that we need to anchor the debate 
about the normative orientation of psychotherapy not least if we are to avoid the 
traditional fusion of normative questions with those of method and technique. Whilst it 
is important not to minimize the impact of clinical differences on the shape of 
psychotherapeutic “talking”, there is also evidence that the various specialist 
orientations may be more generic and integrative in the privacy of the consulting room 
than in the politics of public debates.6 The point is to secure the most enabling and 
potentially creative discursive space in which such discussions between the orientations 
can unfold and contribute to the future development of psychotherapy as a “talking 
cure”. Understandably there is concern about the extent to which psychotherapy as a 
state regulated profession can embrace this process.  
 
Against the background of current debates one is not only reminded of Foucault’s 
conceptualization of knowledge in terms of a power struggle played out in social 
discourse,7 one is also left in little doubt about the intensity of current power struggles 
that give shape to psychotherapy as a socially constructed entity. This is a climate where 
the need to move beyond the cul-de-sac of professional micro ethics to articulate a 
reasoned, overarching justification of psychotherapy’s normative stance has never been 
more urgent. In the absence of this philosophically anchored debate it becomes more 
difficult to challenge the implicit assumption within powerful strands of the 
contemporary discourse and beyond, which imply that an orientation towards personal 
                                                 
5  Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) evolved from the merging of behavioural therapy with cognitive 
therapy (Beck, 1976) and is prominent in the contemporary psychotherapeutic field. For an outline of 
CBT, see Grant et al. (2004) and Westbrook et al. (2007). For discussion of the divide between CBT and 
psychoanalysis see Milton (2001) who writes from a psychoanalytic perspective and for a more 
integrative perspective on this subject see Bateman (2000).       
6  Bateman (2000) offers an overview of research findings and a helpful discussion of this subject as it 
relates in particular to cognitive behavioural therapy and psychoanalysis.  
7  Chapter 5  pp. 117-21. 
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change anchored in positivist thinking offers the most appropriate overarching 
framework for psychotherapy. Conversely it becomes more difficult to challenge critics 
who denounce psychotherapy comprehensively on grounds of psychological 
reductionism.    
 
 
The therapeutic relationship in psychotherapy 
 
Given the private and confidential nature of psychotherapy practice, it is a discourse that 
often struggles to include the voice of recipients in public deliberations beyond the 
implicit feedback that comes from empirical research. The latter has long been another 
highly contested area given the dominant reliance on the methodology of the 
randomized controlled trial in such research; the challenge of applying this 
methodology in psychotherapy; the challenge of evaluating outcomes particularly in the 
more exploratory depth analytic approaches where therapeutic objectives and outcomes 
are more difficult to define; and the concern that this evidence based ethos privileges 
approaches that are oriented to behavioural change, more amenable to empirical 
evaluation and more closely aligned with the medical model of treatment.8 We have 
seen that for Foucault power is a fluid entity and is not synonymous with constraint. 
Where there is power there is always resistance he believed. Against the background of 
current struggles, one is also reminded of the link that Foucault made between 
psychotherapy and social control and his view that within the therapeutic process the 
patient is subjected to a socially constructed regime of truth.9 Current battles over what 
we might define as different regimes of truth in psychotherapy crystallize the fact that it 
is a highly contested area. They also crystallize the urgent need for a wide ranging and 
thoughtful engagement with issues of power in psychotherapy generally including those 
aspects that shape the therapist/client relationship: the need for thinking that might 
enhance our understanding of these processes and help us explore options for 
transcending their more restrictive aspects; and the need for theoretical perspectives that 
might help articulate a normative grounding for psychotherapy that is more 
appropriately attuned to contemporary relational concerns than the Kantian based 
individualist framework which currently prevails. 
 
                                                 
8  See Mace et al. (2001), Roth and Fonagy (2005), Goodheart et al. (2006) and Norcross et al. (2006) for 
consideration of the different dimensions of this debate.  
9  Chapter 5 pp. 121-5 
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We have seen that in Habermas’ early work he drew on psychoanalysis as an 
epistemological paradigm for critical social theory in which recognition of the 
asymmetrical relationship between analyst and patient was central to his 
conceptualization.10 Psychoanalysis understood in terms of a theory of distorted 
communication seeks out the meaning of distortions that have become inaccessible to 
the patient because they are split off or repressed. Explanation in the form of a 
reconstructed life history seeks to close the gap of memory and enable the patient to 
reflectively dissolve the causal connection between the original scene of conflict and 
his/her symptoms. It can do so only when the patient finds meaning in the explanatory 
interpretation offered and can use it to relate his/her own history. In the course of this 
experience there is an implicit realignment of power within the therapeutic relationship. 
A psychoanalytic interpretation does not give the analyst technical control over the 
patient’s psyche. On the contrary by overcoming causal connections themselves, 
psychoanalysis gives power back to the patient’s ego. For the early Habermas, 
psychoanalysis therefore offered an important paradigm for a form of knowledge and 
practical engagement revolving around methodical self- reflection which facilitated a 
more complete self reflection than would otherwise be possible.  
 
Much has changed since the era of classical Freudian analysis which Habermas 
explored, yet arguably the shape of the relationship between the analyst and patient in 
the now dominant object relations tradition remains unchanged in important respects. 
The nature of interpretations may be of a different order with less focus on historical 
reconstruction and greater attention to the here and now of intrapsychic and 
interpersonal processes as played out in the transference relationship. But the overall 
shape of the intervention remains the same, including the asymmetrical relationship 
between analyst and patient; the dialectical relationship between the “objectivity” of the 
analyst and his/here subjective experience of the patient; the reliance on interpretation 
as a key method of intervention and the idea that interpretations offered possess validity 
to the extent that they are experienced as meaningful by the patient. To borrow 
Habermas’ words, this remains a mode of practical engagement where “the subject 
cannot obtain knowledge of the object unless it becomes knowledge for the object- and 
                                                 
10 Chapter 4  pp. 89-95. 
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unless the latter therefore emancipates itself by becoming a subject” ([1968a]1978, p. 
262).  
 
In the course of earlier discussion of Habermas’ dialogue with Gadamer, I made a case 
for the above epistemological paradigm drawn from classical psychoanalysis as 
interpreted by Habermas, as one that is applicable more widely within psychotherapy.11 
I did this on the basis that it allows for the methodological integration of explanation 
and understanding and is therefore more appropriate to the object domain of 
psychotherapy than an exclusively hermeneutical stance in terms of the space which it 
allows for recognition of systematic distortions in communication and the application of 
therapeutic methodology in addressing these difficulties. I also argued that therapeutic 
approaches which rely exclusively on a hermeneutical stance risk alienating clinicians 
from the expertise of their rich methodological inheritance. Implicitly an unhelpful 
schism is also set up with alternative orientations such as cognitive behavioural therapy 
where the discourse of method and technique is prominent. Habermas’ epistemological 
paradigm offers a more inclusive and encompassing framework in which to formulate 
the different and dialectical strands of the therapeutic relationship. This paradigm has an 
added resonance insofar as it offers conceptual scaffolding for addressing the power 
structure of the therapeutic relationship and the possibilities for its transcendence within 
the internal logic of the therapeutic process. But here it should be emphasized that 
Habermas’ account of the psychoanalytic process is a highly idealized version in which 
his primary interest is not psychoanalysis per se but the insights he can derive for 
critical social theory. His account is far removed from the not so ideal realities of 
psychotherapeutic clinical practice where issues of power are as likely to be obscured as 
they are to be addressed in the routine communication of the therapeutic session, and 
where an explication of psychotherapy’s methodological status needs to be firmly 
anchored in consideration of the ethical underpinning of the therapeutic endeavour. To 
this end I turn to the subsequent development of Habermas’ work in his theory of 
communicative ethics and its applicability in the therapeutic context. 
                                      
 
                                                 
11 Chapter 5 pp.78-82. 
  
176 
Towards a communicative ethical framework for psychotherapy  
              
Following my observation of the disjuncture between individually slanted ethical 
deliberation and the relational thrust of wider psychotherapeutic theory and practice, I 
also noted an implicit straining towards a different formulation of ethics that is less 
individualistic and somewhat more focussed on the kinds of conversations we might 
have where matters of ethical import are discussed. Unfortunately lacking an adequate 
conceptual framework in which it might be explored, this thinking remains poorly 
developed and the gulf between a marginalized ethical debate and wider developments 
in the field persists. In this study I have focussed in particular on the relational ethos of 
psychoanalytic object relations thinking and the vigorously relational thrust of systemic 
family therapy. Whilst retaining much of its traditional intrapsychic focus it may be said 
that major strands of contemporary psychotherapy are now profoundly concerned with 
what happens between people and in particular what happens between them when they 
try to communicate, whether within the therapeutic relationship or within family 
relationships. In the case of family therapy, the intersubjective milieu of family relating 
becomes the primary focus of intervention. This is a place where, moment by moment, 
people discuss, sort out, negotiate - or fail to do so - about how “best” to live their lives 
together. Adopting the language of Habermas and Honneth we could describe it as a 
communicative context suffused by interpersonal struggles for understanding, 
agreement and recognition. Viewed from this perspective, a Kantian based morality 
anchored in the paradigm of the solitary individual and the personal struggles of 
individual conscience appears understandably remote from the intensity and immediacy 
of familial communication processes. 
 
In Habermasian thinking he reformulates Kantian theory in line with the paradigmatic 
shift in twentieth century philosophy from individual consciousness to intersubjectivity 
and language. The focus of concern shifts from the isolated individual to the 
intersubjective community. Inner reflection is replaced by dialogue and a model of 
argumentation replaces the silent thought experiment of the Kantian categorical 
imperative. It is these paradigmatic changes that give Habermas’ communicative ethical 
theory such a powerful resonance in relational psychotherapeutic practice. In Habermas’ 
theory communication is stripped back to its most basic level and as such it speaks very 
powerfully to the psychotherapeutic endeavor understood as a “talking cure”. Given the 
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relational thrust of current practice I have suggested it could be more appropriately 
termed the “communication cure” and Habermas’ theory crystallizes the moral/ethical 
themes that are integral to the communicative process.  In essence he reconstructs from 
a moral/ethical perspective the very minimal conditions that make communication 
possible on a routine basis and it is here that the interest of the philosopher/critical 
theorist and the psychotherapist coincide in this space where the minute details of why 
communication does or does not happen are explored.  
 
For Habermas, ideas about ethics are fundamentally ideas about the kinds of 
conversations we might have in which matters of ethical import can be discussed and in 
which it might be possible to remove constraints to ongoing communication. We have 
seen that at the centre of his ethical theory is the rather simple yet profound idea that 
when we speak our utterances carry deep within them an ethical ideal, which transcends 
specific situations and which, he suggests, has a universal status. It is this ideal that 
Habermas reconstructs in his theory of communicative ethics. He focuses on what can 
rationally motivate a hearer to accept something as truth and concludes this is due to 
“the speaker’s guarantee that he will, if necessary, make efforts to redeem the validity 
claim that the hearer has accepted (1990a, p. 58). To summarize very briefly for the 
present discussion, this redemption takes place at the level of “discourse” where we step 
back from our routine everyday communication to some extent in order to engage in a 
more reflective consideration of claims to truth or normative appropriateness. Habermas 
further suggests that each of us through our ordinary communicative competence 
implicitly holds an idea of the kind of discourse in which contested validity claims can 
be redeemed and his excavation of these implicit assumptions leads him to conclude 
that they represent communicatively based reformulations of such ideals as respect, 
equality and justice. These preconditions of discourse include the assumption that it is 
inclusive, that all participants are allowed to initiate and question assertions and that 
everyone is allowed to express their attitudes, desires and needs without being 
prevented by external or internal constraint from so doing. This ideal is immanent in the 
way we routinely draw on language and remains as an ideal that guides our 
communication rather than something we would ever realize fully in concrete situations. 
Psychotherapy understood as a communicative process is undoubtedly imbued with this 
ethical ideal which Habermas describes, even if it remains entirely implicit. I am 
arguing that at its best the psychotherapeutic endeavour could be understood as a form 
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of striving towards this communicatively formulated ideal. For some this will appear 
self evident without the need for theorization. Yet, arguably it is precisely the lack of 
explicit articulation and theorization of this regulative ideal anchored in communication 
that compromises and restricts its critical impact in clinical practice. I will elaborate on 
these points below.    
 
There is much in Habermas’ conceptualization of communicative ethics and discourse 
that resonates in the therapeutic context. At the outset his engagement with the 
breakdown of claims to truth, normative appropriateness and also truthfulness is echoed 
in most referrals for individual, couple or family therapy. Whether the referral is 
triggered by violence or abuse in the couple or family relationships, unfaithfulness by 
one of the partners, family breakdown and the impact on children, “inappropriate” or 
challenging behavior by a child inside or outside the family, the distress for individuals 
resulting from these historical or contemporary events and so on, it is hard to imagine a 
request for psychotherapy where questions concerning a problematic validity claim is 
not part of the background to the referral and the ensuing therapeutic conversation. Yet 
referrals and subsequent interventions are predominantly thought about in pragmatic 
and methodological terms and are rarely if ever considered in moral/ethical terms unless 
a clearly defined “ethical dilemma” arises, for example the need to break therapeutic 
confidentiality because of concern for somebody’s well being or safety. In 
psychotherapeutic discourse it is fair to say that morality and ethics inhabit a space that 
is visited on special occasions only. In essence they are part of the taken for granted, 
mostly untheorized backdrop to routine work encapsulated in a document entitled Code 
of Ethics and Practice.12  
 
This reification and marginalization of ethics in psychotherapy is undoubtedly 
reinforced by the enduring influence of a modernist perspective that locates morality 
and ethics, formulated as abstract ideals such as duty and respect, in the depoliticized 
domain of individual conscience and consciousness. It is a situation which is reinforced 
by processes of professionalization which further reify ethics as a specialist discourse 
addressed by expert ethics committees, complaints procedures, codes of ethics and so 
on. Writing about an allied profession, that of social work, Bauman (2000a, p. 9) makes 
                                                 
12  For example, see the Association for Family Therapy’s Code of Ethics (2008) at http://www.aft.org.uk. 
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a point that could equally be applied to psychotherapy in organizational settings, namely 
that processes of bureaucratization squeeze ethics out of daily practice which in turn 
becomes distant from its original ethical impulse. This individualized and 
professionalized shaping of ethical discourse remains as we have seen, largely 
untouched by wider developments including the impact of postmodernist thinking in 
psychotherapy. In sharp contrast, the reification of morality and ethics is powerfully 
challenged in Habermas’ work and when this is brought into dialogue with 
psychotherapy, his conceptual framework has the immediate and striking effect of 
anchoring our thinking about morality and ethics in contexts of everyday 
communication. Borrowing Bauman’s (1993, p. 3) terminology from a different 
context, we might describe this as a process of “moralization”, or perhaps more 
accurately of re-moralization, of the therapeutic encounter as a communicative 
endeavor. The power of this reframing is considerable and there are a number of 
implications following on from this which I shall consider here and in following 
chapters. I begin by locating the discussion in the context of clinical psychotherapy 
practice drawing on the example of child and family psychotherapy. This will lead into 
a more theoretically oriented exploration of the relevance of Habermas’ thinking for 
psychotherapy in the following chapter before returning to the arena of clinical practice 
in the final chapter. It should be emphasized that the following discussion is being used 
only as an example of how Habermasian thinking about distortions in communication 
and the moral/ ethical implications that ensue, might be integrated into thinking about 
clinical issues. Beyond this it does not aspire to offer a comprehensive account of the 
clinical issues raised.   
 
 
Towards a communicative ethical framework for child and family psychotherapy    
 
In child and family mental health service provision within the UK National Health 
Service, psychotherapists routinely work in multidisciplinary teams alongside other 
professionals including medically trained psychiatrists and nurses. In this clinical setting 
much attention is focused on whether a child’s particular symptoms of emotional, 
behavioral or learning difficulty meet criteria for various disorders as laid down in the 
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discourse of psychiatry.13 This approach does not exclude other professional 
involvement and may well result in a recommendation for psychotherapy to address 
issues in the background to the referral including family relationship problems. 
Nonetheless it raises critical questions about the appropriateness of extensive reliance 
on a medical discourse of diagnosis in the field of child mental health and on treatment 
programmes that include widespread use of medication for children, as in the treatment 
of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for example.14 These are questions 
which take us well beyond the privacy of the clinical setting to the arena of social and 
political debate regarding contemporary society’s engagement with children in 
difficulty 
 
From a social theoretical perspective the pronounced trend towards diagnostic 
categorization of children brings to mind Bauman’s (1989) observations on the 
relentless ordering and systematizing tendencies of modernity, the god like authority 
bestowed on these hegemonic systems of classification and the implicit question of 
what is excluded and unrecognized in this systematizing frame. One is also reminded of 
the Foucauldian ([1961]2006) link between the discourse of psychiatry and that of 
social control. From a Habermasian communicative ethical position one might enquire 
about systematic distortions in debate on child mental health issues and in particular the 
distorting influence of vested interests such as drug companies or professional 
organizations including the medical profession. These issues are not far from public 
consciousness and in the context of growing awareness of diagnostic trends relating to 
children, we find a newspaper article asking whether it is indicative of a society that is 
“less tolerant of difference and needs to medicalize unnormality”.15  Paradoxically these 
are critical questions that one is less likely to encounter in state funded clinical practice 
where the struggle to meet overwhelming demand and manage waiting lists for service 
tends to monopolize thinking processes. Given that systemic family therapists work 
predominantly in National Health Service child and family clinics, lack of engagement 
with these issues in the family therapy literature and debate is striking. Here one finds 
lone voices of concern or alternatively of interest in issues of diagnosis (Pentecost, 
                                                 
13  Psychiatric diagnoses are generally formulated in line with criteria as laid down in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders (DSM- IV-TR, 2000) published by the American Psychiatric 
Association.    
14 See Baughman (2006) and Lloyd et al. (2006).   
15 Does labelling children with behavioural problems such as ADHD help? Times Newspaper, 16th 
February, 2009. 
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2000; Speed, 2004) but a marked absence of any systematic debate or critique. Instead 
the dominant stance appears to be one of deferential accommodation towards 
psychiatric diagnosis. It is a situation suffused with moral/ethical considerations even if 
these are not widely acknowledged and my argument is that bringing this subject, 
amongst others, into the framework of communicative ethics not only sheds light on its 
complexity but offers an invaluable anchor for moral/ethical debate both at a clinical 
level and at more overtly social and political levels.          
 
It should be emphasized that the value of a psychiatric diagnosis or of treatment with 
medication in specific clinical situations is not the issue in question here but rather the 
communicative contexts in which these processes unfold. Systemic family therapy’s 
accommodation to diagnostic trends is especially noteworthy given the marked disparity 
between the individualizing psychiatric diagnostic orientation with its emphasis on 
expertise on the one hand and the dominant postmodernist infused non- hierarchical, 
“unknowing” collaborative stance espoused in the family therapy literature on the other 
hand.16 I have already argued that this latter stance obscures structures of power within 
the therapeutic relationship. Arguably an accommodation to diagnostic trends in the 
wider discourse of child mental health also masks silent support for this hierarchical, 
“knowing” approach notably where therapists are struggling to manage challenging 
clinical situations. When a child is presenting with extreme and out of control behavior, 
diagnosis and medication can come as a great relief not only to the family but to the 
psychotherapist, struggling to hold the situation in an exclusively therapeutic “talking” 
frame. The likely impact of a diagnosis is to lower anxiety levels within the family not 
simply because of the hope that symptomatic relief will follow but because of the 
misleading impression that it offers an explanation for the presenting problem. 
Paradoxically the latter is rarely the case and in the example of ADHD mentioned 
above, there is no exact aetiology, with expert opinion divided on the balance of 
environmental and genetic factors involved.17 Nonetheless the inference sometimes 
taken from a diagnosis is that the condition is innate and need not be thought about 
within a relational frame. Unfortunately this can have the effect of prematurely shutting 
                                                 
16  Interestingly this silent accommodation by contemporary postmodernist infused systemic family 
therapy to individualizing diagnostic trends is also in marked contrast to the early pioneering days of what 
is known as first order or modernist family therapy, which emerged in the context of vigorous 
disengagement from the individualizing ethos of classical psychoanalysis at that time (See Chapter 3).  
17  See Biederman (2005), Joseph (2000) and Rowland et al. (2002). 
182 
down the therapeutic exploratory conversation either partially or completely. In the 
words of the systemic therapist, Bebe Speed: “Diagnosis talk doesn’t have to be used to 
shut down exploration but in my experience it often does” (2004, p. 276). 
 
When a diagnosis is confirmed as in the example of ADHD, then it is likely that 
medication to address the child’s behavioral symptoms will follow. This does not rule 
out therapeutic “talking” for the child and family also aimed at addressing emotional 
and behavioral problems and running parallel to the pharmacological treatment. This 
dual approach is routinely recommended. However the diagnosis powerfully sets the 
tone for the therapeutic work. In the case of family therapy where a child in the family 
is carrying a diagnosis belonging to a separate individually oriented discourse, it may 
well run counter to the family therapist’s efforts to address complex relational issues in 
the family, perhaps between the child and the parents or within the parental relationship, 
that may also be impacting significantly on the child’s difficulties. In a climate where 
positivist thinking and the medical model of diagnosis and treatment prevail it can be 
difficult for psychotherapists to acknowledge or even conceptualize the challenge this 
presents for their work and the lack of comprehensive critical engagement with these 
issues in contemporary family therapy literature is very striking.          
 
Whilst the clinical therapeutic challenges described above are not insurmountable and 
the value of a psychiatric diagnosis can be considerable, a communicative ethical 
framework concentrates attention very powerfully on the communicative processes in 
which this work unfolds and decisions are reached. In particular it concentrates attention 
on relations of power which infuse this communication. For example parents and 
teachers may put pressure on mental health professionals to offer a diagnosis and 
medication whilst being less eager to consider their contribution to the particular 
unfolding of the presenting problem and the part they may need to play in its resolution. 
The question of whether the voice of the child is adequately represented in these 
discussions is brought more sharply into focus in a communicative ethical framework 
encompassing Habermas’ reconstruction of the minimal conditions that need to be met 
for undistorted communication. Where a child is involved they will commonly require 
help to have a voice but this is not a reason to exclude them. Habermas’ regulative ideal 
of the conditions of “discourse” offers a yardstick against which actual communication 
may be judged and concentrates attention on whose interests are being served in this 
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communication. It is a regulative ideal which leaves little room for complacency about 
communicative contexts in which important decisions regarding a child’s life are made.  
 
For the psychotherapist working alongside colleagues in multi disciplinary teams who 
adopt a different and sometimes more hierarchical professional ethos it can be difficult 
to take a stand on clinical issues that concern them. Drawing on the regulative ideal of 
discourse ethics, they may feel encouraged to do so since it offers a framework in which 
to locate their intuitive sense of distortions in the communicative process and thus lends 
itself to feeling empowered to address these issues more openly and rationally. Perhaps 
more importantly it also presents a challenge to psychotherapists themselves whose 
vested interest in the diagnostic process may be informed by an underlying interest in 
closing down the therapeutic conversation because it feels unproductive, emotionally 
overwhelming or outside their area of expertise. These are good reasons for opening up 
a conversation with colleagues about the challenges of the work but not necessarily 
good reasons for closing down the therapeutic conversation. The process by which these 
matters are resolved in professional discussions are often subtly strategic whereas a 
communicative ethical framework challenges those involved to push for further critical 
or radical opening up of the communicative processes in which these complex matters 
are addressed.  
 
Psychotherapists drawing on a postmodernist influenced conceptual framework as 
outlined in earlier discussion, lack a mediating discourse between their “unknowing”, 
collaborative and narrative based ethos and the hierarchical, medical paradigm adopted 
by other professionals in the wider discourse of mental health service provision. The 
result is that the separate professional discourses rest alongside each other whilst 
contradictions and tensions remain unarticulated. The onus appears to rest with the 
individual psychotherapist drawing on his/her personal moral code to confront 
situations that feel intuitively inappropriate. Writing on a similar theme Pilgrim’s 
(2000) assessment is blunt: 
  
Recording and generating one narrative after another will not suffice in this 
regard. Some notion of hard reality and its impact on mental health status is 
required as a point of reference to understand the role of mental health 
professionals and to guide social policy decisions to prevent or ameliorate 
mental distress. To rely on postmodernism may simply help professionals to feel 
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that they are being hip about a new de-differentiated world, whilst enjoying their 
salaries and status in much the same way as their predecessors. (pp. 21-2)    
 
Pilgrim’s blunt comments underline that in the discourse of mental health suffused as it 
is with relations of power and moral/ethical/political considerations, taking a stand is 
sometimes what is required. For psychotherapists drawing on the mediating discourse of 
Habermasian communicative ethics there is little room for accommodation or 
complacency regarding distortions in the communicative framework in which their 
work is located including the possibility of inappropriate diagnosis and medicalization 
of psychological distress. This ethical framework is also more conducive to taking a 
stand and having confidence to do so since its regulative ideal is no longer anchored 
exclusively at the level of individual conscience. Taking a stand that is rooted in the 
framework of communicative ethics might set the therapist on a collision course with 
deeply entrenched structures of distorted communication in their own practice or within 
the wider institutional and social context of this practice. Conversely it may be 
welcomed by other professionals who are on the frontline of pressure to offer a 
diagnostic/labelling response to children in difficulty and who may experience relief at 
being supported in opening up a therapeutic conversation with families and others 
involved, rather than feeling pressurized to follow a path that closes down or 
compromises this possibility. More than any of the theoretical traditions explored in this 
study to which psychotherapy refers for inspiration, Habermas’ communicative ethical 
framework offers a theoretical context in which these complex moral/ ethical issues 
might be formulated and addressed.   
 
Whilst Habermas’ ethical framework is potentially very helpful in considering 
processes of distorted communication in the wider context of engagement with clients 
and with other institutions and professionals, as has been argued above, it is in the 
actual therapeutic intervention itself that its full potential is crystallized. Here its 
contribution can be formulated on two levels: firstly in addressing structures of distorted 
communication that individuals and families bring with them to the therapeutic 
conversation and secondly in promoting developments that may enhance their capacity 
to engage in the discursive resolution of the difficulties that have brought them to 
therapy. For Habermas “discourses are islands in the sea of practice, that is improbable 
forms of communication; the everyday appeal to validity-claims implicitly points 
however to their possibility” (1982, p. 235). Psychotherapeutic encounters at their best 
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might also be described as “islands in the sea of practice” that constitutes individual or 
family life. Here, some of the constraints that routinely infuse everyday life can 
temporarily be challenged or cast aside in a context which - as in Habermas’ idea of 
discourse - is characterized by striving towards what might be described as a heightened 
or reflexive form of communication. It is here that psychotherapy implicitly seeks to 
unleash the full communicative potential of language. Fostering clients’ or families’ 
capacity for reflexivity is at the heart of this process and in what follows I will turn to 
an explication of reflexivity as it applies in psychotherapy and in social theory. The 
context for this discussion is the continued elaboration of the relevance of Habermasian 
communicative ethics for psychotherapy.  
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Psychotherapy as a reflexive resource: shared ground in systemic and 
psychoanalytic approaches    
 
 
Within psychotherapeutic discourse there have been surprisingly few attempts to make 
connections with Habermas’ communicative ethics. As with other philosophical and 
social theoretical sources, connections that are made tend to be superficial, consisting of 
little more than passing reference (Flaskas, 2002; Frosh, 1999). Some of this 
indifference may be down to the complexity and abstraction of Habermas’ writings, but 
it is more likely that it is influenced by the “postmodern turn” of recent decades in 
psychotherapy and the fact that Habermas’ work is positioned outside the postmodernist 
fold.1 The few contributions that demonstrate a more sustained attempt to connect with 
his work tend to be peripheral to mainstream debate including that on ethics, and are 
articulated by what might be described as lone voices, typically writing from a context 
other than clinical practice. Of these, two that stand out are: Steuerman’s (2000) 
dialogue between Habermas, Lyotard and Melanie Klein; and Bennett’s (2005) analysis 
of “the purpose of counselling and psychotherapy”, in which he draws extensively from 
Habermasian theory. Previously I have mentioned Steuerman’s perspective on the 
emotional vacuum in Habermas’ work and her view that psychoanalytic thinking has 
the potential to complement his theory.2 She writes from a philosophical, rather than a 
psychotherapeutic perspective and her primary interest appears to be not so much in 
psychoanalytic theory per se but in how it might be integrated into other theoretical 
contexts. Steuerman does not engage with current debates in psychotherapeutic 
discourse beyond her largely uncritical account of Kleinian theory.  
 
                                                 
1  Loewenthal and Snell (2003), writing from a postmodernist perspective within psychotherapy, engage 
very briefly with Habermasian theory and reveal a complete misunderstanding of the latter when they link 
it with the positivist orientation of mainstream psychotherapeutic discourse in the following statement: “A 
Habermasian, late-modern way of thinking has, however, won in important respects in the world of 
psychotherapy. At the start of the twenty- first century psychotherapy would seem increasingly to have 
gone down the path of empiricism, as can be seen, for example in cognitive-behavioural thinking, which 
tacitly privileges that which is measurable and outcome- based.” (p.181).                    
2  Chapter 4  p. 94 
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Another noteworthy and unusual contribution to this debate is that of Bennett (2005), 
who emphasizes that the context in which he writes is neither academic nor clinical. 
Whilst he is not a psychotherapist, his experience as manager and trustee with a large 
counselling service in the voluntary sector both at local and national level has brought 
him into close contact with the challenges facing therapeutic services in the UK and the 
extent to which organisational decisions are determined by pragmatic criteria in the 
absence of an overarching sense of the purpose of counselling and psychotherapy. He 
turns to Habermas’ work in search of a philosophical underpinning for these activities 
and offers a commendably accessible account of communicative ethics and how it might 
connect in very broad terms with psychotherapeutic concerns. Whilst there is common 
ground between his analysis and the focus of this study, Bennett’s work is hampered by 
his position outside clinical practice and his application of theory to clinical contexts 
can appear overly simplistic. His analysis also lacks significant critical engagement with 
Habermas’ theory and mostly isolates the latter from wider debates and developments in 
philosophy and social theory to which it belongs. This contributes to the impression of a 
somewhat reified theory being applied to psychotherapeutic contexts as distinct from a 
critical dialogue being fostered. His views are firmly rooted in the voluntary sector and 
are unlikely to be shared by many in the field, notably his view of counselling as a 
“social movement” that is being unhelpfully drawn into the framework of a service 
industry and profession. He understates the extent to which counselling and 
psychotherapy have always shown conformist tendencies, and the complexity and 
challenge in drawing out their “social movement” potential. The best that may be said 
of his view that psychotherapy could potentially contribute to what he terms “a new 
social order” is that it requires much more rigorous analysis than is offered, to protect it 
from the criticism of appearing overly idealistic. Whilst it is unlikely to speak to the 
clinical preoccupations of the majority of psychotherapists, Bennett’s analysis of the 
relevance of Habermasian thinking for psychotherapy nonetheless shares some common 
ground with this study and will be referred to again. 
                                                             
A third contribution to this debate which merits attention is that of Stephen Kubacki 
(1994), an American psychologist. His paper, Applying Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action to values in psychotherapy, offers a microscopic analysis of how 
strands of Habermas’ theory of communicative action and ethics connect with 
psychotherapeutic interventions. His particular focus is the relevance of the validity 
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claims of appropriateness and truthfulness in the therapeutic context. Given that it is 
written from a position of familiarity with clinical issues this contribution has some 
advantage over those mentioned above and as such it will also inform later discussion to 
a limited extent. Unfortunately Kubacki’s contribution is severely restricted not only by 
the need to condense complex ideas into one paper, but by an uncritical and reified 
application of Habermasian theory, abstracted from its own theoretical context, in which 
much of the richness of this thinking is lost or reduced. As with the other contributions 
there is little if any sense of a critical dialogue between the discourses of critical theory 
and psychotherapy and therefore the application of Habermasian thinking to practice 
situations can appear formulaic.  
 
The contribution which perhaps has most in common with this study comes from an 
allied discipline, social work. Here a number of theorists have been drawn to Habermas’ 
work as a framework both for exploring the normative basis of social work and for 
challenging the current high levels of regulation and proceduralization of the social 
work task (Blaug, 1995; Lorenz, 2004; Hayes and Houston, 2007; Houston, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b). Prominent amongst these contributors is Houston, who in a number of 
insightful articles makes links between Habermasian thinking, Honneth’s recognition 
theory and social work practice. Whilst there is much of value in this contribution, a 
major limitation from the perspective of this study arises from the different practice 
based priorities of social work and psychotherapy. Foremost amongst these is the 
explicit statutory powers held by social work to influence and determine the course of a 
client’s life, for example in situations where a child is removed from his/her parents and 
placed for adoption. Houston’s main focus is on the communicative contexts in which 
decisions or recommendations of this order are made and on the potential for Habermas’ 
regulative ideal of discourse to serve as a “moral yardstick” in securing a relatively 
egalitarian communicative framework for discussion and decision making. He is also 
very clear on the need for Habermasian theory to be supplemented by Honneths’s 
recognition theory in these practice contexts. One of the key differences between 
Houston’s arena of application and psychotherapy is that in the latter, moral/ethical and 
political themes are normally more subtle and buried in contrast to social work’s 
explicit engagement with the dual functions of social care and social control. Given 
what we might describe as its greater proximity to the moral/political coalface, arising 
from its statutory function notably in child protection and adult mental health practice, it 
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is perhaps not surprising that social work has traditionally been more concerned than 
psychotherapy with theorizing and critiquing its value base. Houston (2010a) challenges 
the individualistic bias of this value base and in particular its contemporary 
manifestation in social work in the neo-liberal ideology of “personalization”.3 He 
contrasts this with the Habermasian idea of ethics as grounded in processes of 
communication and in that sense there are significant parallels between his work and 
this study.4 
  
What distinguishes this study from those outlined above is that it is written from a UK 
based clinical psychotherapy perspective. It explores the theme of ethics in 
psychotherapy in detail and offers a critique of postmodernist, post-structuralist and 
hermeneutical influences relating to ethical debate, or more specifically their lack of 
impact on this debate. The overall discussion is framed in terms of a dialogue between 
critical theory and psychotherapy and connects extensively with debates in both 
discourses. It seeks to avoid the formulaic application of a reified critical theory to 
psychotherapeutic practice and focuses instead on developing critical discussion 
between the two perspectives. Whilst acknowledging and drawing on the insights of the 
above contributions to a limited extent, it therefore aspires to a deeper and more 
comprehensive engagement with the subject. To this end the discussion now moves to 
consider the concept of reflexivity which serves as an important mediating or bridging 
concept between social theory and psychotherapy. In what follows I explore the 
meaning of reflexivity in both contexts and argue that each can enrich the other. In 
concluding this discussion I underline the importance of Honneth’s recognition theory 
as a supplement to Habermas’ discourse ethics and argue that the moral grammar of the 
psychotherapeutic encounter can be framed in terms of the struggle for mutual 
understanding and agreement and the struggle for recognition and that both can be 
anchored in Habermasian thinking around a communicative ethics.                 
 
 
                                                 
3  Houston’s (2010a) critique of “personalization” and the related theme of “individualization” builds on 
an earlier contribution by Ferguson (2007) to this debate within the social work literature.     
4  Houston (2009) acknowledges this connection also with reference to a previously published article by 
the author of this study (Donovan, 2003a) which addresses the marginalization of ethics in contemporary 
postmodernist influenced family therapy.   
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Reflexivity in psychotherapy  
 
Whilst this concept is much in vogue in postmodernist influenced psychotherapeutic 
discourse, its meaning can be surprisingly hard to pin down and the use of slightly 
different terminology in the different therapeutic approaches further complicates the 
issue. It is a theme that runs through the various attempts to apply Habermasian thinking 
in psychotherapeutic contexts discussed above, but only in Bennett’s work is it 
discussed explicitly. For Bennett (2005), reflexivity is equated with “self-awareness” 
and he quotes with approval Williams’ (1993) observation that “there is no way back 
from reflectiveness” (p. 163, quoted by Bennett, 2005, p. 70). In his view this captures 
something of the essential nature of reflexivity as that which we cannot step back from 
consciously once it is achieved. He then moves on immediately to discuss the decentred 
self and the idea of self identity as a reflexive project, drawing on social theoretical 
perspectives including that of Giddens (1991). Missing from his discussion is an 
account of the rich engagement with this subject in psychotherapeutic discourse which, 
as we have seen in Chapter 3, is shared between systemic and psychoanalytic 
orientations and which will now be revisited to locate it within the present dialogue with 
Habermasian theory.5 An understanding of what reflexivity means in psychotherapy is 
an important first step in considering how social theory might enhance this 
understanding. Conversely it is the first step in demonstrating that psychotherapeutic 
engagement with reflexivity can also contribute to social theoretical formulations.  
 
Whilst the dictionary definition of reflexivity simply refers to the idea of something 
directed back upon itself or its own operations,6 in psychotherapy the common 
denominator in its various formulations appears to be the idea of flexible thinking and 
talking processes that can easily and creatively move between different levels of 
meaning and communication. This is in contrast to the rigid, concrete thinking regularly 
encountered in those seeking psychotherapeutic help and which can be the source of so 
much psychological distress both for them and their relational network. Here the 
connection with Habermas’ idea of the speaker’s competence to move between different 
levels of communication and specifically between communicative action and discourse 
is clear. Adopting Habermasian terminology one might describe these peoples’ capacity 
                                                 
5  Chapter 3  pp.80-1.  
6  Sykes (1982) Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English.  
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to move from their immersion in communicative action to a discursive consideration of 
problematic validity claims as severely restricted. In essence it is this connection that 
lies at the heart of my endeavour to link Habermas’ thinking with psychotherapy. I am 
arguing that the central strand of contemporary psychotherapeutic intervention that is 
concerned with promoting reflexivity in thinking and talking processes can also be 
framed as an endeavour that addresses restricted communicative capability to move 
between the levels of communication identified in Habermas’ ethical theory. 
Psychotherapy is not commonly conceptualized in the latter terms however and 
therefore the moral/ethical dimension of communicative processes, theorized in the 
framework of communicative ethics, is more likely to be obscured by considerations of 
methodology and technique. 
  
In systemic psychotherapy, reflexivity is generally understood as a process in which one 
is both performing and, at the same time, audience to one’s own performance. Oliver 
(2005) observes that, “when we practise reflexivity we make choices about how we will 
think and act. We become responsible and accountable for our choices, our actions, and 
our contributions to a relational system” (p. 3). The systemic family therapist, Karl 
Tomm (1887a, 1987b) thinks of it in terms of the family’s ability to make connections 
between different levels of meaning and as a therapist he works towards developing this 
capacity using a style of interviewing known as reflexive questioning, previously 
discussed.7 As we have seen, another key technique in family therapy that is seen to 
enhance reflexivity is the use of reflecting teams and reflecting processes. For Hoffman 
(1993) these are all examples of therapeutic formats that fold back upon themselves. In 
the reflecting team approach for example, the observing team of therapists is no longer a 
protected species, surveying the family anonymously from behind a one way screen. 
Now the family has the chance to reflect back on the team’s reflections in a recursive 
spiral.  
 
Crucially this thinking about reflexivity in systemic therapy and its impact on 
therapeutic technique is firmly embedded in the influential postmodernist framework 
that emphasizes equality between therapist and client/ family. Continuing her account of 
reflexivity, Hoffman writes: 
                                                 
7  Chapter 3  p. 73. 
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The developments around the reflecting team, the use of reflecting conversations 
and reflexive questioning, the prevalence of “co” prefixes to describe a 
therapeutic conversation (“co-author”, “co-evolve”) indicate a preference for a 
mutually influenced process between consultant and inquirer as opposed to one 
that is hierarchical and unidirectional. (1993, p. 127)  
As argued previously this idealization of the therapeutic relationship as a co-constructed 
entity and the implication that structural inequalities between therapist and client might 
be cast aside by the addition of “co” prefixes, by adopting an “uncertain” style of 
conversation and so on, is a highly problematic aspect of postmodernist influenced 
psychotherapy. Creative thinking around the concept of reflexivity needs disentangling 
from this unhelpful fusion with the postmodernist stance, or more accurately a 
psychotherapeutic postmodernist stance narrowly delineated in opposition to earlier 
modernist “hierarchical” approaches.     
 
We have seen that systemic psychotherapy evolved historically in contexts of making 
sense of the difficulties of those not readily amenable to a classical analytical insight 
oriented approach. Whilst seeking relief from their suffering they did not necessarily 
view the interpretation of intrapsychic conflict as part of this process. Over the years, a 
rich repertoire of alternative techniques to that of analytic interpretation of unconscious 
processes emerged, which are focussed on helping people develop a capacity to stand 
back and reflect on their difficulties as part of the change process. Within systemic 
discourse this capacity, as well as the techniques designed to enhance it such as the 
reflecting team, are now conceptualized under the heading of reflexivity and as 
discussed above are firmly anchored in postmodernist thinking. Unfortunately this 
masks recognition of important continuity with earlier “modernist” systemic theory and 
technique which sought to address similar difficulties using interventions that can be 
regarded as precursors of current “postmodernist” approaches. The oppositional framing 
of modernist and postmodernist thinking in systemic discourse masks recognition of this 
continuity and further underlines the need to disentangle the concept of reflexivity from 
this oppositional frame so that its creative potential can be more fully explored and 
developed. One way of reinforcing this point is by underlining common ground between 
the emphasis on reflexivity in systemic psychotherapy and similar thinking within the 
psychoanalytic model of mentalization or reflective functioning (eg. Fonagy and Target, 
1996, 1998, 2003) that has developed outside the postmodernist fold within 
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psychoanalysis, and which is closely connected to traditional Winnicottian object 
relations theory. 
 
Similarity between the systemic concept of reflexivity and the psychoanalytic concept 
of reflective functioning is striking. This similarity might loosely be described as a 
shared interest in engaging clients in the reflexive process of thinking and talking about 
their thinking and talking and in helping those for whom this reflexive capacity is 
deeply compromised. Echoing the historical development of systemic psychotherapy, 
the psychoanalytic model of mentalization has emerged in recent times in recognition of 
the therapeutic needs of people not readily amenable to a classical interpretative analytic 
approach; people variously described as unpsychologically minded, as concrete thinkers 
or as not ready for analytic interpretations. In a previous era they were often deemed 
unsuitable for psychoanalytic intervention. The concept of mentalization refers to the 
capacity to conceptualise mental processes in self and others, which is sometimes 
referred to as having a “theory of mind”: that is, the ability to interpret one’s own and 
others’ actions in terms of mental states including thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires, 
intentions and so on. The psychoanalytic model of mentalization is an attempt to 
formulate and understand difficulty in this area, drawing on a developmental 
psychological perspective. As discussed earlier, it is suggested that in early childhood 
the infant exists in a psychic equivalence mode in which ideas or perceptions are 
experienced as exact replicas of reality. This oscillates with the pretend mode that is 
characteristic of the child’s play in which ideas are experienced as representational but 
are not thought to have a direct relationship to the outside world as such. In the optimal 
developmental situation these two modes are eventually integrated and mental states 
begin to be experienced as representations. Inner and outer realities become linked and 
the capacity to mentalize is laid down. (Fonagy and Target, 1996)   
 
In people who demonstrate very rigid and concrete thinking patterns the capacity to 
mentalize, including the capacity to play with thoughts, ideas and other mental 
phenomena is markedly absent. The link between this capacity and psychological well 
being is demonstrated in the fact that people with significant difficulties in this area 
frequently present in therapy in states of acute distress and experience severe problems 
with affect regulation. They often carry a diagnosis of narcissistic or borderline 
personality disorder. Psychotherapeutic interventions with this client group can be 
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technically very challenging given their difficulty with insight oriented interventions. 
However this rather extreme clinical manifestation should not obscure the fact that in 
everyday life, deficits in reflexivity/reflective functioning are also very common, if not 
the norm, and can impact significantly on relationships notably in terms of difficultly 
with empathizing and placing oneself in the shoes of the other. Clearly this is an area of 
psychotherapeutic theorizing that underlines the challenge in drawing on 
communicative ethics as delineated by Habermas, in real life contexts. This applies 
notably to Habermas’ principle of universalization which specifies that in contexts of 
“discourse” each participant must assume the perspective of all others, a principle that 
echoes Mead’s concept of “ideal role-taking”.8 More generally this is an area of 
psychotherapeutic thinking that intersects with wider social theoretical engagement with 
the phenomenon of narcissism which I shall discuss later. The model of mentalization 
underlines the prevalence of deficits in reflexive capacity to engage with the minds of 
others which may reinforce narcissistic tendencies as well as undermining ordinary 
competence to participate in the kinds of discursive exchanges specified in Habermasian 
theory.       
 
Central to the psychoanalytic theory of mentalization is the view that the acquisition of 
the capacity to mentalize is rooted in the intersubjective process that unfolds between an 
infant and his/her parents. Current thinking in this area is strongly influenced by 
Winnicottian object relations theory which we previously considered, including 
Honneth’s engagement with this theory.9 Here it is important to emphasize that the 
theory of mentalization also represents an important development beyond Winnicott. 
This has implications for Honneth’s theory since we can no longer think of “basic self 
confidence” as offering an adequate account of what emerges from primary relations of 
mutual recognition. On the contrary what becomes clear from current thinking is that 
what we might describe as our very capacity for reflexivity is laid down in primary 
relationships. It is hypothesized that in the early child/carer relationship the child 
internalises the experience of being thought about by the emotionally containing parent 
with whom he/she interacts and in situations of good enough parenting this eventually 
leads to the consolidation of the child’s own capacity for reflective functioning or 
mentalization. Fonagy and Target (1998), who have developed the psychoanalytic 
                                                 
8  See Joas (1985); Habermas (1990a, p. 65); Mead, ([1934]1974).   
9  Chapter 6  pp. 150-2 
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model of mentalization, point to evidence suggesting that trauma and maltreatment 
impair the child’s mentalizing capacity and an important focus for therapeutic 
intervention with such patients is the offer of space where thinking about ideas and 
feelings can be experienced as safe, perhaps for the first time.10  
 
Within the psychoanalytic model of mentalization, the focus is on helping the patient to 
gradually learn that mental experience involves representations that can be thought 
about, talked about, played with, loosened up and changed. It entails a way of working 
that has, therefore, much in common with the systemic practitioner’s focus on 
increasing reflexivity in the family’s thinking and talking processes; notably, through 
the use of reflexive and circular questioning and reflecting teams/reflecting processes 
which are designed to loosen up fixed patterns of thinking, communication, perception 
and belief. In both orientations the emphasis is on increasing space for people to adopt 
an observer perspective in relation to themselves, their families and their world 
generally. Borrowing from the language of philosophy and social theory one might 
describe these interventions as having the ultimate goal of producing a “heightened 
sense of reflexivity” (Kögler, 1999, p. 266). The psychoanalytic perspective on 
mentalization also has much in common with earlier object relations thinking in that 
both reflect a shift towards moral concerns: both try to conceptualize the developmental 
basis of our human capacity to recognize mental states in others and ourselves and to 
engage for example with states of hurt or suffering in the other; both perspectives also 
underline the privileging of intersubjectivity and communication in current therapeutic 
practice and the focus on helping those for whom communication is profoundly limited 
and distorted. The pivotal status of the model of mentalization rests on the fact that it 
offers a developmental psychological perspective on why some people have seriously 
impaired mentalizing or reflective functioning capacity which, in systemic discourse, 
would be described in terms of their capacity for reflexivity.  
 
Central to both systemic and psychoanalytic perspectives is the view that reflexivity or 
reflective function is deeply rooted in intersubjective contexts and should not be 
conflated with insight, introspection or self reflection although it may be seen as 
underpinning these processes. In his systemic interventions, Tomm emphasizes that 
                                                 
10  Fonagy and Target (1998) cite evidence from Beeghly and Cicchetti (1994), Cicchetti and Beeghly 
(1987), Schneider-Rosen and Cicchetti (1984, 1991).   
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“change occurs as a result of alterations in the organisation and structure of the family’s 
pre-existing system of meanings….the basic mechanism of change is not insight but 
reflexivity” (1987b, p. 172). Fonagy and Target (1998) similarly emphasise that the 
capacity to mentalize should not be conflated with introspection or self-reflection. It is 
rooted in procedural type knowledge and is understood as an automatic process invoked 
in interpreting human action, unlike introspection. Holmes (2005) refers to 
mentalization as a “meta- cognitive” phenomenon” (p. 180) and describes the 
mentalization approach as “designed to help establish reflective capacity, before the 
traditional aim of insight-promotion can be pursued” (p. 195). Difficulties in the area of 
reflective functioning point to a structural deficit in the thinking apparatus and unless 
addressed, normal psychoanalytic interpretation of unconscious content is unlikely to be 
helpful. The overarching psychotherapeutic focus is therefore defined in terms of the 
recovery of mentalizing capacity. This can subsequently facilitate the move to a more 
straightforwardly interpretative approach focussed on unconscious material as the 
patient’s capacity for this level of self reflective endeavour increases.  
 
We may conclude that within psychotherapeutic discourse, reflexivity/reflective 
functioning on the one hand and self reflection on the other hand are not synonymous. 
Here it also needs acknowledging that whilst this distinction is made, it is generally very 
poorly delineated and there is widespread imprecise and interchangeable use of these 
terms. From the above discussion however the implication is that the capacity for 
reflexivity/reflective functioning may be integral to self reflection but it is also “meta” 
to the latter process. This is important because it challenges the conflation of reflexivity 
with “self awareness” as in Bennett’s (2005) account. To conflate them is to miss the 
complexity and richness of reflexivity as it is formulated in psychotherapeutic 
discourse. Crucially it also minimizes the vigorously intersubjectivist framing of this 
concept and shrinks the possibilities for connecting this thinking with perspectives in 
social theory which I shall consider below.  
 
Throughout this study a key theme has been the problematic nature of the oppositional 
divide between modernist and postmodernist perspectives in psychotherapy. This divide 
obscures deep rooted shared difficulty in both camps, notably relating to the subject of 
ethics and results in a creatively stuck situation in which the individualizing tendencies 
of modernist ethical perspectives are largely replicated in postmodernist formulations. 
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This argument was elaborated within a critique of contemporary approaches in systemic 
psychotherapy that are loosely termed postmodernist. Subsequent analysis of post-
structualist, postmodernist and hermeneutical influences, drawing on Habermasian 
thinking, pointed to the limitations of these theoretical influences in psychotherapy 
notably relating to ethical themes. But it was also observed that the highly oppositional 
tone of Habermas’ critique masks recognition of at least some common ground or 
complementarity between these perspectives and his own critical theoretical stance. 
This applies notably to the Habermas/ Foucault debate. Had it not been for the 
premature death of Foucault, it now seems highly unlikely that this debate would have 
remained on the confrontational footing on which it began and as noted, a case is now 
made by some commentators for their encounter as representing less oppositional, more 
complementary positions.11  
 
Subsequent discussion of Bauman and Honneth also revealed the evolving relationship 
between postmodernist and critical theory, with the former showing a pronounced 
“ethical turn” whilst the latter addresses, what Honneth terms the “ethical challenge of 
postmodernism” encapsulated in the principle of care or concern for the Other. The 
wider context of this evolving dialogue is well captured by Delanty (2000):  
  
 If modernity was about the centrality of the Self, postmodernity reflects a 
 turning to the Other. From a concern with equality – a struggle for the 
 recognition of the sameness of the Self and the Other – postmodernity is about 
 the struggle for the recognition of difference. (p. 150) 
Viewed from this perspective, the futility of persisting in a view of the modernity/ 
postmodernity divide as representing hostile, oppositional camps is clear, and the 
challenge becomes one of identifying possibilities for the creative combination of both. 
This is the challenge that presents itself to psychotherapy and nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the debate about ethics. We have seen that in the context of an 
oppositional modernist/ postmodernist divide this debate has been allowed to atrophy 
and become mired in the cul de sac of professional ethics. Whilst it is argued in this 
study that Habermasian thinking on a communicative ethics has much to offer, this 
argument is put forward not in opposition to the postmodernist perspective but in a 
spirit of searching for an ethical standpoint that might complement, or transcend the 
                                                 
11 Chapter 5 p. 127. 
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limitations of current postmodernist thinking in psychotherapy whilst giving due 
acknowledgment to creative methodological continuity across the 
modernism/postmodernism divide. We have seen that the concept of reflexivity is 
central to current psychotherapeutic concerns and challenges and in what follows it is 
argued that this concept also holds the key to a constructive dialogue between 
psychotherapy and Habermas’ theory of communicative ethics. I begin this discussion 
with a short outline of reflexivity as it formulated in social theory.  
 
 
Reflexivity in social theory  
 
Within psychotherapy, perspectives on reflexivity are underpinned by a distinction 
between flexible forms of thinking or communicating and more concrete, rigid 
manifestations. Within social theory, reflexivity encompasses somewhat similar themes 
including at a very simple level, the idea that we think increasingly about the conditions 
in which we now live as constructed by ourselves rather than as representative of a 
natural order. Social theorists have become especially focussed on reflexivity as the 
appeal of the paradigm of reflection associated with the decontextualized subject of 
modernist philosophy has waned. Thinking about reflexivity underlines the situated 
character of reflection and it is seen as a defining feature of the contemporary world. In 
the work of Melucci (1989, 1996a, 1996b) it includes the idea of complex human 
societies experiencing themselves as capable of learning and in that sense also 
experiencing themselves as constructed entities. Delanty (1999) observes that this 
perspective incorporates an emancipatory moment since its constructivist slant reveals 
potential for creative change. In Melucci’s work reflexivity is closely tied to thinking 
about “new” social movements and their potential to represent a politics of reflexivity 
through the construction of collective identities and the articulation of struggles for 
recognition. The theme of the reflexive potential inherent in communicative action is 
also integral to Habermasian theory and underpins his idea of discourse ethics in which 
we stand back from routine communication and enter into a discursive redemption of 
validity claims. Whilst Habermas has been criticized for the abstract, decontextualized 
quality of his ethical theory it does allow for supplementation by analyses that are more 
closely tied to historical and practical concerns. In this study what is most helpful about 
recent thinking on reflexivity both in social theory and in psychotherapy is the bridge 
that it provides between Habermas’ abstract model of discourse ethics and the everyday 
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life contexts in which psychotherapy is immersed. To this end my focus is on analyses 
within social theory that offer a broadly based perspective on reflexivity and reflexive 
forms of communication and that offer a mediating framework for dialogue between 
discourse ethics and psychotherapeutic concerns. The work of Anthony Giddens (1991, 
1992) and specifically his focus on psychotherapy and allied themes within the context 
of reflexive modernization, renders his contribution of particular interest. 
 
In the introduction to their seminal text, Reflexive Modernization (1994), Beck, Giddens 
and Lash frame their thinking as an attempt to break the stranglehold of the protracted 
modernity/postmodernity debate which they judge as wearisome and as having 
produced little by way of conceptual innovation. However they also acknowledge 
significant differences even amongst themselves in how reflexivity is understood and as 
in psychotherapy, we find that within social theory generally, a precise meaning is hard 
to pin down. Lash’s introductory remarks in his contribution to Reflexive 
Modernization (1994), serve as a useful point of entry to the subject. Building on the 
contributions from Beck and Giddens, he enquires what happens when modernity 
begins to reflect on itself. “What happens when modernization, understanding its own 
excesses and vicious spiral of destructive subjugation (of inner, outer and social nature) 
begins to take itself as object of reflection?” (p. 112). The response he uncovers is that 
the “self-reflexivity of modernity” can be seen as a development that is immanent to the 
modernization process itself: 
 
In the late twentieth century, if modernization as economic growth is to be 
possible, the work- force must acquire substantial information-processing 
abilities and thus must be highly educated. The framework of problem-solving, 
questioning and the like involved in this education process is also a condition of 
acquisition of the sort of knowledge that can be turned as rational critique upon 
the “system” itself. If modernization presupposes increased individualization, 
then these individuals- less controlled by tradition and convention- will be 
increasingly free also to be in heterodox opposition to the dystopic consequences 
of modernization. (p. 113)   
Continuing his elucidation of reflexivity whilst drawing on the work of his co-authors, 
Lash distinguishes structural reflexivity from self-reflexivity. In very simple terms, 
structural reflexivity refers to the idea of agency, freed from the constraints of social 
structure, reflecting on its social conditions of existence whilst in self- reflexivity, 
agency reflects on itself. Giddens’ analyses in Modernity and Self Identity (1991) and 
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The Transformation of Intimacy (1992) are notable contributions to the subject of self 
reflexivity, focussing as they do on the contemporary shift to autonomous monitoring of 
personal and relationship narratives. Within this twofold categorization of structural 
reflexivity and self-reflexivity another distinction is introduced which concerns the role 
of “expert-systems” and Lash observes that here his co-authors, diverge. Whereas for 
Beck, reflexivity in modernity involves greater potential freedom from expert systems 
both at the levels of structural and self-reflexivity, for Giddens reflexivity in modernity 
comes via a double hermeneutic in which one medium of interpretation is the social 
agent whilst the second is expert-systems. In Giddens’ framework self-reflexivity is 
seen as unfolding via direct or indirect engagement with expert systems that, 
significantly in the context of this study, include psychotherapy.  
 
In my earlier discussion of reflexivity as it is taken up in psychotherapeutic discourse, 
the distinction between this concept and self reflection was underlined and in the theory 
of reflexive modernization the distinction between reflexivity and conscious reflection 
is also addressed. This applies notably in the work of Beck. Refuting Lash’s charge that 
his theory is based on a cognitively foreshortened concept of reflection, Beck 
emphasizes that reflexive modernization “does not imply (as the adjective “reflexive” 
might suggest) reflection, but (first) self-confrontation”. In the transition from the 
industrial to the risk period of modernity, reflexive modernization encapsulates the idea 
of self-confrontation with the effects of risk society. We are, in his words, “living in the 
age of side effects”.    
 
Let us call the autonomous, undesired, and unseen transition from industrial to 
risk society reflexivity (to differentiate it from and contrast it with reflection). 
Then ‘reflexive modernization’ means self confrontation with the effects of risk 
society that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial 
society- as measured by the latter’s institutionalized standards. The fact that this 
constellation may later, in a second stage, in turn become the object of (public, 
political and scientific) reflection must not obscure the unreflected, quasi- 
autonomous mechanism of the transition. (p. 6, his emphasis) 
For Beck, there is a sharp distinction between conscious reflection and the unintended 
reflexivity of modernity and whilst the latter can lead to reflection on the self- 
endangerment of industrial society it need not do so. He also underlines difference 
between his theory’s “neutral” stance and what he describes as more optimistic 
cognitive theories of reflexive modernization: “The cognitive theory of reflexive 
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modernization is optimistic at its core - more reflection, more experts, more science, 
more public sphere, more self awareness and self- criticism will open up new and better 
possibilities for action in a world that has got out of joint” (p. 177). 
 
Whilst Beck’s theory of reflexive modernization is formulated at a very different level 
of conceptual analysis from that of psychotherapeutic theory, some parallels can 
tentatively be drawn. What appears most significant is Beck’s emphasis on the uncertain 
path between reflexivity and conscious reflection that is obscured in any simplistic 
conflation of these categories. This applies in individual as well as in social contexts 
and psychotherapeutic approaches that have traditionally emphasized insight and self 
reflection as the exclusive mechanism of change in psychotherapy can be charged with 
such conflation. In their preoccupation with promoting intrapsychic insight they have 
neglected to engage with difficulties in the underlying psychic structure that facilitates 
self reflection and have thus excluded from the “talking cure” large numbers of 
potential clients, often those most in need of help. Addressing the difficulties of these 
“new” client groups under the more broadly based category of reflexivity/reflective 
functioning entails the quiet democratization of the therapeutic process to include many 
who were previously excluded. Arguably it also enhances the openness of the 
therapeutic encounter by teasing out the distinction between a broadly based focus on 
helping people to learn how they might think flexibly and creatively under the heading 
of reflexivity and a specific interpretative focus on what they might be helped think 
about under the heading of insight or self reflection. Whilst both have their place, the 
latter was often privileged in psychoanalytic approaches in particular in the absence of a 
wider therapeutic lens, a problem which the model of mentalization/reflective 
functioning now arguably begins to address.          
 
In the social theory of Giddens, connections are also made between the dynamic of 
reflexivity and processes of democratization in the arena of personal life. Central to 
Giddens’ theory is the idea of the double hermeneutic in which specialist knowledge 
contributes to the reflexivity of modernity by routinely reshaping those aspects of social 
life on which its analyses are based:  
 
Each of us not only ‘has’, but lives a biography reflexively organized in terms of 
flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life. 
Modernity is a post-traditional order, in which the question, ‘How shall I live?’ 
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has to be answered in day- to- day decisions about how to behave, what to wear 
and what to eat- and many other things- as well as interpreted within the 
temporal unfolding of self-identity. (1991, p. 14, his emphasis) 
Abstract systems become centrally involved in the formation and continuity of the self 
and for Giddens one of the most distinctive connections between these systems and the 
self can be found in the expansion of various forms of psychotherapy and counselling. 
Interestingly he does not draw the pessimistic conclusion from this development, 
evident in Bauman’s analysis. Whilst accepting that it is possible to interpret the 
expansion of therapy services in purely negative terms as a reflection of the alienating 
and depersonalizing effects of contemporary life coupled with the lack of supports 
available in more traditional contexts, this is not his focus. On the contrary his view is 
that,    
  
 therapy is not simply a means of coping with novel anxieties but an expression 
 of the reflexivity of the self- a phenomenon which, on the level of the 
 individual, like the broader institutions of modernity, balances opportunity 
 and potential catastrophe in equal measure. (1991, p. 34)                                                                                          
In Giddens’ work we are offered a very different social theoretical perspective on 
psychotherapy than is offered in a range of contributions mentioned earlier where 
attention is exclusively focussed on psychological reductionism and related themes.12 
Giddens guides our attention in an altogether more optimistic direction, implicating 
psychotherapy in developments that hold considerable potential to enhance the 
democratization of personal life.  
               
 
Common ground on reflexivity between Giddens and Habermas 
 
The starting point for this discussion is Outhwaite’s (1998) observation that what is 
offered by Habermas is:  
  
 a philosophy of reflection which develops outside the limits of what has 
 traditionally been understood by the philosophy of reflection, consciousness, 
 and the subject. It is a philosophy or a sociology for a world of the kind 
 described, for example, by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens with the notion 
 that modernity has become reflexive. This is a world in which individuals are 
 increasingly thrown onto their own resources to define their own social 
                                                 
12 See above pp.165-70.  
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 relations - what Habermas calls “risky self-steering by means of a highly 
 abstract ego- identity”. (p. 167) 
 
Harrington (2001) similarly links Habermas’ with Beck and Giddens, noting that 
Habermas’ emphasis on communicative rationality can be linked productively with their 
focus on the reflexive opening up of previously exclusive expert systems to democratic 
scrutiny. Delanty (1999) also comments on the correlation between Beck’s and 
Habermas’ respective theories of a “discourse society”, and Giddens’s idea of a 
“sociological society”. Whilst the former refers to an increase in discursive questioning 
of established forms of legitimation and authority by public citizens, the latter similarly 
explores the democratizing implications of a society that is becoming ever more 
informed and by implication more reflexive. In Giddens’ framework knowledge makes 
reflexivity possible and the reflexive appropriation of knowledge is regarded as a 
potentially transformative force. 
  
What is different about knowledge is that it is less objectivating and not so 
easily reduced to ideological manipulation. Indeed, knowledge transcends 
structure and agency: it is neither a property of individuals nor of structures.  
The idea of a ‘sociological society’ thus suggests a kind of society in which 
individuals become increasingly more self-reliant as a result of having recourse 
to such resources as knowledge. Basically, then, everybody can become a 
‘sociologist’: reflexive modernization facilitates democratic structuration.” 
(Delanty, 1999, p. 163)     
In his engagement with psychotherapy as an expert system, Giddens (1991, 1992) is 
similarly interested in the reflexivity of this process, in particular how 
psychotherapeutic thinking, as articulated in self help manuals for example, becomes 
integrated into those aspects of social life on which it comments, thus reconstituting 
these domains. The constitution of the self is a reflexive project, entailing a more or less 
continuous interrogation of past, present and future and this project is now conducted 
amidst a wide range of reflexive resources that include psychotherapy and 
therapeutically inspired literature. As indicated, Giddens disagrees with those who only 
draw negative conclusions from this development and here he singles out the work of 
Christopher Lasch (1978, 1984) for critique.  
   
On Lasch’s (1978) account, modern social life is characterized by a retreat into purely 
personal concerns in the face of a social environment that seems impermeable to 
change. In this climate we witness the rise of the narcissistic personality type, who 
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typically shows little awareness or concern for the needs of others whilst endlessly 
striving for an elusive sense of self worth or well being. At the level of personal 
relations, the narcissist‘s search for intimacy becomes as pressing as it is unobtainable 
given his/her relentless self absorption. The contemporary growth of therapeutic 
services only compounds the problem since the therapeutic encounter encourages the 
individual to become the focus of reflection and concern. Dependence on “experts” who 
offer these services becomes a way of life. In this critique such “experts” are viewed as 
intrinsic to a social and cultural climate that promotes narcissistic and individualistic 
tendencies. This is yet another variation on that criticism which, as we have seen, has 
long bedevilled psychotherapy and whilst it generally targets the discipline as a whole, 
arguably its appropriate target is the individualistic bias of psychotherapy’s normative 
orientation. This normative framework, anchored in Kantian ethics, has traditionally 
privileged such abstract ideals as individual autonomy and self determination and, as 
discussed in this study, is deeply at odds with the vigorously relational thrust of 
contemporary psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Whilst Giddens does not deny that 
therapy can be seen to promote or reinforce narcissistic tendencies and withdrawal and 
can also be construed as a form of diversion for those who are privileged, he is 
unequivocal in his view that it is much more than this: 
   
 Therapy is not just an adjustment device. As an expression of generalized 
 reflexivity it exhibits in full the dislocations and uncertainties to which 
 modernity gives rise. At the same time it, participates in that mixture of 
 opportunity and risk characteristic of the late modern order. It can promise 
 dependence and passivity; yet it can also permit engagement and 
 reappropriation. (1991, p. 180) 
For Giddens, what Lasch and similar commentaries offer is a wholly inadequate 
representation of human agency as a passive entity in the face of external forces. 
Against this, his argument is that human agents rarely accept external conditions 
passively but continuously reflect upon them and reconstitute them taking account of 
their particular circumstances. He also argues that on a collective as well as individual 
level there are significant areas of appropriation of new possibilities that flow from the 
increased reflexivity of social life and that psychotherapy as a contemporary reflexive 
resource is positively implicated in these democratizing developments. He uses the 
example of key changes in personal and family life centred on what he calls “the pure 
relationship” to demonstrate this argument. 
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For Giddens (1991, 1992), the “pure relationship” is prototypical of developments in 
personal life that signal the “transformation of intimacy” in the sense of a growing 
democratization of this sphere. In simple terms it refers to a context of relating in which 
“external criteria have been dissolved: the relationship exists solely for whatever 
rewards that relationship as such can deliver” (1991, p. 6). Trust is integral to the pure 
relationship and can only be mobilized by elements within the relationship that are 
anchored in mutual disclosure as distinct from criteria outside the relationship such as 
kinship or social duty. Integrity is something that each partner presumes of the other and 
is integral to the ethical framework of the pure relationship. Underpinning this mode of 
relating is an ongoing process of reflexive monitoring by the partners which intersects 
with wider contexts of reflexivity. Specialist texts and manuals, magazines, television 
programmes and so on convey information and debate about close relationships and in 
this process reflexively reconstruct what they seek to describe and analyse. The 
expansion of therapy services is closely linked to the emergence of the pure relationship 
since this mode of relating puts considerable pressure on the integrity of the self and on 
the requirement not only to understand oneself but to present oneself authentically 
within the communicative framework of the relationship.   
 
The pure relationship is a mode of relating, which can be terminated at will if it fails to 
offer sufficient “psychic returns” for the individuals involved. On this basis, as will be 
recalled, Bauman (1993) draws the sweeping conclusion that it represents the “intimacy 
of persons who suspend their identity of moral subjects for the duration. Pure 
relationship is a de-ethicized intimacy” (p. 106). This is profoundly different from 
Giddens’ own conclusion regarding the ethics of the pure relationship since he regards 
the transformation of intimacy personified in this mode of relating as closely entwined 
with processes of democratization in the personal sphere. He elaborates on the meaning 
of democracy in personal life at some length (1992, pp. 184-203) and at the risk of 
oversimplifying this account, essentially it upholds the ideal of “relating to others in an 
egalitarian way” at its centre. For Giddens, “democracy means discussion, the chance 
for the ‘force of the better argument’ to count as against other means of determining 
decisions” (p. 186) and in the context of the pure relationship he speaks of the 
imperative of free and open communication as the sine qua non of this relationship. It is 
not difficult to understand why commentators thus make connections between 
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Habermasian ethical theory and Giddens’ work or why Outhwaite (1998) might 
conclude that Habermas offers a philosophy for a world of the type described by 
Giddens – and Beck -  as having become reflexive. In his brief consideration of the link 
between psychotherapy and the pure relationship, Giddens himself stops short of 
making an explicit connection with Habermasian communicative ethics but elsewhere 
he speaks of the “energising vision of emancipation” (1991, p. 213) that is offered by 
the Habermasian concept of the ideal speech situation. The pure relationship represents 
a contemporary form of relating in which the communicative processes between those 
involved take precedence over external or abstract criteria such as duty or obligation. 
Far from being a “de-ethicized intimacy” it is intimacy in search of an ethical standpoint 
anchored within a communicative ethical framework. What Giddens’ work underlines is 
the need for an ethical understanding that is firmly anchored in communicative 
processes given the centrality of communication to the contemporary transformations of 
personal life which his analyses so vividly capture. It is difficult not to conclude that 
Habermas’ communicative ethics is well placed to offer this ethical framework        
 
Whilst Giddens distances himself from the negative perspective on psychotherapy 
represented in Lasch’s critique, he is acutely aware that the therapeutic endeavour 
unfolds against a background of significant moral impoverishment that characterizes the 
contemporary world of “late modernity”. He notes the burden and pressure which 
results in the sphere of pure relationships as an arena that potentially offers “a morally 
rewarding milieu for individual life development”. But again he resists the conclusion 
that the latter milieu can only be understood in terms of a defensive retreat into personal 
life and a shrinking of self-identity. Notwithstanding the struggle to survive in a 
disturbing external world which Lasch depicts, Giddens argues that on the basis of the 
research he has considered, there is much evidence of ongoing persistent and creative 
engagement with the outer social world. He uses the example of the reflexive 
reorganisation of family life and relationships in the aftermath of divorce, the creative 
restructuring of gender and kinship relationships and the phenomenon of reconstituted 
families to illustrate this point. He sees this as an example of institutional reconstitution 
on a massive scale orchestrated by those affected by marriage breakdown. However 
despite these outward looking, creative, relationally oriented developments in 
contemporary personal life, he does accept that personal meaninglessness and moral 
impoverishment is a fundamental issue in late modernity:  
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‘Existential isolation’ is not so much a separation of individuals from others as a 
separation from the moral resources necessary to live a full and satisfying 
existence. The reflexive project of the self generates programmes of 
actualization and mastery. But as long as these possibilities are understood 
largely as a matter of the extension of the control systems of modernity to the 
self, they lack moral meaning. ‘Authenticity’ becomes both a pre-eminent value 
and framework for self-actualisation, but represents a morally stunted process. 
(1991, p. 9) 
Giddens suggests that one implication of this morally impoverished social climate in 
which psychotherapy operates is the tendency to emphasize the values of control and 
mastery and to formulate the reflexive project of self primarily in terms of self 
determination. As has been argued throughout this study the problems of psychological 
reductionism, individualisation, social conformism and so on are not intrinsic to 
psychotherapy per se but to the reductionism and individualistic bias of the normative 
framework by which it is underpinned. Giddens’ social theoretical analysis implicitly 
makes a compelling case for the relevance of an alternative communicative formulation 
of ethics for the psychotherapeutic endeavour as a response to the widespread moral 
impoverishment which his analysis describes. 
 
In drawing this discussion to a close it is important to reflect on a question that Lash 
(1994) believes neither Giddens nor Beck address with sufficient urgency, namely why 
we find reflexivity in some places and not in others and in some economic sectors but 
not in others. Clearly this question is primarily for social theory to address. However 
within psychotherapeutic discourse one contribution to this debate emerges from the 
model of mentalization, which is the idea that the capacity for reflexivity is intricately 
linked with the experience of being recognized and cared for in primary relationships 
and conversely the idea that it is impaired by experiences of “disrespect” within primary 
relationships. We have seen that the model of mentalization is closely linked to 
Winnicottian theory and in Giddens’ work he engages very briefly with this object 
relations perspective in a manner similar to Honneth, but without the comprehensive 
approach of the latter. Arguably Honneth therefore takes this particular discussion 
further than Giddens and in so doing also goes further towards supplementing the gap in 
Habermasian theory in this respect. I have noted the emotional lacuna in Habermasian 
theory which Honneth’s work addresses and it needs to be reiterated that the dialogue 
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between critical social theory and psychotherapy which this study seeks to promote is 
one in which Honneth’s theory has a central place.  
 
I am arguing that the moral “grammar” or moral “force” within the psychotherapeutic 
encounter can be formulated in terms of struggles for understanding and agreement and 
struggles for recognition of those with whom psychotherapists work and that these 
interrelated dynamics can helpfully be anchored in the framework of communicative 
ethics. In this chapter I have explored the concept of reflexivity as a bridge between 
communicative ethics and psychotherapeutic concerns. Giddens’ social theory has been 
used to anchor the discussion and to reinforce the need for a reformulation of ethics in 
psychotherapy to take account of contemporary engagement with relational themes. In 
essence my conclusion, following on from this discussion, is that psychotherapy has the 
potential to serve as a reflexive resource that draws out the potential for communicative 
rationality in those domains in which it operates and that in this process, Habermas’ 
communicative ethics can helpfully serve as a regulative ideal. This argument will be 
developed further in the final chapter where attention is more explicitly focussed on 
clinical practice based themes.    
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Chapter 9 
 
 
Towards a Communicative Ethical Framework for Psychotherapy: 
Perspectives from Clinical Practice 
 
  
Within the Frankfurt tradition of critical social theory, an engagement with 
psychoanalysis dates back to the first generation of theorists that included Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Marcuse.1 Whilst it may be said that the outcome of this early 
endeavour was somewhat disappointing, it re-emerges in the second generation work of 
Habermas, for whom the classical Freudian model offered “the only tangible example of 
a science incorporating methodological self reflection” ([1968a]1978, p. 214). For 
Habermas, as for Marcuse before him, the significance of Freudian thinking was that it 
represented the possibility of a therapeutic social science and emancipation from 
distorted communication (Delanty, 2000, p. 138). Unfortunately the dialogue with 
psychoanalysis articulated by Habermas was also largely disappointing and is 
associated with a theoretical cul de sac in his work. He subsequently lost interest in the 
subject as his theory of communicative ethics evolved. Reviewing this somewhat 
unsatisfactory connection between critical theory and psychoanalysis it could be argued 
that the difficulty which Habermas and his predecessors encountered was indicative not 
only of limitations in their own theoretical frameworks but also of underlying 
limitations in the individualistic paradigm of classical psychoanalysis with which they 
engaged. We have seen that the classical Freudian model has been powerfully 
challenged in the objects relations perspective of Klein, Winnicott and others, which is 
the dominant orientation within contemporary British psychoanalysis. In the third 
generation of critical theory, represented notably by Axel Honneth, this relational 
transformation of psychoanalysis brought about by object relations theory now inspires 
a reinvigorated engagement by critical theory with psychoanalytic thinking.  
 
Notwithstanding impasses along the way, it is arguable that critical theory’s interest in 
psychoanalysis has always held much creative promise which has ensured its survival. 
Yet for all its potential, insights gleaned from this engagement have generally failed to 
                                                 
1  See Chapter 4  pp. 90-1.  
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make their way back into mainstream clinically oriented debates either within 
psychoanalysis or within the wider discourse of psychotherapy.2 Whilst in some 
respects this contrasts with the relationship between psychotherapy and what is loosely 
termed postmodernist thinking, we have also seen that the extent of the latter’s 
influence is more problematic and peripheral than might initially appear particularly 
with respect to moral/ethical debate. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges to creative 
dialogue between social theory in general and psychotherapy is the implicit expectation 
of a formulaic connection between theory and practice that infuses psychotherapeutic 
discourse. Undoubtedly this reflects the residue of positivist thinking that adheres 
within psychotherapy and which implicitly discourages engagement with other 
discourses that are regarded as overly abstract or as holding little practical import. 
Contrary to the idea of a prescriptive application of theory to practice this study is 
interested in possibilities for a mutually influencing critical dialogue between theoretical 
and practice based perspectives. Whilst the focus of engagement with psychoanalysis by 
consecutive generations of critical theorists has been to derive insights for their 
formulation of social theory, here the focus is on the potential insights that are thrown 
up by this encounter for psychotherapeutic theory and practice and more generally on 
what can emerge from the reflexive redirecting of strands of critical social theory back 
into psychotherapeutic debates. In particular, attention is directed to the contribution of 
Habermas’ and Honneth’s thinking, towards reinvigorating moral/ethical debate.  
 
In what follows the discussion now shifts gear to some extent with a greater emphasis 
on clinical practice based concerns and the relevance of insights drawn from Habermas 
and Honneth at this level of engagement. As indicated my interest is not to elicit 
prescriptive formulae from these theoretical perspectives. Their contribution lies rather 
in offering a depth philosophical anchor for moral/ethical debate in psychotherapy from 
which, amongst other things, further and more specific practice oriented theorizing 
might emerge. My primary concern is to explore in broad terms how Habermas’ and 
Honneth’s thinking might impact on our thinking and theorizing. In this final chapter, I 
begin by drawing together themes relating to the relevance of Habermas’ work, which 
                                                 
2  The work of the American psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin (1988, 1998, [1990]1999) which is heavily 
influenced by critical theory, is a notable exception in this regard. However her work is positioned within 
a specialist discourse most commonly associated with the postmodernist orientation of the American 
relational psychoanalytic tradition. As such it remains somewhat peripheral to mainstream clinical 
debates in psychoanalytic discourse, particularly within the UK context (See Chapter 2 pp. 60-3).     
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includes a short practice based discussion drawing on two case vignettes from the 
author’s clinical practice in a child and family mental health setting.3 This underlines 
the importance of a communicative ethical framework for psychotherapeutic practice. In 
further drawing together the connections between critical theory and psychotherapy the 
theme of reflexivity again emerges as an important bridge for discussion. Additional 
case material will be used to underline the relevance of this concept in the clinical 
setting and make connections with wider themes within social and political theory. As 
in the previous chapters, the key argument underlining this discussion is that the moral 
grammar of the psychotherapeutic encounter can be framed in terms of the intertwined 
struggles for understanding and agreement and for recognition and that we can helpfully 
think of psychotherapeutic practice which is anchored within a communicative ethical 
framework as representing a reflexive resource and potential carrier of communicative 
reason in personal and social contexts.  
 
 
Perspectives from clinical practice 
 
Starting with the hypothesis that communicative ethical theory offers scope for 
reinvigorating psychotherapeutic moral/ethical debate, this study considered the 
difficulties with current debate. These can be traced back to the historically individualist 
normative bias in psychotherapy and its contemporary manifestation in the restrictive 
framework of professional micro ethics. Influential trends which emanate from the 
vigorously relational thrust of current psychoanalytic and systemic psychotherapy and 
which are at odds with this individualistic bias were also explored. The disjuncture 
between these relational developments on the one hand and a peripheral individualistic 
moral/ethical debate on the other has been a key focus. Another important strand of 
discussion has been the influence of postmodernist thinking and the extent to which it 
has failed to move the debate forward. Essentially a modernist, Kantian influenced, 
individualistic moral/ethical framework and a postmodernist influenced general 
theoretical debate operate on parallel tracks in the absence of any mediating discourse. 
The problems that result in clinical practice have been considered in Chapter 7 with 
specific reference to concerns that arise in the practice arena of child and family 
                                                 
3  Both case vignettes have previously been discussed in an article by the author of this study (Donovan, 
2003a) published in the peer reviewed Journal of Family Therapy. Issues of confidentiality and clinical 
relevance have therefore been addressed in this context.  
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psychotherapy.4 An example of a pressing moral/ethical concern from this context 
relates to the extensive use of psychiatric diagnoses and pharmacological treatment in 
child mental health practice. It was argued that psychotherapy’s evident difficulty in 
confronting and engaging with what we might describe as macro ethical issues of this 
nature can be connected to the absence of a conceptual framework in which they might 
be located and which could serve as an anchor for practitioners and theorists in taking a 
stand on matters that concern them. It was also argued that Habermas’ communicative 
ethics could offer this framework and I will now develop this argument further. 
 
In practice settings that continue to be heavily influenced by positivist thinking 
emanating from psychotherapeutic discourse itself, from allied disciplines and from the 
social and institutional context of practice, an engagement with Habermasian theory has 
the very immediate and striking effect of opening up the moral/ethical domain of 
therapeutic engagement by anchoring our thinking about morality and ethics in contexts 
of everyday communication. Introducing the Habermasian frame results in what I have 
described as the remoralization of the therapeutic encounter as a communicative 
endeavour. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this contribution in a context 
where morality and ethics currently inhabit a deeply marginalized and reified space. 
Whilst as discussed previously, the breakdown of claims to truth, normative 
appropriateness and truthfulness underpin most referrals for individual, couple or family 
psychotherapy, these difficulties are rarely thought about in moral/ethical terms and are 
more likely to be approached within an exclusively pragmatic, methodological frame. 
The remoralization of the space inhabited by psychotherapy therefore lies at the heart of 
the contribution of Habermasian theory to psychotherapy and all further influence 
follows on from this. For Habermas, ideas about ethics are fundamentally about the kind 
of conversations we might have in which matters of ethical import can be discussed and 
in which it might be possible to remove constraints to ongoing communication. The 
significance of his work is that it places ethics firmly on the agenda of theoretical debate 
and offers an overarching framework for scientific enquiry and engagement in which 
ethics is firmly anchored. I now consider how we might begin to think about this 
communicative ethical perspective in relation to routine intervention in a child and 
                                                 
4  Chapter 7 pp. 179-85. 
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family mental health setting which adopts the systemic reflecting team therapeutic 
approach, previously discussed in Chapter 3.5  
 
 
Family A 
 
Mrs A, her two and a half year old son and six year old son are seen because of the 
latter’s severe behavioural difficulties at school and at home. She is a single parent and 
there is no contact with the children’s father. The atmosphere in sessions is fast moving 
and chaotic with much quarrelling and competition for mother’s attention. It is a 
situation where there seems to be little space for the complexity and nuances of life to 
be considered. Life is to be survived by just getting by. A traffic accident involving the 
family, which happened between the therapy sessions, is dismissed as of little 
consequence in that nobody was physically harmed. Plans to send the older child to 
boarding school at eight years are mentioned lightly as if he might not understand or 
care about what is being said. The children do not seem to know why their father is 
absent and he is rarely mentioned.  
 
The therapist in the consulting room with the family struggles to contain the situation 
and to create space for thinking. She seeks input from her colleagues observing from 
behind the one way screen. Following a reflecting conversation amongst team members, 
observed by the family, in which the team members talk mostly about their own 
reactions and feelings whilst listening to the family’s earlier conversation with their 
therapist, calm prevails for a time as if something has been contained, as if the family 
has at least momentarily absorbed some of the reflecting qualities of the team.       
 
 
Family B 
 
This family consisting of Ms B, her four-year old daughter and her partner, the child’s 
stepfather are seen because of an acute problem with being unable to sleep which the 
child is experiencing. Ms B in particular has many doubts and worries about the 
therapeutic process and there is a powerful sense of constraint regarding what can and 
cannot be talked about. She is keen to keep the focus on the subject of sleep. At a certain 
                                                 
5  See Chapter 3 pp. 69-71. The context of this work is a family therapy training clinic and the reflecting 
team was comprised of three trainees with a supervisor observing from behind the one way screen. 
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point in this very tense conversation the therapist suggests that the team on the other 
side of the screen might care to join them for a reflecting conversation. Ms B raises an 
objection just as the team are entering the consulting room. She would like the team 
members to make eye contact with her and her family during their conversation this 
time and finds it uncomfortable and unsettling that they have not done so in previous 
sessions.6 
 
The team has little time to gather their thoughts before finding themselves in the room. 
It becomes immediately clear there are differences of view within the team with one 
member feeling that it is not the correct basis on which to proceed with the reflecting 
conversation given Ms B’s unease. This hesitantly evolves into a conversation between 
team members about what to do and their thoughts about the meaning of this issue that 
has arisen. The idea of helping the family to adopt an observer position in the sessions 
and of keeping some conversations within the team, so that members can thus share 
their “thinking in the making” with the family is introduced and explored between team 
members. 
 
 
These practice snapshots that capture fleeting moments in routine psychotherapeutic 
sessions, underline the slow moving, unremarkable qualities of the work. They also 
highlight the way that it is routinely infused with questions of validity, of normative 
appropriateness and therefore of morality and ethics within a Habermasian frame, for 
example, the appropriateness of a particular cultural/class norm of sending young 
children to boarding school in case A, or the appropriateness of particular ways of 
working therapeutically as a reflecting team in case B. Yet such matters are rarely 
conceptualized explicitly in moral/ethical terms in a professional context that most 
commonly prioritizes questions of methodology and technique, and within which 
therapists generally think of themselves as aspiring to a non-judgemental, non-directive 
therapeutic stance. Here the strength of the Habermasian communicative ethical 
framework for psychotherapy is that it brings questions of ethics in from the cold, 
disentangling them from their reified position within professional codes of ethics and 
locating them in contexts of ordinary everyday communication.  
                                                 
6  It is customary for the reflecting team to keep their conversation- their “thinking in the making”- within 
the team and not to interact directly with the family in therapy. This reflecting team conversation is 
subsequently discussed between the family and their therapist.   
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With the A family, the social norm about boarding school was questioned discursively 
in the course of this therapy, by opening up reflecting team discussions that held 
different shades of opinion on this emotionally charged issue. From a Habermasian 
perspective one could say there was considerable constraint on movement between 
different levels of communication in the A family, that is from the day to day level in 
which the appropriateness of this norm seemed entirely taken for granted to one in 
which its validity could be opened up to reflecting processes. The reflecting team 
challenged this distortion in communication. Boarding school was not on the agenda for 
discussion, as Mrs A sometimes jokingly reminded the team. Yet somewhere in her joke 
was recognition that it mattered and recognition that the team believed it mattered. In 
reconstructing the ethical underpinning of discourse, Habermas (1990a) notes the 
requirement that all participants are allowed to take part and to express their attitudes, 
needs and so on. The team and therapist sometimes had the opportunity to act as 
advocates for the six year old in this case, not in the sense of “knowing” definitively 
what was best for him but in the sense of helping to construct the best possible 
conversation in which matters that concerned him could be thought about and in which 
he could be helped to participate at a level that was developmentally appropriate. In this 
case the transition to boarding school continued to come up in reflecting team 
conversations where it seemed to link with material in the sessions and over time the 
therapeutic conversation with the family shifted towards the idea of “being ready or 
unready” for this transition and how this might best be decided and judged. 
 
Much of the work in these cases is essentially about engaging with and patiently 
chipping away at constraints on talking and thinking that are a source of suffering and 
discomfort. In the B family presenting with a child’s sleep problem, the very idea of 
talking and thinking other than in a highly circumscribed way seemed terrifying. Here 
the essence of the reflecting process consisted in putting this into words and daring to 
voice some of the underlying worries that might be impacting on family members 
including the child. What seemed so important was sharing with the family an 
experience of relatively uncircumscribed thinking and talking about the difficulty in 
thinking and talking. In taking a stand to defend the potential for unhindered 
communication between themselves, the team challenged the narrative of constraint 
within the family. They presented a view that some ways of communicating are better 
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than others. Mrs B’s opposition to the reflecting team method set them on a potential 
collision course, which they might have avoided by acquiescing or fuelled by becoming 
prescriptive. Instead the dilemma of how to proceed was reflected upon in the presence 
of the family in a way that highlighted differences between team members and 
uncertainty about how to proceed and offered a model for moving forward through 
debate. Of course the team’s reflections were informed by technical considerations 
about how to conduct a reflecting team conversation, but this example also underlines 
the ethical dilemma that Mrs B’s opposition triggered and which was addressed 
discursively in the work. In essence, a certainty/uncertainty dialectic played itself out, 
insofar as the team was relatively certain about needing the opportunity to explore and 
understand its uncertainty in a discursive exchange. 
  
 
The relevance of Habermas for moral/ethical thinking in psychotherapy 
 
Alongside its traditional intrapsychic interest, contemporary relationally oriented 
psychotherapy is profoundly concerned with what happens between people when they 
try to communicate whether this is within the therapeutic relationship or elsewhere. In 
systemic psychotherapy the intersubjective milieu of family relating becomes a key 
focus. Within this communicative context people routinely discuss, negotiate, sort out 
and compromise about how best to lead their lives. A breakdown in this communicative 
process is often the point where psychotherapy begins or is likely to be a significant 
factor in the background to referral. Kantian based morality anchored in the paradigm of 
the solitary individual appears far removed from the intensity of this interpersonal 
context and not surprisingly an ethical framework formulated in Kantian terms is 
marginalized within the wider discourse of psychotherapy. Situations which present 
themselves in the therapeutic space are most commonly suffused by interpersonal 
struggles for understanding and agreement and it seems reasonable to infer that, what 
we might describe as the underlying moral grammar of this therapeutic encounter may 
be defined in relation to this communicatively formulated struggle. The appeal of 
Habermasian theory is that it strips communication back to the minimal conditions that 
make understanding and agreement possible and, as I have argued, it is here that the 
interest of the critical theorist and the psychotherapist coincide in this space where the 
intricate details of why “good” communication may or may not occur are explored. 
 
217 
The key significance of Habermasian communicative ethics is that it also offers 
relationally oriented psychotherapy practice a moral/ ethical framework that includes 
the regulative ideal of “discourse”, against which actual situations of communication 
might be considered. Given the distance to be navigated between the philosophical 
abstraction of Habermasian theory and the intensely personal, intimate arenas of 
psychotherapeutic practice this claim might seem improbable. Yet arguably the 
presuppositions of discourse as reconstructed within Habermasian theory are essentially 
what psychotherapists adhere to implicitly in their attempts to open up and challenge 
distorted communication processes in routine practice such as that described in the 
above case vignettes. Briefly these assumptions are likely to include the idea that it is 
helpful for the therapeutic conversation to be as inclusive as possible, that it is helpful 
for all participants to be allowed initiate and question assertions and that it is helpful for 
everyone involved to be able to express their attitudes, desires and needs without 
obstruction by external or internal constraint. This common ground between a 
relationally oriented psychotherapeutic practice and the theory of communicative ethics 
is hardly surprising if we consider that the aim of Habermasian theory is to reconstruct 
the implicit normative assumptions that each of us holds as part of our ordinary 
communicative competence. As argued in Chapter 8, psychotherapy at its best could be 
understood as a form of striving towards the communicatively formulated ideal of 
discourse as reconstructed in Habermasian theory, however improbable this ideal might 
be in practice. The issue is that within psychotherapy, this normative ideal, rooted 
within processes of communication, operates silently whilst explicit moral/ethical 
debate remains trapped within the restrictive paradigm of individual consciousness. My 
argument is that lack of theorization of the normative presuppositions of relationally 
oriented psychotherapy compromises and restricts the latter’s critical impact in practice.                 
 
Within a communicative ethical framework our ideas about ethics are reshaped as ideas 
about the kinds of conversations we might have in which matters of ethical concern can 
be raised and debated and the reflecting team approach, used in the case vignettes, is an 
example of current relationally oriented therapy which is remarkably consistent with 
this communicative ethical orientation. However the case I am making goes beyond 
compatibility. I am suggesting that by drawing out the communicative ethical 
underpinning of psychotherapeutic practice and debating it in the literature, we are more 
likely as therapists to maximize its potential including what could be described as its 
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emancipatory potential. We are more likely to have the courage to “take a stand” in our 
work about issues that concern us, whether inside or outside the consulting room, if we 
believe our position can be defended and if we have a framework for offering this 
defence and accepting critique.  
 
Drawing on Habermasian language, I would argue that progress in both of the above 
cases held an emancipatory moment symbolized by a four year old who no longer has 
anxiety related difficulty getting to sleep or a six year old who can think about and talk 
with his mother about things that really matter to him and that are likely to impact 
enormously on the course of his life including the plan to send him to boarding school 
at a young age. These may not register on the revolutionary scale but they draw 
attention to the ethical thrust of psychotherapy and to what we might mean when, in our 
code of ethics we aspire to maximising “the good”. An ethical theory, which guides us 
towards an ethics of communication, also guides us towards an idea of ethics as integral 
to each passing moment of our work rather than something to be visited on special 
occasions. Ideas about maximizing the “good” are reshaped as ideas about maximizing 
opportunities for “good” conversations and the starting point for debate about what 
might constitute a “good” conversation. Within this framework ethics is no longer 
“simply a matter of individual conscience or subjective consciousness but rather a 
concern indissolubly connected with language and communication” (Dallmayr, 1990, p. 
2). The individual thought experiment of the Kantian universalisablity test gives way to 
a “dialogically reformulated universalist ethical theory” (Benhabib, 1990, p. 334).  
 
We have seen that the universalist thrust of Habermasian theory sets it apart from 
hermeneutical, post-structuralist and postmodernist perspectives, fuelling much debate 
as outlined in Part 11. However as was also discussed, Habermas is not simply opposed 
to what these traditions represent and has been influenced by them along the path of his 
own theoretical development not least in recognizing that his initial conception of 
reason as self reflection was too closely tied to solipsistic subjectivity and needed to be 
relocated in contexts of intersubjectivity. The criticism that in reconstructing the 
regulative ideal of discourse, Habermas is essentially drawing on modernist 
assumptions about what might constitute an ideal speech situation is broadly accepted 
within the debate about communicative ethics but defenders of communicative ethical 
theory would argue that the ideal itself retains its universal status even if the question of 
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how it is filled is specific to our place and time in history. In that sense it is more 
appropriate to speak of a post- universalist perspective in which the dualism of 
universalism and relativism is transcended. Benhabib for example, makes a strong case 
for a “historically self-conscious universalism” (ibid., p. 339) and observes that the 
oppositional framing of universalism and historicity within moral philosophy is no 
longer tenable. She distils the Habermasian reconstruction of the universal and 
necessary preconditions of discourse into two key principles, universal moral respect 
and egalitarian reciprocity, with the former referring to the right of all who are capable 
of speech and action to be included in the moral conversation and the second requiring 
that each has symmetrical rights to raise and question assertions and so on, within the 
conversation: “The principles of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity are our 
philosophical clarification of the constituents of the moral point of view from within the 
normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (ibid.). Benhabib also observes that the 
intuitive idea behind universalist ethics is not only of ancient origin but has always been 
closely entwined with the principle of reversibility of perspectives which requires us to 
judge situations from the other’s point of view within a moral community. This theme 
of reversibility of perspectives is as we have seen, also implicit within the 
psychotherapeutic constructs of reflexivity and reflective functioning and I shall return 
to this important common ground between contemporary themes in psychotherapy and 
the idea of a universalist ethics in concluding the study. 
 
It is sometimes observed that even amongst those who distance themselves from the 
universalist or post-universalist stance, there persists a tendency to assign “some sort of 
favoured status to moral appeals which stress equality as well as mutual recognition and 
appreciation of different forms of life” (White, 1988, p. 2). Here the great strength of 
Habermasian theory is that it attempts to provide a systematic elaboration of such 
appeals, to accord them a measure of universal validity and to show that ideas of 
equality and mutual recognition can be articulated in ways that do not have to be 
completely indeterminate. Steuerman (2000) observes that any defence of the particular 
has to involve some idea of the universal and that in the absence of universal values the 
possibility of justifying one’s condemnation of the Holocaust, for example, disappears 
given that its perpetrators could claim it conformed to the values of nazism. However 
whilst thus concluding that a radical relativism is impossible to sustain, she also 
introduces a note of caution, reflecting that the inevitable universalistic dimension of 
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morality is insufficient to justify specific rights: “General laws need to be seen against 
their specific backgrounds, where no answers are given once and for all” (ibid., p. 5).  
 
In her defence of the post- universalist perspective, Nussbaum (2000) also reflects on 
the confusion that arises between tolerance of diversity and relativism, noting that some 
find the latter attractive on the assumption that it indicates respect for different ways of 
life:    
  
 But of course it does no such thing. Most cultures have exhibited considerable 
 intolerance of diversity over the ages, as well as at least some respect for 
 diversity. By making each tradition the last word, we deprive ourselves of any 
 more general norm of toleration or respect that could help us limit the 
 intolerance of cultures. (p. 49) 
We have seen that for Nussbaum, a universalist theory that is framed in terms of general 
human capabilities offers the best framework within which to locate our thoughts about 
difference.7 She argues that certain basic aspirations towards human flourishing are 
recognizable across differences of culture, class and other variables and uses this 
thinking as the basis for an account of general human capabilities for which she claims 
universal status. Within this approach, capability denotes what people are able to do and 
be, “in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of dignity and 
respect” and an idea of the person as an “end”, not a “tool of the ends of others” (ibid., 
p. 5). In her framework she includes capabilities that relate to emotional development, 
forming attachments and showing concern and compassion for other human beings. 
These include what she terms the capability for “affiliation” and which encompasses the 
idea of  “being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for 
other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to 
imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation” (ibid., p. 79).  
 
Nussbaum’s normative philosophical theory undoubtedly speaks very clearly to the 
concerns of the psychotherapist and the psychotherapeutic constructs of reflexivity and 
reflective functioning, which have much in common with her category of “affiliation”, 
fit easily within this perspective on human capabilities. From a psychotherapeutic 
perspective her work implicitly underscores the embryonic nature of our human 
                                                 
7  Chapter 4  p. 100-1. 
221 
disposition towards reflexivity and focuses attention on those conditions in personal and 
social life that may impede its development or alternatively help it to flourish. From a 
psychotherapeutic perspective her use of the expansive language of capability is also 
particularly helpful in that it redresses the imbalance towards cognitive abstraction in 
Habermasian theory and offers an emotionally grounded engagement with the detail of 
our human potential to flourish and realise our capabilities in certain circumstances. In 
that sense her theory, like Honneth’s, could be seen to supplement the lack of 
engagement with subjectivity and personal identity in Habermasian theory. In the 
present context the overriding significance of Nussbaum’s theory resides in her 
emphatic rejection of relativism and her support for a universalist ethical stance.  
 
In the wake of the poststructuralist and postmodernist critique of several decades, the 
challenge now is as Delanty (1999) observes, “no longer a question of attacking false 
universalisms but of overcoming relativism and the fragmentation of the social” (p. 3). 
In the case of psychotherapy we have seen that the influence of what is loosely termed 
postmodernist thinking leads to concerns about a possible relativizing of reality, a 
sliding away from issues of power and abuse of power in family relationships and a 
concern that therapy as a process of “bearing witness” to destructive realities of 
“disrespect” is thereby undermined. The “ethical turn” of postmodernist thinking has 
been considered and whilst aspects of this development not only present a significant 
challenge to Habermasian theory but in general have much to commend them, we have 
also seen that postmodernist influence fails notably to challenge the individualistic bias 
of a privatized, professionalized moral/ ethical debate in psychotherapy. It also fails 
problematically to connect with the psychotherapeutic discourse of method and 
technique. In this context I have argued that Habermasian communicative ethics has 
much to offer psychotherapy on the basis that it shifts the centre of gravity of 
moral/ethical debate away from individual conscience and subjective consciousness and 
anchors it firmly in the mediating paradigm of communication.  
 
The evolving relationship between critical social theory and postmodernism has also 
been considered and the futility of persisting in a view of the modernity/ postmodernity 
divide as representing hostile, oppositional camps has been acknowledged. The 
challenge becomes one of identifying possibilities for the creative combination of both 
perspectives and this is the challenge that is presented to psychotherapy, nowhere more 
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so than in the debate about morality and ethics. We have seen that in the context of an 
oppositional modernist/ postmodernist divide this debate has been allowed to atrophy 
and whilst it is argued that Habermasian thinking on a communicative ethics has much 
to offer, this is put forward not in opposition to the postmodernist perspective but in a 
spirit of searching for an ethical standpoint that might complement, or transcend the 
limitations of current postmodernist thinking in psychotherapy whilst allowing for 
ongoing creative methodological continuity across the modernism/postmodernism 
divide. The idea of a “social postmodernism” associated with the work of Nicholson 
and Seidman (1995) has relevance here in that it advocates a perspective within 
postmodernism that has not closed itself off from “the social” and from a positive 
politics but which searches for new ways of conceptualizing these processes. Reflecting 
on these developments, Delanty (1999) notes that “the problem is no longer relativism 
versus universalism, but is one of expanding the discursive and democratic space” (p. 
113). Against this background I am commending Habermas’ communicative ethics as 
offering a moral/ethical framework in which opportunities for the ongoing 
democratization of the discursive space of psychotherapeutic engagement might be 
explored and radicalized.     
 
 
The relevance of Honneth for moral/ethical thinking in psychotherapy  
 
Writing from the perspective of an allied discipline that of the social work, Hayes and 
Houston (2007) are also of the view that Habermas’ discourse ethics can act as a moral 
yardstick against which actual situations of communication can be judged and they use 
the Family Group Conference as an example of current social work practice where the 
regulative ideal of discourse can helpfully be applied. This type of conference takes 
place when a child is deemed in need of care and protection and includes family 
members, care professionals and other supportive figures. It is convened and facilitated 
by an independent coordinator who, on Hayes and Houston’s account, has a key role in 
promoting and nurturing unrestrained dialogue oriented to reaching understanding and 
agreement on what is in the best interests of the child and in addressing power plays 
within the conference, whether rooted in professional ideologies or intra-familial 
entanglements that might impede this process. In their view the procedural model of 
discourse provides a very useful yardstick in establishing communicative conditions for 
“moral decisionmaking” in this situation:  
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 …what we find is a procedural model that underscores reason, 
 universalization, and democratic sentiments allowing all to participate free 
 from the constraining effects of power. This particular direction is exacting in 
 its demands. It alerts us to the many ways in which communication becomes 
 ridden with strategic influence. (Hayes and Houston, 2007, p. 1003)  
In this study I have made the case for supplementing Habermasian communicative 
ethics with Honneth’s theory of recognition on the basis that Habermas’ orientation is 
overly cognitive and his focus is primarily at the macro social and political levels of 
analysis whereas Honneth engages more directly with issues relating to emotionality 
and personal identity. In so doing, he offers a bridge between Habermas’ 
communicative ethical framework and the intensely personal, emotionally charged 
arenas of psychotherapeutic engagement. Houston (2009) makes a similar argument in 
the case of social work and drawing on case material concludes that an approach to 
moral/ethical deliberation based solely on the Habermasian procedural model has 
significant limitations:  
 
 Evidently, a more fundamental, heartfelt understanding of a person’s identity 
 must exist prior to discourse; moreover, it must carry through to discourse to 
 ground it in everyday suffering. Communicational procedures, which are 
 framed in abstract terms, can be acted out blithely without any real substantive 
 identification with human pain or hurt. (2009, p. 1281-2, his emphasis)  
Whilst the theme of recognition plays an important part in Habermasian theory it is 
conceptualized in abstract terms as embedded in structures of language and 
communication. For Honneth the human struggle for recognition is addressed through 
the dynamic of identity formation in real life contexts and is much more 
comprehensively theorized. In Houston’s view, Honneth’s three limbs of recognition, 
that is the experience of love and emotional support, rights and solidarity offer a 
“prism” through which social workers can become attuned to ethical imperatives in their 
work. This has the effect he believes, of sharpening empathy and can lead to a more 
heartfelt understanding of a person’s identity struggles in the three domains of 
recognition. However he also observes that sensitivity to an individual’s need for 
recognition has to be channelled through a communicative striving for understanding 
and agreement in situations of conflict where social workers are often required to 
intervene. Here Habermas’ discourse ethics offers an anchoring framework for 
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Honneth’s model of recognition and Houston (2009) concludes that combining these 
two perspectives offers a “synergy of ‘heart’ and ‘head’ ” at the level of ethical theory.   
 
Allowing for certain differences between psychotherapy and social work practice, 
Houston’s argument translates easily into the psychotherapeutic context. 
On the whole psychotherapy is less oriented to decision making than social work and 
there is more opportunity for adopting a “meta” position and engaging with the process 
of communication as distinct from the outcome. Within this context there is much 
potential for challenging distorted communication processes which individuals, couples 
and families bring with them to the work and in the case vignettes we saw that the 
reflecting team approach is one strategy employed by psychotherapists to this end. But 
here as in social work, there is a great need for emotionally grounded engagement if we 
are to avoid the pitfall of subsuming discourse ethics into an already existing 
professional framework of sterile moral/ethical rules and codes of practice. Writing 
about the dialogue between Habermasain theory (1990a) and the feminist influenced 
work of Gilligan (1982), White (1988) observes that the communicative ethical 
perspective needs supplementing by accounts of intersubjectivity that are more closely 
tied to an understanding of emotional life and he regards this ethical perspective as 
“crippled” if it proceeds in an emotional vacuum: 
 
            ……..one has to conclude that any attempt to deepen Habermas’s insights into 
what a communicative orientation really entails must draw  heavily upon 
sources such as Gilligan which explore the social side of being human, not in 
terms of language claims and contested norms, but in terms of our character as 
creatures who are constituted by concrete relationships and  the necessity of 
providing long-term attentive care for their young. (p. 85)            
As Benjamin (1998) observes, Habermasian theory provides a “point of entry” into 
intersubjectivity but pays insufficient attention to emotional barriers to communication 
rooted in struggles for recognition, which she conceptualizes drawing on her 
psychoanalytic frame of reference. In Honneth’s work (1995, 2007) he also reignites 
critical theory’s longstanding engagement with psychoanalytic thinking as part of his 
endeavour to offer a psychological grounding for his moral theory of recognition and in 
so doing he goes some considerable way towards addressing the emotional lacuna in 
Habermasian theory.  
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From the perspective of this study Honneth’s moral theory of recognition offers an 
invaluable corrective to the moral relativism that pervades postmodernist influence in 
psychotherapy and which as we have seen is the focus of sharp criticism, notably in the 
work of the systemic theorist Flaskas (2002). In making a case for “family therapy 
beyond postmodernism”, she speaks eloquently of her clients’ search not simply for the 
meaning but for the “truth” of their experiences, for example of sexual abuse and she 
reflects on the centrality of the emotionally charged process of “bearing witness” to the 
reality of people’s lived experience within psychotherapy. Similarly she talks about 
powerful and stubbornly concrete social realties such as poverty and racism which 
impact so powerfully on the life experience of those with whom she works. Within 
Honneth’s recognition theory he offers a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing 
these different strands of disrespect and violations of recognition at the personal, social 
and political levels and in so doing extends and deepens the impact of communicative 
ethics in remoralizing the space in which psychotherapy operates. It is difficult to 
exaggerate this contribution of Honneth’s overarching framework which powerfully 
mediates between the personal on the one hand and social and political domains on the 
other. Within psychotherapy an engagement with patterns of recognition at the 
personal/familial level has traditionally been severed from thinking about the dynamics 
of recognition at more overtly social and political levels. Whilst the latter are then seen 
as outside the sphere of influence of psychotherapy, the former have traditionally been 
addressed within a positivist framework which obscures their moral/ethical/political 
significance whilst privileging questions of methodology and technique.8 Honneth’s 
three fold schema of love, rights and solidarity challenges the reductionist tendency to 
conflate or conversely isolate these interrelated but distinctive arenas of social 
interaction and struggle.   
 
As with moral/ethical debate in general within psychotherapy, the moral challenge of 
“bearing witness” to the various dimensions of disrespect which our clients experience 
has had a troubled history that long precedes postmodernist influence but which is 
compounded by the latter influence. I am arguing that Flaskas’ alternative perspective 
on the therapeutic significance of “bearing witness” to oppressive personal, social and 
political realities in clients’ lives can be linked productively with Honneth’s moral 
                                                 
8  This point was at the heart of the feminist influenced critique of first order family therapy which 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. See Chapter 3 p. 69.      
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theory of recognition. This theory offers an inclusive conceptual framework from which 
we can at least begin to address the chasm between the majority of psychotherapists 
who concentrate on the arena of “personal” difficulties in the clinical setting and a small 
minority who advocate a more overtly “political” role for psychotherapy beyond the 
clinical setting. Whilst this split has its roots in the dated oppositional framing of 
personal and political themes it is sustained by the abstract individualistic normative 
bias of psychotherapy and the lack of a more encompassing moral/ethical framework in 
which the entrenched divide between the individual on the one hand and the social and 
political on the other hand might be challenged.  
 
In this study I am arguing that engagement with the social origins of psychological 
distress needs to be anchored within the intimate and personal arenas of clinical 
practice. It is within this space that we need to begin reformulating and broadening the 
parameters of our moral/ethical and political engagement. We need to start with what is 
already creative in psychotherapy and use this as the foundation for further creative and 
progressive development of our work. The great contribution of Honneth’s inclusive 
multidimensional moral theory is that it implicitly discourages privileging one form of 
disrespect or disadvantage over another and thus guards against either psychological or 
sociological reductionism. On this basis I am arguing that Honneth’s and Habermas’ 
combined theories of recognition and communicative ethics offer psychotherapy a 
powerfully inclusive moral/ethical framework for practice and I will continue to explore 
the implications of this normative orientation for clinical practice based concerns.   
 
 
Psychotherapy as a reflexive resource: a clinical perspective 
 
The psychotherapeutic emphasis on “bearing witness” to the meaning and “truth” of 
various forms of disrespect articulated by Flaskas (2002) is a helpful starting point for 
making connections with Honneth’s theory of recognition and for recognizing that, as 
with the search for understanding and agreement, the closely intertwined struggle for 
recognition is a moral force that permeates the therapeutic encounter. However the 
challenge of integrating this moral perspective into psychotherapy requires rigorous 
linking with the discourse of methodology and technique. We need a 
moral/ethical/political perspective that not only guards against psychological 
reductionism in our work but which conversely embraces its psychological complexity 
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and the methodological challenge that it therefore entails. In Houston’s (2010a) social 
work based analysis he views Honneth’s multidimensional perspective on disrespect as 
offering a platform for an educationally oriented “conscientization” process (Freire, 
1972):  
 
Through conscientization, the dispossessed begin to question their social 
exclusion and lack of social rights…. Social work has a vital role to play here by 
fostering social education, social praxis, empathy, advocacy and changes that are 
directed both within the established system and outside it as well. (Houston, 
2010a, p. 852) 
Unfortunately, when translated into psychotherapeutic contexts the great difficulty with 
this thinking is firstly, the inadequacy or thinness of the conscientization or 
consciousness raising paradigm in relation to the psychologically complex and 
entrenched situations that present in psychotherapy and secondly, the gulf between this 
educational approach and therapeutic methodology. As argued throughout this study we 
need an approach to moral/ethical/political considerations that embraces 
psychotherapy’s rich methodological inheritance and its clinical challenges, not one 
where these are ignored or sidelined and which will simply entrench existing 
dichotomies in the field between those who are clinically motivated versus those who 
are politically motivated.  
 
Returning to Flaskas’ (2002) therapeutic theme of “bearing witness” and the 
connections that can be made with Honneth’s recognition theory, it is reasonably self 
evident what the act of “bearing witness” might mean in a technical sense in the case 
example involving sexual abuse which Flaskas uses in her work. This material depicts 
the therapist actively responding by labelling as “abusive” a situation from childhood 
which her client has just recalled in disturbing detail but stopped short of defining as 
abuse. In this case the conclusion that it was abusive and the therapist’s “bearing 
witness” in naming it as such, appears relatively uncontroversial. However the majority 
of situations within psychotherapy are a great deal less certain, less clear cut and more 
entangled than that described by Flaskas and “bearing witness” within these contexts 
will inevitably rest on more nuanced and uncertain foundations. Here the therapeutic 
focus is likely to centre on fostering a sufficiently reflexive, undistorted dialogue or 
“discourse” where the individual or family together with the psychotherapist can begin 
to step back from the immediacy of their experience and their communication and 
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reflect on its meaning. As proposed earlier this is likely to include, what could be 
described in Habermasian terms as discursive exploration of claims to truth, truthfulness 
or normative appropriateness and which might for example conclude that something is 
indeed abusive as in Flaskas’ example. However, here the therapeutic process of 
“bearing witness” to experiences of disrespect, acknowledging painful struggles for 
recognition and offering emotional support unfolds within a more nuanced, and 
technically challenging therapeutic conversation than is evident from Flaskas’ succinct 
but perhaps overly simplistic case example. In essence we are in the realm of facilitating 
reflexivity and reflexive communication as discussed in the previous chapter. This is 
closely entwined with considerations relating to method and technique that might 
facilitate the development of reflexive capacity in those for whom it is severely 
restricted and for whom the option of standing back from the immediacy of their 
experience to engage in a more reflective and discursive consideration of events and 
feelings is not easily available.  
 
Within psychoanalytic discourse it will be recalled that thinking about reflexivity is 
encapsulated in the model of mentalization and here a correlation is made between 
restricted mentalizing capacity and early experiences of trauma and abuse.9 It is most 
likely that the capacity of these clients to engage in a reflective consideration of the 
meaning of their experiences will be seriously compromised at least in the early stages 
of the work. Here the technical style is likely to be tentative and non interpretative 
initially as the therapist helps foster a therapeutic climate where thinking about ideas 
and feelings can be experienced as safe perhaps for the first time in the client’s life. 
Within the psychoanalytic model of mentalization, the focus is on helping the client to 
gradually learn that mental experience involves representations that can be thought 
about, talked about, loosened up and changed. It is a way of working psychoanalytically 
that has, as I have suggested, a great deal in common with the systemic practitioner’s 
focus on increasing reflexivity in families’ thinking and talking processes for example 
through the use of reflecting teams/reflecting processes which are also designed to 
loosen up fixed or rigid patterns of thinking and communication. In both orientations 
the emphasis is on increasing space for people to adopt an observer perspective in 
relation to themselves, their families and their world. 
 
                                                 
9  Chapter 8  pp. 194-5. 
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We have noted Benhabib’s (1990) observation that the principle of reversibility of 
perspectives which requires us to judge situations from the other’s point of view in a 
moral community has always been integral to the idea of a universalistic ethics. We 
have also noted that at the centre of Habermasian ethical theory is this principle of 
universalization which specifies that in contexts of “discourse” each participant must 
assume the perspective of all others, a principle that echoes Mead’s concept of “ideal 
role- taking”. However as Outhwaite (1994) observes, in the case of the discursive 
redemption of validity claims, “the ability to enter the sphere of discourse presupposes 
certain cognitive capacities (e.g. metacommunication)” (p. 50). Within psychotherapy 
we have also seen that this capacity for metacommunication is framed in terms of 
reflexivity which includes both cognitive and emotional dimensions. The pervasiveness 
of severely restricted capacity for reflexivity in those who attend psychotherapy 
underlines the challenge of drawing on a universalistic ethical perspective in real life 
contexts and I will now use further case material to anchor this discussion of reflexivity 
in clinical practice and underline the challenge that it represents.10 I will then reconnect 
the clinical discussion with the moral/ ethical framework offered by Habermas’ and 
Honneth’s combined theories and will conclude the study by drawing together various 
themes relating to the psychotherapeutic “talking cure” as a reflexive resource that can 
help unleash the genuinely communicative power of talking and listening.             
 
 
Family C 
 
Mr and Mrs C reluctantly attend family therapy sessions with their twelve-year old son 
Adam, an only child. They are firmly of the view that what Adam needs is individual 
therapy for a range of difficulties that concern them. These include facial tics, lack of 
confidence and self- esteem, physical aggression, a deeply negative relationship with 
his father and in addition some reluctance around attending school. My co therapist 
and I also believe that Adam could benefit from individual therapy running parallel to 
family/parental intervention but he has resolutely refused to separate from his mother 
when arrangements have been made for him to have an individual meeting. Multi-
disciplinary discussion of the case has concluded that for now, family therapy is the 
optimum treatment and it is hoped that family meetings interspersed with parental 
meetings might help Adam separate from the acute emotional entanglement in his 
                                                 
10 This case material has previously been discussed in Donovan (2009).  
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parents’ troubled marriage which makes consideration of his own separate needs so 
difficult both within the family and in the therapeutic context. It is a classic family 
therapy case with questions and battles around who is the “identified patient” at the 
heart of the work. It is also typical of many cases encountered by psychotherapists in 
child and adolescent mental health settings and an example of the routine challenges of 
our work in engaging families in a therapeutic conversation within an uneasy 
therapeutic alliance.  
 
In the initial meetings our impression is of a family clinging together in highly 
ambivalent relationships. Mr and Mrs A both express dissatisfaction with the marriage 
and air their thoughts about divorce but seem incapable of making a decision. Marital 
therapy at another clinic fizzled out. Both parents have past histories of mental health 
difficulties including hospitalisation and these histories have the status of secrets in the 
family. They are deeply concerned that their son’s current problems may represent the 
onset of similar mental health issues. A powerful sense of stuckness prevails and I often 
feel relieved when my colleague who is observing my conversations with the family from 
behind the one way screen, joins me for a reflecting conversation in front of the family. 
I experience these as moments when my own thinking is freed and I begin to play with 
thoughts and words in a way that feels very difficult with this family. Sometimes our 
reflecting conversation simply entails putting into words this stuckness and rigidity of 
thinking and talking that we experience and then exploring its possible ingredients. We 
might reflect on our impression that everybody in the family seems very deeply attached 
to their own perspective and is waiting for somebody else to do the changing. We might 
draw out and think about fleeting moments in the session when the seeds of a different 
and less restrictive way of thinking and communicating seemed possible. Much of our 
exchange is as likely to be about the process of conversation as it is about content 
issues.  
 
Often it seems that in our meta-conversations in front of the family, my colleague and I 
are looking for a variety of ways of saying the same things so that they might be heard 
and taken in. In the early sessions it is striking that different aspects of the reflecting 
conversation resonate for different family members and here we find the spontaneous 
free flowing quality of the reflecting process helpful in furthering each family member’s 
engagement with the therapy. Put simply, what seems most important is that we are 
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introducing and constantly reinforcing the value of thinking and talking about the 
family’s thinking and talking. It could be argued that what we are doing is modelling a 
different kind of conversation which has a less restrictive way of dealing with 
differences of perspective; a conversation that places greater emphasis on putting 
feelings into words, on playing with words and ideas and allowing for contradiction, 
mixed feelings and compromise in and through the talking process. In effect all our 
effort are directed towards developing this family’s severely restricted capacity for 
reflexive communication which we hope will create the foundations for further insight-
oriented talking about the specific symptoms, disagreements and worries that have 
brought them to therapy .  
 
 
It is difficult to overstate the gulf between the severely and systematically distorted 
communicative processes represented in the above case and the Habermasian regulative 
ideal of undistorted communication. Furthermore these processes are unfolding in a 
deeply personal and intimate space in contrast to the macro social and political contexts 
that are Habermas’ primary focus. Nonetheless I would argue that within this intimate 
therapeutic space the regulative ideal of undistorted communication centred notably on 
presuppositions of inclusivity, reciprocity, the absence of coercion and the ability to 
move between different levels of communication, as reconstructed in the theory of 
communicative ethics, implicitly permeate our faltering attempts to help this troubled 
family move towards a less restrictive, more reflexive mode of communicating and 
resolving their differences. An explicit theorization of these presuppositions drawing on 
Habermasian communicative ethics can only help secure, consolidate and expand this 
fragile and uncertain therapeutic process.  
 
But this case also depicts the very early stages of supporting the parents in offering their 
son a more appropriate, emotionally containing family context where his developmental 
needs as a twelve year old boy rather than a substitute partner to his mother, can be 
recognized and where he can be helped to consolidate the basic self confidence which 
Honneth (1995), following Winnicottian thinking, describes as a fundamental mode of 
relating to self and the bedrock for our engagement with the outside world. For this 
twelve year old boy the world beyond his immediate family will include his peer group 
and school and it is hoped that therapeutic input will, in the long run, help him to 
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participate more fully and satisfyingly in this external world in ways that might enhance 
his self esteem and loosen the grip of his current destructive, all consuming struggle for 
recognition within his family. Helping him towards accepting the offer of individual 
therapy sessions away from his parents might also represent a symbolic movement 
towards accessing his speaking rights as an independent person and a very small step on 
the road towards adulthood and what we might describe, in line with Honneth’s theory, 
as “autonomous participation in public life” (1995, p. 107). Overall I would argue that 
the threefold schema of love, rights and solidarity offers an invaluable “prism” through 
which we can become ethically and emotionally sensitized to this troubled young 
person’s identity struggles in the three domains of recognition as outlined by Honneth.  
 
Problems that present themselves in psychotherapy are often deeply entrenched at the 
personal level as in the above case and whilst our moral/ethical framework needs to 
guard against psychological reductionism, it also needs to embrace the psychological 
complexity of our work. The great value of Habermas’ and Honneth’s combined 
theories in the psychotherapeutic context is not only their overarching compatibility 
with a therapeutic focus which I have discussed throughout this study but the specific 
ways in which the orientation of these theories can be seen to operate in unison with 
therapeutic method that is honed to address psychological complexity. This is what I 
have endeavoured to illustrate, albeit to a limited extent, in the case material discussed 
in this chapter. Engaging with the minds of other people which the moral principle of 
reversibility of perspectives asks of us may be a presupposition of the universalistic 
ethical perspective but for many, including those who attend psychotherapy, nurturing 
the capability to engage with one’s own mind and that of others may be a life long 
journey. For those who are helped on this journey by psychotherapy there is little doubt 
that it constitutes a “good” outcome; one that is entirely consistent with a 
communicative ethical orientation and with progressive, democratizing developments in 
personal, social and political contexts as defined within this communicative ethical 
framework.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Of course our moral and political world is more characterized by struggles onto 
death among moral opponents than by a conversation among them. This 
admission reveals the fragility of the moral point of view in a world of power 
and violence but this is not an admission of irrelevance. (Benhabib, 1990, p. 
340) 
At the heart of this study lies the argument that the psychotherapeutic “talking cure” can 
contribute to progressive, democratizing change in personal, social and political spheres 
and whilst this contribution may be very modest in scale particularly at the latter levels, 
this is not, to borrow Benhabib’s words, “an admission of irrelevance”. On the contrary 
what is underlined is the need for fresh impetus and renewal of a debate that has become 
hopelessly mired in the conceptually impoverished framework of professional micro 
ethics, whilst eschewing engagement with the macro level of moral/ethical and political 
theory and debate. Ethical concerns and dilemmas that confront clinicians are addressed 
within overarching quasi legal moral codes, whose legitimacy is accepted uncritically 
without clarity or even interest regarding the underlying conception of morality from 
which such codes derive. Not surprisingly this reified micro ethical debate is then 
consigned to a peripheral status within the wider discourse.  
 
In asserting that psychotherapy can contribute to progressive change at the personal and 
social levels our starting point needs to be a rigorous engagement with the normative 
orientation of our work and a critical evaluation of what progressive change might mean 
in this context. Evaluating what constitutes a “good” outcome in psychotherapy is 
intricately linked with wider, macro level evaluations of what constitutes good and right 
living. Inevitably this leads us into the territory of moral, social and political theory 
notwithstanding positivist inclinations to steer clear of such considerations and 
concentrate exclusively on matters relating to therapeutic methodology and technique. 
In this study I have explored the limitations of current professional ethical debate in 
psychotherapy as well as the inadequacy of the postmodernist response. I have argued 
that the Habermasian communicative ethical framework, including his regulative ideal 
of undistorted communication, complements and expands existing progressive and 
democratizing trends within psychotherapeutic discourse and in so doing offers a very 
promising foundation for reinvigorating moral/ethical debate. 
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Few places offer a better vantage point than that offered by the psychotherapeutic 
session, from which to observe in minute detail the persistence but also the fragility of 
the moral point of view when framed in communicative terms as in the above quotation 
from Benhabib’s work. Within the ebb and flow of psychotherapeutic intervention it is 
often that case that what unfolds comes closer to, what Benhabib terms, “struggles onto 
death” as opposed to “conversation”. The therapeutic process itself may break down 
acrimoniously and perhaps also the relationships that were its focus. In extreme cases 
other agencies may be summoned to ensure personal safety notably in situations of 
domestic violence, suicidal ideation or suspected child abuse and neglect. Such 
developments do not necessarily signal the end of the therapeutic conversation however 
but rather the opportunity for realignment of power and speaking rights which may offer 
a fairer and more solid foundation for therapeutic conversation to reconvene and which 
may include some or all of the previous participants. Within this reconvened 
conversation the challenging endeavour of communicatively reshaping “struggles onto 
death” into struggles for understanding agreement and recognition can then resume. I 
am arguing that the latter constitute the moral “force” at the heart of the 
psychotherapeutic encounter and have drawn extensively on the critical theories of 
Habermas and Honneth as a theoretical framework for this discussion.  
 
The theme of reflexivity has been central to the discussion not least as an important 
bridge between the discourses of psychotherapy and critical social theory but also as a 
theoretical construct that embraces the profound therapeutic challenge of helping those 
for whom thinking and communicating are severely limited and distorted by internal or 
external constraints and deprivations. In essence the challenge of promoting reflexivity 
within the psychotherapeutic process centres on facilitating less rigid, less concrete and 
constricted thinking and talking processes including the capacity to move between 
different levels of meaning and communication. Here I have underlined the connection 
with Habermas’ idea of the speaker’s competence to move between communicative 
action and discourse. Put simply much of our work aspires to modes of thinking and 
communicating that encompass discursive principles of fairness, inclusivity and non 
coercion and within which those struggles for understanding, agreement and recognition 
that infuse the psychotherapeutic process can be opened up to relatively unbiased and 
undistorted consideration. Should this sound overly idealistic, the case material upon 
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which I have drawn in the final chapter serves as a reminder of the painstaking and 
modest aims of the “talking cure” in action. Nonetheless I would argue that this case 
material also reveals the implicit yet potent influence of a normative ideal of undistorted 
communication that permeates routine psychotherapeutic interventions and which can 
be linked productively and creatively with Habermas’ communicative ethical theory.  
 
We have seen that a problematic issue relating to Habermasian theory is that it 
presupposes certain cognitive and emotional capacities as a basis for engaging in 
“discourse”, including those capacities that relate to the principle of universalization. 
This principle specifies that in contexts of “discourse” each participant must assume the 
perspective of all others, a principle that echoes Mead’s ([1934]1974) concept of “ideal 
role- taking”. In this study I have argued that the cognitive and emotional capacities 
required for participation in discourse may helpfully be framed in terms of the 
psychotherapeutic constructs of reflexivity or reflective functioning. However the 
pervasiveness of severely restricted reflexive capacity in those who seek psychotherapy 
also underlines the challenge of drawing on a universalistic ethical perspective in real 
life contexts. Whilst engaging with the minds of other people, which the moral principle 
of reversibility of perspectives requires of us, may be a presupposition of the 
universalistic ethical perspective, for many who attend psychotherapy, generating the 
capacity to engage with their own and other peoples’ minds is likely to encompass a 
long and painful journey out of narcissistic withdrawal or other related difficulties. Here 
I would argue that psychotherapy can helpfully draw on the language of “human 
capability” reflected notably in Nussbaum’s (2000) normative philosophical approach, 
as a basis for thinking about the construct of reflexivity within a moral/ethical 
framework.  
 
The value of Nussbaum’s work, as with Honneth’s recognition theory, is that it 
redresses the imbalance towards cognitive philosophical abstraction in Habermasian 
theory. Thinking about reflexivity within a universalist framework that privileges 
capability or human potential underscores the embryonic nature of this disposition and 
focuses attention on conditions in personal and social life that may impede its 
development or alternatively help it to flourish. The challenge of theorizing about these 
conditions is integral to the psychotherapeutic objective of enhancing reflexivity and 
this objective clearly fits most comfortably with normative philosophical approaches 
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where the theorization of such issues is also prioritized, as in Nussbaum’s work. This 
emphasis is similarly evident in Honneth’s recognition theory which as we have seen 
goes some considerable way towards addressing the limitations of Habermasian theory 
and which offers an invaluable bridge for dialogue between psychotherapy and critical 
social theory. I have argued that the contemporary psychotherapeutic constructs of 
reflexivity/reflective functioning which straddle both cognitive and emotional 
dimensions can be encompassed within but paradoxically also expand Honneth’s 
thinking about “basic self-confidence” as a primary mode of relating to self. In 
Honneth’s schema this thinking is rooted in earlier object relations theory that largely 
privileges a discourse of emotionality over that of cognition. For Honneth basic self-
confidence as a mode of relating to self is seen as the bedrock for our capacity to access 
our speaking rights and participate in contexts of discourse. From a psychotherapeutic 
perspective I am suggesting that we can think of the capacity for reflexivity/reflective 
functioning as a mode of relating to self and others, encompassing both cognitive and 
emotional dimensions, which serves a comparable function.  
 
The focus within relationally oriented psychotherapy on expanding restrictive reflexive 
capacity brings us to the heart of the potential psychotherapeutic contribution to 
progressive personal and social change as defined in communicative ethical terms. 
Borrowing from the language of social theory, I am arguing that in this reflexive 
therapeutic endeavour, “a space of freedom is opened up” (Kögler, 1999, p. 270) or 
potentially opened up. At its best the therapeutic session expands into a reflexively 
constituted space where we are helped to engage more openly, creatively and playfully 
with our own thinking and talking and that of others and where the moral point of view 
as a communicatively constituted process of reversing perspectives and placing oneself 
in the shoes of the other can slowly begin to emerge. We have seen that the charge of 
psychological reductionism and of promoting individualizing tendencies is one that has 
bedevilled psychotherapy over the years and I am arguing that this is not so much a 
reflection of any inherent weakness in the psychotherapeutic process as of the latter’s 
traditional individualistic normative bias. The mediating paradigm of communicative 
ethics offers scope for transcending this bias and reinforcing already existing relational 
currents in contemporary theory and practice.  
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Writing about psychoanalytic therapy, Frosh (1999) asserts that it is capable of offering 
insights and experiences that are “congruent with, and can contribute to, progressive 
political changes,” on the basis that psychoanalysis represents “an agency of criticism 
even when it restricts itself to the personal concerns of individuals because at the heart 
of these concerns is a social process” (p. 244, his emphasis). Nowhere is this idea of the 
social at the heart of the personal more evident within psychotherapy than in current 
thinking about reflexivity or reflective functioning. In the latter case we have seen that 
psychoanalytic thinking on the capacity for reflective functioning and its acquisition is 
deeply anchored in the framework of primary relationships. Its difference from insight, 
self reflection or introspection is also strongly upheld, with Holmes (2005) for example 
emphasizing that it represents a “meta- cognitive phenomenon”. Difficulties in this area 
point to what can be described as structural deficits in the thinking apparatus and the 
overarching psychotherapeutic focus is defined in terms of the recovery and 
development of reflexive capacity, or “capability”, if we adopt Nussbaum’s 
terminology. This can pave the way for a more traditional insight oriented therapeutic 
approach but the underlying intersubjective framing of this reflexive endeavour is very 
clear as is its distinctiveness from processes of personal introspection. In essence the 
focus is more about helping people learn how to think within the context of the 
therapeutic relationship rather than what to think about. Thus whilst the widespread 
expansion of psychotherapy and counselling services and literature has been greeted 
with dismay by some social theorists (Bauman, 2003; Lasch, 1978, 1984) who perceive 
it as evidence of current individualizing tendencies, this differentiation between 
reflexivity and personal introspection provides a useful basis for questioning this 
critique. It underlines that far from promoting any exclusive narcissistic retreat, 
contemporary psychotherapy is profoundly implicated in developments that also 
challenge the narcissistic psychic structure and which nurture a reflexive capacity to 
engage creatively and empathically with the minds and the emotions of others. We have 
seen that the principle of reversibility of perspectives lies at the heart of the 
universalistic ethical perspective and I am arguing that it is also closely entwined with 
contemporary relationally oriented trends in psychotherapy.  
 
Contrary to negative social theoretical perspectives on the rise of psychotherapy, we 
noted that Giddens (1991, 1992) reaches a strikingly different conclusion and in 
drawing this study to a close I will refer to his thinking as a framework for bringing 
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together significant themes from earlier discussion. Whilst not denying that therapy can 
be seen to promote or reinforce narcissistic tendencies, Giddens is adamant that it is 
much more than this. He argues that it holds considerable potential to enhance the 
democratization of personal life and he is especially interested in the reflexivity of the 
therapeutic process:         
   
 Therapy is not just an adjustment device. As an expression of generalized 
 reflexivity it exhibits in full the dislocations and uncertainties to which 
 modernity gives rise. At the same time it, participates in that mixture of 
 opportunity and risk characteristic of the late modern order. It can promise 
 dependence and passivity; yet it can also permit engagement and 
 reappropriation. (1991, p. 180) 
In Giddens’s view there are significant areas of appropriation of new possibilities that 
flow from the increased reflexivity of social life and he views psychotherapy as a 
reflexive resource that is positively implicated in these democratizing trends. We have 
seen that Giddens uses the example of key changes in personal and family life centred 
on what he calls “the pure relationship” to illustrate his general argument. In his view 
the “pure relationship” is prototypical of developments that signal the “transformation 
of intimacy” in the sense of a growing democratization of this sphere. Trust is integral 
to the pure relationship and is mobilized by elements within the relationship that are 
anchored in mutual disclosure as distinct from criteria outside the relationship. Integrity 
is something that each partner presumes of the other and is integral to the ethical 
framework of the relationship. Underpinning this mode of relating is an ongoing process 
of reflexive monitoring by the partners which intersects with wider contexts of 
reflexivity. The expansion of therapy services is closely linked to the emergence of the 
pure relationship since this mode of relating puts considerable pressure on the integrity 
of the self and on the requirement not only to understand oneself but to present oneself 
authentically within the communicative framework of the relationship.   
 
Whilst Bauman draws the sweeping conclusion that the pure relationship “is a de-
ethicized intimacy” (1993, p. 106), this view diverges sharply from Giddens’ own 
conclusion. He regards the transformation of intimacy personified in this mode of 
relating as closely entwined with processes of democratization at the personal level. For 
Giddens, “democracy means discussion, the chance for the ‘force of the better 
argument’ to count as against other means of determining decisions” and in the context 
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of the pure relationship he speaks of the imperative of free and open communication as 
the sine qua non of this relationship (1992, p. 186). As we have seen it is not surprising 
that connections are thus made between Habermasian ethical theory and Giddens’ work, 
with Outhwaite (1998), for example, observing that what Habermas offers is a 
philosophy for a world of the type described by Giddens - as having become reflexive. 
The pure relationship represents a contemporary form of relating in which the 
communicative processes between those involved take precedence over external or 
abstract criteria such as duty or obligation. In this study I have argued that far from 
being a “de-ethicized intimacy” the pure relationship could be seen as intimacy in 
search of an ethical standpoint anchored within a communicative ethical framework. 
What Giddens’ work implicitly underlines is the need for an ethical understanding that 
is firmly anchored in communicative processes given the centrality of communication to 
the contemporary transformations of personal life which his analysis so vividly 
captures.        
 
We have seen that Giddens (1991) is also acutely aware that the therapeutic endeavour 
unfolds against a background of significant moral impoverishment that characterizes the 
contemporary world of “late modernity”. He notes the burden and pressure which 
results in the sphere of pure relationships as an arena that potentially offers “a morally 
rewarding milieu for individual life development” (p. 169). But he resists the conclusion 
that the latter can only be understood in terms of a defensive retreat into personal life 
and instead argues that there is much evidence of ongoing creative engagement with the 
outer social world. He uses the example of the reflexive reorganisation of family life 
and relationships in the aftermath of divorce to illustrate this point. However despite 
these outward looking, creative, relationally oriented developments he accepts that 
personal meaninglessness and moral impoverishment is a fundamental issue in late 
modernity. Furthermore an implication of this morally impoverished climate in which 
psychotherapy operates is the tendency to emphasize the values of control and mastery 
and to formulate the reflexive project of self primarily in terms of self determination. As 
argued throughout this study the problems of psychological reductionism, 
individualisation, social conformism and so on are not intrinsic to psychotherapy per se 
but to the reductionism and individualistic bias of the normative framework by which it 
is underpinned. Whilst he does not spell this out and his perspective on 
psychotherapeutic discourse is that of an observer, Giddens’ social theoretical analysis 
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implicitly points towards the relevance of an alternative communicative formulation of 
moral/ethical themes as a response to the widespread moral impoverishment which his 
analysis describes.  
 
Adopting Giddens’ positive perspective on the potential for psychotherapy to contribute 
to progressive change, we may conclude, contrary to Bauman’s view, that widespread 
expansion of psychotherapy services is a welcome development which facilitates 
enhanced access for those in need of help. Significantly this expansion has been 
accompanied by a radical opening up of the therapy field that includes the proliferation 
of therapeutic modalities and which greatly increases the choices available to potential 
clients. Two examples of this development have been highlighted here. Firstly the 
emergence of systemic psychotherapy in a clinical world that was still in thrall to 
classical psychoanalysis and which offered a much needed therapeutic service to 
families and individuals who were unlikely to be engaged or helped by a classical 
insight oriented interpretative approach. Over the decades systemic psychotherapy has 
constructed an impressive repertoire of alternative styles of practice for engaging and 
helping people develop a reflexive capacity to stand back from their presenting 
difficulties as part of the change process. The reflecting team approach has received 
particular attention in this study as an example of this style of therapeutic engagement. 
Contemporary psychoanalysis demonstrates a similar preoccupation with exploring 
ways of engaging and working with those not readily responsive to a traditional 
interpretative approach. Fonagy and Target’s model of mentalization or reflective 
functioning which has been explored here is a good example of this endeavour to 
broaden the repertoire of psychoanalytic practice and to help client groups with deep 
seated psychological difficulties that might previously have been deemed unsuitable for 
psychoanalysis. These developments challenge any dismissal of psychotherapy as a 
mere indulgence of those who are already privileged and point to the quiet 
democratization of the therapeutic field as a result of which more people with more 
severe levels of difficulty have increased opportunity to access appropriate help.  
 
Another aspect of this democratizing trend is the reflexive opening up of the therapeutic 
process itself which is clearly demonstrated in the development of the reflecting team 
approach for example. With this development the role of the systemic therapist is no 
longer defined in terms of any privileged access to definitions of change. Gone are the 
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old style certainties of an earlier era which adopted a predominant natural science 
paradigm for the therapeutic process and within which it was not uncommon to view 
change as that which happened when the therapist intervened independently of the 
awareness of the participants about how they were behaving. In its place comes much 
greater emphasis on “joining” with the client/ family in conversations that are seen to 
have an indeterminate outcome. When those who initiated these radical developments in 
therapeutic practice looked for a conceptual framework in which to locate and develop 
their thinking it is perhaps not surprising that they turned to hermeneutics and 
postmodernism for inspiration. Undoubtedly the latter theoretical traditions offered 
much needed impetus for the elaboration of what were ground breaking therapeutic 
developments, but as discussed at length in this study, hermeneutical, post-structuralist 
and postmodernist influence within psychotherapy also came with very significant 
difficulties attached.  
 
I have criticized the tendency within therapeutic approaches influenced by hermeneutic 
and postmodernist thinking to idealize the therapeutic relationship as a “co-constructed” 
entity. I have also criticized the assumption within these approaches that structural 
inequalities and power differentials between therapist and client might simply be cast 
aside by adopting an “uncertain” style of conversation and so on, in the absence of 
substantive engagement with issues of power within the therapeutic relationship and in 
the absence of substantive consideration of the normative orientation of therapeutic 
practice.  I have also argued for the need to disentangle contemporary engagement with 
reflexivity from its unhelpful fusion with the postmodernist stance, or more accurately a 
psychotherapeutic postmodernist stance delineated in opposition to earlier modernist 
“hierarchical” approaches.  
 
Habermas’ communicative ethics offers a helpful theoretical context for expanding our 
thinking about this key construct of reflexivity from a moral/ethical perspective and 
crucially as we have seen, does not require us to divorce our thinking from the discourse 
of methodology and technique and therefore from engagement with questions of 
therapeutic expertise. In the case of the Habermas/Foucault encounter it was observed 
that at the heart of Habermas’ critique of Foucault is the conviction that the game of 
normativity is most helpfully played in the light of day and this same critique might 
equally be applied to post-structuralist and postmodernist influenced therapeutic 
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orientations. In the absence of rigorous debate and engagement with the normative 
foundations of psychotherapy it is difficult to imagine that key progressive, 
democratizing developments, which I have underlined in this study, can realize their full 
potential given the challenging social context in which psychotherapy currently 
operates. This context includes an entrenched positivist ethos within certain strands of 
the discourse which in turn connects with powerful vested interests both inside and 
outside the field that promote a heavily truncated version of psychotherapy with 
objectives that are defined primarily in terms of symptom relief and circumscribed 
behavioural change. In this process, whether it is fuelled by ideology, monetary reasons 
or other criteria, there is a real danger that the richness of the “talking cure” as depicted 
throughout this study both in its systemic and psychoanalytic formulations is suppressed 
or simply preserved for privileged groups who can afford it.  
 
In Giddens’ work, we have seen that he defines democracy in dialogical terms. He also 
identifies a number of domains of life which represent dialogic space for the extension 
of democracy and which, as Delanty points out, brings his thinking very close to 
Habermasian discourse theory (1999, p. 169). These domains include personal life, the 
dynamic of social movements, the organizational sphere and the global sphere. This 
study began with the premise that any satisfactory engagement with moral/ethical and 
political themes in psychotherapy needs to focus on the personal space of 
psychotherapeutic intervention as its starting point. It is within this space that we need 
to begin the task of reformulating and broadening the parameters of moral/ethical and 
political debate in psychotherapy. We need to begin with what is creative and 
progressive in psychotherapy as it is currently practiced and use this as the basis for 
further development. Honneth’s theory of recognition gives invaluable direction for 
how this might be embraced. By offering a comprehensive framework for 
conceptualizing different strands of disrespect and violations of recognition at the 
personal, social and political levels, his contribution extends and deepens the impact of 
communicative ethics in remoralizing the space in which psychotherapy operates.  
Honneth’s overarching framework powerfully mediates between the personal on the one 
hand and social and political domains on the other. His three fold schema of love, rights 
and solidarity challenges any reductionist tendency to conflate or isolate these 
interrelated but distinctive arenas of social interaction and struggle. I have argued, in 
line with Houston’s (2009) social work perspective, that Honneth’s framework serves as 
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a “prism” through which psychotherapists can become more sensitized to identity 
struggles in the three domains of recognition which are identified. How 
psychotherapists address this in their work is a subject for both moral/ethical debate and 
methodological consideration.   
 
Giddens (1991) observes that we live in a world that is not only witnessing considerable 
transformation within the personal sphere but that similar processes are to some extent 
evident within the social and political spheres and which are closely interconnected. For 
him these changes include the emergence of “life politics”, the politics of a reflexively 
constituted world focussed on life choices relating to personal identity. In essence we 
might describe this as the politics of a world that psychotherapy routinely inhabits. It is 
also arguable that past suppression of this aspect of political debate is an important 
dimension of the oppositional relationship between personal and political themes and 
concerns that has persisted within psychotherapy. Even if psychotherapists continue to 
remain within the intimate space of the consulting room rather than venturing out into 
more overtly political spheres it seems likely that political themes and debate will 
coalesce more explicitly around concerns that are often the focus of psychotherapy. This 
is already evident in the politicisation of issues relating to sexual abuse and related 
forms of disrespect, as awareness grows of widespread organisational collusion with 
this very personal tragedy which so often finds its first voice in the intimate space of the 
psychotherapeutic session. Delanty (1999, p. 57) observes that we live in a world that 
seeks to give more place to feelings, emotions and desires and which has inspired many 
social movements. There seems little doubt that psychotherapy is an integral part of this 
changing social environment. However the extent to which it can become a significant 
democratizing force in the unfolding of these developments remains to be seen. How 
psychotherapists address this challenge in their work is a subject for both moral/ethical 
debate and for methodological consideration.    
 
In Giddens’ work he does not see “life politics” usurping the place of “emancipatory 
politics” as articulated for example in Habermasian discourse theory. On the contrary 
the less there is suppression of themes and concerns relating to “life politics” the more 
we encounter “moral disagreements” relating to these existential concerns and the need 
for these to be reconciled. In her rich engagement with communicative ethics, Benhabib 
(1990) believes that notwithstanding its various flaws, the model of a universalist moral 
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dialogue envisaged by Habermasian discourse theory can serve as a defensible version 
of “the moral point of view”:  
 
 .…the less we view such discourses along the model of public fora or courts 
 of appeal, and the more we understand them as the continuation of ordinary 
 moral conversations in which we seek to come to terms with and appreciate 
 the others point of view, the less do we submit to the distorting lens of 
 procedural universalism. To argue that the counterfactual ideals of reciprocity, 
 equality and the “gentle force of reason” are implicit in the very structures of 
 communicative action, is to argue that the “moral point of view” articulates 
 more precisely those implicit structures of speech and action within 
 which human life unfolds. Each time we say to a child, “But what if other kids 
 pushed you into the sand, how would you feel then? and each time we say to a 
 mate, or to a relative “But let me see if I understand your point correctly,” we 
 are engaging in moral conversation of justification. And if I am correct that it 
 is the process of such dialogue, conversation, and mutual understanding, and 
 not consensus which is our goal, discourse ethics can represent the moral point 
 of view without having to invoke the fiction of homo economicus or homo 
 politicus.” (1990, p. 358, her emphasis)                          
This nuanced defence of discourse theory encompasses the spirit of qualified 
engagement with Habermasian thinking that I have endeavoured to present throughout 
this study. We have seen that for Habermas, discourses are “islands” in the sea of 
communicative practice. Drawing on this analogy we might think of significant 
discursive moments in the therapeutic encounter as islands of heightened reflexivity in 
the ebb and flow of ordinary conversations both within and beyond the consulting room, 
in which the full communicative power of language is unleashed. I have presented the 
communicative ethical perspective not as a model for therapeutic practice but as a way 
of thinking about morality and ethics in practice. Thinking about these themes is not an 
alternative to thinking about emotionality, methodology and technique and I have 
underlined the extent to which these dimensions are intricately linked in psychotherapy. 
It is unlikely that we would ever draw very precise prescriptions for therapeutic practice 
from Habermas’ highly abstract moral theory which is deeply rooted in philosophical 
discourse. On the contrary it is only through integrating this thinking into our 
therapeutic debates that we will get a realistic sense of how it might reshape our work 
and how it might contribute to further more radical democratization of the therapeutic 
process and of the domains in which psychotherapy operates. For Habermas the neglect 
of morality and ethics inevitably leads to the neglect of human aspirations. My hope is 
that I have been able to demonstrate what a communicative ethical framework has to 
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offer psychotherapy in guarding against such neglect and serving as a touchstone for 
further debate and progressive development of our work. 
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